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My thesis argues that Gabriele d’Annunzio and Thomas Mann both conceive of artistic 
creation as a process which is influenced by their interpretations of Nietzsche’s notion of the 
Dionysian, and that striking affinities characterise their respective literary portrayals of the 
relationship between the artist and (a version of) the Dionysian. D’Annunzio and Mann, who 
were contemporaries, are rarely considered together, and it is widely assumed that there is 
little common ground between them. This thesis will demonstrate that their creative and 
critical engagement with Nietzsche, especially his idea of the Dionysian, offers a productive 
way of comparing the two writers and illuminating hitherto overlooked parallels between 
their understandings of creativity. The relationship between the artist and the Dionysian will 
constitute the main point of comparison. For both d’Annunzio and Mann, the Dionysian 
appears as a drive that can promote creativity, through encouraging liberation from repression 
and the rediscovery of primordial energies, but also destruction, by threatening self-
dissolution, chaos and annihilation. The Dionysian will be seen to offer a highly precarious 
form of creativity. The artist’s success, and even survival, will depend upon his ability to 
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List of Abbreviations 
References to Nietzsche’s writings are to the texts as they appear in the electronic version 
published in the Nietzsche Source collection (http://www.nietzschesource.org/eKGWB), 
edited by Paolo d’Iorio. 
Citations are identified by abbreviations of the titles of the works in which they appear, 
followed by Arabic numerals referring to the relevant sections or paragraphs. Where 
necessary, Roman numerals are used to identify the parts of the works in which they are 
located. This form of citation should enable the reader to find the passages cited in German or 
English editions of Nietzsche’s works. Nietzsche’s letters are identified by the abbreviation 
BVN (‘Briefe von Nietzsche’), followed by the year in which the letter was written, which is 
followed by the number given to the particular letter in question by d’Iorio. Nietzsche’s notes 
are identified by the abbreviation NF (‘Nachgelassene Fragmente’), followed by the year in 
which the note was written, which is followed by the number given to the note by d’Iorio. 
BVN Briefe von Nietzsche (letters from Nietzsche). 
DS David Strauss, 1873. 
EH Ecce homo, 1888. 
FW Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science): Books I-IV, 1882; 2nd edn 
incorporating Book V and new Preface, 1887. 
GD Götzen-Dämmerung (Twilight of the Idols) 1888. 
GM Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morality) 1887. 
GT Die Geburt der Tragödie (The Birth of Tragedy) 1872. 
JGB Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil) 1886. 
M Morgenröthe (Dawn) 1881. 
MA  Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (Human, All Too Human): I, 1878. II/1 – 
Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche (Assorted Opinions and Maxims), 1879; II/2 – 
Der Wanderer und sein Schatten (The Wanderer and his Shadow), 1880. New edition 
of MA (I and II), 1886. 
NF Nachgelassene Fragmente (Notes and Fragments). 
Za Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus spake Zarathustra): Parts I-II, 1883; Part III, 1884; 
Part IV, 1885. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
It is widely assumed that there is little common ground between the near-contemporaries 
Gabriele d’Annunzio (1863-1938) and Thomas Mann (1875-1955). While the former is most 
commonly regarded as an aesthete or decadent, as well as a warrior-poet, the latter is 
generally seen as a writer of highly psychological and intellectual works; and while the 
biography of the former contains many wild and bohemian episodes – such as dodging 
creditors, participating in air-raids, and, famously, much womanising –, the latter pursued a 
seemingly more conventional way of life, settling down with a wife and family (at least until 
1933, when the Manns were forced to relocate to avoid National Socialist persecution).  
Perhaps because of these apparent differences, very few studies have directly compared 
d’Annunzio and Mann: no book-length comparison pre-exists this thesis, and the few (fairly 
brief) articles which do compare the two writers tend merely to highlight affinities and 
similarities between specific texts, often in rather general terms. Such affinities are largely 
noted without any suggestion of influence or interaction between the two writers; only 
Santoli (1971), Riccobono (2006) and Galvan (2007) go as far as suggesting that Mann’s 
encounter with d’Annunzio’s works may have impacted upon his own literature. Santoli’s 
brief study highlights themes common to the two writers (such as beauty, Schopenhauer and 
Wagner), and suggests that Mann inherited the technique of incorporating ‘ausgedehnte 
Umschreibungen und Interpretationen von Werken des großen sächsischen Meisters und 
andere Musiker’1 (1971, p. 196) into his narratives. Santoli does not pursue this theory, 
however, and offers very little by way of evidence. He also points out that the technique had 
not been unique to d’Annunzio. Riccobono posits Mann’s Tristan (1903) as a parody of 
                                                          
1
 ‘extensive descriptions and interpretations of the works of the great Saxon maestro [Wagner] and other 
musicians’. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated. 
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d’Annunzio’s Le vergini delle rocce (The Virgins of the Rocks, 1895), and Galvan claims that 
Mann’s exposure to d’Annunzio’s fame (during visits to Italy) may have left ‘Spuren’ 
(‘traces’ [2007, p. 262]) in Mann’s literature. While Riccobono fails to offer a thoroughly 
convincing argument (largely relying on tenuous links such as the use of similar names in 
both texts), Galvan’s consideration of Il fuoco (The Flame, 1900) and Der Tod in Venedig 
(Death in Venice, 1912) highlights striking and intriguing affinities, particularly regarding the 
shared dual focus of each text, namely ‘Liebespassion’ (‘passionate love’) and ‘ästhetische 
Produktion’2 (p. 264). These shared pivotal threads will be discussed throughout this thesis. 
Even among the articles that discuss d’Annunzio and Mann together, parallels that are 
drawn are often fairly superficial. Schoffman, for example, finds that, ultimately, 
‘fundamental [differences]’ (1993, p. 514) divide the two writers, despite their common 
interest in Venice and Wagner. What is perhaps overlooked, though, by some of the scant 
existing comparisons of d’Annunzio and Mann, is the ambivalence and ambiguity of both 
writers: neither is entirely dogmatic in his aesthetic, political and social views, and both 
undergo shifts in their artistic values and practices. Schoffman is arguably guilty of this when 
he summarises the substantial differences that he finds between the two writers: 
Mann’s characters are bourgeois; d’Annunzio’s are bohemians. Mann’s artists are sickly and 
isolated from society; d’Annunzio’s are supermen. […] D’Annunzio relishes decadence; Mann 
confronts the problem of decadence. D’Annunzio celebrates the sensuous life; Mann ponders the 
human condition. (p. 514) 
While rapturous depictions of sensuality, for example, are mainly d’Annunzio’s terrain, 
reflections on sensuality are certainly to be found in Mann’s literature, as this thesis will 
show. Equally, while d’Annunzio may portray ‘decadence’ more often than Mann, Mann 
                                                          
2
 ‘aesthetic production’. 
3 
 
himself noted the ambiguity of his feelings regarding this cultural phenomenon, and portrays 
it frequently with fascinated disapproval. 
This thesis will argue that d’Annunzio and Mann lie closer together than has hitherto 
been maintained, based on an analysis of selected texts. The central point of comparison will 
be the two writers’ shared engagement with (Nietzsche’s) Dionysian, and their portrayal of 
this drive as one that can promote artistic creativity. This thesis will demonstrate that both 
view the Dionysian as a potentially valuable source of creative inspiration, but also as a drive 
that can promote death and destruction, and that striking affinities exist in their literary 
portrayals of Dionysian creativity. Throughout this thesis various aspects of d’Annunzio’s 
and Mann’s versions of the Dionysian will be compared: the third, fourth and fifth chapters of 
this thesis will each deal with a different – but related – aspect of the Dionysian that is 
common to the two writers’ depictions of this potent drive. They will be seen to portray the 
Dionysian functioning in similar ways for the artist, and to involve the same dangers. Both 
also offer comparable strategies for dealing with the Dionysian in the healthiest and most 
creatively beneficial way. The affinities uncovered in this thesis will allow for a better 
understanding of d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s conception of creativity, and of the psychological 
processes that lie behind artistic production. In shedding light on the hitherto overlooked 
relationship between d’Annunzio and Mann, this thesis simultaneously seeks a better 
understanding of the two writers individually. A more nuanced understanding of their 
respective receptions of Nietzsche, and respective literary treatments of creativity, will be 
pursued. 
A common theme that does link d’Annunzio and Mann, which has been noted by 
commentators, is the prominence with which art and the artist feature in their literature. Mann 
explicitly discusses the artist through characters such as Tonio Kröger (Tonio Kröger, 1903), 
Detlev Spinell (Tristan), Gustav von Aschenbach (Der Tod in Venedig), and Adrian 
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Leverkühn (Doktor Faustus [Doctor Faustus, 1947]). He also offers implicit comments on 
the artist through characters such as Klaus Heinrich (Königliche Hoheit [Royal Highness, 
1909]), Cipolla (Mario und der Zauberer [Mario and the Magician, 1929]), and Felix Krull 
(Bekenntnisse des Hochstaplers Felix Krull [The Confessions of Felix Krull, 1954]). In 
d’Annunzio’s (fewer) novels, conventional artists include the characters of Andrea Sperelli 
(Il piacere [Pleasure, 1888]) and Stelio Effrena (Il fuoco), but almost all of d’Annunzio’s 
protagonists are highly artistic, and are profoundly moved by art. Giorgio Aurispa (Il trionfo 
della morte [The Triumph of Death, 1894]) and Claudio Cantelmo (Le vergini delle rocce) 
are examples of these figures, artists by sensibility if not by profession. Of course, 
d’Annunzio and Mann are not the only writers of their time to have offered literary reflection 
on the nature and role of the artist: Wilde’s A Portrait of Dorian Gray (1891), Fogazzaro’s Il 
mistero del poeta (The Mystery of the Poet, 1888) Hesse’s Gertrud (1910) and Joyce’s 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1913), to give a few examples, also offer portraits of 
the artist. As this thesis will argue, however, a more interesting and valuable comparison 
between d’Annunzio and Mann can be drawn when their portrayals of the experience of 
creativity are more closely compared.  
Before turning attention to these portrayals of creativity, however, consideration must 
be given to d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s views regarding the role of art and the artist, for it is 
here that the two writers appear most divergent. An understanding of the two writers’ beliefs 
regarding the purpose and responsibility of art and creativity allows for a deeper 
understanding of the experiences of creativity that will be seen in their literature throughout 
this thesis, and enables us to gain a clearer idea of the two writers’ understanding of the 
relationship between life and art. 
 Mann’s views regarding the role and social responsibilities of the artist were to 
undergo significant transformation during his career. Broadly speaking, while Mann was to 
5 
 
find an overt political voice with the rise of National Socialism, his opposition to which was 
vehement and outspoken, at the time of the First World War (and at the time of the 
publication of the texts under discussion in this thesis) Mann believed the politically engaged 
artist to be an abhorrent figure, and lambasted artists who use (or abuse) their position to 
argue social or political causes. This belief placed Mann in stark opposition to both 
d’Annunzio and to his brother, Heinrich, resulting in a notorious Bruderzwist (‘brotherly 
dispute’), which lasted several years. 
In 1915 Heinrich Mann published a long essay entitled ‘Zola’, which examined the 
French writer’s aesthetic principles and which examined the Dreyfus Affair3 in order to 
comment upon the political situation in contemporary Germany. Heinrich lauded Zola as a 
model for other artists, precisely because of his political and social engagement. Zola had 
been outspoken against the French government during the political crisis and had written an 
open letter entitled J’accuse (I accuse [1898]). Just as Zola had argued for the good of the 
people and adopted an artistic theory with a social conscience, Heinrich Mann believed 
German artists and intellectuals should work towards social and political emancipation, and 
that they should operate as the ‘Gewissen’ (‘conscience’ [Heinrich Mann, cited in Reed, 
1974, p. 192]) of the German people. As he declared in the essay, ‘Der Intellektuelle erkennt 
Vergeistigung nur an, wo Versittlichung erreicht ward’4 (p. 194). Instead, Heinrich Mann 
found, certain artists and intellectuals – including his brother, Thomas – had abused their 
position and betrayed the German people upon the outbreak of war, by voicing support for 
the actions of the German government which had led to war. Heinrich bemoaned the 
‘enforced solidarity between the governing and the governed, which annihilated all 
                                                          
3
 The Dreyfus Affair divided France between 1894 and 1906, and revolved around a conviction of treason made 
against army captain Alfred Dreyfus, who was Jewish. The case garnered much publicity and caught the 
attention of many intellectuals. Dreyfus was finally exonerated in 1906, after accusations made against him were 
found to be unfounded and driven by anti-Semitism.  
4
 ‘The intellectual recognises spiritual quality only where some moral effect has been achieved’ (translated by 
Reed [ibid]).  
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opposition to the military leadership’ (Doerfel, 1971, p. 104) and felt isolated in his 
objections: ‘Es ist kein Platz mehr für den, der nicht die ganze nationale Grösse auf die 
Anbetung des Säbels beschränkt’5 (Heinrich Mann, cited in Doerfel, p. 104). Heinrich’s sense 
of isolation may have been exacerbated by his own brother’s supposed betrayal. 
  Several of Heinrich Mann’s criticisms in the Zola essay were clearly aimed at his 
brother, although Heinrich never actually named Thomas. In the latter months of 1914 
Thomas Mann had written several articles (including Gedanken im Kriege [Thoughts in War] 
and Friedrich und die große Koalition [Friedrich and the Great Coalition]) which were 
criticised for displaying ardent nationalism and enthusiasm for war. The historian Wilhelm 
Herzog referred disdainfully to Mann’s Friedrich und die große Koalition as ‘diese literarisch 
manikürte Irrlehre der deutschen Seele’6 (cited in Reed, 1974, p. 189), and Romain Rolland 
responded to Mann’s articles with an essay (which did not name Mann) positing the artist’s 
rightful position as ‘au-dessus de la mêlée’7 (ibid.). Mann’s Betrachtungen eines 
Unpolitischen (Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man), written between 1915 and 1918 and 
published in 1918, were intended partly as a response to such criticisms, and to counter 
Heinrich’s essay. Accordingly, many (thinly) veiled criticisms of Heinrich can be found in 
the Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. He bears more than a passing resemblance to the 
Zivilisationsliterat,
8
 for example, a ‘symbolic figure made to represent the popular 
democratic political values based on the European Enlightenment’ (Lehnert and Wessell, 
2004, p. 136). This figure, Mann writes, campaigns for the democratisation and therefore, 
according to Mann, the ‘Entdeutschung’ (‘de-Germanisation’ [1974, p. 68]) of Germany; he 
practises a politicised art; belongs to the Anglo-French Entente; and has come under the 
influence of French literature. 
                                                          
5
 ‘There is no longer a place for those whom the entire national greatness is not limited to the worship of the 
sabre’. 
6
 ‘[this] demented doctrine of the German soul, decked out as literature’ (translated by Reed). 
7
 ‘above the melee’. 
8
 Stock translates this term as ‘civilisation’s literary man’ (1985, p. 176). 
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 In an attempt to defend himself from the attacks of Herzog, Rolland and others, 
Thomas Mann, in his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, deflects criticisms he himself had 
received in the direction of others. The Zivilisationsliterat and Gabriele d’Annunzio are two 
of the figures that Mann employs to this end.
9
 Mann posits d’Annunzio as the antithesis to his 
own artistic persona (whether accurately or not), using the Italian as a means of consolidating 
his own artistic identity and his own sense of responsibility. While Mann despises politicised 
art, d’Annunzio allegedly practises ‘[politisierte] Ästhetizismus’10 (p. 549); while Mann 
values introspective and respective literature, d’Annunzio (‘ein Rhetor-Demagog’11 [p. 577]) 
is forever before the crowd, orating from his balcony or in the piazza;
12
 and whereas Mann 
claims to have written his allegedly ‘pro-war’ articles as a detached observer13 who merely 
accepted the outbreak of war, he labels d’Annunzio a ‘Kriegspanegyriker’ (‘war-panegyrist’ 
[ibid.]) and ‘Kriegsrufer’ (‘warmongerer’ [ibid.]) for his well-documented interventionism.14 
In terms of aesthetics, too, Mann finds d’Annunzio to be his antipode: he accuses the Italian 
of ‘Schönheits-Großmäuligkeit’ (‘beauty-swaggering’ [p. 106]) and of ‘üppigen 
Ästhetizismus’15 (p. 537), while declaring that he himself was never concerned with beauty.16 
Instead, Mann claims to have pursued ethics (‘das Ethische über das Ästhetische’17 [p. 106]), 
                                                          
9
 For example, Mann protests that the Zivilisationsliterat has named him an aesthete for remaining apolitical 
(1974, p. 149), and claims that actually the Zivilisationsliterat is more deserving of the name ‘aesthete’, for his 
politicising is merely a way of achieving effect, and is therefore actually the more concerned with aestheticism. 
Mann claims: ‘sein Politizismus [ist] nur eine neue und sensationelle Form der bellezza’ (‘his politicism [is] just 
a new and sensational form of bellezza’ [p. 545]). 
10
 ‘politicised aestheticism’. 
11
 ‘a demoagogue-rhetorician’. 
12
 ‘Ist so ein Rhetor-Demagog denn niemals allein? Immer auf dem “Balkonˮ? Kennt er keine Einsamkeit, keine 
Selbstbezweiflung, keine Sorge und Qual um seine Seele und um sein Werk [...]?’ (‘But is such a rhetoric-
demagogue never alone? Always on the “balconyˮ? Does he know no loneliness, no self-doubt, no worry and 
anguish over his soul and his work […]?’ [Mann, 1974, p. 577]). 
13
 Mann states: ‘Ich bin einzeln, ich sehe zu’ (‘I am isolated, I observe’ [p. 153]). 
14
 See Alfredo Bonadeo, D’Annunzio and the Great War (London: Associated University Presses, 1995), pp. 1-
68.  
15
 ‘sumptuous aestheticism’. 
16
 ‘Nie war es mir um “Schönheitˮ zu tun’ (‘For me it was never about “beautyˮ [p. 106]). 
17
 ‘the ethical over the aesthetic’. 
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as a writer of German burgherly roots,
18
 and affirms the kind of literature that is described in 
Tonio Kröger thus: ‘die Literatur als Weg zum Verstehen, zum Vergeben und zur Liebe, die 
erlösende Macht der Sprache, der literarische Geist als die edelste Erscheinung des 
Menschengeistes überhaupt’19 (Mann, 2004, p. 275).  
 In his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, Mann emphasises his German, burgherly 
identity, and betrays little of his (maternal) southern heritage. Indeed, the south here seems 
rather a realm of pernicious influence, against which Mann, as a writer, wishes to defend 
himself. While there is not scope here for a full examination of Mann’s perceived antithesis 
between north and south, a summary regarding his concerns is contained in observations 
written at the turn of the century regarding the uses and abuses of Nietzsche: 
Ich wiederhole, daß ich mit dem Renaissance-Ästhetizismus gewisser “Nietzscheanerˮ 
innerlich nie irgend etwas zu schaffen gehabt habe. Was mich ihm aber fernhielt, das mochte, 
es ahnte mir früh, mein Deutschtum sein; die “Schönheitˮ, wie jene Dionysier sie meinten 
und mit steiler Gebärde verherrlichten, erschien mir von jeher als ein Ding für Romanen und 
Romanisten, als ein “Stück Südenˮ ziemlich verdächtiger, verächtlicher Art [...]’20 (1974, p. 
541). 
Mann affirms his German, burgherly identity against what he associates with the south, and 
from the irresponsible, suspicious, and overly-Dionysian art practised by fanatical 
Nietzscheans. While the Zivilisationsliterat has reportedly attacked him for favouring 
aesthetics over morality (in remaining apolitical), Mann here distances himself from southern 
aestheticism and posits himself as the decorous and dutiful artist, insisting that he was never 
                                                          
18
 In the Betrachtungen it is Mann’s German side which has the strongest voice, and he declares that this 
German, burgherly part of his nature prevented him from becoming entangled in irresponsible aesthetic 
concerns that he associates with the south. 
19
 ‘literature as the path towards understanding, towards forgiveness and towards love, the redemptive power of 
language, the literary spirit as the most noble manifestation of the human spirit possible’. 
20
 ‘I repeat that I never had anything to do with the Renaissance-aestheticism of certain “Nietzscheans”. What 
kept me away from them, as I perceived early on, was my Germanness: “beauty”, as those Dionysians mean it, 
and which they glorify with bold gestures, always seemed to me to be a thing for Latins and Latinists, a “piece 
of the south” of a somewhat suspicious, contemptible type […].’ 
9 
 
interested in beauty. As will be seen throughout this thesis, Mann saw creative value in the 
Dionysian, but here he renounces an over-zealous and irresponsible Dionysianism.  
 In later years Mann’s apoliticism and anti-democratic views appeared to undergo a 
reversal. In October 1922 he became a self-appointed cultural representative of the new 
Weimar Republic (Kurzke, 2010, p. 67). As Kurzke notes, Mann’s conversion to democratic 
republicanism was at first half-hearted (‘geschieht anfangs nur mit halber Überzeugung’21 
[ibid.]), and it was only with the rise of Adolf Hitler that Mann’s politicisation became 
‘endgültig’ (‘final’ [ibid.]). At the time of his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, however, 
Mann articulates an understanding of the role of the artist that excludes both political 
engagement and vacuous aestheticism. The artist should neither argue for political causes nor 
withdraw into a world of superficial beauty. Mann’s disapproval of the decadent aestheticism 
practised by some artists around the turn of the century will be highlighted in Tristan, in the 
parodic figure of Detlev Spinell, and is also seen in Mann’s polemicising against d’Annunzio 
in the Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. While Mann may have (slightly) caricatured 
d’Annunzio, it is true that the Italian saw more potential for politically engaged art than Mann 
at this stage. 
 Even in d’Annunzio’s earliest writings, traces of social and political engagement are 
evident. D’Annunzio himself claimed that his Canto novo (New Song, 1882), written when he 
was just nineteen, contained ‘scariche di socialismo feroce’22 (d’Annunzio, cited in Becker, 
1990, p. 75), a claim which has been disputed by some critics. As Becker notes, Benedetto 
Croce found the work’s socialism to be ‘negligible posturing’ (p. 81). Becker argues that 
d’Annunzio is here presenting beauty as a substitute to capitalist and socialist politics, and 
practising a ‘“politics of aestheticism”’ (p. 80) – echoing a chapter title from Mann’s 
                                                          
21
 ‘occurred initially somewhat half-heartedly’. 
22
 ‘bouts of fierce socialism’. 
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Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (‘Ästhetizistische Politik’23). D’Annunzio’s article ‘La 
bestia elettiva’ (generally translated as ‘The Beast who Wills’, 1892), the first treatment of 
Nietzsche in the Italian language (aside from a few very brief reviews of his books), displays 
a strong political slant, renouncing parliamentary democracy and arguing instead for a new 
aristocracy. D’Annunzio’s distaste for democracy did not prevent him from briefly entering 
parliament in 1897 however – although his achievements as a member of parliament were 
negligible. One of his most famous acts was a highly theatrical one, involving the writer 
dramatically passing (literally walking) from the benches of the right to those of the left. 
D’Annunzio had, after all, declared himself (in quasi-Nietzschean terms) to be ‘al di là della 
destra e della sinistra – […] come al di là del bene e del male’24 (d’Annunzio, cited in Alatri, 
1983, p. 193). 
 With the outbreak of the First World War, d’Annunzio’s was one of the loudest 
voices among the interventionists. In the many orations he gave in support of Italy’s entrance 
into the war (which eventually took place in May 1915), he revealed his understanding of the 
artist as manipulator of the crowds and man of action. As Piredda says of d’Annunzio’s 
interventionist speeches: 
The argument […] is grounded on a synthetic series of apodictic statements, in which the 
truth is presented as absolutely certain and evident. Far from striving to persuade by means of 
rational argumentation, d’Annunzio’s discourse aims to impose a truth regardless of its actual 
validity. The language of his propaganda […] evokes those easily recognisable tropes and 
myths that are deeply rooted in common opinion and imagery, even if they are scarcely 
representative of the reality of the new war, the first truly modern conflict fought with 
industrial techniques and machinery in Europe. (2011, p. 311) 
                                                          
23
 ‘Aesthetic Politics’. 
24
 ‘beyond right and left – […] as I am beyond good and evil’. 
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The principles identified by Piredda in d’Annunzio’s orations stand in stark opposition to 
those declared by Mann in his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. Not content with 
launching emotive and intoxicating arguments for Italy’s entry into the war (perhaps Mann 
was not unjustified in calling d’Annunzio’s Latinism and nationalism ‘ein Wirkungs- und 
Begeisterungsmittel’25 [Mann, 1974, 577]), d’Annunzio, who was in his fifties by the time of 
the First World War, felt compelled to go beyond political words and take part in military 
action, too. Among his legendary deeds the most famous is probably his participation in a 
daring leaflet-dropping mission over Vienna in August 1918, in the earliest days of long-
range aviation. Romain Rolland, who had named d’Annunzio a ‘purveyor of the guillotine’ 
(Rolland, cited in Bonadeo, 1995, p. 14) for his early interventionist rhetoric, paradoxically 
found d’Annunzio’s military actions worthy of praise, conceding that he ‘had given the world 
proof […] of his burning courage. He alone among the rhetoricians of the war paid with his 
own person; he signed his rhetoric with his own blood’ (ibid.). 
 In strong contrast to Mann (or at least, the Mann of the Betrachtungen eines 
Unpolitischen), then, d’Annunzio believed the artist’s role should extend beyond that of the 
creation of works of art. D’Annunzio understood the poet as a guide for the people, and 
handled his crowds in much the same way as Il fuoco’s Stelio Effrena, inciting and exciting 
them towards a particular end. While it may seem contradictory of Mann to accuse 
d’Annunzio of both vacuous aestheticism and excessive socio-political engagement, Borelli 
convincingly argues that d’Annunzio ‘illustrates the coexistence, rather than the opposition of 
[intellectual aloofness and political engagement], as [he strives] to reintegrate art and 
literature in modern society by evoking ideals which belong both to the life of action and to 
that of contemplation’ (2012, p. 8). At the time of Mann’s strict policy of remaining apolitical 
(or at least claiming to), d’Annunzio was practising the other extreme, involving himself in 
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politics and militarism as much as possible. d’Annunzio’s actions suggest that he saw himself 
as something of a ‘vate’, a poet-guide for the people.  
 While d’Annunzio and Mann appear poles apart in their beliefs regarding the role of 
the artist, their understandings of the nature and workings of creativity are more closely 
aligned. As this thesis will argue, both writers portray creativity as a process which relies 
upon something that strikingly resembles Nietzsche’s Dionysian. 
 A neglected link between d’Annunzio and Mann, which is key to this thesis, is their 
shared reception of Nietzsche. Both are known to have read and engaged with Nietzsche’s 
ideas, but this thesis will offer the first detailed analysis of this connection and its importance 
to both writers’ creative output. The comparison will centre on the two writers’ reception of 
Nietzsche’s idea of the Dionysian (first expounded in Die Geburt der Tragödie [The Birth of 
Tragedy, 1872]), and their portrayals of the role of this psychological drive in artistic 
creation. For Nietzsche, the Dionysian was a drive of crucial artistic significance: it was his 
eagerness to reintroduce modern audiences to the forgotten drive of the Dionysian, in order to 
revitalise the contemporary artistic landscape, which contributed significantly to the 
demolition of Nietzsche’s academic reputation in 1872. While contemporary audiences were 
largely unmoved by Nietzsche’s appeals, and reluctant to embrace his idea of the Dionysian, 
later readers were more enthusiastic; prominent among these readers were d’Annunzio and 
Mann. Evidence of both writers’ engagement with the Dionysian will be seen in this thesis, 
and it will be argued that their shared understanding of the artistic value of the drive 
constitutes an important and hitherto overlooked parallel between them.  
 The works selected to illustrate this argument are Thomas Mann’s Tristan, Tonio 




 The second chapter of this thesis will discuss the reception of Nietzsche’s ideas, 
especially the Dionysian. It will consider the (belated) impact of Nietzsche’s thought, paying 
particular attention to his reception in Germany and Italy, and assess d’Annunzio’s and 
Mann’s receptions of Nietzsche’s ideas. This chapter will also explore the significance of the 
Dionysian throughout Nietzsche’s thought, examining the transformation that this idea 
undergoes from 1872 until the end of Nietzsche’s active life (1889). This second chapter will 
lay the foundations for the argument of this thesis, establishing that what appears as the 
Dionysian in d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s literature is a descendant of Nietzsche’s Dionysian, 
and enabling us to compare the various manifestations of this potent psychological and 
creative drive. 
 Chapter Three will consider a particular aspect of the Dionysian; namely, its 
promotion of a creatively enriching experience of profound and primal union. D’Annunzio 
and Mann’s artistic characters will be shown to fit into the trope (even cliché) of the isolated, 
solitary artist. Here (as in many other portrayals of creative individuals), the artist is an 
outsider, who stands apart from the crowd and often struggles to identify with his fellow man. 
When d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s fictional artists come under the influence of the Dionysian, 
however, they experience intense oneness and intimacy – both with other individuals and 
with nature. In this state creativity may be provoked, but, because the experience is one in 
which the artist’s individuated identity is suspended, the very survival of the artist is also at 
stake: suspension of identity (and immersion into a community of some kind) can become 
loss of identity, and can hurl the artist towards psychological destruction. 
 Chapter Four will complement the discussion of the third chapter, arguing that the 
Dionysian state, for d’Annunzio and Mann, but also for Nietzsche, is reached via a form of 
regression. It involves a retrieval of forgotten or repressed impulses and desires, and often 
results in an embrace of instinct (often expressed as unbridled sexual desire). The Dionysian 
14 
 
thus promotes a rawer, more intuitive form of existence, free of the restraints and repressions 
of large scale society. In this sense, d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s portrayals of Dionysian 
creativity could arguably be situated within the cultural primitivism of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.
26
 As will be seen, however, while the Dionysian here promotes a 
more ‘primitive’ form of existence, like the primitivists of the abovementioned period, it 
lacks the patronising and racist stereotypes of much primitivist discourse, which looked to 
contemporary cultures deemed ‘less civilised’ for artistic inspiration or to justify colonial 
activities. 
 In Chapter Five, by which time both the profits and perils of the Dionysian in the 
context of both writers’ works will have been demonstrated, a means of successfully 
navigating this powerful drive will be discussed. It will be argued that both d’Annunzio and 
Mann portray sublimation – in a Freudian as well as Nietzschean sense – as a strategy for 
successfully and healthily engaging with the Dionysian. This strategy allows the artist to reap 
the creative benefits of the Dionysian without fully submitting to the drive: the artist remains 
in control and artistically focused. Rather than submitting fully to the inflamed sexual desire 
that the Dionysian can trigger, for example, the artist redirects the impulses of the Dionysian 
so that they are ultimately expressed in artistic production; this is how Freud understands 
sublimation to operate. In line with Nietzsche’s (scanter) statements regarding sublimation, 
d’Annunzio and Mann also portray their healthier artists as displaying unification of their 
various drives, rather than appearing fragmented and torn in different directions. Sublimation, 
therefore, appears to offer a useful strategy for reaping the creative benefit of the Dionysian.
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 This involved Western artists looking to civilisations deemed comparatively more ‘primitive’ and ‘less 
developed’, or to imagined stereotypes of the ‘primitive’, and appropriating characteristics that they found – or 
believed to find – in their art.  
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Chapter Two: Nietzsche’s Dionysian and its Reception 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, this thesis will establish the relationship between the artist 
and (a version of) Nietzsche’s Dionysian as a common feature of the portrayal of artistic 
creativity in selected works by Gabriele d’Annunzio and Thomas Mann. This chapter will 
illuminate the background to this relationship, exploring the artistic significance of Dionysus 
and the Dionysian before Nietzsche’s appropriation, and the critical reception and cultural 
impact of Nietzsche’s version of the Dionysian.  
We will begin by discussing the reception of Nietzsche’s legacy (especially his idea 
of the Dionysian), with a particular focus on Germany and Italy, before considering 
d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s personal engagement with Nietzsche and his ideas. This survey of 
Nietzsche’s reception will also explore reasons for his belated rise to fame. Having 
established when and why Nietzsche’s Dionysian gained purchase among artists and 
intellectuals across Europe, a brief overview of the prehistory of the Dionysian will be given, 
in order to gain a clearer idea of the figure that Nietzsche inherited, and to illuminate his own 
adaptations and innovations. This overview will begin by considering the ancient figure of 
Dionysus and his worship, before tracing the progression and transformation of the Dionysian 
until its appearance in the (largely German) literature of the eighteenth century. Finally, the 
chapter will conclude by exploring the significance of the Dionysian in Nietzsche’s writings, 
beginning with the text that aimed and claimed to ‘resurrect’ him (Die Geburt der Tragödie) 
before turning to Nietzsche’s notes, and finally to his later writings, where we find the 






i) The Reception of Nietzsche and his Ideas 
Die Geburt der Tragödie is one of the nineteenth century’s most famous treatises on art, and 
one of Nietzsche’s most iconic texts; yet during Nietzsche’s lifetime the book was a 
commercial failure,
1
 and turned Nietzsche, almost overnight, into a figure of ridicule and 
contempt in the academic world. Nietzsche’s frustration at his first book’s lack of success is 
evident from his letters and notes, and his disappointment at the book’s reception was set to 
be repeated with his subsequent publications. During his active lifetime (after a breakdown in 
1889 he remained alive for a further ten years in a vegetative state, before dying in 1900) 
Nietzsche was to achieve very little attention, let alone acclaim, and his many books largely 
fell upon deaf ears.
2
  
In a letter of November 1871 to the classical scholar Erwin Rohde, written shortly 
before the publication of Die Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche expresses anxiety regarding its 
potential success: he writes, ‘Ich fürchte immer, daß die Philologen es der Musik wegen, die 
Musiker der Philologie wegen, die Philosophen der Musik und Philologie wegen nicht lesen 
wollen [...]’3 (BVN-1871, 170). These reservations notwithstanding, Nietzsche had high 
hopes for his first book, and wrote to Wagner early in 1872, ‘Meinen Philologen gnade Gott, 
wenn sie jetzt nichts lernen wollen’4 (BVN-1872, 185).  
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 An inventory of Nietzsche’s books carried out in 1893 revealed that out of the 31,950 books that Nietzsche had 
had printed, 22,894 copies had sold. The only books to have sold more than 1,000 copies by 1893 were Die 
Geburt der Tragödie (The Birth of Tragedy, 1872), of which 1,462 copies had been sold, and the fourth of the 
Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen (Untimely Meditations, 1873-76), published in 1876, of which 1,500 copies had 
been sold (Schaberg, 1995, p. 188). The inventory was carried out after Nietzsche’s belated rise to fame began 
around 1890 (discussed shortly), and so these figures, themselves modest, even reflect the increase in sales since 
around 1890. Unfortunately sales figures for Die Geburt der Tragödie during Nietzsche’s active lifetime appear 
not to exist. 
2
 As Schacht notes, ‘prior to his collapse, none of [Nietzsche’s books] sold more than a few hundred copies, and 
few of them attracted any attention whatsoever’ (1996, p. xii). Schacht takes Menschliches Allzumenschliches 
(Human All Too Human, 1878) as a ‘vivid case in point. Of the 1,000 copies in the first printing of the original 
version, only 120 were sold in 1878; and more than half remained unsold in 1886, when Nietzsche reacquired 
them and repackaged them with a new introduction as the first volume of the two-volume second edition’ 
(ibid.). 
3
 ‘I fear that the philologists will not read it because of the music, the musicians will not read it because of the 
philology, the philosophers will not read it because of the music and philology […]’. 
4
 ‘God help my philologists, if they do not wish to learn anything now’. 
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Unfortunately for Nietzsche, these philologists were not ready to learn anything from 
Die Geburt der Tragödie, and nor was anyone else. The text’s contemporary relevance 
eluded many of its earliest readers, who instead judged the text purely as a philological 
investigation into ancient Greece. Nietzsche’s philological colleagues found much to criticise. 
A vitriolic attack came from Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, who had known 
Nietzsche personally at school. He accused Nietzsche of various errors, inaccuracies and 
incompetence, and later said of Nietzsche that he was no philologist, but rather ‘Prophet […] 
für eine irreligiöse Religion und eine unphilosophische Philosophie’5 (Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff, cited in Reich, 2013, p. 80). Even Nietzsche’s former doctoral supervisor, 
Friedrich Ritschl, to whom Nietzsche had rather hopefully sent a signed copy, and from 
whom he then had to prompt a response, described the text as ‘geistreiche Schwiemelei’6 
(Ritschl, cited in Reich, p. 29) which was potentially detrimental to young scholars. 
The style alone of Nietzsche’s book was enough to ruffle the feathers of traditional 
philologists. The text flagrantly disregarded academic propriety and stylistic traditions 
(completely omitting, for example, scholarly citations and references), and Nietzsche failed to 
produce any evidence for his controversial claims. Silk and Stern describe the ‘high 
coloration and […] strong emotional charge’ (1995, p. 89) of Nietzsche’s language – 
unconventional characteristics for an apparently academic text – which left the book open to 
ridicule or dismissal. 
Die Geburt der Tragödie adopted a radical approach to themes that were dominated 
by tradition. In suggesting that the irrational and chaotic Dionysian had been a source of 
inspiration to the ancient Greeks, Nietzsche challenged the long-held and deeply-ingrained 
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 ‘the prophet of an unreligious religion’. 
6
 ‘ingenious nonsense’. 
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view of the Greeks as optimistic and untroubled, as models of reason and tranquillity.
7
 
Instead, he claimed, the Hellenes acknowledged the horrors and turmoil of existence, but 
overcame them, even affirmed them, through their art, which arose from Dionysian origins. It 
was only several decades later that his unconventional suggestions began to be taken 
seriously. 
 For the rest of Nietzsche’s sane life he was to lament the neglect of his book. While 
he claimed that his books were being read everywhere except in Germany,
8
 the reality was 
that readers were not paying any real attention to his books either in Germany or abroad.
9
 
During the decade of his insanity (1889-1900), however, his writings began to be recognised. 
By the mid-1890s both Gabriele d’Annunzio and Thomas Mann had discovered Nietzsche’s 
works, and were beginning to write about him themselves. At the turn of the century 
Nietzsche was popular enough for Aschheim to speak of ‘Nietzscheana’ (1994, p. 30) in 
Germany, and for Barzellotti to speak of a ‘contagio nietzscheano’10 (cited in Heyer-Caput, 
2008, p. 163) in Italy. But why was it that Nietzsche’s thought began to gain purchase after 




 find that with the changes that took place in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, and the first decades of the twentieth, Nietzsche’s writings suddenly 
gained relevance. His works were seemingly more in tune with the socio-political and 
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 This had been the view of the German art historian Johann Winckelmann (1717-1768), for example, who 
claimed that Greek art was characterised by ‘edle Einfalt und stille Grösse’ (‘noble simplicity and quiet 
grandeur’ [Winckelmann, cited in Uhlig, 1988, p. 36]).  
8
 In a letter to Jean Bourdeau from 1888 Nietzsche complains, ‘jetzt habe ich Leser überall, in Wien, in St. 
Petersburg, in Stockholm, in Kopenhagen – […] sie fehlen mir in Deutschland’ (‘now I have readers 
everywhere, St Petersburg, Stockholm, Copenhagen – [..] but not in Germany’ [Nietzsche, BV-1888, 1196]). 
9
 A few isolated individuals, such as the Danish scholar Georg Brandes, were already lecturing on Nietzsche 
during the 1880s. Nietzsche was aware of, and corresponded with, Brandes, and possibly had him in mind when 
he remarked upon having being discovered everywhere except in Germany. 
10
 ‘Nietzschean contagion’. 
11
 See, for example, Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890-1990 (University of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1994), pp. 12-16, and Richard Hinton Thomas, Nietzsche in 
German Politics and Society, 1890-1918 (University of Manchester Press: Manchester, 1986), pp. 1-6. 
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cultural context of the turn of the century than with the period of their initial publication. As 
Nietzsche himself commented, ‘[e]inige werden posthum geboren’12 (EH-Bücher-1). The 
period of Nietzsche’s insanity and that following his death were marked by intense change 
and upheaval across Europe: in 1900 Charles Péguy declared that the world ‘had changed 
more in the preceding thirty years than in the entire two millennia since Christ’ (cited in 
Payne, 1996, p. 24). These changes continued into the early twentieth century, so that once 
Nietzsche’s thought had filtered into the mainstream, it became increasingly popular. This 
period of change involved industrialisation, mechanisation and urbanisation: technological 
advancements hurled man into the machine-age, and ushered in a ‘second industrial 
revolution’ (Payne, 1996, p. 23). Improved rail networks meant that travel was suddenly 
possible to many more people, for example, and at far greater speeds. Partly as a result of 
this, increased migration impacted upon social demographics and promoted the emergence of 
mass societies. In such a world of speed, technology and massification, the individual was 
likely to experience isolation and alienation: Hinton Thomas points out that such societies 
can be, and were, hostile to ‘Individualität [‘individuality’] and Persönlichkeit 
[‘personality’]’ (1986, p. 2). In Nietzsche the alienated individual finds his individuality 
brought once more to the fore. 
 As well as improvements in technology and mechanisation, scientific discoveries led, 
paradoxically, to a resurgence of non-rationality and mysticism: the discovery of the X-ray, 
for example, revealed the existence of realities beyond the individual’s sensory perception 
(Henderson, 2007, p. 384) and in 1895 Ferdinand Brunetière spoke of the failures of 
science.
13
 In his view, science had failed to fulfil the demands made of it in Ernest Renan’s 
L’Avenir de la Science (The Future of Science, 1890), which predicted that ‘science was the 
only means man had to improve his lot’ (Paul, 1968, p. 305). Interest in mysticism and 
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 ‘some are born posthumously’.  
13
 As Paul notes, as Brunetière saw it, ‘If science had not plunged into total bankruptcy, it had at least had its 
credit shaken by its considerable failures’ (1968, p. 306).  
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spirituality was also partially triggered by science’s attempted debunking of religion. This 
constituted part of the reaction against positivism that occurred in Europe around the turn of 
the century: while the nineteenth century had been characterised by liberalism, materialism 
and rationality, the political, social, and cultural trends of the early twentieth century tended 
towards non-rationality, emotionalism, subjectivism and vitalism (Payne, 1996, p. 23). Once 
again, Nietzsche’s thought proved particularly pertinent here, providing support for 
opposition to rationalism, to collectivism and to materialism. Instead of encouraging blind 
obedience to knowledge and science, Nietzsche encourages us to obey instinct and exalt art. 
While Nietzsche was famously hostile to religion, he also tried to offer modern man channels 
for his spirituality, in the wake of the death of God.
14
 His Dionysian was arguably one of 
these channels. The combined effect of these many new trends and orientations (Luigi 
Capuana spoke of an age of ‘isms’ in his Gli “ismi” contemporanei [Contemporary “isms”, 
1898]) was considerable: Sternhell even speaks of an ‘intellectual crisis’ (1976, p. 320) 
during the 1890s, which provided fertile ground for the propagation of Nietzsche’s thought. 
 The recent unification of both Germany and Italy may also have been a factor 
affecting Nietzsche’s eventual acclaim. While unification in the former (1871) had been a 
comparative success, in Italy, officially unified since 1861, the process had been incomplete 
and ineffective. D’Azeglio’s calls for the formation of a national identity (in 1867) were not 
to come to fruition until decades later, and as Clarke explains, Italy in 1871 consisted of ‘a 
number of very different regional societies, with different economies and ways of life, 
different cultures, different histories and different religious practices’ (1984, p. 30). The 
dissatisfactions of the period of unification have often been cited as one of the origins of 
Italian fascism,
15
 and Salinari speaks of a ‘frattura psicologica’16 (1960, p. 41) during this 
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 Nietzsche declares the death of God in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science, 1882): ‘Gott ist todt’ 
(‘God is dead’ [FW-108]). 
15
 See, for example, Marco Palla, Mussolini and Fascism (Brooklyn: Interlink, 2000), p. 9. 
16
 ‘psychological fracture’. 
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period. After 1861 the people of the newly declared Italian nation may have been united on 
paper, but in practice the term ‘Italian’ had yet to gain any real significance. In such a climate 
of forced collectivism a philosopher who spoke to the individual would have been welcome, 
and perhaps this partially explains Nietzsche’s appeal to Italians when his name reached Italy 
during the early 1890s. The ability of Nietzsche’s thought to transcend nationality and 
geographical borders also meant that it was not only in Germany that his fame began to 
spread. 
Germany’s unification appears to have been slightly smoother. As Geiss comments, 
‘[in 1871], a newly unified Germany rose overnight as the strongest power on the European 
continent’ (1997, p. 53). Military expansion followed swiftly. While unification appears to 
have initially been more successful for Germany than Italy (with the former outperforming 
the latter as a European and industrial power), German unification too had its problems: the 
process had been as contrived as in Italy, and political tensions soon emerged after 1871. As 
Smith points out, ‘not until the “imperial implosion” following World War I would the era of 
nation states predominate’ (2011, p. 8). 
The young Germany became Nietzsche’s patient in his cultural diagnoses. He 
criticised Germany’s pursuit of military might and consequent neglect of artistic and cultural 
glory (GD-Deutschen-4 and DS-1). He also complained of Germans’ mistrust of the spirit in 
favour of politics (GD-Deutschen-1) and stated that Germans drank too much beer (GD-
Deutschen-1). While he may have articulated these complaints before they became more 
popularly felt, eventually Germans began to take his point. An anti-positivist resurgence in 
spirituality (for example) was not a uniquely German experience, but Germans could find 
particular relevance in what they were told by a German philosopher – especially in a time of 
growing nationalism. Despite his talk of ‘gute Europäer’17 (Nietzsche, FW-357), Nietzsche 
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 ‘good Europeans’.  
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held a special appeal to Germans because of their (eventually) perceived proximity to his 
thinking. As Aschheim notes, ‘Nietzsche was born and died in Germany, and articulated a 
peculiarly German predicament’ (1994, p. 309). 
A further appeal that Nietzsche’s works had in Europe at the turn of the twentieth 
century was his opposition to decadence. As Payne explains, ‘worry over decadence became 
generalised during the second half of the century, apparently intensified by mass urbanisation 
and the growth in crime’ (1996, p. 29). Texts like Max Nordau’s Entartung (Degeneration, 
1892) voiced these fears, exposing the contemptible ‘degenerate’ (Nordau, 1968, p. 17) as the 
cause of Western civilisation’s ills. According to Nordau, under the particular conditions 
obtaining during the latter half of the nineteenth century, anti-social and perverse drives had 
thrived, and become concentrated in this ‘degenerate’, a corrupted and corrupting figure, 
who, Nordau claimed, wreaked havoc on art and culture. Nietzsche’s calls to overcome 
decadence chimed with some of these fears, and offered strategies (whether usable or not) for 
resisting degeneration. One of these strategies was the Übermensch, Nietzsche’s superior, 
self-creating individual, which would often be (mis)interpreted as ‘a standard evolutionary 
narrative’ (Johnson, 2010, p. 55). For those at the turn of the century who saw decay and 
regression as society’s main trends, the Übermensch offered an attractive alternative. It was 
rendered even more relevant by the emergence of eugenics, and by pseudo-scientific studies 
on race and breeding; these became popular at the start of the twentieth-century thanks to the 
works of figures such as the criminologist Cesare Lombroso,
18
 and trends like Social 
Darwinism,
19
 which was well established by the turn of the century.  
The concept of a ‘superhuman’ is certainly not Nietzsche’s invention. The term 
Übermensch had already been employed by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (in his Faust I 
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 Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909) was an Italian criminologist who argued that criminality was an inherited trait, 
and that it could be recognised by certain physical characteristics (or ‘stigmata’). In his L’uomo di genio (The 
Man of Genius, 1889) he also posited artistic genius as a form of hereditary insanity. 
19
 The term Social Darwinism indicates the application of Darwin’s theory of natural selection to sociology. 
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[1808]), Johann Gottfried von Herder (in his Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität [Letter for 
the Advancement of Humanity, 1794] and Kritische Wälder [Critical Forests, 1769]), Jean 
Paul (in his Dr. Katzenbergers Reise [Dr Katzenberger’s Journey to the Spa, 1809]) and 
Friedrich Theodor von Vischer (Ästhetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen [Aesthetics of the 
Science of Beauty, 1846]). Kaufmann notes that the idea of a superman had appeared as early 
as the second-century A.D., in the writings of Lucian, whom Nietzsche had studied (1974, p. 
307); he also points out that Nietzsche’s first use of the term was to refer to Byron’s Manfred, 
in an essay written as a schoolboy at Pforta (p. 308).  
For Enrico Caffi, the Nietzschean Übermensch is nothing other than ‘la storia del 
Machiavelli presentata sotto un altro aspetto e per fini diversi’20 (cited in Michelini, 1978, p. 
201). Gramsci points to French feuilleton novels, popular among intellectuals until around the 
1870s, and finds the Nietzschean Übermensch anticipated in the protagonist of Alexandre 
Dumas’ Le Comte de Monte Cristo (The Count of Monte Cristo, 1844) and his character 
Athos in Les Trois Mousquetaires (The Three Musketeers, 1844) (1996, p. 81). He also 
suggests that racist tendencies of the period, ‘che hanno culminato nel Gobineau e quindi nel 
Chamberlain e nel pangermanismo’21 (ibid.), contributed to the formation of Nietzsche’s 
figure. Curiously, Gramsci does not mention d’Annunzio in this discussion.  
Before 1889 interest in Nietzsche’s works in Germany had largely been limited to 
isolated individuals, as well as a few small groups such as the Dehmel circle (Hinton 
Thomas, 1983, p. 2). Hinton Thomas has named 1890 ‘the year of transformation’22 (ibid.), 
after which Nietzsche and his works rose to fame. Journals such as Die Gesellschaft and the 
Freie Bühne began to take ‘new and lively interest’ (ibid.) in Nietzsche, aiding in the 
propagation of his ideas. Books also appeared, and a ‘cult’ surrounding the figure of 
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 ‘the story of Machiavelli presented under another guise and for different purposes’. 
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 ‘which culminated in Gobineau and therefore in Chamberlain and in Pan-Germanism’.  
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Nietzsche soon emerged in Germany. This cult began to pervade various areas of German 
arts and culture, and Nietzsche’s impact could be seen from the field of architecture to that of 
music. Richard Strauss’ tone poem Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus spake Zarathustra) 
premiered in 1896, for example, and Mahler’s Third Symphony (originally entitled Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft [The Gay Science]) in 1897.  
 Nietzsche’s increasing fame in Germany was aided, at least in part, by the efforts of 
his sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Having appointed herself as the custodian of her 
brother and his works, she founded the Nietzsche-Archiv in 1894. She even held soirees 
during which guests were occasionally allowed to glimpse her incapacitated brother. The 
extent to which Elisabeth influenced the dissemination of Nietzsche’s works has been greatly 
debated: some commentators, such as Aschheim, suggest that Elisabeth and the archive 
played ‘an important role in the popularisation and monumentalisation of Nietzsche’ (1992, 
p. 46) but others find that Nietzsche’s ascension to cult status may well have taken place 
anyway. Diethe, for example, states that it is ‘probable that Nietzsche’s Nachlaß [manuscript 
remains] would have seen print even if Elizabeth had not lifted a finger’ (2003, p. 159). 
While the exact extent to which Nietzsche’s sister aided his rise to fame can never be 
determined, it may be that she played a greater role in the creation of a cult surrounding the 
personality of her brother, than in the propagation of his thought; she was also largely 
responsible for the appropriation of Nietzsche’s thought by German nationalists and, later, 
National Socialists, although this is disputed by some scholars.
23
 
 In Italy, Nietzsche’s name first reached audiences with the publication of an article 
written by Gabriele d’Annunzio, which appeared in Il mattino in September 1892, and was 
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 See, for example, Robert C. Holub, ‘The Elisabeth Legend: The Cleansing of Nietzsche and the Sullying of 
His Sister’, in Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy ed. by Jacob Golomb 
and Robert S. Wistrich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 215–34. 
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entitled ‘La bestia elettiva’24 (‘The Beast who Wills’). Thanks to this article, d’Annunzio is 
generally acknowledged as the conduit through which Italians first came to know Nietzsche’s 
thought. In fact, an earlier mention of Nietzsche can be found in an edition of La rivista 
europea from March 1872, which contains a brief (anonymous) review of Nietzsche’s 
recently published Die Geburt der Tragödie. The review focuses on the book’s treatment of 
ancient Greece while appearing to miss (as most initial readers did) its significance for 
contemporary Germany. It deems Nietzsche’s book ‘degno di fermar l’attenzione degli 
studiosi’25 (‘Notizie teatrali’ [‘Theatrical News’], 1872, p. 402) for its novel views and 
applications, but notes that there is ‘forse […] più metafisica che storia’26 (ibid.). Despite the 
reviewer’s generally favourable judgement on Nietzsche’s book, it would be another two 
decades before Nietzsche was accorded any kind of lengthy consideration in an Italian 
publication. As Fazio points out, d’Annunzio may not have been the first to write about 
Nietzsche in Italian, but it was through him that Italy was properly introduced to Nietzsche 
(1988, p. 26).  
D’Annunzio’s 1892 article contained many arguments that could be described as 
‘Nietzschean’. It attacked the idea of democracy, for example, which in d’Annunzio’s (and 
Nietzsche’s) opinion effected an undesirable levelling of individuals, and instead advocated a 
return to aristocracy (or rather, an ‘aristocrazia nuova’27 [d’Annunzio, cited in Valenti, 1994, 
p. 17]). A year later d’Annunzio published a series of three articles entitled ‘Il caso 
Wagner’28 (‘The Case of Wagner’, whose title is a direct translation of Nietzsche’s Der Fall 
Wagner [1888]) in La Tribuna, which discuss both Wagner, and Nietzsche’s critique of him. 
D’Annunzio (like other isolated intellectuals) had come to know Nietzsche initially through 
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 This article appears in Su Nietzsche, ed. by Davide Valenti (Catania: De Martinis & C Editori, 1994), pp. 7-
19. 
25
 ‘worthy of halting the attention of scholars’.  
26
 ‘possibly […] more metaphysics than history’.  
27
 ‘new aristocracy’. 
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French translations of his works (the first translations available), as he could not read 
German. Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil, 1886) was the first of 
Nietzsche’s texts to be translated into Italian, in 1899. Between 1899 and 1901, d’Annunzio 
‘read widely in Nietzsche’ (Witt, 2007, p. 87), as his complete works had become available in 
French. These volumes, stored in the archives of the Vittoriale (the complex built by 
d’Annunzio in the hills overlooking Lake Garda, where he spent his last years), are covered 
in annotations, revealing the aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that most interested 
d’Annunzio.29 Alongside articles, d’Annunzio also propagated Nietzsche’s ideas in literary 
form, especially in the novels that will be discussed in this study.  
The initial reception of Nietzsche’s writings was, perhaps understandably, somewhat 
superficial. In Germany, Hinton Thomas explains, the most quoted of Nietzsche’s works 
during the 1890s was Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus spake Zarathustra, 1883-85) – and 
citations were largely limited to the earlier and simpler parts of the text (1983, p. 3). In Italy 
the propagation of Nietzsche’s ideas was, at least initially, largely limited to articles in 
magazines and journals. These discussions were generally cursory, and failed to explore the 
wider implications of Nietzsche’s thought. Michelini notes that, in Italy, the Übermensch was 
received as if it were ‘il succo della filosofia di Nietzsche’30 (1978, p. 198); a sign, perhaps, 
that audiences were drawn to the most dynamic and (seemingly) straightforward of 
Nietzsche’s ideas, which were not always the most coherent, significant, or enduring ones. 
The result of the superficial and propagandistic treatment to which Nietzsche’s works were 
initially subjected in Italy (for example, by a series of articles in the journal Marzocco, 
between 1899 and 1904) resulted only in the propagation of a ‘caricatura’ (‘caricature’ [p. 
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 In particular underlinings and markings are to be found where Nietzsche offers statements regarding art and 
the artist, such as the section entitled ‘Zur Psychologie des Künstlers’ (‘Towards a Psychology of the Artist’ 
[GD-Streifzüge-8]) in Götzen-Dämmerung (Twilight of the Idols, 1889) and Nietzsche’s declaration (in the same 
book) that art is the great stimulus to life (GD-Streifzüge-24). In a book called Le idee fondamentale di Federico 
Nietzsche (The Fundamental Ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche), written by Francesco Orestano and published in 
1903, as well as underlining sections dealing with Nietzsche’s views regarding art d’Annunzio has also heavily 
marked sections citing Nietzsche’s pleas for us to live daringly and to embrace danger (such as FW-283).  
30
 ‘the core of Nietzsche’s philosophy’. 
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198]) during the first years of his fame (which began in high-society salons before reaching 
‘[il] mondo accademico ufficiale della cultura’31 [p. 18]) rather than provoking serious 
discussion of Nietzsche’s thinking.  
D’Annunzio’s impact on the propagation of Nietzsche’s thought in Italy was 
substantial: Witt describes d’Annunzio as ‘the major advocate of Nietzscheanism in Italy’ 
(2007, p. 30), and Michelini finds that ‘la grande propaganda che d’Annunzio fece della 
morale del Superuomo, obbligò quasi gli ambienti filosofici ad accorgersi di Nietzsche’32 
(1978, p. 221). It is telling, however, that the philosophers mentioned by Michelini neglect to 
reference d’Annunzio in their discussions of Nietzsche; it seems that while d’Annunzio may 
have flagged up Nietzsche’s name, and drawn attention to certain aspects of his thinking (in 
particular, the superuomo), he was (and largely still is) not really considered to have engaged 
with Nietzsche philosophically. Salinari notes that d’Annunzio ‘lascia cadere la parte più 
strettamente filosofica dell’opera nicciana’33 (1960, p. 80), commenting that he knew nothing 
of Hegel (p. 75). It is important to remember, however, that d’Annunzio’s treatment of 
Nietzsche is an artistic one: d’Annunzio adapted Nietzsche’s ideas into something that he 
found personally useful for his own literature, arguably engaging with Nietzsche not as a 
philosopher, but as a writer.  
Nietzsche’s arrival on Italy’s cultural landscape can be seen in the very first years of 
the twentieth century. In a 1902 edition of La rassegna internazionale, Remy de Gourmont 
contrasts ‘[il] superuomo di Nietzsche’34 (1902, p. 271) with Tolstoy’s ‘supercristiano’ 
(‘super-Christian’ [ibid.]), suggesting that readers are familiar enough with Nietzsche to be 
interested in the study, and in a 1903 edition of the same journal Jacobsen is able to speak of 
‘individualismo’ (‘individualism’ [1903, p. 343]) in literature as a sign of Nietzsche’s 
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 ‘[the] official academic world of culture’.  
32
 ‘the great propaganda that d’Annunzio made of the moral of the superuomo almost obliged the philosophical 
world to take notice of Nietzsche’. 
33
 ‘drops the most strictly philosophical part of Nietzsche’s works’. 
34
 ‘Nietzsche’s superuomo’. 
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influence. Heyer-Caput also cites Grazia Deledda as an early reader of Nietzsche, finding 
evidence of Deledda’s engagement with Nietzsche in her novel Cenere (Ashes, 1903), for 
example (2008, p. 10). 
Until around 1900 Italian philosophers remained aloof from the Nietzsche ‘vogue’ 
and refrained from discussing his ideas. Eventually, however, it became difficult for 
philosophers to ignore Nietzsche’s growing fame, and they began to consider his thought. 
Michelini gives a survey of the first Italian philosophers to engage with Nietzsche, listing 
Giacomo Barzellotti, Ettore Zoccoli and Francesco Orestano among them. Zoccoli’s, in 1898, 
was the first comprehensive study on Nietzsche to be published in Italy, and was thereafter 
seen as something of a reference point – treated, as Michelini comments, as if it were the only 
source on Nietzsche’s philosophy (1978, p. 179). His study (entitled Federico Nietzsche) was 
critical, accusing Nietzsche of dilettantism and claiming that his solitary stance was made 
necessary by his inability to understand the depths of the German soul (‘dal non aver voluto, 
o potuto penetrare nell'intima significazione dell’anima tedesca’35 [Zoccoli, 1898, p. 356]). 
Orestano, on the other hand, in his Le idee fondamentali di Federico Nietzsche (The 
Fundamental Ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche, 1903), a copy of which d’Annunzio owned and 
annotated, presented Nietzsche more enthusiastically. However, Orestano offered an 
‘idiosyncratic and distorted categorisation of Nietzsche’s works’ (Diethe, 2014, p. xiv), and 
failed to provide a comprehensive and objective explanation of Nietzsche’s ideas. Neither 
Zoccoli nor Orestano mention d’Annunzio, which suggests that d’Annunzio’s engagement 
with Nietzsche was not considered relevant in the field of philosophy. 
Croce, one of the protagonists of the reaction against positivism in Italy, was another 
of the earlier thinkers to discuss Nietzsche. Initially he found little in Nietzsche’s works 
which with he agreed; in 1903 for example, he accused Nietzsche of lacking a philosophical 
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 ‘from not wanting - or being unable - to penetrate the deep meaning of the German soul’.  
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system, which, Croce says, renders him uninteresting
36
. Die Geburt der Tragödie found 
favour with Croce, however, and in 1907 he wrote an essay for an Italian edition of the 
book.
37
 One of the very first Italian philosophers to engage with Nietzsche, and one who is 
frequently overlooked, is Angelo Conti, who was a close friend of d’Annunzio. In his La 
beata riva (The Blessed Shore, 1900), which takes the form of a dialogue between the 
characters Ariele (Conti’s alter ego) and Gabriele (generally understood to represent 
d’Annunzio), Nietzsche is mentioned several times, and always in complimentary terms. 
Conti’s text reveals a fairly superficial understanding of Nietzsche, however: references to 
Nietzsche’s works are limited to Die Geburt der Tragödie, and (Conti’s) Gabriele speaks of 
his fraternal identification with Nietzsche.
38
 While Conti’s text was lauded by d’Annunzio, it 
appears to have had little impact elsewhere, and is rarely discussed except in relation to 
Conti’s more famous friend. 
Among the first German philosophers to engage with Nietzsche were Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1833-1911) and Georg Simmel (1858-1918). Dilthey referred to Nietzsche for the 
first time in 1898 (as Behler notes [1991, p. 19]), in his Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels (The 
Story of Hegel’s Youth) and presented a study of him in his 1907 Das Wesen der Philosophie 
(The Essence of Philosophy). Simmel, who was lecturing on Nietzsche by 1902, wrote a book 
entitled Schopenhauer und Nietzsche (Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) in 1907. While no 
significant interaction is evident between the contemporaries Nietzsche and Dilthey (Hodges, 
2010, p. 107), Cooper explains that Simmel felt an affinity with Nietzsche (2008, p. 620). 
Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger and several members of the Frankfurt School (such as Ernst 
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 Croce writes, ‘[u]na costruzione filosofica, sia pure erronea, manca così al Nietzsche come al Tolstoi: il che li 
rende filosoficamente ben poco interessanti’ (‘a philosophical construction, even an erroneous one, is lacking in 
Nietzsche just as in Tolstoy; this renders [Nietzsche] of little interest philosophically’ [1903, p. 74]).  
37
 In the essay, Croce calls the book ‘genialissimo’ (‘exceedingly genius’ [Croce, 1907, p. 311]), and a truly 
poetic philosophy; he predicts that the book will be ‘generalmente riconosciuto’ (‘generally recognised’ [p. 
312]), and find many readers in Italy (p. 314). 
38
 Gabriele says, ‘ciò che mi ha colpito in Federico Nietzsche è stato il far la conoscenza d’un’anima tragica, 
affine alla mia, fraterna alla mia anima’ (‘what struck me in Friedrich Nietzsche was becoming acquainted with 
a tragic soul, akin to my own, fraternal to my own soul’ [Conti, 1900, p. 131]). 
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Bloch and Theodor Adorno) make up some of the more prominent German philosophers and 
thinkers who engaged with Nietzsche later on, from the 1920s onwards. Nietzsche’s place in 
Western philosophy was finally being secured – even if European philosophers were slightly 
slower than artists and writers in taking his legacy seriously.
39
 
While Mann was not as instrumental in the recognition of Nietzsche’s thought in 
Germany as d’Annunzio had been in Italy (he wrote no journalistic articles championing 
Nietzsche’s thought while the philosopher was still unknown, for example), he was, like 
d’Annunzio, an early reader of Nietzsche. A notebook from 1908-1909 claims that Mann 
read Nietzsche for the first time aged nineteen (Mann turned nineteen in June 1894).
40
 
Lehnert notes that the articles Mann wrote for his school newspaper, Frühlingssturm,
41
 
during the early 1890s demonstrate Nietzsche’s impact on Mann, finding ‘an affinity with, 
one could even say a strong influence of, Nietzsche’s thinking’ (in Lehnert and Wessell, 
2004, p. 30). In particular, a trace of Nietzsche seems evident in an essay entitled ‘Heinrich 
Heine, der “Gute”’ (‘Heinrich Heine, the “Good Man”’, 1893). Here Mann declares his 
philosophical position, ‘von dem ich die Wörter “gut” und “schlecht” als soziale 
Aushängeschilder ohne jede philosophische Bedeutung und als Begriffe betrachte, deren 
theoretischer Wert nicht größer ist als derjenige der Begriffe “oben” und “unten.”’42 (Mann, 
2002b, p. 21) By 1901 Mann was attending Nietzsche evenings, indicating both Mann’s 
interest and the hold that Nietzsche’s thought had established in cultural circles by this time.  
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 Hugo von Hofmannsthal was writing to Schnitzler about Nietzsche in 1891, for example; Rainer Maria Rilke 
was showing clear signs of engaging with Nietzsche during the 1890s (Hillebrand, 2000, p. 78); and, as Frida 
notes, Frank Wedekind was dealing with Nietzschean themes in his Der Kammersänger (The Chamber Singer, 
1897) and Der Marquis von Keith (The Marquis of Keith, 1900) (1972, p. 722). 
40
 Mann writes: ‘[n]ichts von brennenderem Interesse, als die Kritik der Modernität: das fühlte ich schon mit 
neunzehn, als ich zum erste Male Nietzsche’s Wagner-Kritik las’ (‘Nothing is of more burning interest than the 
critique of modernity: I felt that already at nineteen, when I read Nietzsche’s Wagner-critique for the first time’ 
[1991, p. 181]). 
41
 Winston notes that the title of this magazine, which translates as ‘Spring Storm’, may be a reference to 
Wedekind’s Frühlingserwachen (Spring’s Awakening, 1906) (1981, p. 44). 
42
 ‘from which I view the words “goodˮ and “badˮ as social pretences without any philosophical meaning, and 
as terms whose theoretical value is no greater than those terms “above ˮ and “underneathˮ.’  
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 Both Mann and d’Annunzio were (as will be seen throughout this thesis) deeply 
affected by their encounter with Nietzsche and his thought;
43
 but while d’Annunzio’s views 
on Nietzsche must largely be determined from his fictional writings (as well as the two 
magazine articles mentioned earlier), Mann’s numerous essays, lectures, letters and 
notebooks clarify his reception of Nietzsche. Naturally, Mann’s own accounts of Nietzsche’s 
impact on him and his works must be critically evaluated, but they can still prove useful. 
Mann declared that one of his deepest affinities with Nietzsche was ‘als Prosaisten und 
Psychologen auf allen Stufen seines Lebens’44 (1974, p. 541). It was the Nietzsche who 
offered psychological critiques of decadence that most appealed to Mann; indeed, Nietzsche’s 
treatment of decadence is a major area of common interest between Mann and d’Annunzio, 
and an element of ambiguity arguably characterises the attitudes of all three towards 
decadence. Nietzsche portrays decadence variously as part of the natural processes of decay 
and renewal that actually stimulate health and life,
45
 and, conversely, as irreversible decline 
that is to be fought in the name of health or life.
46
 Mann and d’Annunzio treat decadence in a 
similarly enigmatic way, and while we will find, in their fiction, decadence portrayed as a 
deathly and pernicious phenomenon, they are also both clearly drawn to decadent subjects 
and relish their portrayal.  
 While Mann frequently spoke and wrote of the significant impact Nietzsche had had 
upon his own literature, d’Annunzio remained more vague, even attempting to minimise the 
extent to which Nietzsche had affected him. In a memorial poem written after Nietzsche’s 
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 Mann’s discovery of Nietzsche had been a personal one, and in his 1947 lecture, Nietzsches Philosophie im 
Lichte unserer Erfahrung (Nietzsche’s Philosophy in the Light of our Experience) Mann speaks of a 
‘Verwandtschaftʼ (‘kinship’) that was ‘früh empfundenʼ (‘experienced early’ [2009, p. 186]). 
44
 ‘as a prose writer and psychologist in all stages of his life’. 
45
 In a note Nietzsche states: ‘Die décadence selbst ist nichts, was zu bekämpfen wäre: sie ist absolut 
nothwendig und jeder Zeit und jedem Volk eigen’ (‘Decadence itself is nothing to be fought: it is absolutely 
necessary and unique to every time and every people’ [NF-1888, 15 (31)]). 
46
 In his Der Fall Wagner in particular, he uses the term ‘decadent’ in a highly negative sense. 
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death (Per la morte di un distruttore
47
 [Upon the Death of a Destroyer, 1903]), for example, 
d’Annunzio suggests that his encounter with Nietzsche’s ideas was an experience of 
recognition, not discovery, and that a fraternal affinity existed between him and the 
philosopher.
48
 Elsewhere d’Annunzio declares that he was ‘Nietzschean’ before even reading 
any of the philosopher’s works,49 suggesting that he had been so drawn to Nietzsche’s works 
because they echoed his own thoughts back to him. Carravetta notes that this statement has 
largely gone unchallenged, and that ‘it is now an accepted truism even among unsympathetic 
critics that D’Annunzio was “Nietzschean” ante litteram’ (1991, p. 79). In fact, d’Annunzio 
rarely admits to having come under the influence of other writers and thinkers, and his claims 
must be taken with a pinch of salt. It is true, however, that some of d’Annunzio’s works 
written before his encounter with Nietzsche (such as Il piacere) demonstrate an engagement 
with themes that he would later read about in Nietzsche (such as the confrontation between 
the individual and the masses, the conflict between decadence and vitality, and the need to 
create oneself and one’s life as a work of art). It is perhaps because of a pre-existing affinity 
of some kind that d’Annunzio was able to add new material to his Il trionfo della morte when 
he first encountered Nietzsche: while d’Annunzio’s article ‘La bestia elettiva’ was published 
in 1892, Hughes-Hallett informs us that d’Annunzio had begun preliminary work on Il trionfo 
della morte as early as 1889 (2013, p. 193).  
Mann is more open than d’Annunzio regarding his literary relationships. In particular, 
in his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen and his lecture of 1947, Nietzsches Philosophie im 
Lichte unserer Erfahrung (Nietzsche’s Philosophy in the Light of our Experience), he 
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 This can be found in the second book of d’Annunzio’s Laudi del cielo del mare, della terra e degli eroi (In 
Praise of the sky, of the sea, of the earth and of the heroes: I-III, 1903; IV, 1912; and V, 1918), which is entitled 
Elettra (Electra). 
48
 D’Annunzio writes: ‘riconobbi i suoi pensieri / fraterni come il navigatore / ansio riconosce i verzieri / d’Italia 
da lungi all’odore / che gli recano i vènti’ (‘I recognised his thoughts / as fraternal, like the anxious navigator / 
who recognises the gardens / of Italy from afar by their scent / which the winds carry to him’ [d’Annunzio, 
1920, p. 136]).  
49
 Piga informs us that d’Annunzio affirms, ‘in una lettera al Morello dell’ottobre 1895, di essere stato niciano 
ancor prima di conoscere Nietzsche’ (1979, p. 120).  
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explains the profound impact that Nietzsche had upon him and his literature. Mann states 
explicitly, for example, that by the time he wrote Tonio Kröger, which Winston tells us Mann 
began in 1901 (1981, p. 140), he had come under the influence of Nietzsche.
50
 Mann’s high 
regard for Nietzsche is demonstrated in his veneration of Nietzsche, Wagner, and 
Schopenhauer as a ‘Dreigestirn ewig verbundener Geister’51 (1974, p. 72), a trinity of kindred 
spirits whom Mann esteemed (though not uncritically). 
 In this thesis, it is d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s shared engagement with Nietzsche’s 
treatment of art that forms the essential point of comparison between the two writers. Their 
fictional portrayals of creativity demonstrate a deep involvement with Nietzsche’s thoughts 
regarding art and the artist, as will be seen throughout this thesis. One of Nietzsche’s most 
fundamental assertions regarding art is its dependence upon the relationship of the 
psychological and creative impulses symbolised by Apollo and Dionysus, a notion which is 
often reflected in the works of d’Annunzio and Mann. The impetus to creativity that 
Nietzsche assigns to his Dionysian is evident in all of the texts under study, and, in most, 
provides the pivotal axiom around which the artist’s experience revolves. The crucial 
significance that Nietzsche attaches to art and the creative process is also reflected by 
d’Annunzio and Mann, whose artists are compelled towards creativity. The fictional artists 
considered are artists by necessity rather than choice, whose very survival (or not, as the case 
may be) is often bound up with their experience of the Dionysian.  
Witt finds that there are two main areas of interest for d’Annunzio in Nietzsche’s 
legacy, both of which touch upon art: firstly, the sexualisation of artistic creation in general, 
and tragedy in particular; and secondly, support for an aesthetic, as opposed to a moral, 
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 ‘[...] während in “Buddenbrooksˮ nur der Schopenhauer-Wagner’sche Einfluß, der ethisch-pessimistisch und 
der episch-musikalische, sich hatte geltend machen können, in “Tonio Krögerˮ das Nietzsche’sche 
Bildungselement zum Durchbruch kam’ (‘[...] while in “Buddenbrooksˮ only the Schopenhauer-Wagnerian 
influence, the ethical-pessimistic and the epic-musical, could have asserted themselves, in “Tonio Krögerˮ the 
effect of a Nietzschean education broke through’ [1974, p. 91]). 
51
 ‘triumvirate of eternally bound spirits’.  
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significance of tragedy (2007, p. 87).
 
Witt indicates that ‘like other fin-de-siècle aesthetes, 
d’Annunzio misreads Nietzsche’s celebrated statement that the world can be justified only as 
an aesthetic phenomenon
52
 by interpreting it to mean that art must replace religion as the 
foundation for the rebirth of tragedy’ (p. 76). D’Annunzio might therefore be placed 
alongside names such as Walter Pater, Charles Baudelaire and Gustave Moreau, for 
subscribing to the principle of art for art’s sake.53 Yet while d’Annunzio certainly does 
venerate art and beauty as a devoted aesthete at certain stages of his writing, at other periods 
in his life he can only be described as a man of action, who promotes art driven by politics, 
for example, and not empty aestheticism. Mann does not share d’Annunzio’s (or the 
aesthetes’) interpretation of Nietzsche’s famed statement (in which the world is justified as 
only as an aesthetic phenomenon), and is possibly even more suspicious than Nietzsche of the 
worship of beauty. He is certainly uncomfortable with the notion of art divorced entirely from 
morality, but, similarly, is equally disdainful of overly engaged art, art for politics’ sake.  
 In his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen Mann attacks both pure aestheticism and 
what he calls the Zivilisationsliterat. Mann states, ‘daß ich mit diesem unzweifelhaft auf 
Nietzsches “Lebens-Romantik” zurückgehenden Äesthetizismus, welcher zur Zeit meiner 
Anfänge in Blüte fand, niemals […] das Geringste zu schaffen gehabt habe’54 (1974, p. 539). 
He does note however, that this does not mean that it did not occupy his thoughts. He also 
distances himself from the ‘ästhetizistischen Renaissance-Nietzscheanismus’55 (ibid.) that he 
observed around him, and that seemed to him ‘eine knabenhaft mißverständliche Nachfolge 
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 In Die Geburt der Tragödie Nietzsche states that ‘nur als aesthetisches Phänomen ist das Dasein und die Welt 
ewig gerechtfertigt’ (‘only as an aesthetic phenomenon are existence and the world eternally justified’ [GT-5]) 
and later repeats that ‘nur als ein aesthetisches Phänomen [erscheint] das Dasein und die Welt gerechtfertigt’ 
(‘only as an aesthetic phenomenon do existence and the world seem justified’ [GT-24]). 
53
 Théophile Gautier had made famous the slogan ‘l’art pour l’art’ both in his novels and in his editorship of the 
review L’Artiste. See Aaron Schaffer, ‘Théophile Gautier and “L’Art Pour L’Art”’, The Sewanee Review, 36 
(1928), pp. 405-417. 
54
 ‘that I have never had anything to do with this aestheticism that undoubtedly harks back to Nietzsche’s “life”-
romanticism that was in full bloom when I started writing’. He does note however, that this does not mean that it 
did not occupy his thoughts. 
55
 ‘aesthetic, renaissance-Nietzscheanism’. 
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Nietzsches’56 (ibid.). Mann reveals his disdain for pure aestheticism, entirely divorced from 
social responsibility (and, equally abhorrent, for aestheticism that is overtly political and 
turns to warmongering – such as that of Gabriele d’Annunzio57), which claims kinship with 
Nietzsche. Mann particularly detested readings of Nietzsche that he considered superficial. 
His brother, Heinrich, comes under attack for this: in a letter to Richard Schaukal from 1903, 
Mann mentions (but does not name) one of his brother’s novels and complains, ‘[m]it 
welcher Oberflächlichkeit ist überhaupt in dem ganzen Buch Nietzsche verstanden!’58 (2003, 
p. 61). Mann even declares that ‘[s]elbst mit dem d’Annunzio fühlte ich mich noch 
verwandter’59 (ibid.), which is, of course, no great compliment to either writer. 
 Nietzsche’s treatment of art is imbued with both psychology and mythology. The 
impulses symbolised by the ancient Greek deities of Apollo and Dionysus (discussed below) 
act upon their initiates’ psychology, and Nietzsche’s later description of Die Geburt der 
Tragödie highlights the text’s psychological innovations.60 The fruitful combination of 
mythology and psychology was lauded by Thomas Mann, for whom the formula ‘Mythos 
plus Psychologie’61 (cited in Dierks, 1991, p. 9) became a maxim. His adherence to this 
formula is clear, especially in Der Tod in Venedig’s Aschenbach, whose turbulent experience 
of the Dionysian hastens his death. The formula could also be applied to d’Annunzio, 
especially given that Mann intends us to understand ‘myth’ as encompassing ‘legend, history, 
and the literary traditions of the most recent past’ (von Gronicka, 1956, p. 191). In Il fuoco, 
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 ‘a puerilely mistaken emulation of Nietzsche’. 
57
 Mann writes, ‘Aber woher nehme ich das Wort, um ein Maß von Verständnislosigkeit, Staunen, Abscheu, 
Verachtung zu bezeichnen, wie ich es angesichts des lateinischen Dichter-Politikers und Kriegsrufers vom Typ 
des Gabriele d'Annunzio empfinde?’ (‘But where do I find a word to portray the measure of incomprehension, 
astonishment, revulsion, contempt, that I feel towards the Latin poet-politician and warmongerer Gabriele 
d’Annunzio?’ [1977, p. 577]) For a discussion of Thomas Mann’s view on the engagement of the writer with 
society and politics, see, for example, Horst Daemmrich, ‘Friedrich Schiller and Thomas Mann: Parallels in 
Aesthetics’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 24, (1965), pp. 227-249. 
58
 ‘with what superficiality is Nietzsche understood in the book!’  
59
 ‘I even felt myself closer to d’Annunzio’. 
60
 ‘ein Buch vielleicht für Künstler [...], voller psychologischer Neuerungen und Artisten-Heimlichkeiten’ (‘a 
book for artists, maybe [...], full of psychological innovations and artist’s secrets’ [GT-Selbstkritik-2]). 
61
 ‘myth plus psychology’. 
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for example, mythological symbolism (especially Dionysus) is used to illuminate the 
psychology of the artist and his muse.  
 Inseparably bound up with Nietzsche’s discussion of art is his critique of Richard 
Wagner. The relationship between Wagner and Nietzsche, which was so cordial in 1872, had 
famously soured by the late 1870s. Nietzsche’s Der Fall Wagner, published in 1888, attacks 
Wagner as a personification of the detrimental side of decadence, namely, decadence as an 
illness that goes untreated, and instead of strengthening the body, overwhelms it with decay 
(for example, § 5). For anyone who engages with Nietzsche’s views on art, a confrontation 
with Wagner is necessary, and in the works of d’Annunzio and Mann this confrontation plays 
a prominent role.  
Mann’s ranking of Nietzsche alongside Wagner and Schopenhauer in a ‘Dreigestirn 
ewig verbundener Geister’62 has already been noted. In fact Mann declared that ‘der 
Nietzsche, der mir eigentlich galt und [...] am tiefsten auf mich wirken mußte, war der 
Wagnern und Schopenhauern noch ganz Nahe oder immer nahe Gebliebene’63 (1974, p. 541). 
It was not only in Nietzsche but also in Wagner that Mann found the combination of myth 
and psychology. Mann’s admiration for Wagner was not unqualified, however: Reed points 
out that Mann ‘read Nietzsche’s writings on Wagner at the age of nineteen, and the suspicion 
which inevitably resulted – of Wagner’s methods and motives, of his effects on German 
culture and later politics – remained with Mann permanently’ (Reed, 1974, p. 77). In a letter 
to Hermann Hesse, in April 1910, Mann confesses something like this:  
Nietzsche spricht einmal von Wagners “wechselnder Optikˮ: bald in Hinsicht auf die gröbsten 
Bedürfnisse, bald in Hinsicht auf die raffiniertesten. Dies ist der Einfluß, den ich meine, und 
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 ‘triumvirate of eternally bound spirits’.  
63
 ‘the Nietzsche who really mattered to me and […] affected me most deeply, was the one who was still very 
close, and remained so, to Wagner and Schopenhauer’. 
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ich weiß nicht, ob ich je den Willen finden werden, mich seiner völlig zu entschlagen
64
 
(2002a, p. 449).   
As will be seen in subsequent chapters, Mann (like Nietzsche) often employs Wagner’s music 
as a symbol for the dangers of art, and particularly of that art that strays into the dangerous 
ground of decadence, where death and beauty are worshipped side-by-side. Yet while Mann 
found reason to approach Wagner’s music cautiously, he also attended performances of 
Tristan und Isolde (Tristan and Isolde, premiered 1865) several times during his lifetime.  
 D’Annunzio arguably adopts a more critical stance regarding Nietzsche’s Wagner-
critique, which he discusses at length in his ‘Il caso Wagner’. He defends Wagner against 
some of Nietzsche’s charges, insisting, for example, that Wagner, as all artists must, 
expressed the spirit and customs of his era.
65
 In Il fuoco, while the dramas of Wagner are 
lauded as ‘il fiore supremo del genio d’una stirpe’66 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 286), the 
protagonist, Stelio Effrena, recognises that they are distinctly northern in character, and 
would be less powerful in the Mediterranean, outside their home in Bayreuth. In Il trionfo 
della morte, d’Annunzio’s position on the conflict between Nietzsche and Wagner will be 
seen to be played out as a psychological struggle within the protagonist, Giorgio Aurispa: 
while he longs to affirm life as Nietzsche instructs, he is instead seduced by Wagner’s 
worship of beauty and death. Like Mann, d’Annunzio took great pleasure in hearing 
Wagner’s music performed throughout his life, sometimes obsessively.67  
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 ‘Nietzsche speaks at one point of Wagner’s “alternating perspective”: sometimes in regard of the crudest 
needs, sometimes in regard of the most refined ones. This is the influence that I hold, and I do not know if I 
shall ever find the will to free myself fully of it.’  
65
 ‘L'opera d'arte è determinata dalle condizioni generali dello spirito e dei costumi presenti nell'epoca. Ora, lo 
sviluppo straordinario della musica nel nostro tempo è promosso da certe speciali condizioni dello spirito 
pubblico’ (‘The work of art is determined by the general conditions of the spirit and of the customs of the epoch. 
Now, the extraordinary development of the music of our time is promoted by certain special conditions of the 
public spirit’ [d’Annunzio, in Valenti, 1994, p. 58])  
66
 ‘the supreme flower of the genius of a race’. 
67
 As d’Annunzio was not a musician, however, he relied on others to play the music for him, and, as Hughes-
Hallett reports, repeatedly prevailed upon the composer Niccolò van Westerhout to play the whole of Tristan 
und Isolde (2013, p. 23). 
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 In the conflict between Nietzsche and Wagner, d’Annunzio sees Nietzsche (along 
with his Zarathustra and Dionysus) as a philosopher of life-affirmation, healthy will and 
strength. These characteristics are instilled into d’Annunzio’s superuomo, his own version of 
the Übermensch. By contrast, this was an idea that repelled Mann. In his Betrachtungen eines 
Unpolitischen Mann relates that he saw Nietzsche as a kind of ‘Meister’ (‘master’ [1974, p. 
79]), but as a psychologist of decadence, not as the prophet of a vague Übermensch (ibid.). 
D’Annunzio’s superuomo develops over several novels, demonstrating his departure from the 
world of languid decadence to one inhabited by virile men of action. While Andrea Sperelli 
of Il piacere could be described as the archetypal decadent, later protagonists (like Stelio 
Effrena of Il fuoco) demonstrate strength of will, a resilience towards suffering that allows 
them to affirm life, and a virility that distances them from the effeminate dandy. These later 
protagonists are d’Annunzio’s superuomini. Unlike Nietzsche’s Übermensch, however, they 
display nationalistic drives, and aim to use their superhuman strength for the artistic (and 
political) glorification of Italy.  
While Nietzsche sees a possibility only for male Übermenschen (woman bears the 
responsibility only of giving birth to the Übermensch
68
), commentators have identified a 
female version of the superuomo – the ‘superfemmina’– in d’Annunzio’s works. Although 
d’Annunzio’s most well-known superuomini are, indeed, men, and although his initial forays 
into the trope of the superhuman were conducted through male protagonists (Le vergini delle 
rocce’s Claudio Cantelmo and Il fuoco’s Stelio Effrena, for example), females resembling the 
superuomo can certainly be found, especially in d’Annunzio’s theatrical works. Woodhouse 
finds d’Annunzio’s Phaedra (from his play, Fedra [Phaedra, 1909]) to be a ‘superwoman’ 
(2001, p. 242); Witt comments upon the ‘superfemmina’ (2001, p. 67) of La nave (The Ship, 
first performed in 1909), the bloodthirsty, vengeful Basiliola; and Laffi and Nardi speak of ‘la 
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 In Also sprach Zarathustra Zarathustra instructs woman: ‘Eure Hoffnung heisse: “möge ich den 
Übermenschen gebären!ˮ’ (‘Let your hope be: “may I give birth to the Übermensch!”’ [Za-I-Weiblein]). 
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sostituzione del Superuomo con la Superfemmina’ (1974, p. 29), which they find is initiated 
in La Gioconda (The Gioconda, premiered in 1905) and completed in La gloria (The Glory, 
performed once, in 1899) (ibid.). Hughes-Hallett does not use the word ‘superfemmina’ (or 
‘superwoman’) to refer to La nave’s Basiliola, but provides a description of her 
characterisation and behaviour that emphasises the figure’s ‘superhuman’ aspects:  
Basiliola […] is an avenging demon. Her father and brothers have all been blinded for their 
treachery […]. Now she hopes to destroy their rivals, another pair of brothers whom she 
seduces one after another with a lascivious ballet-cum-striptease in which she unsheathes her 
body like the lethal weapon it is (2013, p. 297).  
Witt also notes that while Basiliola is the antagonist in this play, and that ultimately it is her 
rival, Marco, who triumphs, Marco ‘lacks depth and interest’ (2001, p. 69), and Basiliola is 
‘far more interesting’ (ibid.). While d’Annunzio’s superuomo is always a creative individual, 
however, the superfemmina does not share his artistic talent or aspirations. Indeed, 
destruction seems more to characterise the activity of the d’Annunzian superfemmina, as is 
certainly the case with La nave’s Basiliola. The superuomo is always sympathetically 
portrayed as a triumphant figure who campaigns for national glory, but the superfemmine 
noted here are generally antagonistic to the male characters with whom they share the stage, 
and pursue a personal (often retributive) agenda. The trope of the hostile woman, who 
impedes (or threatens to impede) the ambitions of the creative male will be seen in the texts 
under discussion in this thesis, although the superfemmina has not yet emerged, and during 
the period under consideration d’Annunzio’s attentions are fixed firmly on the superuomo. 
Furthermore, the superuomo is far more prominent in d’Annunzio’s works than the (slightly 
later) superfemmina, featuring in a greater number of works. 
 Explanations for d’Annunzio’s emphasis on the superuomo at the turn of the century 
must surely take into account the socio-political situation of the time. Salinari, for example, 
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finds that the ‘antigiolittismo’ (‘anti-Giolittism’ [1960, p. 61]) of the turn of the century may 
have created the need for a heroic, macho figure. As Salinari points out, ‘Giolitti non è un 
superuomo, si trova meglio fra le carte di un ministero che alla testa di eserciti vittoriosi’69 
(1960, p. 61). Dissatisfaction with Giolitti’s government fostered a feeling that something 
was missing from the new Italy – ‘ed era appunto la gloria delle armi’70 (p. 44). 
D’Annunzio’s superuomo aimed to provide both a militaristic, nationalistic hero, or role 
model, behind whom Italians could rally, and a masculine figure of might and power. The 
superuomo may also have been a reaction to the decadent trend for emasculated males: 
writers like Swinburne and Pater, two of the protagonists of British decadence, for example, 
had attempted to ‘reimagine masculinity at the margins of conventional middle-class notions 
of manliness’ – which they did through use of ‘androgynous beauty and […] homoeroticism’ 
(Morgan, 1996, p. 140). Thomas Mann arguably parodies this male persona, for example, in 
the figure of Detlev Spinell in Tristan. After several, somewhat effeminate, decadent ‘heroes’ 
(like Andrea Sperelli and Giorgio Aurispa), d’Annunzio appears to have distanced himself 
from themes of degeneration, inertia, and pure aestheticism, in order to promote action, 
machismo and dominance; his own needs appear to have matched those he perceived in his 
countrymen, leading to the birth of the D’Annunzian superuomo in Il fuoco.  
 D’Annunzio’s superuomo appears to have been well received by ordinary readers; 
Rhodes explains how Il fuoco (whose protagonist is d’Annunzio’s first fully-fledged 
superuomo) propelled d’Annunzio to Europe-wide fame, and that, ‘[f]inancially, too, it was 
his greatest success, translated into six languages’ (Rhodes, 1959, p. 101). Critics, however, 
reacted – and still react – less favourably towards the superuomo. Ladenarda, for example, 
called for d’Annunzio’s arrest,71 accusing him of having stolen and mutilated the idea of the 
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 ‘Giolitti is no superuomo, he is more at home amongst the papers of a ministry than at the head of victorious 
armies’.  
70
 ‘and this was glory in arms’. 
71
 ‘Carabinieri, arrestate il d'Annunzio!’ (‘Police, arrest d’Annunzio!’ [1914, p. 79]). 
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superuomo from Nietzsche. He names d’Annunzio ‘un vanesio, un poseur, un istrione, un 
ciarlatano’72 (1914, p. 76) and his superuomo an ‘aborrimento assoluto’73 (p. 75). The notion 
of a superuomo also appears to have gained relatively little purchase in Italian literature and 
art. Vittorini (1929) explains how, at the beginning of the twentieth century (as, in fact, 
happens with each generation, he writes), young Italian writers (like Luigi Pirandello, 
Giovanni Papini and Giuseppe Prezzolini) in search of new currents broke with those who 
had dominated the literary landscape in recent years (like Carducci, Verga and d’Annunzio); 
such was the magnitude of these established figures, however, that the new generation of 
writers were practically obliged to respond to them. Thus we find groups such as the Futurists 
and Crepuscular poets who dealt with similar matters to d’Annunzio, but produced very 
different results.  
Marinetti and his futurists were, by their own admission, familiar with Nietzsche, and 
many critics have deemed Marinetti’s Mafarka (Mafarka le Futuriste [Mafarka the Futurist, 
1910]) to be a superuomo with strong affinities to Nietzsche’s Übermensch.74 The futurist 
Primo Conti praised Nietzsche for his ‘capacità di rinnovarsi, di liberarci finalmente da ciò 
che ci aggroviglia, di mettere in dubbio tutto ciò che era stato acquisito sino ad allora’75 (cited 
in Lambiase, 1978, p. 95); yet in their indiscriminate revolt against the stuffy and antiquated 
world of academia, and in their violent rejection of all that had preceded them, the Futurists 
found that, ultimately, even Nietzsche had to be overthrown. Berghaus notes that Marinetti 
fell foul of the usual common misinterpretations of Nietzsche’s thought (2006, p. 24), and 
that, alongside the Übermensch, Marinetti was attracted to Nietzsche’s Will to Power. These 
were the same two ideas that were most frequently taken up by those engaging with 
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 ‘a fop, a poseur, a histrionic, a charlatan’. 
73
 ‘absolute abhorrence’.  
74
 Blum finds Mafarka to ‘[incorporate] both the unfettered sovereignty/vitality of an exotic individual and the 
empowering forces of progress’ (2002, p. 147). 
75
 ‘capacity for self-renewal, for freeing us from that within which we are entangled, for questioning all that has 
been learned until now’. 
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Nietzsche’s thought (ibid.). The Futurist superuomo was characterised by overt masculinity, 
which, perhaps like that of d’Annunzio, provided a virile foil to the effeminate males of the 
fin-de-siècle – Blum speaks of Marinetti’s superuomo as a response to ‘the embattled 
masculine self’ (2002, p. 76), against which d’Annunzio’s superuomo is also arguably 
erected. The threat to this masculine self is linked to the fin-de-siècle concerns explored 
earlier: ‘anxieties about looming threats, such as the massification of society, racial 
“degeneration” and, most notably, the dissolution of sexual identity’ (Blum, 2014, p. 89). 
Strength, masculinity and dynamism would characterise the Futurists’ reaction to such 
threats.  
The Futurists also declared themselves opposed to d’Annunzio’s legacy, although 
Marinetti had initially admired d’Annunzio. Marinetti violently defended d’Annunzio’s La 
città morta (The Dead City, 1898) against disapproving critics in 1901, and one of the 
Futurist soirées was held in honour of d’Annunzio (Hughes-Hallett, 2013, p. 308). 
D’Annunzio’s and Marinetti’s common use of the superuomo also ties them together to a 
certain extent– the fame of d’Annunzio’s superuomo meant that the Futurists could not have 
been unaware of it – as does their embrace of nationalism and pursuit of Italian glory. 
Marinetti eventually abandoned his earlier praise for d’Annunzio, however, finding him too 
passé, and characterised him thus in a diary entry: ‘è rimasto l’esteta. Maniaco di bel gesto, 
prigioniero delle belle frasi e degli uomini mediocri che lo incensano e favoriscano le sue 
manie’76 (Marinetti, 1987, p. 439). Similarly, in their 1914 futurist manifesto, Corra and 
Settimelli demand that d’Annunzio (and others) be put on trial for fraud (cited in Poggi, 
Rainey and Wittman, 2009, p. 185). D’Annunzio certainly had an impact upon the Italian 
Futurists; but he ultimately provoked hostility and reaction, rather than emulation, and the 
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 ‘[h]e has remained an aesthete, a maniac of elegant gestures, a prisoner to beautiful phrases and to men of 
mediocre status who flatter him and foster his mania’. 
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Futurists did their best to distance themselves from d’Annunzio’s legacy while still 
responding to similar anxieties, sometimes with similar techniques.  
The Crepuscular poets also responded to d’Annunzio, and Ghidetti notes that their 
works were characterised by ‘l“effetto di antidannunzianesimo”’77 (1977, p. 212). Their 
response to the fin-de-siècle concerns that motivated d’Annunzio (and the Futurists) led in the 
opposite direction, and instead of exalting the epic and heroic they praised the everyday, the 
melancholy, ‘la nuda prosaicità della vita borghese’78 (p. 213). Resisting the machoism and 
daring of the superuomo, they erected figures of impotence and despondency, like Gozzano’s 
Totò Merùmeni (which appears in I colloqui [The Discussions, 1911]). Italo Svevo produces 
a similar figure to oppose the superuomo, one of sheer ineptitude (l’inetto, ‘the inept one’), 
exemplified by the protagonist of La coscienza di Zeno (Zeno’s Conscience, 1923).79 The 
Crepusculars’ interests also lay in illness and decay as opposed to strength and virile health. 
But, as with the Futurists, many critics find an enduring element of d’Annunzianism in the 
Crepuscular’s poetics: Ambrosini claimed that Gozzano never ceased to be d’Annunzian 
(‘non cessa egli di essere dannunziano’80 [1926, p. 296]), and Podavini finds Palazzeschi 
(who is also counted among the Futurist poets) to have been influenced by d’Annunzio’s 
poetics (2012, p. 45). 
Another of the most prominent strands of d’Annunzio’s Nietzsche reception was the 
Dionysian. While the idea of the superuomo was to be taken up by the Futurists (and resisted 
by the Crepuscular poets), the Dionysian appears to have been largely neglected after 
d’Annunzio. Indeed, it is difficult to find the name ‘Dionysus’ in Italian literature in the 
decades following d’Annunzio. The term ‘Dionysian’ is used sparsely (and ornamentally) by 
Maria Savi Lopez, Alfredo Panzini and Giuseppe Vanicola, and more frequently by Guido da 
                                                          
77
 ‘the “anti-d’Annunzian-effect”’. 
78
 ‘the naked prosaicality of bourgeois life’. 
79
 As Baldi notes, Svevo’s earlier protagonists actually recall some of d’Annunzio’s earlier characters, such as 
failed superuomo Giorgio Aurispa (1996, p. 125). 
80
 ‘he never ceases to be d’Annunzian’. 
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Verona and Renzo Novatore. Da Verona was a follower of Nietzsche and imitated 
d’Annunzio; Magri even speaks of a ‘dipendenza’ (‘dependence’ [2005, p. 46]) on 
d’Annunzio. Da Verona’s La vita comincia domani (Life Begins Tomorrow, 1913) is his most 
‘Nietzschean’ text, according to Magri, and shows adhesion to the idea of the Übermensch 
(Magri, p. 63). For da Verona the Dionysian had a similar meaning as for d’Annunzio, linked 
with intoxication, pleasure, delirium and excesses.  
In Germany, Mann’s success and prestige was at least equal to that of d’Annunzio. As 
Richard Winston notes, his first book Buddenbrooks
81
 (1901) had sold 30,000 copies by 1904 
(Winston and Winston, 1975, p. xvii) and in 1929 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Literature, principally for that first novel. His Der Tod in Venedig was reviewed more than 
forty times during the first two years after its publication (Shookman, 2003, p. 12).  
In German literature, the idea of the Dionysian does not appear to have had much 
resonance after Mann. Pütz tries to account for the apparent lack of ‘impact’ (‘Wirkung’) of 
Mann’s writing, noting that ‘Von Thomas Manns Wirkung sprechen, heißt also in erster Linie 
an diejenigen denken, die ihm nicht folgten, sondern sich von ihm entfernten’82 (1977, p. 
456). He cites figures like Arno Schmidt and Jürgen Becker, who, Pütz explains, in contrast 
to Mann, ‘hielten sich [...] weniger streng an die traditionellen Gattungsbestimmungen der 
Epik’83 (p. 457). This echoes Vittorini’s findings that d’Annunzio (like Carducci and Verga) 
became, for young Italian writers, a phenomenon against which to react, rather than to 
imitate. While the Dionysian can be found in the works of Mann’s German contemporaries 
(such as Hesse and Rilke), the idea appears to have gradually disappeared from artistic life in 
Germany. 
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 According to Richards, Buddenbrooks was the best-selling book in Germany during the period 1915-1940 by 
a considerable margin; Richards reports that it sold 1,305,000 copies during this period (1968, p. 55). 
82
 ‘to speak of Thomas Mann’s impact means, first and foremost, thinking about those who did not follow him, 
but distanced themselves from him’.  
83
 ‘stuck less strictly to the traditional category-designations of the epic’. 
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Both Mann and d’Annunzio engage critically and creatively with Nietzsche, and just 
as Witt notes that d’Annunzio did not interpret Nietzsche ‘slavishly’ (2007, p. 99), the same 
can be said of Mann. In the case of both, Nietzsche’s ideas appear to have chimed with their 
own thoughts. Neither writer merely reproduces Nietzsche’s ideas in his literature, and both 
are discriminate in what they chose to engage with.  
Nietzsche’s Dionysian, which so interested both d’Annunzio and Mann, and which 
both writers treated with an element of ambiguity, will shortly be considered. Firstly, 
however, the pre-Nietzschean Dionysian will briefly be discussed in order to establish the 
cultural connotations of this figure, and to illuminate the origins of his artistic significance. 
 
ii) Dionysus in Antiquity 
Nietzsche’s selection of Dionysus as one of the ‘protagonists’ of Die Geburt der Tragödie is 
not arbitrary; the deity who appears in his book is laden with millennia of associations – as 
well as displaying some traits and characteristics that are Nietzsche’s own additions. 
Nietzsche’s discussion of the figure in 1872 may give the impression that the ancient 
Dionysus was a monolithic phenomenon, inhabiting one particular region at a specific time, 
possessing a fixed set of characteristics and connotations. In reality, substantial variations 
existed depending on geographical and temporal location. Figures of antiquity are notoriously 
difficult to pin down (Silk and Stern, 1995, p. 167), and often defy definition (Henrichs, 
1984, p. 209); this is especially true of ancient deities. Multiple manifestations of Dionysus 
existed, and it is therefore impossible to give a definitive picture of this figure or of the 
worship of him in the ancient world. Nevertheless, many scholars have attempted to cast light 
on Dionysus and his worship, and their findings will now be discussed. 
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Dionysus is commonly referred to as a ‘foreign’ god,84 who found his way into 
mainland Greece at some point in antiquity and became assimilated into Greek religion. The 
birthplace of Dionysus varies depending on the version of the myth: notable suggestions for 
his origin include Crete (Kerényi, 1976, p. 113), India (Schlesier, 2011, p. 469), Thrace and 
Phrygia (Silk and Stern, 1995, p. 171).  
Dionysus is commonly understood as a god of wine who was associated with 
drunkenness and excess, and portrayals from the Renaissance onwards often depict him with 
grapes and vine leaves. In fact, Dionysus was not a god of wine, but, as Otto clarifies, simply 
a deity of certain plants and vegetation, ‘unter denen der Weinen ohne jeden Vergleich das 
wichtigste ist’85 (1933, p. 49). Wine certainly featured in the worship of Dionysus, but as a 
means of reaching the desired state of intoxication, rather than as an end in itself.
86
 This 
enthusiasm, or ecstasy, allowed the ancient Greek to experience liberation from the quotidian 
world, and revealed life’s concealed depths and primordial undercurrents –‘[der] rasende, 
alles überflutede Lebensstrom, der aus den mütterlichen Tiefen empordringt’87 (Otto, p. 89). 
This was no debilitating and numbing drunkenness, but ‘höchste Gesundheit’88 (p. 132), an 
experience of vitality and exuberance. In this state social and civic boundaries collapsed,
89
 
and borders were transgressed. Initiates expressed themselves through dance and music: 
Rohde describes ‘frantic, whirling, headlong eddies and dance-circles’ (2000, p. 257), which 
we find echoed in Die Geburt der Tragödie.  
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 Thomas Mann’s Aschenbach dreams of the worship of ‘der fremde Gott!’ (‘the foreign god’ [Mann, 2004, p. 
583]). 
85
 ‘among which wine was without comparison the most important’. 
86
 As Otto explains, ‘[n]euerdings hält man dafür, daß der Wein zwar schon in alten Zeiten zum Dionysoskulte 
gehört habe, aber nur als Mittel, den Enthusiasmus zu erregen’ (‘more recently it is held that wine may well 
have belonged to the Dionysus-cult in ancient times, but only as a means of reaching intoxicationʼ [1933, p. 
135]).  
87
 ‘this manifestation of truth, greeted by cries of victory, is the raging, overflowing current of life, which breaks 
forth from the maternal depths’. 
88
 ‘supreme health’. 
89
 Kerényi points out that ‘no one, not even slaves, was prevented from drinking wine’ (1976, p. 303). 
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Through his connections with wine, Dionysus was seen to be linked to artistic 
creativity: McKinlay (1953) investigates the notion of ‘Bacchus as inspirer of literary art’ by 
examining classical writers who spoke of Dionysus (or Bacchus) and his intoxication either 
as aid or hindrance to creative production. Archilocus, for example, ‘credits wine for his skill 
in dithyrambic poetry’ (p. 101) and ‘Horace owns that Bacchus may apply the gentle goad to 
a stupid mind’ (p. 103). On the other side stand the ‘sceptical’ (p. 104) Euripides, as well as 
Aristophanes, who satirises the idea of drunkenness as a stimulant to inspiration (p. 104). The 
relationship between Dionysus, drunkenness and creativity was, therefore, already well-
established (if not unanimously upheld) in antiquity, and would be taken up centuries later by 
German Romantic poets, among others. 
An aspect of the Greek Dionysus which Nietzsche largely ignored was the 
prominence of women. Otto calls the Dionysian world ‘vor allem eine weibliche Welt’90 
(1933, p. 132), and notes that ‘Frauen erwecken und erziehen den Dionysos, Frauen begleiten 
ihn, [...] Frauen warten auf ihn und sind die ersten, die sein Wahnsinn überfällt’91 (ibid.). 
According to one legend Dionysus was nursed as a child and brought up by a community of 
women, and was later worshipped by the maenads (his female followers). In Euripides’ The 
Bacchae (first performed around 405 BC), Pentheus comments upon Dionysus’ ‘sexual 
attractiveness, long hair, and looks that radiate the grace or charm (charis) of Aphrodite’ 
(Segal, 1982, p. 173), emphasising Dionysus’ femininity. Many classical sculptures 
corroborate this characterisation, and in the ancient Dionysus we find a blurring of gender 
boundaries. 
Blurred boundaries are a theme common to Dionysus, for he also unites life and death 
in his associations with the world of the living and with the Underworld. According to 
mythology Dionysus journeyed to the Underworld to retrieve Semele and restore her to 
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 ‘above all a feminine world’.  
91
 ‘Women awaken and rear him, women accompany him, […] women wait upon him and are the first to fall 
under his madness’. 
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Mount Olympus. The story of his death and resurrection also symbolises his belonging to the 
realms of both life and death, and, according to some versions of his legend, he was the son 
of Persephone, who was the bride of Hades and the queen of the Underworld. Otto describes 
Dionysus as ‘ein leidender und sterbender Gott’92 (1933, p. 96), and according to McGinty, 
Dionysus bears ‘many similarities to Hades, Lord of the underworld’ (1978, p. 173). The 
deathly connotations of Dionysus are certainly present in Nietzsche’s version, but are 
particularly emphasised by Mann, as will be seen. 
Linked to this blurring of boundaries, the Greeks’ Dionysus was also characterised by 
duality. Accounts attribute him with contrasting natures, and the story of his birth is often 
used as an illustration of this. As the son of an earthly, mortal mother (Semele – sometimes 
Persephone) and a heavenly, divine father (Zeus), his conception already presages a character 
of twofold personality; Otto calls him ‘der rätselhafte Gott, der Geist der Doppelwesenheit 
und des Widerspruchs’93 (1933, p. 70). As a deity of duality Dionysus unites life and death, 
male and female, calmness and wildness (illustrated particularly in The Bacchae). Nietzsche 
portrays this duality too: a note from 1870 describes how the dismembered Dionysus 
(Zagreus) has ‘die Doppelnatur eines grausamen, verwilderten Dämons und 
eines milden Herrschers’94 (NF-1870, 7 [12]). In Die Geburt der Tragödie Nietzsche is at 
pains to demonstrate how the Dionysian triggers both agony and ecstasy, for example, in the 
collapse of the Apollonian principle of individuation, which triggers both fear (at exposure to 
the primordial foundations of existence) and joy (at being released from an individuated 
existence). Nietzsche’s later, philosophising Dionysus is a figure that unites apparently 
opposing impulses such as life and death, creation and destruction, and the highest 
affirmation of life achieved through the deepest pessimism.  
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 ‘a suffering and dying god’.  
93
 ‘the mysterious god, the spirit of double-being and of contradiction’. 
94
 ‘the dual nature of a cruel, savage demon and of a mild ruler’. 
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Nietzsche’s Dionysus certainly could not be called completely historically accurate; 
but the danger of assuming that accuracy is even possible when dealing with such enigmatic 
and protean sources as ancient deities has, it is hoped, been made clear. It is also important to 
bear in mind that Nietzsche’s Dionysus is employed to serve a specific function (which will 
shortly be analysed), one that requires the adaptation and modification of the historical figure 
that Nietzsche inherits. Furthermore, Nietzsche does not inherit Dionysus directly from the 
Greeks, but instead receives a figure that has passed through the hands of various writers, 
historians, and artists, and has thus undergone a lengthy process of metamorphosis and 
adaptation, gaining and losing various connotations. The cultural connotations of the 
Dionysus that Nietzsche inherited will now be discussed. 
 
iii) The Originality of Nietzsche’s Dionysus 
Nietzsche was not the first modern writer to appropriate and redeploy the ancient figure of 
Dionysus (even if he sometimes made this claim), and a pre-history of the Dionysian, or 
something resembling it, can be traced, leading up to the time when Nietzsche conceived and 
wrote his first book. 
With the advent of Christianity in Europe during the fourth century AD, the figure of 
Dionysus initially managed to hold out as the ‘last stronghold of pagan beliefs’ (Henrichs, 
1984, p. 212). Even as the eighth century AD approached, Dionysian worship was still 
prominent enough to be outlawed in Constantinople (p. 213). Such measures appear to have 
succeeded in suppressing the Dionysian religion: Henrichs explains that for centuries we find 
practically no mention or depiction of the deity, who once adorned mosaics, plates and 
amphorae (ibid.). 
During the Renaissance, pagan deities returned as the subjects of fine art. We find 
Dionysus (or Bacchus, as the Romans named him) in the art of Tintoretto, Titian, Carracci 
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and Caravaggio, for example. But, as Bull explains, a significant shift took place in the 
characterisation of Dionysus during the Renaissance: no longer a symbol of drunkenness that 
brought with it the darkest destruction and savagery (such as mothers dismembering their 
sons), he was instead reduced to a figure of tipsy joviality and light-hearted merriment (2005, 
p. 228). Michelangelo’s Dionysus raising a cup, for example, is a far cry from the raging 
force of annihilation in The Bacchae. Bull also notes the absence of the maenads in 
Renaissance representations of Dionysus, where they would have offended rational and 
religious tastes with their ‘destructive frenzy’ (p. 226). These women will also largely be 
absent in Nietzsche’s Dionysian. In Renaissance literature, Bacchus appears in works by 
Boccaccio (for example, his Commedia delle Ninfe fiorentine [Comedy of Florentine 
Nymphs, 1341-1342]), Sacchetti (such as his Rime [Rhymes] of the fourteenth-century) and 
Lorenzo de’ Medici’s Canzone di Bacco (Song of Bacchus, 1497). As in fine art, these 
manifestations of Dionysus largely eschew violence and destruction for revelry and 
bawdiness, although Poliziano’s Orfeo (Orpheus, 1478) does contain echoes of the darker 
Dionysus. 
From the latter part of the seventeenth century until the second half of the eighteenth, 
Dionysus’ darker side was emphasised, largely by (pre-)Romantic writers, and he appeared 
predominantly as a deathly figure (Henrichs, 1984, p. 213). Many aspects of Nietzsche’s 
Dionysus are anticipated in the flowering of German literature at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. A key contribution by German writers at this time was a shift in the understanding of 
the Dionysian, relocating it from an external space to the inner space of man’s self (p. 218). 
Goethe (in his Faust) and Heinse (in his Ardinghello und die glückseligen Inseln [Ardinghell 
and the Blessed Islands, 1787]) both depict the Dionysian phenomenon of ‘rauschhaften 
Selbstübersteigerung’95 (Baeumer, 1967, p. 255), but without naming Dionysus. It was also 
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 ‘intoxicated self-striving’.  
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during this period that the Dionysian began to be perceived again as a source of inspiration – 
in particular by Novalis and Hölderlin
96
 (Nietzsche’s favourite poet when he was a student). 
In the philosophy of the Romantic period, too, Dionysus returned (for example, in the works 
of Schelling and Hegel). In his own, composite Dionysus, Nietzsche collates the Dionysian 
connotations that best serve his purpose; as Baeumer points out, ‘Bei Nietzsche vereinen sich 
mythologische, philosophische und dichterische Entwicklungsphasen des Dionysischen’97 
(1967, p. 257). 
Precedents for Nietzsche’s famous antithesis of Apollo and Dionysus can also be 
found. Winckelmann (1717-1768) placed the two deities in opposition, with Apollo as ‘his 
ideal of masculine beauty […] whom he contrasted with the more effeminate Dionysus’ 
(Henrichs, 1984, p. 215). As Henrichs notes, however, Winckelmann’s antithesis was a 
highly forced one, requiring him to ignore anything that contradicted his ‘absolute standard’ 
(ibid.). Baeumer names Friedrich Schelling as ‘der Schöpfer des Begriffspaares apollinisch-
dionysisch’98 (1964, p. 20), explaining Schelling’s understanding of the two phenomena as 
‘Kräfte des dichterischen Genius’99 (p. 21). The two deities appeared once again in antithesis 
in Friedrich Creuzer’s Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker (Symbolism and Mythology 
of the Ancient Peoples, 1810), where their tension ‘formed a key dualism in Greek culture’ 
(Williamson, 2004, p. 133). Henceforth, the pairing of Apollo and Dionysus was a frequent 
device. Another of Nietzsche’s antitheses, that of ‘Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigten’100 (EH-
Schicksal-9) also has precedents: Hölderlin, for example, emphasised the similarities between 
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 See, for example, Max Baeumer, ‘Dionysos und das Dionysische bei Hölderlin’, Hölderlin Jahrbuch, 18 
(1973-74), pp. 97-119. Hölderlin’s most famous references to Dionysus occur in an early hymn entitled ‘Dem 
Genius der Kühnheit’ (‘To the Genius of Boldness’, 1795), and the poem ‘Brod und Wein’ (‘Bread and Wine’, 
1801), in which Christ and Dionysus are assimilated. Hölderlin also used the wisdom of Silenus (see Nietzsche, 
GT-3) as the epigraph to the second volume of his novel Hyperion (1797-99).  
97
 ‘With Nietzsche, the mythological, philosophical and poetic developmental phases of Dionysus are united’. 
He also finds that these phases ‘eigentlich nie voneinander getrennt verliefen’ (‘actually never strayed apart’ 
[ibid.]). 
98
 ‘the creator of the conceptual pair Apollonian-Dionysian’. 
99
 ‘powers of poetic genius’. 
100
 ‘Dionysus versus the crucified one’.  
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Christ and Dionysus (for example, both were resurrected after death), but, as Baeumer notes, 
‘Mit der Zerstörung der romantischen Lebensauffassung werden Dionysisches und 
Christliches scharf getrennt. Schließt Heine das Dionysische in seine Antitheses “hellenisch-
nazarenischˮ ein, so vollendet Nietzsche den Bruch und stellt Dionysos gegen den 
Gekreuzigten’101 (1964, p. 145).  
Two of the most significant works often cited as heavy influences for Nietzsche’s Die 
Geburt der Tragödie are Schiller’s Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung (On Naïve and 
Sentimental Poetry, 1795) and Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (The 
World as Will and Representation, 1819/1844). Silk and Stern, for example, posit these two 
texts as ‘formative influences’ on Nietzsche’s first book (1995, p. 210). At first glance, the 
dualism of Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus recalls Schiller’s naive (‘naïve’) and 
sentimentalisch (‘sentimental’) or Schopenhauer’s Vorstellung (‘representation’) and Wille 
(‘will’); in both cases, however, major discrepancies emerge, and neither Schiller’s nor 
Schopenhauer’s pairing can be overlaid onto Nietzsche’s unproblematically.  
Nietzsche’s Apollo can be compared to Schopenhauer’s notion of Vorstellung 
(representation) – in other words, the phenomenal world we sense and experience – and 
Nietzsche’s Dionysus to Schopenhauer’s der Wille, the will, the noumenal reality that lies 
beneath these phenomenal appearances. Support for these likenesses is provided by 
Nietzsche’s citation of Schopenhauer in Die Geburt der Tragödie, where he employs the term 
‘Wille, das Wort im Schopenhauerischen Sinne genommen’102 (GT-6), for example. In the 
preface to the 1886 edition of Die Geburt der Tragödie, however, Nietzsche expresses his 
regret at having clung to Schopenhauerian (and Kantian) terminology and formulations to 
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 ‘With the destruction of the romantic outlook on life Dionysus and Christ were abruptly separated. As Heine 
had placed the Dionysian in his “Hellenic-Nazareneˮ antithesis, so Nietzsche completed the break and placed 
Dionysus in opposition to the Crucified One’.  
102
 ‘will, taken in the Schopenhauerian sense’. 
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communicate his own ideas, which he worries may have been misunderstood or lost.
103
 While 
this retrospective attempt to emphasise the innovations of his own work is not sufficient on 
its own to combat the argument for Schopenhauer’s influence, other commentators have 
pointed out further difficulties in matching Wille and Vorstellung neatly with Dionysus and 
Apollo. Daniels, for example, points out that Schopenhauer’s pair are ‘metaphysical 
categories’ (2013, p. 60), whereas Nietzsche’s pair are ‘drives’ (p. 60). Dionysus causes his 
initiates to experience something resembling Schopenhauer’s Wille, but Nietzsche appears to 
find ecstasy as well as suffering in the experience – unlike Schopenhauer, for whom the 
will’s manifestations entail only suffering.104  
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer also differ in their responses to a crucial issue, namely, 
the question of how life is to be borne or justified, once its ultimate meaningless and 
ceaseless suffering have been exposed. Schopenhauer finds that detached aesthetic 
contemplation can offer redemption only of a temporary and palliative kind, and that 
withdrawal from the world is one’s only real option; Nietzsche, by contrast, puts his trust in 
art as a surer salvation, one that can convince us to face and even embrace existence in all its 
joy and torment. Furthermore, Nietzsche makes his opposition to the conceptualisation 
inherent in Schopenhauer’s categories very clear, as emphasises his preference for an 
intuitive way of understanding.
105
 (GT-1). Nietzsche’s use of Schopenhauerian language in 
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 ‘Wie sehr bedauere ich es jetzt, [...] dass ich mühselig mit Schopenhauerischen und Kantischen Formeln 
fremde und neue Werthschätzungen auszudrücken suchte, welche dem Geiste Kantens und Schopenhauers, 
ebenso wie ihrem Geschmacke, von Grund aus entgegen giengen!’ (‘How deeply I now regret, [...] that I 
laboriously tried to express strange and new estimations, which were fundamentally at odds with the spirit and 
tastes of Kant and Schopenhauer, with Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulae!’ [Nietzsche, Versuch-6]).  
104
 ‘Jene große Heftigkeit des Wollens ist nun schon an und für sich und unmittelbar eine stete Quelle des 
Leidens. Erstlich, weil alles Wollen, als solches, aus dem Mangel, also dem Leiden, entspringt. [...] Zweitens, 
weil, durch den kausalen Zusammenhang der Dinge, die meisten Begehrungen unerfüllt bleiben müssen und der 
Wille viel öfter durchkreuzt, als befriedigt wird, folglich auch dieserhalb heftiges und vieles Wollen stets 
heftiges und vieles Leiden mit sich bringt.’ (‘That great intensity of the will is in and of itself directly a constant 
source of suffering. First, because all willing, as such, springs from a lack, ergo a suffering. […] Second, 
because through the causal relationship of things, most desires must stay unfulfilled, and the will is more often 
frustrated than satisfied, consequently much intense willing always brings much intense suffering.’ 
[Schopenhauer, 1844, p. 410]). 
105
 Of Apollo and Dionysus Nietzsche comments: ‘[d]iese Namen entlehnen wir von den Griechen, welche die 
tiefsinnigen Geheimlehren ihrer Kunstanschauung zwar nicht in Begriffen, aber in den eindringlich deutlichen 
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Die Geburt der Tragödie admittedly invites the reader to interpret Nietzsche’s Dionysus and 
Apollo in a Schopenhauerian sense, and to expect them to behave in the same way as 
Schopenhauer’s Wille and Vorstellung; but, as Janaway notes, Nietzsche already viewed 
Schopenhauer as a ‘philosophical opponent’ (1998, p. 19) in 1868,106 and it appears that 
when he wrote his first book, Nietzsche was simply yet to develop his own philosophical 
language sufficiently to be able to break free of the trammels of Schopenhauerian 
terminology.   
At first glance, Schiller’s pairing of the ‘naïve’ and the ‘sentimental’ appears to be a 
closer match for Nietzsche’s antitheses of Apollo and Dionysus, as they symbolise alternative 
modes of creativity, or psychological types. In Die Geburt der Tragödie Nietzsche describes 
his Apollonian in terms of Schiller’s ‘naïve’ (‘Die homerische “Naivetät” ist nur als der 
vollkommene Sieg der apollinischen Illusion zu begreifen’107 [GT-3]), but as Martin notes, he 
is less enthusiastic about Schiller’s ‘sentimental’ (1996, p. 32). This, Nietzsche suggests, is an 
inadequate antithesis to Apollo, and to the naïve; instead he sees Dionysus as the only 
sufficient complement.
108
 Martin also points out another incompatibility between Schiller’s 
and Nietzsche’s pairings: while Schiller envisages the possibility of both ‘naïve’ and 
‘sentimental’ being fused in one artist, Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus ‘do not operate as a 
perfect, synthetic sublation […], even when they unite in tragedy’ (1996, p. 33). As with 
Schopenhauer’s Wille and Vorstellung, Schiller’s pair is an imperfect match for Nietzsche’s 
Apollonian and Dionysian, but may well have helped to shape or guide Nietzsche’s 
formulations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Gestalten ihrer Götterwelt dem Einsichtigen vernehmbar machen’ (‘We borrow these names from the Greeks, 
who made the profound secret-teachings of their artistic-intuition perceptible, not through concepts, but in the 
penetratingly lucid figures of their world of gods’ [GT-1]). 
106
 Janaway points us to a short essay written by Nietzsche in 1868, entitled ‘Zu Schopenhauer’ (‘On 
Schopenhauer’), in which Nietzsche explains his philosophical position as distinct from that of Schopenhauer. 
107
 ‘The Homeric “naïveté” can only be grasped as the perfect victory of the Apollonian illusion’. 
108
 ‘Dagegen verstehe ich als den vollen Gegensatz des “Naiven” und des Apollinischen das “Dionysische”’ 
(‘Instead I understand the “Dionysian” as the full complement to the “naive” and to the Apollonian’ [Nietzsche, 
NF-1870, 7 (126)]).  
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Around the turn of the century, in the immediate aftermath of Nietzsche’s thought, 
Dionysus became a frequent subject for painters like the neoclassical aesthete Lawrence 
Alma-Tadema, the traditionalist William-Adolphe Bouguereau and the Symbolist Gustav 
Klimt. The neo-Pagan trend of the late nineteenth century ‘supported the ideal of a Pagan 
revival as an antidote to the ills of industrialisation and the perceived restrictive nature of 
conservative Christian morality’ (Waldron, 2010, p. 656). Louis finds that a trend for 
Paganism had become well established in Victorian England by the 1860s (2005, p. 338), and 
that within a decade or two, writers and artists throughout Europe had rejected ‘the Olympian 
gods of light and of conscious wisdom’ (p. 341) for ‘the chthonic deities and the gods of the 
Mysteries’ (ibid.) – such as Dionysus. Nietzsche is probably the most famous precursor of 
this shift. His revival of paganism (and anti-Christianity) may also have partly inspired the 
members of the eccentric Munich Cosmic Circle (the ‘Kosmiker’): this group, whose 
members included novelist Fanny Gräfin zu Reventlow, the mystic Alfred Schuler and poet 
Karl Wolfskehl, ‘recreated the Dionysian revelries and other ancient fertility rites, and guests 
appeared in drag as Aphrodite and the Great Mother’ (Allen, 2005, p. 36).   
As part of the neo-Pagan trend, Louis explains, ‘depictions of Dionysiac revels 
proliferated rapidly’ (2005, p. 351), presenting a ‘headier version of Greece than Wordsworth 
or Creuzer ever dreamed’ (ibid.). While this may be true, it is not necessarily the case that 
these ‘headier’ representations (or at least, those of the last years of the nineteenth century) 
aimed to expose the danger and darkness of the ancient Dionysian. Thus we find Alma-
Tadema and Bouguereau, for example, depicting maenads as languid, pale-limbed women 
draped in white cloth, engaging in only the tamest of revelry. The only slight suggestion of 
savagery and danger comes from the luxurious tiger and leopard skins worn by Alma-
Tadema’s women. These unthreatening maenads fit more with the trope (identified by 
Djikstra) of the ‘collapsing woman’ (1986, p. 70), which allows the male viewer to ‘enter into 
56 
 
a voyeuristic, passive erotic titillation within a soothing, undemanding context conducive to a 
state of restful detumescence’ (p. 78), than with Euripides’ depiction of savage and frenzied 
worship, for example.  
In literature, interest in both Paganism and Nietzsche meant that the early years of the 
twentieth century produced many works dealing with a version of Dionysus. Schmidt (2012) 
gives an overview of the works produced during this period which displayed an impact of 
Nietzsche’s Dionysian. These include: Hofmannsthal’s Elektra (1903) (which embraces the 
maenads that Nietzsche, at least initially, found so unpalatable), Schnitzler’s Der einsame 
Weg (The Lonely Way, 1903) (which is ‘von einer dionysische Todesmotivik durchzogen, zu 
der “apollinische” Gegenmotive den Kontrapunkt bilden’109 [Schmidt, 2012, p. 79]) and 
Benn’s Ithaka (Ithaca, 1916) (which celebrated the ‘irrationalistischen Kult des 
Dionysischen’110 [p. 79]).  
Of all the texts that fuelled interest in Paganism, Nietzsche’s treatment of Dionysus is 
probably the deepest and most sustained. Unlike the writers and artists of the Renaissance 
(and arguably the neo-Paganists of the turn of the century) Nietzsche reminds us of the side 
of Dionysus that promotes annihilation and violence – although only up to a certain point, for 
Nietzsche (or at least the Nietzsche of 1872) is sure to criticise the more barbarous and 
promiscuous brands of ancient Dionysian worship. Like the German Romantics, he finds 
Dionysus to be a force for creativity and inspiration; and, engaging with, but going beyond, 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism, he employs the Dionysian as a psychological drive through 
which life could be affirmed. Having considered prior versions of Dionysus that may have 
affected Nietzsche’s own appropriation, it becomes clear that Nietzsche’s claims to 
originality are not entirely accurate. Some critics caution, however, that his claims are not 
intended to be taken completely seriously, and may be ‘intentional rhetorical exaggerations’ 
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 ‘streaked through with a Dionysian death-motif, to which the “Apollonian” motif forms the counterpoint’.  
110
 ‘irrationalistic cult of the Dionysian’.  
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(Baeumer, 1976, p. 166). Either way, as Baeumer points out, Nietzsche’s reworking of the 
Dionysian was so effective that ‘sein Name [wird] für immer mit dem Phänomen des 
Lebensrausches verbunden sein’111 (Baeumer, 1977, p. 153). The result of Nietzsche’s 
repackaging of the Dionysian is that it has largely eclipsed previous manifestations of 
Dionysus and the Dionysian in German literature. Elements of Nietzsche’s Dionysian 
doubtless owe something to German Romanticism (for example), but Silk and Stern are 
correct in naming Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus ‘two new composites’ (1995, p. 167). 
One innovation that is undoubtedly Nietzsche’s is the application of Dionysus to 
contemporary Germany, as a tool for contemporary cultural renewal. A rebranding of the 
Dionysian for modernity had not been previously attempted, and was one of the most 
important (and, initially, overlooked) elements of Nietzsche’s Dionysian.  
 
iv) Dionysus in Nietzsche’s Notes Prior to 1872 
Nietzsche’s notes of 1869-71, just before the completion of Die Geburt der Tragödie, reveal 
a persistent engagement with Dionysus, and show the development of the idea as it was to 
appear in 1872. The earliest mentions of Dionysus describe the magical transformations he 
effects in the individual, and the intoxicated frenzy that he triggers, abolishing individuality. 
The Dionysian man is ‘verzaubert’ (‘enchanted’ [NF-1869, 3 (12)]) and ‘kommt […] zum 
dionysischen Rausche’112 (ibid.). Early on in Nietzsche’s notes, this Rausch is linked to the 
collapse of individuation, and is mirrored in the Zagreus myth (‘Zagreus als Individuation’113 
[NF-1870, 7 (55)]), which tells how Dionysus was torn limb from limb by the Titans, before 
being reborn whole again. Just as his body was divided, so the individual is divided from the 
primordial oneness, and the rebirth of Dionysus is a symbol of hope: ‘Die Freude ist möglich 
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 ‘his name will always be associated with the phenomenon of intoxication with life’. 
112
 ‘achieves [...] Dionysian intoxication’. 
113
 ‘Zagreus as individuation’.  
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in Hoffnung auf diese Wiederherstellung’114 (NF-1870, 7 [61]). Art is posited as such a hope, 
foreshadowing the importance with which art will be treated in Die Geburt der Tragödie as a 
kind of coping and enhancing mechanism for dealing with reality. We can also find mention 
of the art of Dionysus, ‘die nicht “Schein des Scheins”, sondern “Schein des Seins” ist, 
Wiederspiegelung des ewigen Ur-Einenʼ115 (NF-1870, 7 [126]). The same note posits this as 
the ʻGegensatzʼ (‘opposite’ or ‘antithesis’ [ibid.]) of the Apollonian.  
From the same year there are notes which discuss the relationship of Dionysus and 
Apollo, whose importance to the creation of true art is already evident: it is ‘das 
Nebeneinander’116 (NF-1870, 7 [12]) of these two that is ‘die Zeit der Kunstwerke’117 (ibid.). 
The generation of tragedy by these two impulses is also outlined: ‘Das, was wir “tragischˮ 
nennen, ist gerade jene apollinische Verdeutlichung des Dionysischen’118 (NF-1870, 7 [128]). 
The complex co-operation of these impulses and their temporary reconciliation in the creation 
of tragedy returns several times in Nietzsche’s notes, and he explores the idea that the core of 
Greek tragedy consists in the Dionysian chorus being aided by the Apollonian in the 
visualisation of its own condition (NF-1870, 7 [139]). 
Alongside notes referring to the Greek context of Die Geburt der Tragödie, there is 
mention of the equally important German context of the book. Sounding a hopeful note, 
Nietzsche posits that German culture has a Dionysian affinity: ‘die germanische Begabung, 
die zuerst in Luther, dann wieder in der deutschen Musik ans Licht kam, hat uns wieder mit 
dem Dionysischen vertraut gemacht’119 (NF-1871, 10 [1]). That German culture is not devoid 
of Dionysian elements will prove crucial in the completed Die Geburt der Tragödie. The 
ideas hinted at in these notes demonstrate a nascent idea of Dionysus; these aspects of 
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 ‘Joy is possible because of the hope of this restoration.’ 
115
 ‘which is not “an image of illusion” but “an image of existence”, the reflection of the eternal primordial 
oneness’.  
116
 ‘the coexistence’. 
117
 ‘the time of the artwork’. 
118
 ‘That which we call “tragic” is that very Apollonian clarification of the Dionysian’. 
119
 ‘[t]he Germanic genius, which appeared first in Luther and then again in German music, has made us familiar 
with the Dionysian’. 
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Dionysus will appear more fully formed and elaborated in Die Geburt der Tragödie, to which 
we can now turn.  
 
v) Dionysus in Die Geburt der Tragödie   
Nietzsche first describes Apollo and Dionysus in Die Geburt der Tragödie as 
‘Kunstgottheiten’ (‘artistic deities’ [GT-1]), whose duality ensures ‘die Fortentwickelung der 
Kunstʼ120 (ibid.). Each deity governs a particular art form: in the case of Apollo (‘der Gott 
aller bildnerischen Kräfte’121 [ibid.]), sculpture and Doric architecture, and in the case of 
Dionysus, music. Here we see a reflection of Schopenhauer’s division of plastic and musical 
arts: ‘[d]enn die Musik ist, […] darin von allen andern Künsten verschieden, daß sie nicht 
Abbild der Erscheinung, [...], sondern unmittelbar Abbild des Willens selbst ist [...]’122 




The two drives exist predominantly in open conflict, provoking each other to ‘immer 
neuen kräftigeren Geburten’124 (Nietzsche, GT-1). If Apollo dominates, the resulting artwork 
will be Apollonian, and if Dionysus dominates, a Dionysian form of art will result. When the 
drives balance each other perfectly, the moment of their harmonious coupling occurs: in this 
moment we witness the birth of true art, ‘das ebenso dionysische als apollinische Kunstwerk 
der attischen Tragödie’125 (ibid.).  
                                                          
120
 ‘the further procreation of art’.  
121
 ‘the god of all plastic arts’. 
122
 ‘for music is [...], unlike all other arts, not a copy of the phenomenon […], but a direct copy of the will itself 
[…]’. 
123
 Nietzsche writes: ‘Denn die Musik ist, wie gesagt, darin von allen anderen Künsten verschieden, dass sie 
nicht Abbild der Erscheinung, oder richtiger, der adäquaten Objectität desWillens, sondern unmittelbar Abbild 
des Willens selbst ist und also zu allem Physischen der Welt das Metaphysische, zu aller Erscheinung das Ding 
an sich darstellt’ (‘For music is, as said, to be separated from all other art forms, in that it is not an image of 
appearance, or more correctly, not the appropriate objectivity of the will, but an immediate image of the will 
itself, and thus represents the metaphysical as compared to all physical things in the world, and the thing in itself 
compared to all appearances’ [GT-16]) 
124
 ‘ever more powerful births’.  
125
 ‘the artwork that is as much Dionysian as it is Apollonian, Attic tragedy’. 
60 
 
 The effects of Apollo and Dionysus are also felt on a psychological level. To describe 
these psychological effects, Nietzsche uses the world of dreams and the experience of 
intoxication as analogies. The world of dreams, filled with illusions which the dreamer 
immediately comprehends, is analogous to the Apollonian experience. The individual under 
the spell of Apollo encounters a world of phenomena, and comforting images; identity is also 
experienced as individual, and one perceives oneself as a being distinct from other beings. 
This is the principium individuationis (principle of individuation), an idea that can be found 
in Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Nietzsche also likens Apollo’s 
beneficial dreams to Schopenhauer’s veil of Maya, in which the individual, tossed about upon 
the vast and terrible seas of his existence, can place his trust. The illusory Apollonian world 
offers calmness and untroubled contentment (‘schöner Schein’126 [ibid.], a term borrowed 
from Schiller) – and, in the aftermath of the chaos of the Dionysian, healing and consolation.  
 Under the influence of the Dionysian the individual reaches a state resembling 
intoxication, triggered by narcotics or the approach of spring.
127
 Dionysus sweeps aside 
Apollo’s comforting illusions, and reveals the primordial undercurrent of existence. The 
principle of individuation collapses, and man, now oblivious to his status as an individual, 
experiences unity with the primordial oneness: ‘der Weg zu den Müttern des Sein’s, zu dem 
innersten Kern der Dinge [liegt] offen’128 (GT-16). The loss of individuation is perceived 
both as terror (for we are faced with an awe-inspiring and primitive essence) and ecstasy (as 
individuation is often cited as a – or even the – cause of human agony): the moment of 
Beethoven’s An die Freude (Ode to Joy) where the millions sink terribly into the dust gives 
an approximation, Nietzsche writes (GT-1), of this experience. The agony of individuation, 
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 ‘beautiful illusion’.  
127
 This intoxication is reached, Nietzsche writes, ʻentweder durch den Einfluss des narkotischen Getränkes, von 
dem alle ursprünglichen Menschen und Völker in Hymnen sprechen, oder bei dem gewaltigen, die ganze Natur 
lustvoll durchdringenden Nahen des Frühlingsʼ (‘either through the influence of narcotic drink, of which all 
primitive men and peoples speak in hymn, or through the powerful coming of spring, which sensually pervades 
through all of nature’ [GT-1]). 
128
 ‘the way to the mothers of all being, to the innermost core of things, lies open’. 
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alleviated by the sense of oneness that intoxication triggers, is symbolised by the myth of 
Zagreus, as mentioned above. Nietzsche reveals ‘den Zustand der Individuation als den Quell 
und Urgrund alles Leidens’129 (GT-10). The return to a unified existence is equated with the 
reassembly of Dionysus: it is implied that this is the true and restorative state of existence.  
 The individual who is intoxicated in this manner feels like a god and becomes a work 
of art (GT-3). Man is a prized material, ‘der edelste Thon, der kostbarste Marmor’130 (GT-1). 
The drunkenness that Dionysus triggers reinvigorates and promotes art: the initiate ‘is 
intoxicated not with chaos but with life, with energy’ (Schutte, 1984, p. 14). This energy fuels 
artistic creativity, and thus Nietzsche can proclaim: ‘[d]as Dionysische, mit seiner selbst am 
Schmerz percipirten Urlust, ist der gemeinsame Geburtsschooss der Musik und des tragischen 
Mythus’131 (GT-24). Radical claims like this, unsupported by any real evidence, were one of 
the reasons that Nietzsche’s book could not be taken seriously by his academic peers in 1872. 
According to Nietzsche, the revelatory power of the Dionysian is reflected in music. 
As mentioned, in Schopenhauerian terms, music gives a direct copy of the will itself, 
unmediated by any phenomenal representation. In Die Geburt der Tragödie Nietzsche 
appears to adopt this idea: whereas the plastic (Apollonian) artist contemplates 
representational images, ‘[d]er dionysische Musiker ist ohne jedes Bild völlig nur selbst 
Urschmerz und Urwiederklang desselben’132 (GT-5). For Nietzsche, music symbolises ʻeine 
Sphäre [...], die über alle Erscheinung und vor aller Erscheinung istʼ133 (GT-6). While music 
is predominantly Dionysus’ domain, Nietzsche also describes an Apollonian form of music, 
which is rhythmic, calm and likened to Doric architecture. Apollonian music, though, is ‘too-
phenomenal’ (Liébert 2004, p. 87) to convey its listener to the same state as Dionysian music; 
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 ‘the status of individuation as the source and origin of all suffering’.  
130
 ‘the noblest clay, the most precious marble’. 
131
 ‘The Dionysian, with its pain felt even in joy, is the common womb of music and of tragic myth’. 
132
 ‘The Dionysian musician himself is, without any image, completely and only original-pain and original 
reverberation of the same’.  
133
 ‘a sphere that is predominantly and above all appearance’. 
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it does not possess the same power of revelation, and does not trigger intoxication and 
ecstasy. 
Music’s unifying effect is evident, as Higgins notes, in ‘the fact that all our bodies 
respond to auditory sensation in essentially the same way’ (1986, p. 666), namely, in dance. 
Enraptured by Dionysian music, the listener is moved to express himself in dance – as are his 
fellow-revellers, creating a feeling of community: ʻ[s]ingend und tanzend äussert sich der 
Mensch als Mitglied einer höheren Gemeinsamkeit: er hat das Gehen und das Sprechen 
verlerntʼ134 (GT-1). The importance of dance in this context echoes the dance of Dionysus’ 
ancient worshippers, the maenads, whom, Rohde recounts, ‘were seized with a violent desire 
to dance’ (2000, p. 286). 
While Nietzsche was happy to appropriate the dance of Dionysian worship, he seems 
to have been unable to accept the violent or sexual aspects of the rituals performed by 
Dionysus’ worshippers, the maenads (at least, in 1872). Nietzsche mentions the maenads 
twice in Die Geburt der Tragödie, ignoring their practice of sparagmos, the ritualistic 
tearing-apart, limb from limb, of a live animal, whose flesh would then be devoured raw. 
Henrichs notes that the (sparse) mentions of the maenads in Die Geburt der Tragödie are 
merely ‘ornamental’ (1984, p. 229), and avoid addressing anything too unpalatable. Despite 
his eagerness to contest the serenity of the ancient Greeks, the brutality and debauchery of the 
maenads seem a step too far, and Nietzsche relegates such practices to the domain of ‘[die] 
dionysischen Barbaren’135 (GT-2), as distinct from ‘die dionysischen Griechen’136 (ibid.). 
Only in the Greek case was the collapse of individuation ‘ein künstlerisches Phänomen’137 
(ibid.). 
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 ‘singing and dancing, man expresses himself as a member of a higher community: he has forgotten how to 
walk and talkʼ.  
135
 ‘the Dionysian barbarians’. The Greek word ‘barbaroi’ signified those who were not Greek, and gained its 
pejorative connotations after the Persian wars. 
136
 ‘the Dionysian Greeks’. 
137
 ‘an artistic phenomenon’. 
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A related aspect of Dionysian worship that Nietzsche sidesteps is the prominence of 
women (indicated earlier). Critics point out that Nietzsche, as a philologist, would certainly 
have been aware of the importance of women to Dionysus, and that his largely defeminised 
version is therefore a conscious choice.
138
 Parting company with Nietzsche, d’Annunzio re-
affirms the importance of the female in the Dionysian, and in his novels it is often female 
characters who undergo the most profound experience of the Dionysian. While Nietzsche will 
attempt to embrace the more violent and sexual aspects of the Dionysian in his later writings 
and notes (as will be discussed later in this chapter), it remains a largely defeminised 
creation, and at no point does he speak of the maenads at length. 
 So far it has been established that the Apollonian and Dionysian drives govern 
apparently opposing art forms and psychological states; but the exact nature of their 
relationship must be clarified. Apollo and Dionysus necessitate each other’s existence, for if 
either is present in isolation, unchecked by the other, dangers arise. The perils of the 
Dionysian are perhaps the more extreme: while an excess of the Apollonian will merely 
restrict the individual to a superficial and individuated existence of reality, a dominance of 
the Dionysian can result in annihilation. The rapturous state of Dionysian intoxication 
triggers ‘völliger Selbstvergessenheitʼ139 (GT-1) which brings the danger of utter destruction. 
Nietzsche describes a gulf (‘Kluft’) that separates the Dionysian state from the everyday 
world (GT-7) – the Dionysian individual risks falling into this gulf. In Wagner’s Tristan und 
Isolde Nietzsche finds this danger exemplified, and he cites Wagner’s lyrics by way of 
illustration: ‘[i]n des Wonnemeeres wogendem Schwall, in der Duft – Wellen tönendem 
Schall, in des Weltathems wehendem All ertrinken – versinken unbewusst – höchste Lust!’140 
(GT-22) The Dionysian individual, like Hamlet, has been granted (or cursed with) a glimpse 
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 See, for example, Adrian del Caro, ‘Nietzschean Self Transformation’, in Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts 
ed. by Salim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell and Dan Conway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 70-91. 
139
 ‘utter self-forgetfulness’.  
140
 ‘In the blissful ocean’s heaving swell, in the ringing sound of waves of fragrance, in the world-breath’s 
wafting all, to drown, to sink unknowingly, highest desire!’ 
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of the true nature of existence, and must recognise the individuation of everyday reality – a 
fundamental notion upon which we structure and order our existence – as false and 
meaningless. He has been exposed to, and burdened with, the wisdom of Silenus: ‘[d]as 
Allerbeste ist für dich gänzlich unerreichbar: nicht geboren zu sein, nicht zu sein, nichts zu 
sein. Das Zweitbeste aber ist für dich – bald zu sterben’141 (Nietzsche, GT-3). Such insight is 
the enemy of action, and instead breeds inertia and resignation – like Schopenhauer’s 
recommended withdrawal from the world. But Nietzsche opposes this resignation,
142
 to 
which (he claims) the ancient Greek did not succumb either. Instead, the Greek created art, 
which redeemed him: ‘[i]hn rettet die Kunst, und durch die Kunst rettet ihn sich – das 
Leben’143 (GT-7).  
Nietzsche’s view of the redemptory power of art therefore differs fundamentally from 
that of Schopenhauer’s in the sense that it sees art as a permanent means of affirming 
existence, rather than a temporary means of forgetting suffering. Nietzsche finds that 
Dionysian art offers a ‘metaphysischer Trost’144 (ibid.) that allows the suffering to be 
channelled into an affirmative art of Dionysian origin. The individual who has seen the true 
nature of things struggles to cope with his discovery that the structured and individuated 
everyday world is an illusion. Dionysian art helps him to accept this, confirming that he has 
discovered the true nature of things, and that this is not something from which he must flee. 
Nietzsche describes these effects of the Dionysian:   
[w]ir sind wirklich in kurzen Augenblicken das Urwesen selbst und fühlen dessen unbändige 
Daseinsgier und Daseinslust; der Kampf, die Qual, die Vernichtung der Erscheinungen dünkt 
uns jetzt wie nothwendig, bei dem Uebermaass von unzähligen, sich in's Leben drängenden 
                                                          
141
 ‘The best thing for you is completely beyond reach: never to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. The 
next best thing for you, however, would be to die soon’.    
142
 ‘Oh wie anders redete Dionysos zu mir!’ (‘Oh how differently Dionysus spoke to me!’ [GT-Selbstkritik-6]). 
143
 ‘Art saves him, and through art, life saves him’. 
144
 ‘metaphysical comfort’.  
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As Nehamas explains, tragedy reveals that the structured and ordered world that man 
perceives, and believes to be natural, is actually his own creation, superimposed over nature 
(1985, p. 43). Art is a conscious illusion that offers us comfort, and once we recognise it as 
such, we can face existence despite the knowledge we have gained. Here we approach 
Nietzsche’s famous (and ambiguous) declaration that ‘nur als aesthetisches Phänomen ist das 
Dasein und die Welt ewig gerechtfertigt’146 (GT-5). 
In the context of tragedy, the Apollonian harnesses the potentially dangerous 
Dionysian, neutralising its negative effects while simultaneously inciting the Dionysian to its 
highest potential. In this, the greatest work of art possible, Apollonian images and Dionysian 
music triumph together in equilibrium, enabling the spectator to escape the mundane and 
quotidian – but safely. Dionysian music reveals the primordial undercurrents of life, and 
encourages the breakdown of individuation through the chorus, in which many ecstatic voices 
become one. If one were exposed to this aspect of the drama without Apollonian phenomena, 
one would risk annihilation; but Apollo succeeds in restraining the destructive force of the 
Dionysian in a world of images (the actors on the stage), creating a safe distance between 
drama and spectator. Apollo veils the Dionysian in beauty, which both renders it attractive 
and objectifies it.  
In this account of the birth of tragedy, Apollo and Dionysus must both be present, and 
complement each other perfectly: if either impulse dominates, the tragic moment will be lost. 
This is precisely what happened, Nietzsche claims, with the advent of Socrates (or what he 
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 ‘For a few moments we are truly the primordial being itself, and feel its unbridled hunger for, and joy of, 
existence; struggle, anguish, the destruction of phenomena, these appear to us now as necessary, at the excess of 
existence forms, surging and thrusting into life, at the exuberant fertility of the world-will’.  
146
 ‘only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified’. For a discussion of the 
ambiguity of this statement, see Daniel Came, ‘The Aesthetic Justification of Existence’, in A Companion to 
Nietzsche, ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 41-57. 
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stood for), who introduced theoretical culture to the West, and banished Dionysus from the 
stage, bringing about the death of tragedy. Nietzsche explains that Socrates, not Apollo, is the 
true opponent of Dionysus (GT-12). In his Versuch einer Selbstkritik (An Attempt at Self-
Criticism, 1886) Nietzsche characterises Socratism as a decadent influence, which brought 
about the death of instinct (GT-Selbstkritik-1). It is precisely this (Dionysian) instinct that 
Nietzsche implores us to rediscover in Die Geburt der Tragödie.   
In 1872 it is the music dramas of Richard Wagner that offer the greatest hope to 
Nietzsche when he surveys the stagnant and languishing artistic landscape, as the ‘Vorwort 
an Richard Wagner’ (‘Foreword to Richard Wagner’) makes clear. Wagner’s music offers 
access to forgotten Dionysian energies, Nietzsche writes, and should reassure Germans that 
the Dionysian foundation of their culture can still be re-awoken: 
Aus dem dionysischen Grunde des deutschen Geistes ist eine Macht emporgestiegen, die mit 
den Urbedingungen der sokratischen Cultur nichts gemein hat und aus ihnen weder zu 
erklären noch zu entschuldigen ist, vielmehr von dieser Cultur als das Schrecklich 
Unerklärliche, als das Uebermächtig-Feindselige empfunden wird, die deutsche Musik, wie 
wir sie vornehmlich in ihrem mächtigen Sonnenlaufe von Bach zu Beethoven, von Beethoven 
zu Wagner zu verstehen haben.’147 (GT-19) 
Thus Nietzsche attempts to present the Dionysian as an impulse with which Germans have an 
affinity, and which must simply be retrieved; he even claims that it was the Dionysian that 
fuelled the ecstatic rituals of the German Middle Ages (including the festivals of St John and 
St Vitus). Goethe, Schiller and Winckelmann are among those who have struggled to keep a 
Greek spirit alive in contemporary Germany, Nietzsche claims, but even they could not grasp 
the essence of the Greeks (GT-20) and could not resurrect Dionysus. It is the magic of 
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 ‘Out of the Dionysian foundation of the German soul a power has arisen, that has nothing in common with 
the original conditions of Socratic culture, and cannot be explained or excused by these conditions; is, instead, 
experienced by this culture as the terribly inexplicable, as the overwhelmingly hostile – German music, as we 
understand it primarily in its powerful orbit from Bach to Beethoven, from Beethoven to Wagner.’ 
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Dionysus that will transform the gloomy wilderness of German culture
148
 and lead to ‘die 
Wiedergeburt der Tragödie’149 (ibid.). Nietzsche urges his readers to abandon their faith in 
Socratism and instead to take up the Dionysian thyrsus; once this has been achieved, the art 
of contemporary Germany will be fit to stand ‘vor dem untrüglichen Richter Dionysus’150 
(GT-19).  
 When we attempt to account for the apparently greater élan with which Dionysus is 
depicted in 1872, we should keep in mind the text’s purpose. Here Nietzsche hopes to 
reacquaint us with a neglected drive (the Dionysian), presenting it as a source of forgotten 
creativity, and encourage us to re-embrace it. He must therefore present this impulse to us in 
the most favourable light, and ‘sell’ Dionysus to his readers, in order to effect the changes he 
recommends. Nietzsche repeatedly emphasises the dangers, or limits, of either the Dionysian 
or Apollonian in isolation, and does not advocate the Dionysian above and beyond its 
counterpart; it is merely that modern man has become estranged from the former, leading to 
the impoverishment of art.   
In Nietzsche’s first book the Dionysian is presented as a drive that abolishes 
individuation, triggers intoxication and promotes creativity. But Dionysus is not only to be 
found in Die Geburt der Tragödie, and Nietzsche continues to write about him until his 
breakdown in 1888: the name ‘Dionysos’ may even have been one of the last words 
Nietzsche ever wrote (in his Wahnsinnsbriefe, or ‘madness-letters’). It is to Nietzsche’s later 
Dionysian that attention will now be turned, in order to understand the transformation that 
this idea undergoes, and its continued creative significance. 
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 ‘wie verändert sich plötzlich jene eben so düster geschilderte Wildniss unserer ermüdeten Cultur, wenn sie 
der dionysische Zauber berührt!’ (‘how that dismally depicted wilderness of our tired culture suddenly 
transforms itself, when it is touched by the magic of Dionysus!’ [GT-20]). 
149
 ‘the rebirth of tragedy’.  
150
 ‘before the infallible judge Dionysus’.  
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vi) The Dionysian after 1872 
After Nietzsche’s attempted Dionysian revival of 1872, which exalts Dionysus on virtually 
every page, Nietzsche appears to lose interest in the Dionysian. Between 1872 and 1888, the 
name ‘Dionysus’ and the term ‘Dionysian’ appear only a handful of times, until 1888’s Ecce 
homo and Götzen-Dämmerung (Twilight of the Idols) welcome the Dionysian back again. 
Nietzsche’s notes, however, demonstrate a continued occupation with the idea. Examination 
of these notes, and of references to the Dionysian in published works, reveal that the figure 
undergoes something of a transformation over the period 1872-1888. While it retains the 
creative connotations of Die Geburt der Tragödie, its relevance and significance are 
expanded: where once the Dionysian promoted the creation of literal works of art, the 
Dionysian in Nietzsche’s later writings promotes the creation of the self as a work of art.151 
Many of the strategies that Nietzsche impels us to employ, in order to affirm existence in the 
highest way, are linked to Dionysus, and in the later years of Nietzsche’s active life the figure 
of Dionysus acts as an emblem of his entire Weltanschauung. 
 From around 1881 the Dionysian is described as an impulse towards self-
transformation. In a note from this year Nietzsche defines the essence of the Dionysian as 
‘Versuche von ungeflügelten Thieren, sich Flügel einzubilden und sich über die Erde zu 
heben’152 (NF-1881, 15 [60]) There is no mention of art, or Greeks here, for Dionysus has 
outgrown the aesthetic context of Die Geburt der Tragödie. If Nietzsche’s attempt to 
resurrect Dionysus in contemporary Germany was too subtle in 1872, from 1881 he 
emphasises the contemporary relevance of the idea by largely disposing of its classical 
context. Dionysus becomes a figure inspiring elevation, advancement and growth, of which 
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 The notion of creating one’s self as a work of art was taken up by many subsequent thinkers, such as 
Foucault and Rorty. See Graham Longford, ‘“Sensitive Killers, Cruel Aesthetes, and Pitiless Poets”: Foucault, 
Rorty, and the Ethics of Self-Fashioning’, Polity, 33 (2001), pp. 569-592 and Alan Milchman and Alan 
Rosenberg, ‘The Aesthetic and Ascetic Dimensions of an Ethics of Self-Fashioning: Nietzsche and Foucault’, 
Parrhesia, 2 (2007), pp. 44-65. 
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 ‘attempts of wingless animals to imagine themselves a pair of wings and raise themselves over the earth’. 
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modern man (and not just artists) can avail himself. Similarly a note from 1885 defines the 
Dionysian world as ‘ein Werden, das kein Sattwerden, keinen Überdruß, keine Müdigkeit 
kennt’153 (NF-1885, 38 [12]). Nietzsche speaks of the notion of ‘becoming’ almost 
obsessively, urging individuals to an ongoing and exuberant process of self-driven 
development and advancement that has no fixed end. This process is a form of creativity, 
which still gains impetus from the Dionysian, and the resulting work of art is the self. 
Obvious parallels with Heraclitus’ philosophy exist, and Nietzsche himself points out (in 
Ecce homo) that the Heraclitean affirmation of destruction is ‘das Entscheidende in einer 
dionysischen Philosophie’154 (EH-GT-3). 
 As with the Dionysian of Die Geburt der Tragödie, the creativity of this later 
Dionysian is also balanced by destruction. In Götzen-Dämmerung Nietzsche writes:  
Das Jasagen zum Leben selbst noch in seinen fremdesten und härtesten Problemen; der Wille 
zum Leben, im Opfer seiner höchsten Typen der eignen Unerschöpflichkeit frohwerdend — 
das nannte ich dionysisch, das errieth ich als die Brücke zur Psychologie des tragischen 
Dichters. Nicht um von Schrecken und Mitleiden loszukommen, nicht um sich von einem 
gefährlichen Affekt durch dessen vehemente Entladung zu reinigen [...]: sondern um, über 
Schrecken und Mitleid hinaus, die ewige Lust des Werdens selbst zu sein, — jene Lust, die 
auch noch die Lust am Vernichten in sich schliesst…155 (GD-Alten-5) 
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 ‘a becoming that knows no satiety, no tedium, no weariness’. 
154
 ‘the most crucial aspect of a Dionysian philosophy’. 
155
 ‘Saying yes to life even in its strangest and hardest problems; the will to life, rejoicing in its own 
inexhaustibility in the sacrifice of its highest types – this is what I called Dionysian, this is what I divined as a 
bridge towards the psychology of the tragic poet. Not in order to escape terror and pity, not in order to cleanse 
one’s self of a dangerous feeling through its vehement discharge […]: but rather in order to overcome horror 
and pity, to be the eternal joy of becoming itself, – all joy, which also includes joy in destruction’. Nietzsche 
continues: ‘Und damit berühre ich wieder die Stelle, von der ich einstmals ausgieng — die “Geburt der 
Tragödie” war meine erste Umwerthung aller Werthe: damit stelle ich mich wieder auf den Boden zurück, aus 
dem mein Wollen, mein Können wächst — ich, der letzte Jünger des Philosophen Dionysos, — ich, der Lehrer 
der ewigen Wiederkunft’ (‘And here I touch again upon the position from which I proceeded once upon a time – 
the “Birth of Tragedyˮ was my first transvaluation of all values: thus I stand once again upon the ground out of 




This Dionysian philosophy embraces a cyclical view of existence that accepts – indeed 
prescribes – destruction as well as creativity. 
 The later Dionysian symbolises an alternative to pessimism. Eschewing the traditional 
pessimistic attitude (like that of Schopenhauer), which saw resignation as the only option for 
those who had acknowledged the suffering inherent in man’s existence, Nietzsche presents 
another choice. The Dionysian offers strategies by which crippling pessimism can be 
transfigured into jubilant affirmation. In Attic tragedy, Dionysus reveals the horrors of 
existence, which Apollo’s veil of beauty makes tolerable. In Nietzsche’s later writings, 
Dionysus still forces his initiates to confront the dismaying and unpleasant truths about their 
existence, but now also offers ways (once Apollo’s task) to affirm and embrace these truths. 
This is, Nietzsche writes, ‘meine neue Fassung des Pessimismus’156 (NF-1887, 10 [3]), which 
voluntarily searches out ‘der furchtbaren und fragwürdigen Seiten des Daseinsʼ157 (ibid.), and 
uses strength and acceptance to bear them.  
 The strategies that the later Dionysian offers for coping with (and even thriving on) 
the burden of pessimistic knowledge are among Nietzsche’s most radical ideas. While these 
strategies are not solely the property of Dionysus, they are often linked to the figure. Two of 
these are the notions of amor fati and the eternal recurrence of the same (which Pupino finds 
echoed in d’Annunzio [2002, pp. 116-121]). The former appears for the first time in Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft (§ 276) and prescribes an accepting love of one’s fate; the latter is a 
thought experiment, borrowed in part from Indian philosophy, which denotes time as cyclical 
rather than linear or teleological, and first appears in the same work (§ 285). This experiment 
requires one to confront the question of whether one could bear to re-live the same life 
infinitely. This is one of the highest acts of affirmation, and is therefore also the ‘grösste 
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 ‘my new formulation of pessimism’. 
157
 ‘the frightening and questionable sides of existence’. 
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Schwergewicht’158 (Nietzsche, FW-341). A note from 1888 explicitly links amor fati to the 
Dionysian, and explains that the highest philosophical state attainable is reached through a 
Dionysian approach to existence: ‘[h]öchster Zustand, den ein Philosoph erreichen 
kann: dionysisch zum Dasein stehn —: meine Formel dafür ist amor fati…’159 (NF-1888, 16 
[32]) With these strategies the individual can – and must – seek out those revelations that 
resemble the dismaying judgement of Silenus. Only after these potentially devastating 
revelations have been embraced can the highest levels of life-affirmation be reached: ‘[e]s 
wird ein höchster Zustand der Daseins-Bejahung concipirt, in dem sogar der Schmerz, jede 
Art von Schmerz als Mittel der Steigerung ewig einbegriffen istʼ160 (NF-1888, 14 [24]). This 
condition is ‘der tragisch-dionysische Zustand’161 (ibid.). 
 A Dionysian affirmation of existence, then, can only be reached through agony, 
suffering and pessimism. It may also require the aspiring individual to embrace destruction 
and violence, for the Dionysian individual must first free himself of the burdensome 
moralities and values that have, allegedly, enslaved man for centuries. Nietzsche admits that 
this undertaking is not an easy one: ‘Für eine dionysische Aufgabe gehört die Härte des 
Hammers, die Lust selbst am Vernichten in entscheidender Weise zu den Vorbedingungen’162 
(EH-Za-8). The hammer shares a similar symbolic function to the Dionysian itself, capable of 
annihilation and devastation as well as creation, reconstruction and refinement. After all, a 
hammer may be used as a weapon or tool of destruction in the hands of the warrior or the 
iconoclast, but is also used to create beauty and bring new artefacts into being in the hands of 
the sculptor or carpenter.  
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 ‘heaviest burden’. 
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 ‘The highest condition, that the philosopher can reach: to be Dionysian in one’s existence –: my formula for 
this is amor fati…’  
160
 ‘a highest condition of existence-affirmation will be conceptualised, in which even pain, every type of pain, 
will be eternally valued as a means of heightening’. 
161
 ‘the tragic-Dionysian condition’. 
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If the Dionysian and the hammer can be used in the process of self-creation, what is 
their function as tools of destruction – what exactly are they used to dismantle? Nietzsche’s 
later Dionysian shuns traditional moralities and teleological conceptions of the world, 
replacing them with Nietzsche’s own notions of eternal becoming. The Dionysian also 
provides Nietzsche with a means of opposing Christianity – because of its condemnation of 
sexuality, for example, for in the Greeks’ (Dionysian) mysteries of sexuality, Nietzsche 
claims, we find ‘der tiefste Instinkt des Lebens’163 (GD-Alten-4). The hammer operates 
similarly: this tool becomes, for Nietzsche, a means of philosophising (the subtitle of Götzen-
Dämmerung is ‘Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophirt’164), and a way of questioning all 
that man has blindly obeyed for centuries. With the hammer, one can finally sound out false, 
hollow, idols and topple them from their pedestals. The hammer is not to be employed 
recklessly, but with measure and precision, where necessary, like the tuning fork used to 
perfect the sounds of the piano. Among the false idols that Nietzsche wishes to expose with 
his Dionysian hammer, Christianity looms largest.  
 Christianity is one of Nietzsche’s most famous and enduring targets. He characterises 
the religion as a system born of weakness that negates life. In contrast to the Dionysian 
attitude towards suffering explained above, Christianity teaches its adherents to endure 
suffering passively in the knowledge that this world is only a preparation for the afterlife. For 
the Christian, suffering is borne not for the sake of this life, but for the sake of the one that 
follows it. Nietzsche finds Christianity to be a hinderance to any affirmation of existence and 
life: ‘es [das Christenthum] ist im tiefsten Sinne nihilistisch, während im dionysischen 
Symbol die äusserste Grenze der Bejahung erreicht ist’165 (EH-GT-1). Nietzsche also abhors 
Christianity’s power to impose its values and moralities upon man, rather than allowing the 
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 ‘the deepest instinct to life’.  
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 ‘How one philosophises with the hammer’. 
165
 ‘it [Christianity] is in the deepest sense nihilistic, while in the Dionysian symbol the extreme frontier of 
affirmation is reached’. 
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individual to create his own.
166
 Dionysus allows Nietzsche to expose (what he perceives to 
be) the faults of Christianity, and also offers an alternative to Christ, perhaps in the same way 
that early Christianity permitted the continuation of certain, harmless, elements of paganism 
for ease of transition. The opposition of Christ and Dionysus (‘Dionysos gegen den 
Gekreuzigten’167 [EH-Schicksal-9]) cements the status of the Dionysian as a system of 
thought in Nietzsche’s view. Freed from the shackles of Christianity, the Dionysian 
individual can create himself according to his own values, and in his own image. 
 Nietzsche is vague about how he envisages the self-created individual (after all, it is 
to be determined by our own striving), but many of the traits of the Übermensch appear to 
resemble the individual who follows Dionysus’ philosophy. The Übermensch (announced by 
Zarathustra) is a symbol of individual self-becoming, attainable through a process of going-
under and going-beyond. It is analogous to a work of art, as Ansell-Pearson notes: ‘the vision 
of the Übermensch has the status of an artist’s creation; it is the product of the imagination of 
the poet’ (1992, p. 321). The Übermensch will disregard outdated or limiting values and 
boundaries, and create himself and his own existence according to his own desires and 
values. Gooding-Williams finds this to be a possibility ‘grounded in passional, Dionysian, 
chaos’ (2001, p. 69), and, indeed, the necessity for painful experiences and tribulations before 
the attainment of the Übermensch does resemble the suffering inherent in the Dionysian 
experience. Two notes in particular support the connection between Dionysus and the 
Übermensch: one from 1882, describing how the Übermensch resembles the Dionysian 
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 ‘Das Christenthum setzt voraus, dass der Mensch nicht wisse, nicht wissen könne , was für ihn gut, was böse 
ist: er glaubt an Gott, der allein es weiss. Die christliche Moral ist ein Befehl [...].’ (‘Christianity postulates that 
man does not know, cannot know, what is good for him, and what is bad for him: he believes in god, that alone 
does he know. Christian morality is an order […]’ [GD-Streifzüge-5]). 
167
 ‘Dionysus versus the crucified one’. 
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dancer in his exuberance;
168
 and another from 1885, linking Dionysus to ‘[d]ie 
übermenschliche Auffassung der Welt’169 (NF-1885, 35 [73]). 
What is certain about the later Dionysian is that while it retains certain crucial 
elements of the Dionysian of 1872 (such as an impetus towards creativity, and an affirmative 
attitude towards suffering and burdensome knowledge), its significance and relevance is 
amplified. The Dionysian is no longer limited to the aesthetic sphere, and becomes a 
worldview for the individual, rather than society as a whole. The creative impetus Dionysus 
offers goes beyond the creation of literal works of art, and encompasses the affirmative task 
of self-creation. Through ‘die Philosophie des Dionysos’170 (NF-1885, 34 [176]) Nietzsche 
shows us an alternative to the outmoded values to which he takes his iconoclastic hammer, an 
alternative that is strange and incredible.
171
 Dionysus becomes, as Pfeffer notes, ‘the symbol 
of modern man who has lost all traditional values and beliefs and faces nihilism and despair’ 
(1972, p. 36). Nietzsche’s Dionysian Weltanschauung offers a philosophy that will allow this 
modern man to continue to survive, and even thrive in his own self-creation. 
This chapter has traced Dionysus’ passage from antiquity into the hands of Nietzsche. 
As discussion of d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s reception of Nietzsche has established, their 
understanding of the Dionysian was doubtless informed – to some extent – by Nietzsche. As 
will be seen throughout this thesis, their versions of the Dionysian mirror many aspects of the 
version presented by Nietzsche. The Dionysian that we find in the literature of d’Annunzio 
and Mann echoes the artistic and creative significance of Die Geburt der Tragödie, and, in 
the case of d’Annunzio, the impetus towards self-creation of Nietzsche’s Dionysian is 
reflected. The next chapter will consider a particular aspect of the Dionysian that is common 
                                                          
168
 ‘Der Übermensch hat aus Überfülle des Lebens jene Erscheinungen der Opiumraucher und den Wahnsinn 
und den dionysischen Tanz’ (‘The Übermensch, out of his abundance of life, has the appearance of the opium-
smoker, and madness and Dionysian dance’ [NF-1882, 4 (75)]).  
169
 ‘the superhuman conception of the world’. 
170
 ‘the philosophy of Dionysus’. 
171
 ‘es handelt sich dabei um mancherlei Heimliches, Neues, Fremdes, Wunderliches, Unheimliches.’ (‘it deals 
with much that is hidden, new, strange, miraculous, unsettling.’ [JG-295]).  
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to d’Annunzio and Mann, as well as appearing in Nietzsche’s Dionysian and in the worship 
of the ancient Dionysus; namely, the liminality of the Dionysian experience. For Nietzsche, 
as for the ancients, the Dionysian triggered the transgression of boundaries, placing the 
enraptured and intoxicated individual outside conventional social spaces. D’Annunzio and 
Mann continue these associations, and portray their Dionysian artists as marginal and isolated 
figures who are not easily integrated into society. The influence of the Dionysian, however, 
often causes these artists to experience profound communion, echoing both the ancient and 
Nietzschean Dionysian. The next chapter will explore the issue of liminality and communion, 
and will argue that these experiences form a crucial part of the process of Dionysian 




Chapter Three: The Dionysian Artist and Liminality 
 
The previous chapter traced the transition of the Dionysian from an ancient Greek deity to a 
psychological and artistic drive in the works of Nietzsche, and explored the reception of this 
idea. It was seen that Gabriele d’Annunzio and Thomas Mann, both early and enthusiastic 
(but not uncritical) readers of Nietzsche, were intrigued by Nietzsche’s Dionysian, and 
portrayed a version of it in their own literature. For them, as for Nietzsche, the Dionysian was 
a drive with great artistic significance. As this thesis shows, d’Annunzio and Mann both see 
creative inspiration in the impulses of the Dionysian, but also detect hints of danger. They do 
not advocate a total embrace of the Dionysian and the utter abandonment of instincts that 
hold it in check. For d’Annunzio and Mann, the Dionysian proves especially useful for the 
artist because of a certain aspect of creativity: namely, that the artist is an isolated individual 
who stands apart from his fellow man. Loneliness and alienation are often the lot of the artist, 
but the Dionysian, in its promotion of union, offers a means of combating this, to creative 
effect. This aspect of the Dionysian will be explored in this chapter. 
 We will begin by discussing d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s portrayals of the artist as an 
outsider. As will be seen, this is not an entirely original notion, and the long-standing 
stereotype of artists as isolated individuals will be discussed. It will be argued that the artists 
portrayed by d’Annunzio and Mann are not merely outsiders, but ‘liminal’. In other words, 
they sit between definitions and classifications, and display a somewhat ambiguous identity. 
Van Gennep’s and Turner’s theories regarding liminality will be used to illuminate the 
outsider-status of D’Annunnzio’s and Mann’s artists. These theories will shed light on the 
reasons for the artist’s necessary isolation, and enable a better understanding of the space 
occupied by such artists. 
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  The Dionysian, in its suspension of individuation and promotion of oneness, allows 
the artist to experience a form of communion and intimacy that is largely unknown to him or 
her. D’Annunzio and Mann both portray this experience as one that can bring creative 
benefits, but which can also threaten both creativity and the artist’s life: for if the suspension 
of identity that precedes immersion into a community goes too far, the artist’s individuated 
identity may be lost in an abyss of self-forgetfulness. Again, Turner’s theories will be used to 
illuminate this experience, for he discusses a state of intimacy and community 
(‘communitas’) into which participants enter during rites of passage, and which strikingly 
resembles the effects of the Dionysian. Turner’s theories will be used to explain both the 
benefits and the perils of Dionysian community (as a foil to the artist’s liminal isolation), and 
will allow for a better understanding of the experiences of d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artists. 
 
i) Theories of Liminality 
The term ‘liminal’ was coined by anthropologist Arnold van Gennep (Smith, 2012, p. 159), 
who explored ‘liminality’ in his studies of the rites of passage of tribal communities (Les rites 
de passage [The Rites of Passage, 1909]). He identifies three stages in rites of passage: ‘I 
propose to call the rites of separation from a previous world, preliminal rites, those executed 
during the transitional stage liminal (or threshold) rites, and the ceremonies of incorporation 
into the new world post-liminal rites’ (van Gennep, 1960, p. 21). During the first stage, an 
individual is separated from his community; during the middle stage the individual possesses 
an ‘ambiguous’ (Turner, 1977, p. 94) identity; and during the third stage the individual 
returns to the original community. Van Gennep states that this model can be applied to 
ceremonies which ‘accompany, facilitate, or affect the transition from one stage of life to 
another, or from one social position to another’ (1960, p. 187). Victor Turner, who expands 
upon van Gennep’s work, and applies it to a broader context, explains that during the middle 
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stage identified by van Gennep, the ‘characteristics of the ritual subject […] are ambiguous; 
he passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming 
state’ (1977, p. 94). The liminal stage of van Gennep’s rites of passage, then, is a transitional 
state in which identity is temporarily suspended.  
Liminality in van Gennep’s work is restricted to the context of tribal rituals; Turner’s 
development of van Gennep’s work applies the idea of liminality to a much broader 
anthropological context. Tribal communities (especially the Ndembu of Zambia) remain a 
focus of Turner’s attention,1 but he also considers human societies (including large-scale 
communities) in general. With ritual processes in mind, Turner juxtaposes two forms of 
society: the first, which constitutes the everyday realm of conventional society, is structured 
and hierarchical, a ‘system of politico-legal-economic positions’ (Turner, 1991, p. 96); the 
second, with little or no structure, is a ‘relatively undifferentiated comitatus, community, or 
even communion of equal individuals’ (ibid.). The latter form of society, inhabited during the 
liminal stage of a rite of passage, is referred to as ‘communitas’ by Turner, and, operates in a 
‘dialectical process’ (ibid.) with the former: ‘each individual’s life experience contains 
alternating exposure to structure and communitas, and to states and transitions’ (ibid.). 
Discussing human societies generally, Turner identifies what he called ‘liminal 
personae (“threshold people”)’ (ibid.), defined as those ‘elude or slip through the network of 
classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space’ (ibid.). These 
individuals, for whom liminality is a permanent condition, not just a temporary ritualistic 
stage, are ‘betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, 
convention, and ceremonial’ (ibid.). In this group of liminal individuals, who embrace 
participation in communitas,
2
 Turner places ‘what came to be known as the “beat 
                                                          
1
 Turner notes that rites of passage ‘tend to reach their maximal expression in small-scale, relatively stable and 
cyclical societies, where change is bound up with biological and meteorological rhythms and recurrences’ 
(1964, p. 46).  
2
 As Csapo notes, ‘[t]he principal object of liminal ritual is to create “communitas”’ (1997, p. 254). 
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generation”, who were succeeded by the “hippies”’ (p. 112), for example. These groups 
rejected the norms and structures of conventional society, which often disapproved of them 
because of their nonconformity. Liminal individuals are often regarded as ‘dangerous, 
inauspicious, or polluting’ (p. 108), and are frequently referred to in terms of myth, magic 
and religion. As Turner explains, ‘one often finds in human cultures that structural 
contradictions, asymmetries, and anomalies are overlaid by layers of myth, ritual, and 
symbol’ (p. 47). He gives the birth of twins in tribal societies as an example: in some tribal 
societies they may be elevated to a privileged status, while in others, Turner explains, they 
are killed as dangerous anomalies. 
In this chapter, many echoes of these notions and theories will be found, and 
d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artists will be seen to display many characteristics of Turner’s 
‘liminal personae’. Before discussing this, however, consideration will be given to the history 
of the Dionysian, in order to establish how and when connotations of liminality surrounding 
the deity sprang up. 
 
ii) Dionysus and Liminality 
The liminality that will be seen as a characteristic of Nietzsche’s Dionysian, and then of 
d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s versions of the Dionysian, is grounded in ancient accounts of the 
deity and his religion. This was seen in part in the previous chapter, in the duality that 
characterised the ancient (and the Nietzschean) Dionysus. As the offspring of a mortal and a 
deity, for example, he constituted a figure who stood between (or astride) the realm of 
mortals and that of the gods; additionally, he stands apart from the Olympian gods, as one of 
the chthonic deities. Dionysus was also associated with both life and death, and, legend tells, 
was able to pass into the Underworld and return unscathed to the world of the living. Soule 
writes that Dionysus’ liminality can be seen ‘not only in his changeability, but in his 
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association with youth. The earlier images show him bearded, but later he was usually 
portrayed as a beardless youth in soft, feminine shape’ (Soule, 2000, p. 27). As well as 
uniting youth and age, Dionysus similarly defied gendered definition; in the previous chapter, 
it was noted that various depictions emphasised qualities traditionally attached to both 
genders.  
 The liminal nature of the Dionysian is emphasised by Camille Paglia, who explains 
how Western art embraced Apollonian structures and drives in an attempt to renounce all that 
was associated with the dark and dangerous Dionysian. She names Dionysus ‘the Liberator’ 
and ‘a vandal’ (Paglia, 2001, p. 97), depicting him as a force that balks at structures and 
boundaries, and rejoices in transgression and deviancy. This is echoed by Oppel’s statement 
regarding the essence of Dionysus: ‘he overflows the limits, exceeds and obliterates 
boundaries’ (2005, p. 73). Paglia’s Dionysian promotes the suspension of individual identity, 
enabling one ‘for a short time to stop being [oneself]’ (2001, p. 97), and she notes the literal 
meaning of the Greek term ecstasis – ‘standing outside of’ (ibid.). For Paglia, Dionysus is 
also associated with the realm of liquids, a further challenge to defined structure: ‘[t]he 
Dionysian is nature’s chthonian fluidity. Apollo, on the other hand, gives form and shape, 
marking off one being from another’ (Paglia, p. 30). Paglia names ‘milk, blood, [and] sap’ 
(ibid.) as examples of Dionysian liquids, and calls the Dionysian ‘a miasmic swamp whose 
prototype is the still pond of the womb’ (p. 12). As with Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus, 
the former here signifies structure and individuality, while the latter signifies wildness, 
disruption, and plurality – all linked to liminality. It is the Apollonian that creates the 
boundaries and delineations which the Dionysian transgresses, and the liminal space is the 
Dionysian primordial world beneath or between Apollonian structures.  
 Liminality also featured in ancient Dionysian worship, which conveyed initiates to a 
liminal state. The intoxication inherent in Dionysian worship aided in the abandonment of 
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inhibitions and restraints, and suspended worshippers’ identity. This was a ritual for the 
whole community, regardless of social station, for, as Kerényi notes, ‘no one, not even slaves, 
was prevented from drinking wine’ (1976, p. 303). Dionysian intoxication transported 
worshippers to a state resembling the middle stage of van Gennep’s rites of passage: 
enraptured individuals were separated from the rest of the community by their delirium, and 
withdrew to a space outside the polis. Kuritz explains the three stages of the Dionysian ritual: 
‘first, an orgiastic exodus to the countryside; second, a sacrificial tearing apart and eating of a 
victim; and third, a joyous return to the city’ (1988, p. 19). In The Bacchae, Euripides 
opposes Dionysian worship to civic duty and responsibility, symbolised by the king 
Pentheus, who tries to outlaw Dionysian worship for the good of civilisation; notoriously, 
Pentheus ends up being dismembered by maenads who are too delirious to distinguish 
between their king and a wild animal. As Wood explains, Dionysus encouraged ‘the women 
of Thebes to abandon their civic duties, to move outside the walls of the city, and to engage 
in self-indulgent, wanton, and destructive behaviour’ (2008, p. 10). 
 Yet communitas, for Turner, is not merely the destructive antipode to civilisation that 
it is in the Dionysian delirium of The Bacchae. Turner notes that, like liminal individuals, the 
state of communitas is regarded as something magical and sacred, even mystical, for its 
transgression of structural norms ‘is accompanied by experiences of unprecedented potency’ 
(1991, p. 128). Such occurrences are often expressed in terms of ritual and even myth. 
Furthermore, he claims that the products of liminality are ‘art and religion’ (ibid.) as opposed 
to the ‘legal and political structures’3 (ibid.) that are the fruits of structural existence. He 
describes the ‘anti-structure’ that is the effect of communitas and liminality thus: 
liberation of human capacities of cognition, affect, volition, creativity, etc, from the normative 
constraints incumbent upon occupying a sequence of social statuses, enacting a multiplicity of 
                                                          
3
 Turner also notes: ‘Liminality, marginality, and structural inferiority are conditions in which are frequently 
generated myths, symbols, rituals, philosophical systems, and works of art’ (1991, p. 128). 
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social roles, and being acutely conscious of membership in some corporate group such as a 
family, lineage, clan, tribe, nation, etc, or of affiliation with some pervasive social category 
such as a class, caste, sex or age-division (Turner, 1982, p. 44). 
He suggests that liminality is ‘more creative […] than the structural norm’ (p. 47) – but adds 
the caveat that it is also ‘more destructive’ (ibid.). Echoing Euripides’ portrayal of deadly 
Dionysian unity, Turner notes that liminality: 
may be for many the acme of insecurity, the breakthrough of chaos into cosmos, of disorder 
into order […]. Liminality may be the scene of disease, despair, death, suicide, the breakdown 
without compensatory replacement of normative, well-defined social ties and bonds (p. 46).  
In terms of the Dionysian, this is the uncontrollable and noxious side of the drive, which will 
be seen to play havoc in d’Annunzio’s and, especially, Mann’s portrayals of the Dionysian 
experience.  
In several respects, then, Turner’s notion of communitas echoes the ancient worship 
of Dionysus, and in fact Turner does make reference to ‘the ecstatic communitas of 
Dionysos’ (Turner, 1991, p 160). Intoxicated individuals were temporarily ‘undifferentiated’ 
and enjoyed a feeling of community that transcended that of everyday existence. He 
emphasises (here in the context of hippy communities) the ‘spontaneity, immediacy, and 
“existence”’ (p. 113) of communitas, where consideration for the past (an aspect of structured 
existence) is eclipsed by concern only for the present moment. In order to illuminate the idea 
of communitas further, Turner cites Martin Buber, who uses the term ‘community’ where 
Turner uses ‘communitas’:  
Community is the being no longer side by side […] but with one another of a multitude of 
persons. And this multitude, though it moves towards one goal, yet experiences everywhere a 




The bond experienced between two individual participants in communitas is such that, by 
extension, they feel the whole of humanity to be united by the intensity of their connection. 
Turner’s descriptions of communitas recall the communion of intoxication, in which a deeper 
level of identification is experienced. This is one of the key aspects of Nietzsche’s Dionysian, 
which, as was seen in the previous chapter, demolishes the Apollonian principium 
individuationis and reveals a more profound bond between initiates, and between initiates and 
nature, granting them a feeling of unity with the ‘Ur-Einen’ (‘primordial oneness’ [GT-1]). 
Nietzsche describes this phenomenon thus:  
Unter dem Zauber des Dionysischen schliesst sich nicht nur der Bund zwischen Mensch und 
Mensch wieder zusammen: auch die entfremdete, feindliche oder unterjochte Natur feiert 
wieder ihr Versöhnungsfest mit ihrem verlorenen Sohne, dem Menschen
4
 (GT-1). 
Nietzsche’s description of the Dionysian state of deindividuation, where the subject enters a 
realm of intense communion – a ‘höheren Gemeinsamkeit’5 (ibid.) – resembles Turner’s 
communitas. Echoing Kerényi’s description of the universality of Dionysian worship, 
Nietzsche notes that in this state, the slave is now a free man,
6
 and the individual forsakes 
social structures and inhibitions that are now revealed as arbitrary.  
For Nietzsche, though, Dionysian intoxication is a temporary experience, and would 
be untenable as a permanent condition; under the influence of the Dionysian we are united 
with ‘das Urwesen selbst’7 – but, as Nietzsche specifies, only briefly.8 Hence the necessity of 
the Apollonian (in Die Geburt der Tragödie) as a means of taming the Dionysian. As seen in 
the previous chapter, if the Dionysian were experienced without the safeguards of the 
                                                          
4
 ‘Under the magic of the Dionysian, not only is the bond between man and man consolidated once again: 
nature, estranged, hostile, or subjugated, also celebrates her festival of reconciliation with her lost son, man’.  
5
 ‘higher community’. 
6
 ‘Jetzt ist der Sclave freier Mann’ (‘Now the slave is a free man’ [GT-1]). 
7
 ‘the primordial being itself’. 
8
 ‘Wir sind wirklich in kurzen Augenblicken das Urwesen selbst’ (‘For a few moments we are truly the 
primordial being itself’ [GT-17]). 
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Apollonian, the individual would be lost in ‘völliger Selbstvergessenheitʼ9 (GT-1). The raw, 
elemental power of the Dionysian requires the Apollonian in order to channel and tame it.
10
 
Nietzsche writes that the Apollonian reminds us of our individuated existence,
11
 and casts a 
veil of beauty
12
 over the horrors which the Dionysian exposes. The Apollonian also causes 
our experience of immediacy (a feature of Nietzsche’s Dionysian and Turner’s communitas) 
to cease: ‘[w]ir hatten unter den eigenthümlichen Kunstwirkungen der musikalischen 
Tragödie eine apollinische Täuschung hervorzuheben, durch die wir vor dem unmittelbaren 
Einssein mit der dionysischen Musik gerettet werden sollen [...]’13 (GT-24). After an intense 
experience of the Dionysian world of primordial unity, then, individuality must be re-
established, and the initiate is returned to a world of illusions, representation, and concepts, in 
order to survive. This is the end of the Dionysian ‘ritual’, and the individual returns to a civic 
existence. In antiquity, as Stephen Levine notes, Dionysian festivals took place at particular 
times, but ‘When the festival has concluded, […] daily life must begin again, although it is 
hoped that it will be marked by a sense of increased vitality and meaning’ (2005, p. 44). 
While Nietzsche’s notion of Apollo’s delivering the Dionysian individual safely back to 
structured society is not an aspect of historical Dionysian worship, the temporary nature of a 
Dionysian experience seems to be. 
Return to civilisation after a Dionysian experience echoes the final stage of van 
Gennep’s rites of passage, and the re-incorporation of which Turner speaks. After 
‘reaggregation’ (Turner, 1991, p. 94), the subject is ‘in a relatively stable state once more’ (p. 
95) and is no longer ‘betwixt and between’ (ibid.). Both van Gennep and Turner speak of the 
                                                          
9
 ‘utter self-forgetfulness’. 
10
 this can be seen in Strong’s analogy, in which we view ‘Dionysus as a light source and Apollo as a lens, 
which serves to colour and focus’ (1988, p. 142). While the analogy perhaps fails to convey the genuinely 
hazardous nature of the Dionysian source, it does emphasise the need for an Apollonian control. 
11
 ‘So entreisst uns das Apollinische der dionysischen Allgemeinheit und entzückt uns für die Individuen’ (‘So 
the Apollonian wrests us from Dionysian community and delights us with individuals’ [GT-21]).  
12
 ‘einen Schönheitsschleier’ (‘a veil of beauty’ [GT-25]).  
13
 ‘Under the unique artistic effects of musical tragedy, we emphasised an Apollonian deception, through which 
we are to be saved from immediate oneness with Dionysian music’. 
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liminal stage as a period of transition, implying that the re-incorporated individual rejoins 
society in an altered state: van Gennep talks about ‘rites of incorporation at marriages’ (1960, 
p. 11) for example, where subjects embark upon a new life as a couple, and no longer as 
unattached individuals.  
Nietzsche also employs Dionysus as a symbol for change and becoming, which must be 
embraced if mankind is to overcome decadence. In Die Geburt der Tragödie Dionysus 
promotes change by triggering intoxication, but in later writings (and notes), where Dionysus 
becomes an emblem of Nietzsche’s entire Weltanschauung, the Dionysian becomes an 
impulse for more permanent transformation, as discussed in the previous chapter. In a note 
from 1885, for example, Nietzsche speaks of ‘eine Art Charakter von Proteus-Dionysos’14 
(NF-1885, 25 [68]), linking the two classical figures. Proteus, as a son of Poseidon, was 
associated with the ever-changing seas, and is noted for having possessed ‘the faculty of 
changing himself into whatever forms he chose’ (Robbins, 1849, p. 84). In placing the two 
names side by side, Nietzsche signals Dionysus’ own capacity for undergoing and triggering 
transformation. Nietzsche defines his (later) Dionysian as ‘ein Werden’15 (NF-1885, 38 [12]) 
that knows no cessation, for the Dionysian becomes the embodiment of a philosophy that 
fights decadence with a life-affirming striving.  
Substantial affinities exist, then, between van Gennep’s and Turner’s notions of liminality 
and communitas, and the ancient and Nietzschean versions of the Dionysian. In all cases, the 
participant enters a state of ambiguousness in which their previous identity is suspended, and 
which leaves them able to undergo some kind of transition. Everyday social structures 
temporarily collapse, and the participant may discover creative energies in this liberation. 
Before turning our attention to d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s creative characters, a further 
incidence of liminality will be noted: namely that of the period (1894-1912), during which 
                                                          
14
 ‘a type of Proteus-Dionysus character’. 
15
 ‘a becoming’. 
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d’Annunzio and Mann published the texts under examination in this study. The next section 
will discuss this period, and argue that the period can be viewed as a ‘liminal’ one. This will 
allow for additional contextualised understanding of the themes and tropes of d’Annunzio’s 
and Mann’s literature, and for a deeper understanding of their isolated artists.  
 
iii) The fin-de-siècle: a Liminal Period? 
The period during which Gabriele d’Annunzio and Thomas Mann were writing, and in 
particular the period spanned by their texts under consideration here (1894-1912), was one 
characterised by intense change and transition. As indicated in the previous chapter, the final 
years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century saw dramatic 
transformations in the fields of culture, politics, economics, technology and demographics, 
and the period dubbed the fin-de-siècle could be seen as something of a liminal period, 
bridging the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Precisely what period is intended by the term 
‘fin-de-siècle’ varies considerably: Ledger and McCracken, in their Cultural Politics at the 
Fin de Siècle (1994), address the period stretching from the 1880s to 1914; whereas 
Showalter (1995), comparing the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth, 
considers the term to cover primarily the 1890s (and 1990s). Here the former of these two 
definitions will be used, encompassing the date of publication of all of the literary texts under 
consideration. 
One of the most prominent cultural trends of the final decades of the nineteenth 
century, ‘decadence’,16 was also arguably liminal in nature. Weir argues that decadence 
should be seen as a ‘dynamics of transition’ (1995, p. 15) from Romanticism to modernism, 
for decadence and aestheticism have been considered ‘as the preamble to twentieth-century 
transgressions of social and sexual boundaries’ (p. xv). He finds that decadence ‘is situated 
                                                          
16
 The aftermath and repercussions of decadence were still being felt when Mann published his Der Tod in 
Venedig in 1912 (and, indeed, cultural decadence remained a concern for Mann for at least another decade). 
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somewhere between romantic bohemia and avant-garde belle époque’ (ibid.), defying 
categorisation in either the former or the latter. An understanding of decadence as a transition 
is shared by several other critics; Williams, for example, deems the fin-de-siècle ‘a working-
out, rather, of unfinished lines; a tentative redirection’ (1963, p. 165). Pykett similarly finds 
the period to constitute ‘a space between two literary and historical periods […]; it occupied a 
borderland between two fields of study’ (1996, p. 3). Stephan notes that the period displays 
many contradictions and paradoxes: ‘[d]ecadent thinkers accepted Rousseau’s idea that 
nature is good and civilisation bad, yet they enthusiastically preferred the artificial: such 
perverse enjoyment of what is thought to be evil characterizes decadence’ (1974, p. 19). For 
Robbins decadence is a ‘slippery’ and ‘liminal cultural phenomenon, taking place between 
the binaries of life and art, natural and artificial, male and female, masculine and feminine, 
conventional and unconventional’ (1996, p. 5).  
 In the themes and tropes of the decadent era, a penchant for transgression, violation, 
and ‘between-ness’ is evident. Texts like Baudelaire’s Une charogne (A Carcass [from Les 
Fleurs du Mal, The Flowers of Evil] 1857), an important precursor of decadent literature, 
challenged conventions and categories of taste, and propagated the notion of ‘the Beauty of 
the Horrid’; perverse tropes such as incest (which emerged during the Romantic period, and 
recurs periodically in d’Annunzio’s fiction) became commonplace; the boundaries between 
life and art were blurred (most famously in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray); and 
writers displayed an unhealthy obsession with pathology and physical decay, muddying the 
distinctions between life and death. The ‘personae’ of the decadent period, who are among 
the subjects of Paglia’s Sexual Personae (1990), are also liminal, and include figures such as 
the dandy, the New Woman, the femme fatale, and the ephebe – all of whom challenge 
traditional gender identities. Kaye states that the final decades of the nineteenth century 
‘witnessed a complex and sometimes contradictory constellation of differing movements and 
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comprehensions of sexuality’ (2007, p. 54), and cites falling birth rates, the trend for sexual 
theory (for example, the writings of Havelock Ellis or Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s 
Psychopathia sexualis [1886]), the emergence of birth control, and suffrage movements as 
contributing factors to the ‘sheer conceptual chaos’ (p. 53) that critics tends to diagnose. 
Echoes of some of these ‘sexual personae’, to use Paglia’s phrase, will be seen among 
d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s characters.  
Another common trope of decadence, reflecting the liminality of the period and of the 
cultural trend, was the isolated individual, unable (or unwilling) to integrate fully into society. 
Huysman’s Des Esseintes (from À Rebours [Against Nature, 1884]) is probably the most 
notorious of these. His rejection of norms, structures, and conventions leads him to highly 
deviant behaviour: he becomes nocturnal, for example, and feeds himself via enema (the 
‘ultimate deviation from the norm’ [Paglia, 2001, p. 431]). Des Esseintes resembles the 
liminal individuals of which Turner speaks, but taken ad absurdum: for while Turner’s 
individuals may form a group that positions itself outside social structures, Des Esseintes is 
an entirely isolated figure who eschews participation in any kind of community. Even when 
his health is threatened by his eccentric behaviour and lifestyle, causing him to return to 
society, he does so in scepticism and resignation, likening himself to a ‘Christian who doubts’ 
(Huysmans, 1959, p. 220).  
 This brief survey of the fin-de-siècle has suggested that the period can be viewed as a 
liminal one, characterised by the rejection of fixed boundaries and cultural norms. Many of 
the protagonists of its most iconic literature were outsiders and behaved in ways that opposed 
mainstream culture and values. The (fictional and real) outsiders of the fin-de-siècle, who are 
often artists of some kind, can arguably be regarded as a continuation of the Romantic figure 
of the tortured, isolated (creative) genius, who conducts an uneasy relationship with 
mainstream society. Before turning to the artistic outsiders of d’Annunzio and Mann, the 
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cultural trope of the isolated artist will be discussed, allowing for a better understanding of 
the figures portrayed in the texts under consideration.  
 
iv) The Artist as Outsider 
The outsider – and the creative outsider in particular – is a frequent motif in the literature of 
d’Annunzio and Mann, but certainly not an original one, and the notion of the artist as an 
isolated individual is encountered so frequently that is has become something of a cliché.
17
 
D’Annunzio’s and Mann’s portrayals of the isolated artist (almost exclusively writers) can 
arguably be situated within this cliché, but these characters’ experiences of the Dionysian 
provide a striking foil to their solitude. Here the motif of the artist as outsider (both in real 
life and in literature) will be briefly discussed, in order to shed light on the origins of the idea 
taken up by D’Annunzio and Mann. 
 Countless artists
18
 of the recent centuries have gained a reputation as outsiders 
(whether correctly or not). Rader, looking to English literature, cites Shelley, Swinburne, 
Byron, Wilde, Blake, Pater, the pre-Raphaelites, Hardy and Houseman as examples of figures 
who ‘all exhibit some symptoms of cultural estrangement’ (1958, p. 308). Looking further 
afield we may also place Homer (Kohl, 2007, p. 383), Hölderlin, Sartre, Camus, Tolstoy, Van 
Gogh, and Pasolini – to name but a few examples – in the same list of artistic figures 
considered to be outsiders in some way. Rader considers explanations for the persona of the 
isolated artist: he notes that ‘there seems to be a profound maladjustment between the 
creative life and the existing social order’ (1958, p. 306) and alludes to Paul Klee’s belief that 
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 Pope challenges the notion of the Romantic artist as outsider, and distinguishes between the real and the 
stereotypical ‘romantic’ artist. He states that the view of the Romantic artist as ‘[living] in a garret, [starving] 
for his art, […] both a great genius and greatly misunderstood’ (2005, p. 236) is pure cliché, and not true to the 
reality of the situation. For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is of little importance whether the motif of the 
outsider artist is historically accurate or not: if merely a stereotype, it was one that existed at the turn of the 
century, and therefore one which would have been known to d’Annunzio and Mann, whose artists are similarly 
isolated. 
18
 The term ‘artist’ is used here broadly: among the figures considered here are writers, painters, poets, and even 
thinkers who adopted a highly literary style (such as Sartre). 
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‘artists suffer from social disunity – they are cut off from the larger spiritual whole’ (ibid.). In 
a discussion that is echoed by Battersby in her Gender and Genius (1989), Rader also 
considers when the first ‘outsider’ artists emerged: both note that in medieval Europe the 
artist had been little more than a craftsman, whose trade was regarded in much the same way 
as that of any other worker. During this period art was generally imitative, not expressive, 
and the artist’s character was considered to be of little importance, as it was thought not to 
have any real influence upon the resulting product. Both Rader (1958, p. 307) and Battersby 
(1989, p. 26) note that the Renaissance can be seen as something of a turning point in this 
respect: with the advent of private patronage artists were no longer governed by the church 
(Battersby, p. 26), for example, and began to exercise more control over their art. Rader finds 
that the change in status of the artist ‘can be detected in Cellini’s Autobiography and Vasari’s 
description of fellow-artists in sixteenth-century Italy’ (1958, p. 307). It was not until much 
later, however, that the artist fully gained a persona, for Renaissance art was still ‘mimetic’ 
(1989, Battersby, p. 26). For Battersby, it is only once the term ‘genius’ (as we understand it 
today
19
) enters currency – which she finds took place sometime during the seventeenth 
century – that we can talk of the individualistic artist. It is with Romanticism, however, that 
the truly individual artist emerges: Rader notes that ‘the individualistic nature of Western 
civilisation became firmly established […] during the Romantic period of the nineteenth 
century’ (1958, p. 307), and Battersby concurs that ‘for Romantics, art grows out of 
individuality’ (1989, p. 44).  
 During the Romantic period, subjectivity was valued in a way that was alien to the 
attitudes of the Renaissance, for example. This allowed artists to produce more expressive 
works, and to exert their individuality; self-consciousness was key. As Shanahan explains, 
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 She explains how the modern term ‘genius’ came about through the fusion of the Latin genius and ingenius 
(or the Greek genio and ingegno), where the former refers to ‘the divine forces associated with, and protective 
of, male fertility’ (p. 26) and the latter is ‘associated with good judgement and knowledge, but also talent, and 
dexterity and facility essential to the great artist working in mimetic traditions’ (ibid.). 
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Romanticism can be seen as ‘the first convergence of individualistic attitudes into a social, 
literary, and philosophical movement that places an emphasis on the solitary individual as 
nothing less than the centre of the universe’ (1992, p. 90). With this shift the persona of the 
artist became almost as interesting as the works that he or (occasionally) she produced, and 
the stage was set for the advent of the highly individualistic – even isolated – artist. Shanahan 
explains how Romantic individualism could lead to alienation, ‘by way of the search for 
authenticity’ (p. 99): the individual’s search for authentic and original expression could result 
in a distancing from mainstream culture and social norms, and potentially in isolation. 
Society and individualism appear to be in conflict, for, as Trilling informs us, ‘civilisation is 
[…] so inauthentic that personal integrity can be wrested from it only by the inversion of all 
its avowed principles’ (1974, p. 109). The pursuit of authenticity thus appears to render 
alienation inevitable and maybe even necessary.  
Irrationality was also valued by many proponents of Romanticism, partly in objection 
to the Enlightenment’s elevation of reason and rationality. In German Romanticism, for 
example, Ferber notes the reaction of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and Johann 
Georg Hamann (1730-1788) to ‘what they perceived as Kant’s unrelenting and abstract 
rationalism’ (2005, p. 407): they ‘glorified emotional irrationality and the priority of poetic 
instincts over any judgement and rational argument’ (ibid.). Linked to this, madness was a 
frequent subject of Romantic art and literature, echoing the classical notion of furor 
poeticus.
20
 Hence the preoccupation with madness evident in Coleridge’s Kubla Khan21 
(1797), for example, or Goya’s The Madhouse (1812-19). Among artists themselves, an 
element of madness also seemed to be desirable: Esterhammer claims that ‘Blake exploited 
rumours about his madness’ (2010, p. 288), for example, and reminds us of Byron’s 
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 See E. N. Tigerstedt, ‘Furor Poeticus: Poetic Inspiration in Greek Literature before Democritus and Plato, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 31 (1970), pp. 163-178. As Tigerstedt notes, in Plato, for example, we find 
‘poetic inspiration [described] as a kind of possession’ (1970, p. 164).  
21




reputation for being ‘mad, bad and dangerous to know’ (ibid.). Similarly, while Giacomo 
Leopardi (1798-1837) cannot be placed comfortably within Romanticism, he does reflect the 
period’s occupation with irrationality and madness when he describes his years spent 
studying as ‘sette anni di studio matto e disperatissimo’22 (cited in Citati, 2010, p. 33). But as 
Battersby points out, in the Romantics’ view, ‘To be a genius, a person has to be like a 
madman, but not a madman’ (1989, p. 106), and the ‘madness’ glorified by the Romantics 
was often of a mild and ‘romanticised’ variety.  
 The notion of the genius formed during the Romantic period has been an enduring 
one. Subsequently the artistic loner has been portrayed or enacted by Joyce (especially in his 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, 1916), Kafka, Pirandello (notably in Il fu Mattia 
Pascal [The Late Mattia Pascal, 1904]) and Hesse (especially in Der Steppenwolf 
[Steppenwolf, 1927]), among many others.
23
 In many cases, the same traits and experiences 
that segregated the Romantic outsider also endure, and Marcuse’s statement about Goethe’s 
Werther could apply equally to many of the post-Romantic outsider artists (even if Saul is 
correct in noting that the psychology of Die Leiden des jungen Werthers [The Sorrows of 
Young Werther, 1774] was ‘largely rationalist’ [2009, p. 127]):  
Für Werther war in seinem letzten Subjektivismus, in seiner absoluten Innerlichkeit der 
Zwiespalt zwischen Idee und Wirklichkeit, Ich und Umwelt ein unüberbrückbarer, und es gab 
keine Rückkehr zur Einheit als durch den Tod, die Auslöschung des empirischen Seins.
24
 
(1978, p. 69) 
Werther is not alone in being segregated by his tendency towards extreme introspection, and 
in resorting to suicide – a notion which exerted a fascination over the Romantics. The suicide 
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 ‘seven years of insane and desperate study’. 
23
 O’Connor suggests that it was only with the tumultuous events of the 1930s that the artist truly emerged from 
isolation: ‘Unfortunately, the pendulum swung too far the other way. Poetry, in its political aspect, tended to 
become the poetry of a party’ (1947, p. 36). 
24
 ‘Werther was trapped in his extreme subjectivism and absolute inwardness, and the division between idea and 
reality, between self and world, was insurmountable; there was no longer a possibility of a return to unity other 
than through death, the extinction of empirical being’. 
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of Thomas Chatterton, for example, provided inspiration for Shelley, Wordsworth and 
Coleridge (as well as appearing in pre-Raphaelite Henry Wallis’ famous painting in 1856). 
Saul notes that ‘the Romantics abhorred the orthodox (Augustinian) Christian condemnation 
of suicide’ (2009, p. 167), and names Schlegel’s Lucinde (1799) as ‘the definitive theoretical 
account of Romantic suicide’ (p. 168). Saul elsewhere describes suicide as a ‘liminal 
experience’ (2006, p. 578) which ‘transgresses not only the general existential border but also 
an internal ethical and cultural border. It is […] an offence against received cultural norms’ 
(p. 580). In the Romantic context, suicide appears to be the ultimate expression of liminal 
isolation, and of the rejection of social norms.
25
  
The (artistic) outsider is also often seen as a bearer of burdensome knowledge, which 
segregates him (and sometimes her). The artist is often lauded as having a comparatively 
greater insight into the true nature of existence, which can trigger despair and inertia, and 
hinder action. As Byron notes in his Manfred (1817), ‘they who know the most / Must mourn 
the deepest o’er the fatal truth, / The Tree of Knowledge is not that of Life’26 (1901, p. 85). 
Byron’s judgement here recalls the wisdom of Silenus, reported by Nietzsche in his Die 
Geburt der Tragödie (§ 3) and likened to the insight that crippled Hamlet (§ 7). In these 
cases, too acute an insight into the truth behind man’s existence can render it unappealing, 
and hinder one from living with ease; as this is not an experience common to all men, it can 
be an alienating discovery. In several of d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s characters, burdensome 
knowledge will be seen to segregate the creative individual. 
All of these (stereotypical and clichéd) traits and experiences can render the artist 
something of an outsider; as Battersby states, during the Romantic period (and arguably from 
then on), the typical genius was ‘atypical’ (1989, p. 13). It is a trope common to the literature 
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 Saul also notes that Wether’s suicide differs from the traditional (German) Romantic idea of suicide: for while 
the former kills himself in an ‘act of madness’ (2006, p. 591), ‘Romantic suicide is […] enacted in a state of 
high emotional serenity and self-knowledge’ (ibid.). 
26
 These lines appear in Nietzsche’s Menschliches Allzumenschliches (Human All Too Human, 1878), and 
Nietzsche names them ‘unsterblichen Versen’ (‘immortal verses’ [MA-109]). 
94 
 
of d’Annunzio and Mann, but given the frequency with which the artist is portrayed as an 
isolated outsider, this is not a particularly interesting observation; more interesting, and more 
significant for this study, is the way that both d’Annunzio and Mann appear to view the 
Dionysian as a vital aid to the isolated artist, which can act as a foil to the artist’s liminal 
position and enhance his creativity. For while both d’Annunzio and Mann appear to see some 
degree of isolation as an inevitable side-effect of creative talent, they also do not appear to 
view utter segregation as particularly beneficial for the artist; as will be seen, for both writers 
an experience of the Dionysian, and the profound and primitive intimacy that it triggers, can 
be a valuable stimulant to creativity. 
 
v) The Liminal Artists of d’Annunzio and Mann 
For both d’Annunzio and Mann, the nature of art and the artist provided a lifelong subject for 
literary exploration. Some prominent examples of their fictional artists were cited in the 
introduction to this thesis, including d’Annunzio’s Claudio Cantelmo (Le vergini delle rocce) 
and Mann’s Adrian Leverkühn (Doktor Faustus). A common trait of these figures is their 
solitude. In their portrayals of the artist both d’Annunzio and Mann draw upon the idea – 
even stereotype – of the artist as an outsider. The fictional artists considered here stand apart 
from their fellow man and find themselves marginalised by their creativity; they occupy a 
liminal space on the edge of social norms and are characterised by ‘between-ness’. These 
artists recall the liminal personae described by Turner, who exist as a small group in a 
permanent state of liminality; but d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artists are entirely solitary 
individuals and do not belong to any kind of group.  
 In the texts considered here, creativity goes hand in hand with solitude: Giorgio 
Aurispa, who is musically talented and pursues creativity in his attempt to become the 
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superuomo, is ‘il solitario’27 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 930), and Aschenbach in Venice is ‘der 
Einsame’28 (Mann, 2004, p. 570). Tonio Kröger is caught ‘zwischen krassen Extremen’29 (p. 
265) as an artist of bourgeois background perched between the two spheres, and Stelio 
Effrena is singled out by his unique artistic gift. In Tristan, Detlev Spinell (the dilettante 
‘artist’) avoids social contact in the sanatorium in which he is residing under false pretences, 
until the arrival of the genuinely artistic Gabriele Klöterjahn, who is, herself, a lone 
participant in a profound musical experience. Similar methods are employed by both 
d’Annunzio and Mann to illustrate the isolation of these characters: we find artistic characters 
placed in liminal settings, for example, or contrasted as a single figure against a collective 
audience.  
 The liminal settings employed by d’Annunzio and Mann to emphasise their artists’ 
marginality are all spaces outside the city, where social norms and structures are (to some 
extent) abandoned. We encounter Detlev Spinell and Gabriele Klöterjahn in a sanatorium in 
the mountains; Giorgio Aurispa withdraws to a hermitage by the sea with his lover; Tonio 
Kröger visits a coastal hotel in Denmark; Aschenbach eventually arrives at a hotel on the 
Venetian lagoon; and the preparation for Stelio Effrena’s imminent work of art also takes 
place in Venice. Both d’Annunzio and Mann place a high symbolic value upon Venice – 
admittedly a city, but a unique one: where tourists outnumber residents; where East and West 
meet; where the boundary between land and sea is blurred; and which has traditionally been 
portrayed as a site of loosened morals and transgressive behaviour. Tristan’s sanatorium 
shares features with Venice: like the holiday resort, it is a location where daily life is less 
structured – it is filled instead with leisure or recovery time – and where social norms are 
somewhat relaxed. Both are also locations where people of various nationalities and 
occupations (but not classes – in both the residents are wealthy) mix. Aschenbach’s inability 
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 ‘the solitary one’. 
28
 ‘the lonely one’. 
29
 ‘between stark extremes’. 
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to communicate with some of his fellow guests (including Tadzio’s Polish family), at least in 
his or their native tongue, emphasises his isolation, and in a space of relaxed social structure 
he appears more alienated and unable to communicate than ever. The marginality of the 
sanatorium (named Einfried) is furthered by its ambiguous location: Mann informs us only 
that it is situated among mountains and that snow covers the premises. As Ezergailis 
comments, the sanatorium is so vaguely described as to remain ‘charged with the widest 
possible symbolic associations’ (Ezergailis, 1975, p. 347), creating the impression of a place 
that is anchored nowhere and exists outside normal geographical realms.  
In the Einfried sanatorium social hierarchies and boundaries are to some extent 
suspended, because patients of all sorts (‘Herren, Damen und sogar Kinder’30 [Mann, 2004, p. 
320]) coexist here. As a retreat for the sick, the sanatorium is already rendered a liminal 
location, for it hosts those whom illness has excluded from the ordinary routine of life, but 
who are not yet ready to be consigned to death. Einfried is also ‘liminal’ in the sense that it is 
removed from the world of work and commitment: its residents can forget the demands of 
everyday life, and participate in activities such as sledding trips.  
 As a city on the waters, historically a portal between East and West, and a city of 
quasi-Oriental architecture sinking into the lagoon onto which it was built, Venice is the 
archetypal place ‘betwixt and between’ (Turner, 1991, p. 95). As Mann’s narrator comments, 
it is ‘halb Märchen, halb Fremdenfalle’31 (Mann, 2004 p. 567). Venice appears in both Der 
Tod in Venedig and Il fuoco, commanding a presence in both texts that is equal to that of a 
prominent character. For both writers it is a city between life and death: while Aschenbach 
wanders into the arms of death in Venice, it is also the place where, arguably, he experiences 
a fullness of life that he has hitherto repressed. When we first encounter him in Munich, he is 
suffering from what he believes to be writer’s block, and takes a walk in a vain attempt to 
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 ‘men, women, and even children’. 
31
 ‘half fairytale, half tourist trap’. 
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alleviate the difficulties. During this walk the sight of an exotic stranger triggers a 
hallucination of a wild swampland, a primordial landscape that bristles with life. Lush plants 
dominate the landscape and a tiger crouches ready to pounce. The abundance of life in this 
vision contrasts starkly with the spartan world Aschenbach seems to inhabit in Munich – we 
read of him sitting, monk-like, at his desk with two tall candle sticks – and presages his 
Venetian experiences: for it is the re-awakening of Dionysian impulses within Aschenbach 
that has triggered the vision, in which the object of his repression is made manifest. While 
Aschenbach does not travel quite as far as the tigers, in Venice (whose canals recall the 
watery landscape of the hallucination) he is confronted with a realisation of this vision, and 
although the Dionysian delivers him along a path to death, it also grants him an experience of 
those primordial impulses that were depicted in his hallucination. Ultimately, however, it is 
death and degeneration that triumph in Der Tod in Venedig: Aschenbach’s Venice is ‘krank’ 
(‘ill’ [Mann, 2004 p. 567]), ‘die faulriechende Lagune’32 (p. 541) and is plagued with ‘eine 
widerliche Schwüle’33 (p. 541). On the day of Aschenbach’s death, just after he learns of the 
Polish family’s imminent departure, the beach has a distinctly melancholy feel: 
‘Herbstlichkeit, Überlebtheit schien über dem einst so farbig belebten, nun fast verlassenen 
Lustorte zu liegen, dessen Sand nicht mehr reinlich gehalten wurde’34 (p. 590). As his 
surroundings reflect, while the release of Aschenbach’s repressed sexuality may occasion an 
initial surge in vitality and energy, mental and physical decline swiftly follow.  
In Il fuoco, too, Venice is a city suspended between death, decay, and stagnation on 
the one hand, and life, vitality, and art on the other. Degeneration is visible: Effrena notes that 
the city can seem ‘senza palpito e senza respiro, morta nelle sue verdi acque’35 (d’Annunzio, 
1989, p. 233); Venice’s gondolas are likened to funeral barges, a metaphor also found in Der 
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 ‘the reeking lagoon’. 
33
 ‘a repulsive oppressiveness’. 
34
 ‘An autumnal feeling and a sense of expiration lay upon the beach, which had once been so colourful and 
animated, and was now almost deserted, and whose sand was no longer kept clean’. 
35
 ‘without a pulse and without breath, dead in its green waters’.  
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Tod in Venedig; and at one point Effrena and Foscarina are rowed through a landscape that is 
described as ‘stigia’ (‘stygian’ [p.429]), ‘come una visione dell’Ade’36 (ibid.). But 
d’Annunzio – as well as Effrena, who shares several autobiographical details with his author 
– attempts to counteract this degeneration, and resists the image of Venice as a paradigm of 
decadence and decay. For Effrena Venice is ‘una Città di Vita’37 (p. 254), and must be 
restored to this rightful state. In Il fuoco, therefore, we also find signs of life that are absent in 
Mann’s funereal Venice: we read that ‘la fresca marea rifluiva nella Città bella’38 (p. 312); 
the natural elements of wind and water offer up creative inspiration to Effrena (‘Tutti i rumori 
vi si trasformano in voci espressive’39 [p. 354]); and the energy that his oration provokes in 
his listeners gives hope for Venice’s revival. As Becker notes, d’Annunzio ‘paints Venice 
and indeed the whole of Italy as resurgent’ (Becker, 1991, p. 234). The modernisation and 
‘revitalisation of Venice’ (p. 234) that we witness in Il fuoco also includes ‘the glorification 
of modern military technology’ (p. 234); hence we read of battleships on the Venetian waters, 
and activity in the arsenal. The rejuvenation that Effrena desires for Venice seems largely 
driven by a rediscovery of the Dionysian, along Nietzschean lines: Effrena’s climactic oration 
in the Doge’s palace provokes a Dionysian frenzy in his listeners, and Venice is, for an hour, 
reinvigorated with a Dionysian energy. During these delirious celebrations Dionysus is 
lauded as ‘Il Florido, il Fruttifero, […] Dioniso liberatore’40 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 262) 
emphasising the power of the Dionysian to inject life and reawaken fertility in this 
deteriorated city, caught between vitality and degeneration. 
  As a city between land and sea, the Venice of Il fuoco and Der Tod in Venedig is the 
coastal location par excellence. It is literally a liminal location: d’Annunzio writes of ‘la Città 
                                                          
36
 ‘like a vision of Hades’. 
37
 ‘a City of Life’. 
38
 ‘the fresh tide flowed back into the beautiful City’.  
39
 ‘All the sounds are transforming themselves into expressive voices’. 
40
 ‘the thriving one, the fruitful one, […] Dionysus the liberator’. 
99 
 
anadiomene’41 (p. 267), and Mann leads Aschenbach to the ‘Wasserstadt’ (‘water city’ [2004, 
p. 524]), both highlighting the city’s straddling of land and sea. D’Annunzio and Mann make 
use of seaside locations as liminal spaces elsewhere, too. Throughout Mann’s literature the 
sea (or beach) provides a retreat for his characters, offering a space where thoughts of duty, 
social constraints, and business are relaxed. Generations of Buddenbrooks (most notably 
Tony and Hanno) have vacationed by the sea at Travemünde, for example, and Tonio Kröger 
travels to Denmark to stay on the coast (after a journey by sea). In Der Tod in Venedig it is 
Aschenbach’s frustration at not being able to easily access the sea in Pola that eventually 
leads him to Venice, to the lido, where he is seduced to remain. In Il trionfo della morte it is 
to a hermitage on the Adriatic coast that Aurispa retreats with his lover, Ippolita, and, 
elsewhere, Il piacere’s Andrea Sperelli convalesces on the coast after being injured in a duel, 
and reflects upon his existence facing the sea. As one of the realms of Dionysus, as well as 
the setting of much of Richard Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde, the sea also offers myriad 
connotations and associations which appeal to d’Annunzio and Mann. 
 Alongside their use of symbolic landscapes, d’Annunzio and Mann also emphasise 
their artists’ solitude by opposing them to a collective audience. This is especially the case for 
Aschenbach, Tonio Kröger, and Stelio Effrena. Giorgio Aurispa’s (failed) creativity aims at 
the creation of the superuomo rather than of actual works of art; Tristan’s Spinell is too much 
of a charlatan to have any real audience; and Gabriele Klöterjahn’s artistic experience is an 
entirely solitary one – as is her possible Liebestod.  
In Tonio Kröger a gulf separates artist and audience, largely because of the illusory 
relationship that exists between them. Kröger complains to his friend, Lisaweta, that, as a 
writer, he is troubled by ‘[d]as Gefühl der Separation und Unzugehörigkeit, des Erkannt- und 
Beobachtetseins […]’42 (Mann, 2004, p. 272); perhaps because his literature should provide a 
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 ‘the anadyomene City’. 
42
 ‘The feeling of separation and not belonging; being known and observed’. 
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means of communication and unity with his readers, but instead only reinforces his isolation. 
Literature is even described here as an activity that is ‘befremdende’ (‘alienating’ [p. 247]). 
Recalling occasions where he has appeared in public, Kröger speaks of the futility of seeking 
a connection with his audience, lamenting, ‘[i]ch finde nicht, was ich suche, Lisaweta. Ich 
finde die Herde [...]’43 (p. 279). It is entirely an illusion, or a mask, that Kröger’s readers 
come to ‘know’, for he is not the sort of artist to allow feeling and emotion into his work. It is 
only decadents and dilettantish bohemians, Kröger believes, who use their art to give vent to 
their emotions;
44
 true literature must contain something ‘Außermenschliches und 
Unmenschliches’45 (p. 270) and stand aloof from humanity in order to portray it without 
descending into sentimentality or ‘bacchantic howling’ (Reed, 1974, p. 405). Kröger is ‘allein 
und ausgeschlossen von den Ordentlichen und Gewöhnlichen’46 (Mann, 2004, p. 252), a 
situation which appears to be a corollary of his artistic talent.  
In Der Tod in Venedig Aschenbach does not complain of the same false familiarity 
that Kröger experiences with his readers: while Kröger exposes his audience’s supposed 
familiarity with him as illusory, Aschenbach is as much deceived by illusion as his readers. 
Having practised an art of sophisticated and lofty finesse, Aschenbach eventually realises 
(towards the end of Mann’s novella), the extent of his obsession with Tadzio, and its 
implications; after a desperate pursuit of Tadzio through Venice, ‘der Meister, der würdig 
gewordene Künstler’47 (p. 588) collapses in a sweaty and feverish heap at the foot of a well, 
and is forced to admit that ‘wir Dichter [können] den Weg der Schönheit nicht gehen […], 
ohne daß Eros sich zugesellt und sich zum Führer aufwirft’48 (ibid.). One could argue that 
this revelation exposes Aschenbach’s former artistic persona as illusory, and conclude that 
                                                          
43
 ‘I don’t find what I am looking for, Lisaweta. I find the herd […]’. 
44
 ‘Und weil der ein Stümper ist, der glaubt, der Schaffende dürfe empfinden’ (‘And because he is a fool who 
believes that the creator must feel’ [p. 270]). 
45
 ‘extra-human and unhuman’. 
46
 ‘alone and shut out from the ordinary and the normal’. 
47
 ‘the master, the dignified artist’. 
48
 ‘we poets cannot walk on the path of beauty unless Eros accompanies us and becomes our guide’. 
101 
 
Aschenbach’s readers have been deceived; but Aschenbach, too, has been taken in by this 
deception. At least until shortly before we first encounter him, he has believed 
wholeheartedly in his (excessively Apollonian) artistic values. Aschenbach’s eventual 
recognition of Eros in his creativity is as surprising to him as it would be to his readers, were 
they to discover the truth of his Venetian experiences, and the true motivation behind the 
treatise that he writes upon the beach in sight of Tadzio.
49
 
 In Il fuoco, there is no sense of illusion or falseness in the relationship between artist 
and audience, but the portrayal of this relationship nonetheless emphasises Effrena’s solitude. 
As he enters the stage from which he is to give his speech (alone), he is greeted by the sight 
of many faces which become one, ‘il mostro formidabile dagli innumerevoli volti umani’50 
(d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 231). But Effrena is not troubled by his solitude: he does not suffer 
from isolation but rather rejoices in the fact that his ambition and artistic burden single him 
out. He retains the Romantic stance of the aloof artist, but, as a superuomo, is able to bear his 
solitude cheerfully, in the knowledge that it is a precondition of his superior artistic talent. 
Equally, his relationship with his audience is not one of sterile distance but of dynamic 
communication, and he manipulates his listeners masterfully during his oration in the Doge’s 
palace.
51
 The effect of Effrena’s words is likened to ‘[una] incantesimo’52 (p. 241), and the 
interaction between speaker and listener is a fruitful one: ‘Il palpito della folla e la voce del 
poeta sembravano rendere alle mura secolari la vita primiera e rinnovellar nel freddo museo 
                                                          
49
 Aschenbach’s readers are unlikely ever to know the truth behind his Venetian experiences and death, and 
Mann’s novella closes with the (ironic) sentence: ‘Und noch desselben Tages empfing eine respektvoll 
erschütterte Welt die Nachricht von seinem Tode’ (‘And on the same day a respectfully shaken world received 
the news of his death’ [p. 592]). 
50
 ‘the terrible monster of innumerable human faces’.  
51
 His control over his audience is seen when he directs their collective gaze for example: ‘Col suo sguardo e col 
suo gesto egli sollevò l′anima della folla verso il capolavoro che spandeva nel cielo dell′aula una irradiazione 
solare’ (‘With his gaze and with his gesture he raised the soul of the crowd towards the masterpiece which 
spread a beam of sunlight across the sky of the hall’ [p. 235]). 
52
 ‘a spell’. 
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lo spirito originario’53 (ibid.). By the end of his speech Effrena has succeeded in provoking a 
Dionysian frenzy in his listeners, and successfully welcomes Dionysus back to Venice, thus 
achieving his aim and demonstrating the efficacy of his audience-manipulation.  
 With Mann’s artists, liminality is emphasised by the fact that the artist often straddles 
two worlds or spheres, and is of mixed heritage. Aschenbach, for example, is a product of 
northern and southern, and bourgeois and artistic influences: his northern father was a judicial 
officer, and his mother the daughter of a conductor from Bohemia. As we learn, ‘Die 
Vermählung dienstlich nüchterner Gewissenhaftigkeit mit dunkleren, feurigeren Impulsen 
ließ einen Künstler und diesen besonderen Künstler erstehen’54 (Mann, 2004, p. 508). This 
mixture of conflicting heritages was Mann’s own experience, as the son of a middle-class 
grain merchant from Lübeck and a half-Brazilian farmer’s daughter. The theme of mixed 
ancestry returns often in Mann’s (artistic) characters – probably most notably in Tonio 
Kröger (whose very name indicates his divided character). Kröger’s father (‘ein […] 
sorgfältig gekleideter Herr’55 [p. 247]) is a businessman who shows little interest or respect 
for artists and their ilk (scolding Kröger for frittering his time away with poetry), much like 
the father in Mann’s earlier Der Bajazzo (The Joker, 1897); Kröger’s mother (‘dunkle und 
feurige’56 [ibid.]) is a skilled musician from the south. In Gabriele Klöterjahn it is the father 
who provides artistic impulses, and Gabriele describes to Spinell (to his delight) how her 
father’s violin playing would reduce her to tears as a child (itself an echo of the deep love of 
music that unites Hanno Buddenbrook and his mother, Gerda). Such mixed heritages are not 
to be found among d’Annunzio’s artistic characters: after all, his superuomo is a distinctly 
Latin one, and any foreign influence would probably be considered contamination. 
                                                          
53
 ‘The surge of the crowd and the voice of the poet seemed to restore primal life to the centuries-old walls, and 
to reinvigorate the cold museum with its original spirit’. 
54
 ‘The marriage of official and austere conscience with darker, more fiery impulses had given rise to an artist, 
and to this artist in particular’.  
55
 ‘a carefully dressed man’. 
56
 ‘dark and fiery’. 
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 Aschenbach may acknowledge the mixture of impulses and influences in his 
parentage – or at least, so we assume, given the text’s early and expository reporting of this 
biographical detail – but he appears dangerously unaware of the resulting conflict that takes 
place within his psyche. Having practised strict routine and discipline, Aschenbach has 
attempted to approach his creative profession in imitation of his forefathers, living in the 
manner of a senator or businessman. The effort required to do this has left Aschenbach 
fatigued and vulnerable to disintegration, which duly occurs – the result of his Venetian 
experiences, when his already resurgent Dionysian side is irrepressibly inflamed by a chance 
encounter with an adolescent boy. While Tonio Kröger is of similar origins, he is not doomed 
to the same fate, and is not isolated to the same crippling extent, possibly because he shows a 
keener awareness of his predicament. 
 Throughout Mann’s eponymous novella, Tonio Kröger is conscious of his alienation 
from humanity, and of the conflicting sides of his nature: he bemoans his position between 
the two spheres of the burgher and the artist, and the fact that he cannot settle in either. 
Bourgeois concern for respectability and duty make the life of the artist (especially the 
decadent or the bohemian) seem improper to him,
57
 but he is irresistibly compelled to create, 
and he is apparently unable to be anything other than an artist.
58
 As a creative individual with 
bourgeois sensibilities, the role of the artist is one that greatly concerns him. He disdains 
those dilettantes and bohemians who believe that the artist must vent his emotions in his 
work, and don velvet jackets and silk waistcoats in order to play the artist’s role. Kröger 
stands ‘betwixt and between’ (Turner, 1991, p. 95), and it is only when he accepts his liminal 
position, at the end of the novella, that his crisis is resolved. It is possibly Kröger’s ability to 
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 ‘ich hege auf dem Grunde meiner Seele [...] gegen den Typus des Künstlers den ganzen Verdacht, den jeder 
meiner ehrenfesten Vorfahren droben in der engen Stadt irgendeinem Gaukler und abenteuernden Artisten 
entgegengebracht hätte, der in sein Haus gekommen wäre.’ (‘I harbour in the depths of my soul […] as much 
suspicion towards the figure of the artist as any of my honourable ancestors up there in the narrow city would 
have had towards any juggler or roving artist who had come into his house.’ [p. 273]) 
58
 Kröger believes that the true artist does not elect art as his profession, but is simply born an artist, and has 
little choice in the matter: ‘Einen Künstler, einen wirklichen, [ist] nicht einen, dessen bürgerlicher Beruf die 
Kunst ist’ (‘An artist, a true artist, is not one who has chosen art as a burgherly profession’ [p. 272]). 
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articulate his crisis – contrasting with Aschenbach’s repression and self-deception – that 
allows him to achieve a kind of equilibrium, balancing his burgherly and artistic sides. 
Tristan’s Spinell may be a dilettante artist – or a caricature of the decadent artist – but 
he is a liminal figure nonetheless. He avoids Einfried’s residents, apart from Gabriele, and 
sits between masculinity and femininity, youth and age. He is described as a man in his 
thirties, whose face is babyishly round and fat, but whose hair is beginning to go grey at the 
temples.
59
 Because of his contrasting features he is nicknamed ‘der verweste Säugling’60 
(Mann, 2004, p. 328) by fellow patients. Similarly, Spinell is a somewhat effeminate male. 
His hairless face is neither adult nor masculine, and, especially opposite the virile Herr 
Klöterjahn (whose name, Heilbut indicates, is a ‘local idiom denoting ample testicles’ 
[Heilbut, 1997, p. 158]), who angrily confronts Spinell after receiving a flamboyantly 
insulting letter, Spinell seems frivolous and impotent, the antithesis of the masculine world of 
commerce and business. Excluded from the world of virility and masculinity, Spinell 
befriends Gabriele, recalling a common trope of decadent literature, as explained by Weir: 
‘[d]ecadent writers have no sympathy at all for the vigorous, masculine world of the 
bourgeois businessman. On the contrary, they willingly accept the idea that they, like women, 
are outside that world’ (Weir, 1995, p. 18). Their (largely) asexual rapport offers a subversion 
of conventional sexuality. 
The traits that Spinell shares with the true artist, such as his liminality, arguably serve 
two functions. Firstly, they ensure that Mann’s parody remains sharp: Spinell’s social 
isolation appears freely chosen, unlike that of the true outsider. Secondly, these traits also 
suggest a degree of autobiography, for certain parallels exist between Spinell and his author. 
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 ‘Man vergegenwärtige sich einen Brünetten am Anfang der Dreißiger und von stattlicher Statur, dessen Haar 
an den Schläfen schon merklich zu ergrauen beginnt, dessen rundes, weißes, ein wenig gedunsenes Gesicht aber 
nicht die Spur irgendeines Bartwuchses zeigt.’ (‘One was confronted with a brown-haired man in his early 
thirties, of considerable stature, whose hair at the temples was already beginning to go noticeably grey, but 
whose round, white, slightly bloated face did not show a trace of beard growth’ [Mann, 2004, p. 327]). 
60
 ‘the decayed infant’. 
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Barker points out that Spinell ‘reflects several of the writerly attributes of Thomas Mann 
himself’ (2007, p. 440): both ‘share […] similarities in their handwriting, and difficulties with 
the act of writing itself’ (Barker, 2007, p. 440). Mann famously invested many of his 
characters with autobiographical traits, but Spinell is hardly a flattering self-portrait. Spinell 
seems more akin to the kind of artists who are publicly renounced by Mann in his 
Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, and by his more explicitly autobiographical character 
Tonio Kröger, for example.
61
 A possible explanation for this is that Spinell may function as a 
vehicle of exorcism for Mann, allowing him to externalise aspects of his artistic persona that 
troubled him. Mann was heavily critical of decadent artists who promoted the worship of 
death and beauty, who created irresponsibly and immorally, or who were not even artists at 
all, but mere imposters. His strong criticism was probably sharpened by the fact that he had, 
in earlier literature, shown slightly more sympathy with the trends of the fin-de-siècle – he 
chronicles decadence more ambiguously in Buddenbrooks, for example – and by his lasting 
(bourgeois) suspicion of the artist.  
 A further characteristic that segregates both d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artistic 
characters is one that was explored above as a marker of the Romantic artistic genius (and its 
successors), namely, the burden of knowledge or insight. In many of the texts under 
consideration the artist has gained – or been hampered by – a profound insight into the true 
nature of man’s existence, and of its inherent miseries and sufferings.62 It is partly Tonio 
Kröger’s knowledge of the comedy and tragedy of life, and the true motives that lie at the 
core of men’s souls, which segregates him, for example. Like Hamlet, he has glimpsed ‘das 
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 Spinell also shares characteristics with Mann’s brother, Heinrich, and Gabriele d’Annunzio.  
62
 Mann was intimately familiar with the philosophy of Schopenhauer, who made up one third of Mann’s 
venerated ‘Dreigestirn’. While d’Annunzio evidences only an awareness of, rather than familiarity with, 
Schopenhauer (through passing references), the philosopher’s thoughts had become well known by the final 




Innere der Welt und alles Letzte, was hinter den Worten und Taten ist’63 (Mann, 2004, p. 
264). With this knowledge comes loneliness,
64
 and suffering; yet Kröger’s artistic prowess 
simultaneously increases. In Der Tod in Venedig, it appears to be ignorance rather than 
knowledge that condemns Aschenbach, for he (deliberately) disregards the darker motives 
that emerge from his behaviour, and claims that harmless aesthetic delight lies behind his 
fascination with Tadzio. Eventually, however, he is burdened with dismaying insight into the 
artistic condition when he is forced to acknowledge the carnal, and (given Tadzio’s age) 
sinister, undercurrents that lurk beneath the artist’s veneer of aesthetic appreciation. 
Aschenbach’s death follows soon after this uncomfortable revelation. 
 Effrena, as d’Annunzio’s superuomo-artist, does not appear to suffer from the burden 
of knowledge. His solitude is marked by comparison to his crowds, to whom he 
communicates revelations. Before his oration Foscarina asks, ‘[n]on sentite già che la folla è 
disposta a ricevere la vostra rivelazione?’65 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 197) Effrena displays a 
superior artistic consciousness, and he witnesses visions surpassing the capacity of ordinary 
men, which he attempts to convey during his oration. As the superuomo, however, he has 
learned to achieve harmony between the demands of his art and life itself: ‘[e]gli era giunto a 
compiere in se stesso l’intimo connubio dell’arte con la vita e a ritrovare così nel fondo della 
sua sostanza una sorgente perenne di armonie’66 (p. 205). More like Tonio Kröger than 
Aschenbach or Aurispa, Effrena finds a way to channel his liminal position and potentially 
burdensome knowledge into creativity and productivity, and does not lament the solitude into 
which his heightened sensibility forces him.  
 In a manner similar to Effrena, Giorgio Aurispa is also set apart by an acute 
sensitivity. Unlike Effrena, though, he is deeply troubled by the futility and misery that he 
                                                          
63
 ‘the interior of the world, and the ultimate, that lies behind words and actions’. 
64
 ‘die Einsamkeit’ (‘loneliness’ [p. 264]). 
65
 ‘Do you not feel that the crowd is already inclined to receive your revelation?’ 
66
 ‘he had managed to accomplish within himself the intimate union of art with life, and to rediscover thus, in 
the depths of his substance, an eternal source of harmony’. 
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perceives as inherent to man’s existence. He considers that solitude is ‘la suprema prova 
dell’umilità o della sovranità di un’anima’67 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 855) – but only if ‘la 
possanza dell’anima sia tale da formare il perno incrollabile di un mondo’68 (ibid.). He notes 
that his own solitude is sterilising and agonising, not liberating. His cerebral nature and 
psychological unrest segregate him and render identification with others difficult: ‘[u]n’altra 
singolarità organica di Giorgio Aurispa era la frequenza delle congestioni, di varia durata, nei 
plessi cerebrali’69 (p. 790]). Aurispa’s recognition of the vanity of man’s existence could be 
considered a kind of Dionysian knowledge, recalling the wisdom of Silenus, recounted in Die 
Geburt der Tragödie (§ 3); although it is the futility of his own efforts to become the 
superuomo that ultimately defeats him.
70
 He is certainly an illustration of Nietzsche’s claim 
that ‘[d]ie Erkenntniss tödtet das Handeln’71 (GT-7), and vividly demonstrates the perils of an 
over-wrought and over-burdened mind. Echoing Marcuse’s diagnosis of Werther (noted on 
page 92), we also read of Aurispa’s burdensome subjectivity, which leaves him unable to 
identify with others: ‘Essendo vano ogni sforzo per escire dalla solitudine del proprio io, 
bisogna a poco a poco rompere tutti quei vincoli che ancóra ci legano alla vita comune ed 
evitare così l’inutile dispersione d’una quantità di energia preziosa’72 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 
791).  
 As has been explored here, for both d’Annunzio and Mann, true artistic ability 
demands that the artist inhabits a lonely space. This individual is not necessarily condemned 
                                                          
67
 ‘the supreme test of the humility or of the sovereignty of a soul’. 
68
 ‘if the strength of the soul is such that it can form the unshakable pivot of a world’. Elsewhere Aurispa states 
that a superior life would consist of ‘una libertà senza confini, una solitudine fertile e nobile che mi avvolga 
nelle sue emanazioni più calde’ (‘a freedom without confines, a fertile and nobile solitude that surrounds me 
with its warmest emancipations’ [p. 781]). 
69
 ‘Another organic singularity of Giorgio Aurispa was the frequency of his congestions of the cerebral plexus, 
of various duration.’ 
70
 ‘Ed egli era di continuo perseguitato dal fatale pensiero di questa vanità d'ogni suo sforzo’ (‘And he was 
continually hounded by the fatal thought of the vanity of his own efforts’ [p. 789]). 
71
 ‘knowledge kills action’. 
72
 ‘Every effort to emerge from the solitude of one’s own I being in vain, one must gradually break all of those 




to complete isolation – Tonio Kröger confides in his friend Lisaweta and Stelio Effrena finds 
companionship in the poet Daniele Glauro – but he will be segregated by his talents and 
insight. Even meaningful family relationships may be difficult, as demonstrated by the lack 
of warmth between Aurispa and his relatives, and by the frequent figure of the anti-artistic 
father in Mann’s fiction. But d’Annunzio and Mann also see the act of artistic creation as one 
driven by the impulses of a Dionysian drive that strongly resembles the one expounded by 
Nietzsche in his Die Geburt der Tragödie. As seen in the previous chapter, one of the effects 
of the Dionysian is to trigger feelings of deep and ecstatic community in the worshipper – 
surely an alien experience to d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s isolated artists? As will now be seen, 
however, the artist is permitted to feel this heightened sense of community when he enters 
into a state of Dionysian creative intoxication.  
 
vi) The Artist and Dionysian Unity  
 One of the most dynamic effects of Nietzsche’s Dionysian is its promotion of union 
and community among subjects who have been freed from the (Apollonian) illusion of 
individuation, and who, in thrall to Dionysus, become ‘gänzlich mit dem Ur-Einen’73 (GT-5). 
The individual becomes ‘Mitglied einer höheren Gemeinsamkeit’74 (GT-1), an experience 
which chimes with Turner’s notion of communitas, explored above. Such experiences of 
sublime unity and communion may seem at odds with the artist’s solitary position in 
d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s portrayals; but the artist who embraces the Dionysian is granted 
such an experience, and, relieved of his isolation, experiences profound intimacy with man 
and with nature. Thus the Dionysian can counteract the artist’s necessary solitude and, in its 
promotion of communion, allow the artist access to creative energies that have hitherto been 
closed off.  
                                                          
73
 ‘at one with the primordial unity’. 
74
 ‘a member of a higher community’. 
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 This section will consider the artist’s experience of the Dionysian as one which 
offsets the artist’s usual solitude (and even alienation) and will argue that, for d’Annunzio’s 
and Mann’s outsider artists, Dionysian union can be a creatively enriching experience – given 
the right conditions. Under the influence of the Dionysian, identity will be seen to be 
suspended, echoing Turner’s understanding of the ambiguous state into which the liminal 
individual enters. As long as this suspension of identity remains a temporary experience, the 
artist is likely to meet with creative success, but if it becomes loss of identity, creativity will 
be extinguished and the artist’s life endangered. A safe experience of the Dionysian enriches 
Tonio Kröger’s creativity so that he feels able to surpass all of his previous works, and allows 
Il fuoco’s Effrena to invigorate his audience (and the tired city of Venice) with artistic 
fervour. The Dionysian also triggers initial creativity in Aschenbach, who composes a brief 
but brilliant treatise in Venice, after suffering from creative block in Munich; and in Gabriele 
Klöterjahn, who rediscovers music – the Dionysian art-form par excellence – and plays the 
most Dionysian of all music, Tristan und Isolde. For both Aschenbach and Gabriele, 
however, the experience is too extreme, and constitutes a loss rather than a suspension of 
identity. The Dionysian leads these two figures finally into annihilation and oblivion. Giorgio 
Aurispa pursues the creative promise of the Dionysian, and is also struck by the music of 
Tristan und Isolde; but he, too, fails to gain any creative momentum and to reach his goal of 
becoming (or generating) the superuomo, similarly experiencing a loss, rather than 
suspension of, identity. Sometimes loss of identity is fuelled by a fatal over-identification 
provoked by the Dionysian: this will be seen to occur particularly with Aschenbach, who 
over-identifies with the Dionysian barbarians of his dream, and Aurispa, who over-identifies 
with Wagner’s Tristan. 
 In several of the cases explored in the previous section, the artist’s solitude was seen 
to cause pain: Aurispa frequently bemoans the ‘distacco’ (‘distance’ [d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 
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651]) that isolates him; Tonio Kröger complains to Lisaweta of his loneliness and ‘between-
ness’;75 and Aschenbach becomes defined by his loneliness when he becomes ‘der 
Einsame’76 (Mann, 2004, p. 570), connoting emotional loneliness as well as physical solitude. 
As noted, for Effrena solitude is no burden, but a sign of his status as d’Annunzio’s 
superuomo, who stands proudly above the crowd. In Tristan, we read that the dilettante 
Spinell has (voluntarily) avoided social contact in the sanatorium prior to Gabriele’s arrival. 
Gabriele, despite being the more truly artistic character in the novella, appears not to have 
experienced the artist’s solitude: possibly because the world of art has been closed off to her 
since her marriage, when she left her musical father’s house and became a bourgeois 
housewife and mother. 
In van Gennep’s conception of rites of passage, the liminal stage (Turner’s 
communitas) is one in which the individual becomes ‘ambiguous’ (Turner, 1991, p. 94). 
Identity appears to be suspended and participants become equal. Something similar occurs in 
Nietzsche’s delineation of the Dionysian, and during the Dionysian experiences of 
d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artistic characters. Nietzsche’s Dionysian, as already outlined, 
provokes the collapse of individuation (GT-2) and the arousal of a state of unity 
(‘Einheitsempfindung’ [‘sensation of unity’, ibid.]). D’Annunzio and Mann both demonstrate 
that this aspect of their characters’ Dionysian experiences is vital, for it is partly release from 
individuation that releases creative impulses in the artist. Once the artist has been liberated 
from his individuated existence, he is also relieved of his isolation and possible loneliness.  
 For Aschenbach and Tonio Kröger, the Dionysian triggers deviation from their usual 
character, signalling a shifting identity. The ennobled and venerated Aschenbach, a 
descendant of officers and judges, abandons regard for decorum and reputation by stalking 
                                                          
75
 ‘Ich sage Ihnen, daß ich es oft sterbensmüde bin, das Menschliche darzustellen, ohne am Menschlichen 
teilzuhaben’ (‘I tell you, I am often sick to death of portraying humanity without being able to take part in it’ 
[Mann, 2004, p. 271]). 
76
 ‘the lonely one’. 
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Tadzio ever more recklessly in Venice; and Kröger indulges in sensual adventures in the 
south, forgetting (temporarily) the principles of northern burgherly decorum that he has 
inherited from his father. Aschenbach, after a dream of graphic Dionysian revelry, in which 
he feels vividly involved, disregards the opinion of others, and engages in his deviant 
voyeurism with reckless abandon: ‘[e]r scheute nicht mehr die beobachtenden Blicke der 
Menschen; ob er sich ihrem Verdacht aussetze, kümmerte ihn nicht’77 (Mann, 2004, p. 584). 
On the steamboat to Venice Aschenbach had eyed one of his fellow passengers with 
contempt: a grotesque and drunken old man who had disguised his age with cosmetics and 
desperately sought the company of younger men, oblivious of his lack of dignity. In Venice, 
however, Aschenbach becomes the object of his own criticism. He behaves with equal 
depravity to the old man and even undergoing a make-over at the hands of the hotel’s barber 
that leaves him resembling the offensive passenger physically. This is a far cry from his 
public persona at the beginning of Mann’s novella. Mann’s narrator further erases 
Aschenbach’s identity by referring to him with a string of pronouns (‘der Alternde’,78 ‘der 
Heimgesuchte’,79 for example). These pronouns resemble Aschenbach’s former character less 
and less, and gradually ‘der Reisende’80 becomes ‘der Verwirrte’.81 
 Tonio Kröger’s Dionysian experience is milder than Aschenbach’s and limited to his 
excessive experiences in the south. He falls into ‘Abenteuer des Fleisches’82 (p. 264) and 
‘Wollust und heiße Schuld’83 (ibid.), but he is simultaneously appalled at his own behaviour. 
He barely recognises himself in his licentiousness but also resists abandoning the south’s 
‘heimlicher Zeugungswonne’84 (p. 265) that benefits his art. In this Dionysian state Kröger’s 
previous identity, like that of Aschenbach, is suspended; Kröger’s temporary departure is 
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 ‘He no longer dreaded the prying glance of other people; he no longer cared about arousing their suspicion’.  
78
 ‘the ageing one’. 
79
 ‘the obsessed one’. 
80
 ‘the traveller’. 
81
 ‘the confused one’. 
82
 ‘adventures of the flesh’. 
83
 ‘lust and hot guilt’. 
84
 ‘secret procreative ecstasy’. 
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marked by an exclamation of ‘Welch Irrgang’85 (p. 265). Yet unlike Aschenbach, Kröger’s 
former identity is only temporarily overrun by Dionysian instincts, and his bourgeois 
conscience is never fully eclipsed. When we next encounter him, living in Munich, he 
complains to Lisaweta of the irresponsibility of art, and he appears to pursue a much more 
sober form of creativity. He now speaks of the impossibility of being able to create during 
spring, for it causes him to feel too much, and explains that he prefers to write with calm 
detachment.  
 In Il fuoco Effrena’s experience of the Dionysian is often shared with Foscarina. She 
is ‘[la] donna dionisiaca’86 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 282), who offers Effrena access (‘via 
sexual intercourse’ [Otey, 2010, p. 174]) to the impulses and creative visions necessary to 
complete his great work of art and bring about the cultural renaissance at which he aims. It is 
Foscarina who experiences the most vivid suspension of identity in Il fuoco, possibly because 
the identity of the superuomo is totally secure, and because Foscarina’s identity is secondary 
to Effrena’s artistic needs. As she engages in creative collaboration with Effrena, she 
‘becomes’ a character in his imminent work of art. His power over her is marked by his 
exclamation of ‘io t’ho creata’87 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 470), and as he instructs her she feels 
as if ‘la sua stessa vita derivasse nell’opera che tutto assorbiva, […] e i suoi aspetti, le sue 
attitudini, i suoi gesti […] concorressero a formare la figura dell’eroina’88 (p. 469). In such 
moments Foscarina is no longer Effrena’s lover, but his artistic material, and her own identity 
is obscured. She (willingly) renounces autonomy and subjugates herself to Effrena’s 
command. 
 In what is perhaps a reflection of Effrena’s contentment with his isolated position as 
an artist, he does not appear to undergo the same suspension of identity as Foscarina, even 
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during their most frenzied episodes of Dionysian intoxication. While Foscarina inhabits 
various theatrical figures, for example, he remains ‘l’animatore’89 (p. 472), and retains 
mastery of the creative energy that fuels these figures.  
Effrena’s identity is threatened, however, when Foscarina distracts him from his 
artistic goal, and he is forced to subjugate himself and his creativity to her inclination. The 
loss of his artistic identity in such moments is clear, and after one such incident he rests at her 
feet, ‘nell’atto sommesso’90 (p. 334). Here Effrena’s identity is no longer that of the 
superuomo-artist, but merely of Foscarina’s lover, as he realises with dismay. Crucially, 
however, Effrena often feels intense impatience after, and sometimes during, these episodes, 
and his artistic identity is never irretrievably lost. 
In Il trionfo della morte Giorgio Aurispa undergoes a more extreme loss of identity, 
but unlike Foscarina’s (who may even be more resilient to loss of identity as an actor) it does 
not produce any creative output. Aurispa suffers a crisis of identity for the entire duration of 
d’Annunzio’s novel. He exists in a liminal state throughout and consequently displays an 
‘ambiguous’ character. Leading Aurispa through a train station, for example, Ippolita (the 
married woman with whom Aurispa conducts an affair, and whose character was based upon 
Barbara Leoni, one of d’Annunzio’s own lovers) gives him a warning that seems to extend 
beyond the current context: ‘[b]ada di non ti perdere!’91 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 671) Aurispa 
reflects on his inability to take possession of himself, and to maintain his identity,
92
 noting 
that he seems foreign even to himself. Paradoxically, extreme self-reflection and introversion 
have destabilised his identity even further, rather than leading him to secure knowledge of 
himself. Unlike Effrena, Aurispa has not achieved self-mastery: ‘Non gli apperteneva il 
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governo dei sui pensieri’93 (p. 791). Instead Aurispa resembles Aschenbach, whose 
increasingly irrational thoughts spiral beyond the control of his ever diminishing conscience. 
Aurispa appears in a state of limbo from beginning to morbid end, oscillating between 
mild optimism and resolve to follow Zarathustra’s teaching, and destitute pessimism (of the 
Schopenhauerian, not Nietzschean, variety). As with Aschenbach, Aurispa’s name is often 
replaced with pronouns, obscuring his identity; he is ‘il solitario’,94 and ‘il contemplatore’,95 
for example. Seldom does he inhabit a role that gives structure to his identity: to his family he 
seems a stranger; as a lover he harbours secret hostility and, later, even murderous designs; 
he appears to have no friends or companions; and we are given only vague clues as to his 
profession, giving the impression of an anchorless, purposeless figure, delineated solely by 
his psychological crises. Consequently, as his thoughts become increasingly occupied by the 
idea of death and suicide, they become Aurispa’s defining aspect. His eventual death is 
therefore as unsurprising as Aschenbach’s. 
In Tristan a shift of identity is undergone only by Gabriele, the text’s only genuine 
artistic character. While Spinell may occupy a somewhat marginal position, his solitude 
appears elected rather than enforced, and parodic rather than tragic. Gabriele, by contrast, 
arguably undergoes a suspension of identity when she plays that most Dionysian of works, 
Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde, on the piano after a long period of musical abstinence. It is at 
Spinell’s insistence that she plays the piano again, against medical advice. As Gabriele had 
abandoned art and music when she married Herr Klöterjahn, her experience might be read as 
a recovery of identity, rather than loss of identity. Yet Gabriele states that she had married 
Herr Klöterjahn willingly (‘ich wollte es eben’96 [Mann, 2004, p. 341]), and had not been 
constrained to forsake art and music – as Spinell reads the situation. We may therefore 
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conclude that Gabriele Klöterjahn (the mother and grain-merchant’s wife), and not Gabriele 
Eckhof (the musical maiden, who, in Spinell’s imagination, wears a golden crown in an 
overgrown garden) is her ‘true’ identity. Mann is characteristically ambiguous, and supplies 
only clues as to how to interpret Gabriele’s experience. 
The clearest indication is Mann’s choice of music. In Tristan und Isolde two entities 
become eternally and ecstatically joined, as Mann describes: ‘[z]wei Kräfte, zwei entrückte 
Wesen strebten in Leiden und Seligkeit nacheinander und umarmten sich in dem verzückten 
und wahnsinnigen Begehren nach dem Ewigen und Absoluten’97 (p. 351). Euchner suggests 
that ‘the merger portrayed in Mann’s story is not one of two individuals, but rather of a torn 
person’s reconciliation with her own soul’ (2005, p. 192); if this is the case then the ‘zwei 
Kräfte’ of Mann’s description may be the two identities of Gabriele. Euchner continues, 
‘[o]ne may read Gabriele’s divided soul as representing – admittedly on a somewhat abstract 
level – the two lovers’ (p. 192). Spinell’s insistence on using Gabriele’s maiden name, 
Eckhof, instead of Klöterjahn, chimes with this suggestion: he seems to observe a rupture 
between her former and current life, and appears intent on restoring her to her former 
identity. Gabriele is thus depicted as a fragmented entity, and her return to musical passion 
arguably restores her to completeness. If this is so, then Gabriele’s Dionysian experience is 
one that salvages, rather than threatens, her identity – at least for a brief period, for she dies 
only days later.  
For Turner, an experience of communitas follows entry into a state of liminality, 
where the subject’s identity is suspended. Similarly, the Dionysian worshipper becomes a 
member of the ‘higher community’ of which Nietzsche speaks (GT-1) after the Apollonian 
principium individuationis has been abolished, and the subject is relieved of individuation. A 
similar process occurs in d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s portrayals of the artist’s Dionysian 
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experience. The suspension of identity discussed above often precedes a period of intense 
intimacy and union (and sometimes fatal over-identification), as will now be discussed. 
 The most desperate pursuit of communitas is surely that of Giorgio Aurispa, who 
seeks intimacy with his lover, his family, and with his native land. His exhausting loneliness 
has led him to the belief that only in possession of another is true ecstasy to be found, and he 
confuses possession and union: ‘[c]'è su la terra una sola ebrezza durevole: la sicurtà nel 
possesso di un’altra creatura, la sicurtà assoluta, incrollabile. Io cerco questa ebrezza’98 
(d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 794). Transferring himself to a coastal hermitage with Ippolita, in the 
hope of curing his depression and crippling destitution, Aurispa withdraws to a liminal space. 
He still harbours hope that Ippolita will ‘cure’ him of his afflictions in this environment.99 
The title of the fourth book of Il trionfo della morte, which follows ‘L’eremo’ (‘The 
Hermitage’), is entitled ‘La vita nuova’100 (‘The New Life’), auguring recovery and rebirth. 
In reality, however, the book only propels Aurispa (and Ippolita) towards death, and the 
following book is aptly entitled ‘Tempus destruendi’ (‘Time of Destruction’).  
 While Nietzsche’s Dionysian ecstatically rekindles the bond between man and nature, 
Aurispa’s attempt to return to nature reveals a sterile connection. He realises, ‘“[n]oi non 
abbiamo contatto con la natura”’101 (p. 781) and reflects on the barrenness of man’s 
relationship with nature: ‘[l]a terra non gli svelerà mai il suo segreto’102 (ibid.). Similarly, as 
he attempts to force communion with Ippolita through their isolated existence together, he 
finds no rich and transcendent connection. His ideal of intimacy contrasts markedly with the 
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reality of his relationship with her: he aims at sublime union, but eventually realises that 
carnality and sensuality are the dominant drives of their relationship.
103
 Additionally, 
Ippolita’s ‘sangue plebeo’104 (p. 990) is revealed, and he is disappointed by her flaws. He 
realises that she lacks his depth, and that she is instead made for a life of ‘spensieratezza’ 
(‘light-heartedness’ [p. 827]). 
 During the time in the hermitage, as salvation becomes more unlikely, Aurispa 
considers a final strategy to remedy his agonising isolation – that of rekindling contact with 
his native people: ‘[n]on debbo io, per ritrovare tutto me stesso, per riconoscere la mia vera 
essenza, non debbo io pormi a contatto immediato con la razza da cui sono uscito?’105 (p. 
848) In order to do this Aurispa and Ippolita attend the Vigil (a religious event) at 
Casalbordino, intending to become part of the mass of people that will gather there. The 
event should provide a beneficial counterpoint to Aurispa’s isolation, placing him among a 
thronging crowd with whom he seeks identification. The event is distinctly Dionysian, and 
swathes of delirious worshippers become one in a processional ritual that circles the church 
repeatedly: ‘Giravano, giravano, […] che non più parevano un adunamento di singoli uomini 
ma la coerente massa d'una qualche cieca materia sospinta da una forza vorticosa’106 (p. 880). 
Yet while the other worshippers at the Vigil are unified by their participation, and become a 
single entity moving in unison, Aurispa remains marginalised, watching the crowd from 
without rather than attempting to participate. To his dismay, the experiment fails, and 
Aurispa’s isolation is consolidated: ‘Il suo essere non aveva radici in quel fondo; non poteva 
aver nulla di comune con quella moltitudine’107 (p. 891). 
                                                          
103
 ‘contro ogni aspirazione platonica, egli non poteva considerare l’amore se non come opera di senso’ (‘he 
could not consider love as anything but a work of the senses’ [p. 784]). 
104
 ‘plebian blood’. 
105
 ‘In order to rediscover my entire self, to recognise my true essence, must I not put myself in immediate 
contact with the race of which I was born?’  
106
 ‘They turned, they turned, […] so that they no longer seemed a congregation of single beings but the 
congruent mass of some blind material driven by a whirling force.’ 
107
 ‘His being had no roots in that foundation; he could have nothing in common with that multitude’.  
118 
 
 Aurispa’s exclusion from the (Dionysian) communion of the Vigil does not mean, 
however, that his individual identity remains intact; indeed, the experience leaves him more 
adrift than ever, for his last hope of establishing contact with his fellow-man has been dashed. 
Instead of experiencing a Dionysian suspension of identity, Aurispa’s grasp on his identity is 
loosened still further by his despair and detachment, and he slides ever closer towards 
annihilation and death.  
While Aurispa’s isolation is reaffirmed by an encounter with an enraptured Dionysian 
mass with which he feels no kinship, Aschenbach experiences profound identification with 
the worshippers of his Dionysian dream. Having pursued Tadzio through Venice to the point 
of obsession, he finds his psychological turmoil expressed in a disturbing and graphic dream 
of bacchic worship: scantily-clad men and women, bearing daggers and snakes and tearing 
their hair in frenzy, assault his sleeping mind as they come hurtling towards him in a 
mountainous setting. Smells and sounds violate his senses, and he feels seduced by the 
images of the dream: ‘[a]ber mit ihnen, in ihnen war der Träumende nun und dem fremden 
Gotte [Dionysos] gehörig. Ja, sie waren er selbst, als sie reißend und mordend sich auf die 
Tiere hinwarfen und dampfende Fetzen verschlangen’108 (Mann, 2004, p. 584). Unlike 
Aurispa, Aschenbach identifies with these Dionysian worshippers; but the wildness and 
barbarity of this dream marks Aschenbach’s experience of communitas as an unhealthy one. 
Participation in these scenes of sparagmos shatters Aschenbach’s painstakingly maintained 
identity and hurls him into final self-annihilation. The irreversibility of Aschenbach’s 
identification with the Dionysian barbarians seen here indicates a case of catastrophic over-
identification. Both Aschenbach and Aurispa arrive at similar (ruinous) points despite their 
opposing reactions to the frenzied Dionysian crowd – possibly because both are clearly 
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already condemned from the beginning of Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s texts. Aschenbach’s 
death comes days after the dream, and Aurispa’s suicide takes place shortly after the Vigil. 
A Dionysian horde resembling that of Aschenbach’s dream and Il trionfo della 
morte’s Vigil also appears in Il fuoco – but without the grotesque and threatening aspects of 
these former two. The frenzy of the masses in Venice, and the spontaneous chorus of 
celebration that arises from it, is explicitly Dionysian: ‘[t]utta l’antica ebrietà dionisiaca 
pareva risorgere e diffondersi da quel Coro divino’109 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 261). It is with 
art and aesthetic rapture that Effrena’s audience are intoxicated, however, and not with 
barbarity or grotesque wildness. The Dionysian masses at Casalbordino seem in thrall to 
death, and display the signs of disease and decay that have ravaged their bodies; Effrena, by 
contrast, fills his listeners with a sense of vitality and vigour, as well as hope for the 
rejuvenation of Venice and the Latin cultural landscape. Shouts of ‘[e]voe!’, the festival cry 
of the Bacchantes, echo throughout the Doge’s palace, and Foscarina proclaims Venice ‘[l]a 
Città di Vita’110 (p. 254). While Effrena remains apart from his intoxicated audience after his 
speech, and reflects in solitude afterwards, he has orchestrated the feeling of Dionysian unity 
which spreads throughout Venice, and interacted productively with his audience.  
With Foscarina, however, Effrena does experience communitas, and when they excite 
each other to a fevered state, through sensuality and creativity, they transcend the boundaries 
of quotidian human contact, and surpass the level of ‘piccoli amanti’111 (p. 433). Carnality 
does, sometimes, appear to threaten creative focus; as Otey notes, ‘the fascination [Foscarina] 
exerts on [Effrena] as a woman and an artist could overwhelm their creative union’ (2010, p. 
172). Foscarina’s true value for Effrena, however, is as a creative aid, and as the inspiration 
for visions of his coming work of art. When they create together, their relationship transcends 
mere physical pleasure. The novel’s most climactic episode of creative ecstasy, during which 
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Foscarina ‘becomes’ a character in Effrena’s next drama, is not followed by intercourse, for 
example, and the artist’s energies are channelled solely in an artistic direction. This is where 
Effrena truly experiences Dionysian communitas, but, as noted, it is primarily the subordinate 
participant, Foscarina, who experiences suspension of identity, while the dominant creator, 
Effrena, conducts the process and channels the energies released by their creative 
communion.  
 Creativity and communitas are also linked in the case of Tonio Kröger, who finds his 
creativity stimulated while experiencing Dionysian excesses in the south (‘[seine 
Künstlerschaft] verschärfte sich’112 [Mann, 2004, p. 265]). Like Aurispa, he expresses a 
desire for human contact to counter his isolation, but Kröger is not as fatally isolated as 
Aurispa – Kröger feels a partial member of two opposing spheres, while Aurispa belongs to 
none – and he maintains a firmer hold on his identity. Kröger’s southern abandon is tempered 
by the return of his bourgeois conscience, and, like Aschenbach, by thoughts of his 
upstanding ancestors.  
 In Tonio Kröger, where the Dionysian is subtly depicted, communitas is not 
represented by clamorous bacchic crowds and panting maenads, but rather by more 
understated imagery. A mild incident of communitas or identification occurs when Kröger 
travels by ship to Denmark. A fellow passenger speaks to Kröger on the deck: ‘[o]hne 
Zweifel befand er sich in einer jener außerordentlichen und festlich-beschaulichen 
Stimmungen, in denen die Schranken zwischen den Menschen dahinsinken, in denen das 
Herz auch Fremden sich öffnet’113 (p. 297). The (presumably tipsy) passenger waxes lyrical 
about the stars, and remains in conversation with Kröger for a time, although their dialogue is 
not reported in full. The narrator refers to the passenger’s ramblings as ‘Torheit’ 
(‘foolishness’ [ibid.]), to which the more sober Kröger listens with amiable interest. While 
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there is no truly profound or transcendent connection here – they talk of food and the stars, 
and nothing particularly personal – the incident shows Kröger that he can have human 
contact, and that he is not utterly excluded from participation in ‘das Leben in seiner 
verführerischen Banalität’114 (p. 278). This (muted) experience of communitas may aid 
Kröger in coming to his healthy and successful resolution at the end of the novella. 
 Communitas in Tristan also appears to be of a milder variety. The most likely 
possibility for a display of communitas is Mann’s description of Tristan und Isolde, played 
by Gabriele Klöterjahn. Mann’s narrator ecstatically recounts the sublime union expressed in 
Wagner’s music: ‘[o] überschwenglicher und unersättlicher Jubel der Vereinigung im ewigen 
Jenseits der Dinge! Des quälenden Irrtums entledigt, den Fesseln des Raumes und der Zeit 
entronnen, verschmolzen das Du und das Ich, das Dein und Mein sich zu erhabener 
Wonne’115 (p. 352). Impulses of communion are conspicuously manifest not only in the 
music itself, but also, possibly, in Gabriele’s experience. As discussed earlier, her musical 
episode could arguably be interpreted as either a suspension of identity, or a recovery of 
identity; as the second interpretation is favoured in this thesis, I would suggest that her 
playing of Wagner’s music, and the accompanying re-embrace of forgotten artistic drives, 
conveys her to a state of communion with both herself and the lovers of Wagner’s opera.  
A warning comes from the music, and seems apt for Gabriele, who, as she plays, is 
conveyed to the realm of striving and Dionysian self-forgetfulness that it portrays: ‘[w]er 
liebend des Todes Nacht und ihr süßes Geheimnis erschaute, dem blieb im Wahn des Lichtes 
ein einzig Sehnen, die Sehnsucht hin zur heiligen Nacht, der ewigen, wahren, der 
einsmachenden …’116 (p. 352) This warning suggests that Gabriele’s Dionysian experience 
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will not be one from which she can recover, and Mann’s deliberate ambiguities, blurring the 
boundaries between the world of Wagner’s opera and of Mann’s sanatorium, render this 
warning more necessary. When Mann’s narrator speaks of night falling as Gabriele plays, for 
example, we cannot tell whether this is the night of Tristan und Isolde or of Einfried. The 
resulting sense of unity Gabriele feels with the music condemns her to a similar end to that of 
Wagner’s famed lovers – although Mann’s parody ‘turns the deliverance of Tristan and 
Isolde into a medical nightmare’ (Scaff, 1997, p. 41). Several days after playing the piano 
Gabriele begins coughing up large quantities of blood which (we assume) kills her. We learn 
that she had been humming as she suffered this fatal worsening of her condition. Like 
Aschenbach, who hears a ‘tief girrendem, ruchlos beharrlichen Flötenspiel’117 (Mann, 2004, 
p. 582) in his Dionysian dream, Gabriele has internalised the dangers that music represents, 
and her production of ‘music’ (like Aschenbach’s) probably signifies her imminent demise.  
In Die Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche speaks of the dangers of over-identification 
with Tristan und Isolde, and asks if it would even be possible to hear the music alone, 
unaccompanied by images and visuals, ‘ohne unter einem krampfartigen Ausspannen aller 
Seelenflügel zu verathmen’118 (GT-21). Gabriele Klöterjahn certainly does not manage this, 
and suffers the very fate of which Nietzsche speaks. As a mere spectator of Gabriele’s 
performance, Spinell is denied participation in any form of communitas; he also escapes 
death, for he is kept at a distance from the sublime turmoil of Wagner’s music.  
 Returning to van Gennep’s and Turner’s ideas on liminality in rites of passage, we 
recall that the individual is returned to, and reincorporated into, the normal structures of 
society after their transitional, liminal experience. Yet ‘re-aggregation’ (Turner, 1991, p. 94) 
is not the experience of all of d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artistic characters. Gabriele 
Klöterjahn does not survive her musical communion with the deathly world of Tristan und 
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Isolde, and is lost to the seductive annihilation that the music evokes. Aschenbach likewise 
over-identifies with the Dionysian communitas of his dream, in a reflection of his 
psychological disintegration, and also dies. Giorgio Aurispa, too, is denied the possibility of 
re-integration, and death appears to him as the only alternative to his life of eternal isolation 
and suffering. For these three, time spent in the liminal space is a kind of damnation, and 
prevents them from achieving, or returning to, a healthy relationship within the structures of 
everyday existence. 
 By contrast, Stelio Effrena and Tonio Kröger are strengthened and enriched by their 
Dionysian liminal experience and negotiate successful relationships with the structural 
society from which their artistic prowess and sensibility has distanced them. Both Il fuoco 
and Tonio Kröger end optimistically, and with the promise of imminent works of art. When 
Foscarina departs, Effrena feels intense creative purpose, and prepares for the birth of his 
long-awaited drama as well as the inauguration of his great outdoor theatre which will rival 
Bayreuth; and Kröger writes to Lisaweta declaring that his future works will outdo anything 
he has previously composed (Mann, 2004, p. 318). Both have tasted the Dionysian and its 
drive towards communion, and are now re-integrated (or re-aggregated, to use Turner’s term) 
into society as successful artists. 
The case of Detlev Spinell is more difficult to judge. He is certainly a liminal 
individual who appears out of place and ill-equipped for survival within society’s structures; 
but as an artistic imposter he does not undergo a suspension of identity and participation in 
communitas (which form part of the experiences of the more genuinely artistic characters 
studied here). We do not, therefore, expect him to follow the same path as these other artists, 
and at the end of Tristan he is neither condemned (like Aschenbach or Gabriele) nor inspired 
(like Tonio Kröger or Stelio Effrena). Indeed, Spinell seems largely unmoved by the 
novella’s occurrences, and shows no signs of having undergone a process of transition. In the 
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final scenes of the novella he chances upon Gabriele’s son in the gardens at Einfried, and the 
infant shrieks with laughter, apparently at the sight of Spinell; Spinell walks away ‘mit den 
gewaltsam zögernden Schritten jemandes, der verbergen will, daß er innerlich davonläuft’119 
(p. 371). These final comments suggest that Spinell remains much the same poseur and 
charlatan as he had been before. As a consequence he will probably maintain his stance aloof 
from society, therefore, but will also probably continue to produce nothing in the way of true 
art. 
 A final aspect of Turner’s notion of liminality that requires brief discussion here is the 
‘layers of myth, ritual, and symbol’ (Turner, 1991, p. 47) that are frequently a part of liminal 
discourse. The transgressions, contradictions and trespasses symptomatic of liminality are 
often overlaid with mythology and ritual, possibly in an attempt to give structure to disorder, 
and regularity to anomalies. As Turner says, myth, ritual, and symbol stress ‘the axiomatic 
value of key structural principles with regard to the very situations where these appear to be 
most inoperative’ (ibid.). In the texts under consideration in this study, myth, rituals and 
symbols certainly play a substantial role in the depiction of liminality and communitas: in 
each text the nature of the communion experienced has been seen to be strongly Dionysian.  
The frenzied mob of Aschenbach’s dream, which tears apart live animals and devours 
chunks of raw, steaming flesh is unmistakably a crowd of bacchantes, engaged in sparagmos. 
Both Otto (1933, p. 109) and Rohde
120
 (2000, pp. 282-334) describe the ritual in terms 
reminiscent of Aschenbach’s dream. Similar savage crowds horrify Giorgio Aurispa and 
Ippolita when they attend the Vigil, in Il trionfo della morte. Some participants carry rods 
resembling thyrsi
121
 (‘un bastone crociato o fiorito’122 [d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 877]); one 
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 ‘with the violently hesitant steps of someone who wishes to hide the fact that they are internally fleeing’. 
120
 The textual correlations between Mann’s description of Aschenbach’s dream and Rohde’s accounts of 
Dionysian worship have been generally acknowledged. See, for example, Herbert Lehnert, ‘Thomas Mann’s 
Early Interest in Myth and Erwin Rohde’s Psyche’, PMLA, 79, 1964, pp. 297-304. 
121
 The thyrsus was a staff topped with flowers or a pine-cone, and was associated with Dionysus. 
122
 ‘a staff topped with flowers or a crucifix’. 
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woman seems ‘circonfusa d’un mistero dionisiaco’123 (p. 888); the common ‘delirio’ 
(‘delirium’ [p. 890]) recalls Dionysian intoxication; and the ritual has the air of ‘un mistero 
primitivo’124 (p. 886). The grotesque nature of the devotees at the Vigil (many of whom have 
come to be healed) only emphasises the Dionysian atmosphere, and adds a threatening, 
noxious note. While the delirious crowds of Il fuoco are not as barbaric or grotesque as those 
of Der Tod in Venedig and Il trionfo della morte, they are nonetheless explicitly likened to 
Dionysian worshippers. There are ‘menadi’ (‘maenads’ [d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 262]), a ‘Coro 
bacchico’125 (p. 267) arises, and ‘l’antica ebrietà dionisiaca’126 (p. 261) is reawakened. 
Effrena’s artistic experiences, too, are manifestly Dionysian. He expresses a desire to wield 
Foscarina ‘come un fascio di tirsi’127 (p. 284), for example, and refers to the hour of his 
speech as ‘un’ora di vita veramente dionisiaca’128 (p. 494).  
 While overt references to Dionysus are absent from Tonio Kröger and Tristan, 
allusions can be detected. In Tristan, for example, Dionysus claims a strong presence in the 
extended description of Tristan und Isolde, in the striving towards annihilation, self-
forgetfulness, and transcendent union. In Tonio Kröger a Dionysian flavour is given to 
Kröger’s excesses in the south. References to the south may suggest Dionysus (for Mann the 
Dionysian was often bound up with Italy, and is often to be detected when he describes an 
Italian setting), and his licentious pursuit of carnal pleasures comes under the aegis of 
Dionysus and his worship. Kröger also professes dislike for spring, because of the surge of 
emotion that it triggers; spring, as Nietzsche explains,
129
 is a time of Dionysian fervour.  
                                                          
123
 ‘immersed within a Dionysian mystery’. 
124
 ‘a primitive mystery’. 
125
 ‘bacchic Chorus’. 
126
 ‘the ancient Dionysian intoxication’. 
127
 ‘like a bundle of thyrsi’. 
128
 ‘an hour of truly Dionysian life’. 
129
 ‘[B]ei dem gewaltigen, die ganze Natur lustvoll durchdringenden Nahen des Frühlings erwachen jene 
dionysischen Regungen, in deren Steigerung das Subjective zu völliger Selbstvergessenheit hinschwindet’ 
(‘[W]ith the violent approach of spring, which lustfully penetrates the whole of nature, that Dionysian 
excitement awakes, at whose climax the subject fades into complete self-forgetfulness’ [GT-1]).   
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This chapter has explored the liminality, isolation, and marginality that, for 
d’Annunzio and Mann, are inherent in the artist’s experience. Solitude and even alienation 
are common to these figures, and some express a longing for deeper contact with humanity. 
The Dionysian provides this, and, as has been argued, the experience of intimacy that the 
Dionysian offers can be likened to Turner’s notion of communitas, which follows a 
suspension of identity. For d’Annunzio and Mann, artists who undergo a suspension of 
identity, rather than a loss of identity, will benefit from the Dionysian; they will safely 
experience Dionysian union, and will be re-integrated afterwards, creatively enriched. But 
some artists lose their identities permanently when they encounter Dionysus, and fall into 
oblivion.  
The next chapter will delve deeper into the creative potential of the Dionysian, and 
explore d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s portrayal of this drive as a force that triggers an experience 
of regression. As will be seen, Dionysian creativity is often reached through an embrace of 
forgotten or repressed instincts and desires, and once the Dionysian re-opens these 
psychological channels, creativity can result. Indeed, sometimes the experience of 
communitas is reached through a form of regression. As will be indicated, this is not a 
harmless and simple process that guarantees creativity, and by engaging with the Dionysian 
in this way, the artist risks being overwhelmed by impulses and instincts inimical to 
civilisation and creativity. In some cases, the power of these reawakened impulses proves too 
much for the artist to bear – much like the suspension of identity discussed in this chapter, 
which can reach an excessive degree and become irreversible – and regression therefore 




Chapter Four: Dionysian Creativity and Primitive Regression  
 
The previous chapter explored Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s representation of the (Dionysian) 
artist as a necessarily liminal figure, and discussed ways in which the Dionysian provides an 
artistically beneficial foil to the artist’s isolation. Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s versions of this 
drive allow their artistic protagonists an experience of communion and plurality that 
counteracts their solitude, and fuels their creativity. In Il fuoco, for example, Stelio Effrena’s 
experience of intense (erotic) communion with his lover Foscarina promotes creativity that, 
when properly harnessed, will allow him to succeed in his ambitious artistic goal of 
rejuvenating a tired cultural landscape and reviving a tragic tradition fit for the modern age. 
By contrast Der Tod in Venedig’s Aschenbach experiences communion only with the 
barbaric Dionysian hordes of his dream, signalling his departure from creativity, and a loss of 
identity.  
 In this chapter a further aspect of Dionysian creativity will be examined; namely, the 
regressive aspects of this drive, which, it will be argued, encourage a return to a more 
‘primitive’ state of being. This is an aspect of Dionysian creativity that will be seen to 
complement that discussed in the previous chapter, as it helps the artist to reach a state of 
communion. For Nietzsche, the Dionysian promotes a more intuitive and instinctual mode of 
existence, and allows the individual to feel unified with others and with nature itself. While 
Nietzsche was far from being a believer in a Rousseauian return to nature, his portrayal of the 
Dionysian will be seen to involve regressive tendencies which seek a more raw, ‘natural’, and 
intuitive existence. D’Annunzio and Mann retain these regressive aspects in their portrayals 
of the Dionysian and its impact upon creativity. As will be seen, they, too, find creative value 
in a re-embrace of instinct, intuition, and spontaneity, which is often rendered possible by a 
physical departure from the modern, urban space. But for Nietzsche, d’Annunzio and Mann a 
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regressive encounter of the ‘primitive’, rendered possible by the Dionysian, offers a 
precarious mode of creativity. If this is a temporary regression, the artist is likely to find 
creative benefit, but if the artist is unable to re-adjust to civilisation and everyday existence 
afterward, both creativity and artist’s survival are threatened. 
 This chapter will also argue that the Dionysian promotion of the ‘primitive’ portrayed 
by d’Annunzio and Mann can be situated within the discourse of primitivism, which 
characterised cultural production at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
centuries. Fuelled by a combination of disillusionment with modernity and an increasing 
exposure to geographically remote cultures, many painters, sculptors, writers and musicians 
began to look to so-called ‘primitive’ cultures as a remedy to the perceived ills of the modern, 
urban West. I will argue that the ‘primitive’ aspects of the Dionysian sought by the artists of 
d’Annunzio and Mann can be considered akin to those admired by artists who contributed to 
the trend of cultural primitivism (but without its problematic elements), and which were 
propagated by primitivist discourse. In both cases, a retrieval of the ‘primitive’ is believed to 
stimulate artistic creativity. 
 This chapter will begin by discussing the primitive and regressive aspects of 
Nietzsche’s Dionysian, and their creative value. Parallels with the Dionysian of the ancient 
Greeks will also be noted. Next, an overview of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
primitivism (and the earlier roots of this cultural attitude or sensibility) will be offered. 
Having established the main goals and values of primitivism, the thoughts of Sigmund Freud 
and Carl Jung regarding this cultural attitude will be discussed to shed light on the 
psychological undercurrents that made the ‘primitive’ so alluring. Finally, d’Annunzio’s and 
Mann’s portrayals of the regressive and primitive aspects of the Dionysian will be 
considered. It will be seen that two types of ‘regression’ emerge from their portrayals: the 
first involves a reversion to an earlier personal psychological state, and will be referred to as 
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‘internal regression’; while the second involves an embrace (or attempted embrace) of the 
way of life of an earlier civilisation, which will be labelled ‘atavistic regression’. Both can 
prove creatively rewarding under ideal conditions, and can prove debilitating and harmful if 
they are unmoderated. 
 Firstly, however, a definition of the term ‘regression’ must be established. Although 
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) was the first to use the term in a psychoanalytical context, and is 
arguably responsible for its entrance into common discourse, I will not utilise the term 
‘regression’ in a strictly Freudian sense. Freud describes regression as a psychological 
process which relies upon fixations formed during childhood. The adult subject, upon 
encountering a situation which requires a defensive response, ‘regresses’ back to the 
psychosexual stage at which these fixations formed.
1
 Given the sparse details that we glean 
regarding the childhood of each of d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artists, it would be difficult to 
diagnose regression in a Freudian sense. Rather, the term ‘regression’ is here utilised in a 
more general sense, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, for example, where the 
meaning of regression is given as ‘reversion to or towards an earlier type or form, esp. one 
that is less developed’. This is the understanding of regression that has entered common 
discourse. Regression will be taken to involve psychological reversion that does not rely upon 
fixations, but which results in the subject embracing impulses, drives and values that are 
considered to have characterised an earlier stage of the individual’s (psychosexual) 




                                                          
1
 As Freud explains: ‘Eine nicht real zu befriedigende Libidostauung schafft sich mit Hilfe der Regression zu 
alten Fixierungen Abfluß durch das verdrängte Unbewußte’ (‘A blocked libido that cannot be satisfied in reality 
manages, with the help of regression to old fixations, to discharge itself through the repressed unconscious’ 
[1955c, p. 352]). 
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i) Nietzsche’s Dionysian and Regression to the Primitive 
In his Die Geburt der Tragödie Nietzsche made the radical claim that ‘[d]as Dionysische [...] 
ist der gemeinsame Geburtsschooss der Musik und des tragischen Mythus’2 (GT-24), and 
posited it as a drive which could revitalise the modern cultural landscape. In the previous 
chapter the Dionysian was seen to give impetus to creativity in its promotion of a sense of 
primordial unity, reached through intoxication, which offered a foil to the liminal isolation of 
the fictional artists of d’Annunzio and Mann. This state of communion is reached through a 
regressive process, which is aided by the influence of the Dionysian.  
 The regressive tendencies that will be seen in Nietzsche’s Dionysian are arguably not 
his own invention, and can be traced back to the ancient worship of Dionysus. For the ancient 
Greeks Dionysian worship involved a (temporary) liberation from civilisation: ‘for the 
duration of the City Dionysia
3
 prisoners were released from gaol, and […] at the same 
festival the freeing of slaves was announced in the theatre (Aeschines 3.41)’ (Seaford, 2006, 
p. 29). The regressive aspects of the cult of Dionysus were noted by Bachofen, who described 
‘[die] Auflösung der politische Organisation und [der] Verfall des staatlichen Lebens’4 (1927, 
p. 132) that took place during worship of Dionysus. Segal notes regressive elements in 
Euripides’ portrayal of Dionysus and Dionysian worship in The Bacchae, which ‘develops 
the primarily negative side of Dionysus’ blurring between Greek and “barbarian”; but there 
may also be a hint of its positive side in the implicit recognition of the universalising power 
of Dionysus in the theatre and specifically in tragedy’ (1997, p. 391). Otto, too, highlights the 
primacy of the Dionysian experience, and suggests that those who seek creativity must 
remain in contact with it: ‘Der Dionysische Zustand ist ein Urphänomen des Lebens – an dem 
                                                          
2
 ‘The Dionysian, with its original joy even in pain, is the common womb of music and of tragic myth’. 
3
 The Dionysia were regular festivals held in Athens honour of Dionysus.  
4
 ‘the dissolution of political organisation and the decline of political life’. 
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auch der Mann in allen Geburtsstunden seines schöpferischen Daseins teilhaben muß’5 (1933, 
p. 132). 
One of the most valuable aspects of Nietzsche’s Dionysian for the artist is its 
promotion of a state analogous to intoxication, the effects of which are often described in 
terms of retrogression, or return. The influence of the Dionysian allows the individual to 
forget, for a time, his agonising individuated existence, and returns him to a state of 
communion with the ‘geheimnissvollen Ur-Einen’6 (GT-1). Here the German prefix ‘ur-’ 
emphasises the noun that follows, but also denotes this noun as the original, primary and 
primal version. The original unity to which the Dionysian individual is returned is therefore 
the earliest and most primitive form of unity. In this state, the Dionysian affirmer feels part of 
a higher community, and rejoices in an experience of plurality that grants him intimate 
togetherness with both the rest of mankind and with nature itself. However, as will shortly be 
demonstrated, this is no Rousseauian return to nature. This union combats the isolation and 
loneliness of the artist analysed and illustrated in the previous chapter. The Dionysian is, 
Nietzsche claims, the ‘original’ or ‘primitive’ (‘ursprüngliche’ [Nietzsche, GT-12]) element 
of Greek tragedy, which the civilised Greek glimpses again through Dionysian intoxication. 
The effect of the Dionysian ‘leads back to the heart of nature’ (‘an das Herz der Natur 
zurückführt [my emphasis]’ [GT-7]), emphasising the restorative power of this drive. 
Under these conditions the Dionysian individual is granted access to creative impulses 
that are normally stifled by our individuated existence. As Nietzsche explains, ‘die 
Kunstgewalt der ganzen Natur, zur höchsten Wonnebefriedigung des Ur-Einen, offenbart sich 
hier unter den Schauern des Rausches’7 (GT-1). The individual is afforded profound insight 
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 ‘The Dionysian state is the original phenomenon of life – in which even man must participate in all of the 
births which take place in his creative existence’.  
6
 ‘the mysterious original unity’. 
7
 ‘der Weg zu den Müttern des Sein's, zu dem innersten Kern der Dinge [liegt] offen’ (‘the artistic power of the 




in this state, and is stimulated to creative impulses that are otherwise inaccessible. It is for 
these reasons that Nietzsche posits the Dionysian as an artistic ‘Geburtsschooss’8 (‘womb’). 
Without Dionysus’ influence, which sweeps aside Apollonian illusions – including the 
illusion of our individuated existence – and draws us back, intoxicated, to the instinctual and 
passional world described above, the individual would remain excluded from these turbulent 
energies and mysterious insights. 
Yet the embrace of nature that Nietzsche ascribes to the Dionysian affirmer is not to 
be confused with the return to nature advocated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). For 
Rousseau, whose ideas anticipated the Romanticism of the next century, ‘man’s best hope 
[was] to return to nature and to follow its example in the teaching of children’ (Outram, 2006, 
p. 98), as illustrated in his treatise Émile, ou De l’éducation (Emile, or on Education, 1762). 
For Rousseau, nature was ‘harmonious, peaceable, benevolent’ (Singer, 1966, p. 345), and a 
return to nature involved a return to innocence and protection. In Émile Rousseau states: 
‘man is naturally good; […] society depraves and perverts men’ (1918, p. 212); elsewhere he 
notes that ‘the ancients are nearer to Nature, and have more native genius’ (p. 250). To 
Nietzsche, Rousseau’s idea of nature was misguided: in Götzen-Dämmerung Nietzsche asks 
sarcastically, ‘Rousseau — wohin wollte der eigentlich zurück?’9 (GD-Streifzüge-48) and 
states that ‘es gab noch niemals eine natürliche Menschheit’10 (NF-1887, 10 [53]). In 
Nietzsche’s view, Rousseau ‘fails to recognise the dark and terrible forces of nature which 
must be overcome in order to arrive at a harmonious relationship with nature’ (Ansell-
Pearson, 1996, p. 25). As Paglia notes, ‘nature, hailed by Rousseau and Wordsworth as a 
benevolent mother, is a dangerous guest’ (2001, p. 231). The very idea of a return to nature 
requires clarification in Nietzsche’s view, and in a note he explains, ‘Auch ich rede von 
                                                          
8
 This is an example of the biological imagery that Nietzsche invariably employs to characterise the relationship 
of Apollo and Dionysus. 
9
 ‘Rousseau – to where exactly did he wish to return?’ 
10
 ‘there never was a natural mankind’. 
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“Rückkehr zur Naturˮ, obwohl es eigentlich nicht ein Zurückgehn, sondern ein 
Hinaufkommen ist — hinauf in die hohe, freie, selbst furchtbare Natur und Natürlichkeit’11 
(GD-Streifzüge-48).  
In an earlier passage of the same book Nietzsche criticises the promotion of 
regression by priests and moralists who wish to bring man to an earlier state of virtue.
12
 
Perhaps giving a clue to his contempt for Rousseau, Nietzsche declares that one cannot go 
backwards
13
 – ‘man muss vorwärts’14 (GD-Streifzüge-43). In Nietzsche’s view, one does not 
return to nature as to a loving parent, but rather returns to confront the terror inherent in 
nature – which becomes part of the superior individual’s strategy of striving and ascendance. 
While Rousseau advocates a misguided version of returning to nature (in Nietzsche’s view), 
Nietzsche names Napoleon as a model for his own version. In Nietzsche’s eyes, as del Caro 
explains, ‘Napoleon earned his return to nature as an ascent to the natural’ (2004, p. 46), 
whereas ‘Rousseau […], with his doctrine of equality represents the most poisonous poison, 
the end of justice’ (p. 46). For Nietzsche, then, if man is to rediscover a harmonious 
relationship with nature, he must first confront and overcome all of those terrible aspects 
which Rousseau overlooks. 
Crucially, the return of Nietzsche’s Dionysian is moderated. In Die Geburt der 
Tragödie it is still to be distinguished from the utter abandonment of Dionysian barbarians 
(noted earlier) partly by the fact that the Dionysian Greek, unlike his barbaric counterpart, 
also comes under the influence of Apollo. These crude Dionysians flouted all laws and 
traditions in their wild sexual promiscuity, Nietzsche tells us: ‘gerade die wildesten Bestien 
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 ‘I too speak of a “return to natureˮ, although actually it is not a returning, but rather a coming-up – up into 
high, free, even terrible nature and naturalness’.   
12
 ‘sie wollten die Menschheit auf ein früheres Maass von Tugend zurückbringen, zurückschrauben’ (‘they 
wished to bring mankind back, to screw mankind back, to an earlier measure of virtue’ [GD-Streifzüge-43]). 
13
 Nietzsche criticises those (including priests, moralists, and politicians) whose aim is ‘[der] Krebsgang aller 
Dinge’ (‘the retrogression of all things’ [GD-Streifzüge-43]). The German word ‘Krebsgang’ (‘retrogression’) is 
defined by Duden as ‘rückläufige, sich verschlechternde Entwicklung’ (‘backwards, deteriorating 
development’). 
14
 ‘one must go forwards’. 
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der Natur wurden hier entfesselt, bis zu jener abscheulichen Mischung von Wollust und 
Grausamkeit, die mir immer als der eigentliche "Hexentrank" erschienen ist’15 (GT-2). As 
Gooding-Williams points out, ‘Dionysian Greeks, on the other hand, allegedly repudiated the 
literalism of the barbarian and strove figuratively to express Dionysian excess’ (2001, p. 107). 
The regression undergone by Dionysian barbarians is too extreme to be creative or 
productive, and results in the ‘Rückschritte des Menschen zum Tiger und Affen’16 (GT-2). 
Here there is a complete loss of humanity and return to a civilised state is rendered 
impossible. Only cultivated Dionysian Greeks are able to derive artistic output from the 
breakdown of the principle of individuation: ‘erst bei ihnen wird die Zerreissung des principii 
individuationis ein künstlerisches Phänomen’17 (GT-2). 
Thus far the psychological impact of the Dionysian has only been seen within the 
individual; but for Nietzsche the Dionysian can, and should, also be embraced communally – 
specifically, in Die Geburt der Tragödie, by the German nation. Dismayed by the barren 
cultural landscape of contemporary Germany (‘jene eben so düster geschilderte Wildniss 
unserer ermüdeten Cultur’18 [GT-20]), he advocates the Dionysian as a means of effecting a 
creative regression. What this impulse can bring about at a personal level can also be repeated 
for communities, even entire nations. His attempt to locate an affinity with the Dionysian in 
German music – Wagner’s above all – suggests that the Dionysian must simply be 
rediscovered. He tells us that the birth of a tragic age for the German spirit is ‘nur eine 
Rückkehr zu sich selbst, ein seliges Sichwiederfinden’19 (GT-19). As will shortly be seen, the 
notion of a contemporary nation rediscovering its artistic heritages through the Dionysian will 
be strongly echoed in Il fuoco.  
                                                          
15
 ‘the very wildest beasts of nature were here unleashed, resulting in that abominable mixture of lust and 
cruelty, which has always seemed to me to be the real “witches’ brew”’. 
16
 ‘regressions of man to tiger and ape’. 
17
 ‘with them, the tearing apart of the principle of individuation became an artistic phenomenon for the first 
time’.  
18
 ‘that dismally depicted wilderness of our tired culture’. 
19
 ‘only a return to itself, a blissful rediscovery of itself’. 
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Creative regression under the aegis of the Dionysian is reaffirmed in Nietzsche’s later 
writings. In Menschliches Allzumenschliches (Human, All Too Human, 1878), for example, 
Nietzsche talks of the necessity of ‘[climbing] a few rungs backwards [my emphasis]’20 
(MA-20), a step which follows the abandonment of religious and superstitious beliefs, and 
entails the superior individual overcoming metaphysics.
21
 It is only ‘die Aufgeklärtesten’22 
(ibid.) who are able to liberate themselves from metaphysics and succeed in this regressive – 
but also progressive – goal. This passage was one which drew the attention of Sigmund Freud 
and Carl Jung, both of whom developed ideas on the psychological phenomenon of 
regression. In a note from 1887 Nietzsche claims that ‘[d]ie Kunst erinnert uns an Zustände 
des animalischen vigor’23 (NF-1887, 9 [20]), positing art as an activity which resembles the 
raw vitality of untamed and animal instincts. Here the artistic impulse seems to be accessible 
only once the structures and restraints of civilisation have been removed – perhaps when one 
has climbed ‘a few rungs backwards’. As seen above, the notion of regression in the service 
of progress appears again in Götzen-Dämmerung, and Nietzsche talks about his 
understanding of a ‘Rückkehr zur Natur’24 (GD-Streifzüge-48).  
In Nietzsche’s later articulation of the Dionysian, sexual arousal is lauded as a crucial 
part of creative inspiration. In Götzen-Dämmerung he describes how creativity requires ‘die 
Erregbarkeit der ganzen Maschine’25 (GD-Streifzüge-8) and, having posited Rausch as a 
precondition for creativity,
26
 names sexual intoxication the ‘älteste und ursprünglichste Form 
des Rausches’27 (GD-Streifzüge-8). Satisfying one’s sexual instincts, Nietzsche believes, can 
be creatively beneficial. However, he also warns the artist against elevating this drive at the 
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 ‘einige Sprossen rückwärts steigen’. 
21
 ‘die Metaphysik zu überwinden’ (‘[overcoming] metaphysics’ [MA-20]). 
22
 ‘the most enlightened’. 
23
 ‘art reminds us of states of animalistic vigour’. 
24
 ‘return to nature’. 
25
 ‘the excitability of the whole machine’. 
26
 Nietzsche declares that Rausch is a ‘physiologische Vorbedingung’ (‘physiological precondition’ [GD-
Streifzüge-8]) of creativity. 
27
 ‘oldest and most original form of intoxication’. 
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expense of others, declaring that the artist who devotes himself solely to carnality will deplete 
energies that might otherwise be artistically employed: ‘Es ist ein und dieselbe Kraft, die man 
in der Kunst-Conception und die man im geschlechtlichen Actus ausgiebt: es giebt nur Eine 
Art Kraft. Hier zu unterliegen, hier sich zu verschwenden ist für einen Künstler 
verrätherisch’28 (NF-1888, 23 [2]).   
In the creatively inspiring erotic intoxication which Nietzsche discusses in Götzen-
Dämmerung, there is also evidence of regression. When the artist allows himself to be 
creatively stimulated by the sex drive, he experiences a primitive form of energy and 
intoxication. Notes from the period before the publication of Götzen-Dämmerung support the 
idea of sexual excitement as a form of regression. In 1887 Nietzsche emphasises the primacy 
of the sex drive – which belongs to the ‘ältesten Fest freude [sic] des Menschen’29 (NF-1887, 
9 [102]) – and notes that it, along with intoxication and cruelty, dominates within the artist. In 
the same note Nietzsche speaks of the animalistic nature of creativity, which seems to receive 
impetus from these three elements (‘der Geschlechtstrieb, der Rausch, die Grausamkeit’30 
[ibid.]).  
There is possibly a promotion of regression, too, in Nietzsche’s continued use of the 
ancient Greeks as a model for creativity. In Götzen-Dämmerung, Nietzsche tells us that 
(ancient) Dionysian art grew out of ‘Orgiasmus’ (‘orgiasm’ [GD-Alten-4]) and proceeds to 
laud the ancient Dionysian mysteries as a guarantee (for the pre-Socratic Greek) of an 
affirmative and ascendant existence. Orgiasm is certainly not a phenomenon considered 
acceptable by the modern West, and it reflects a pre-Christian acceptance of more ‘primitive’ 
drives. By this point, creativity for Nietzsche has come to encompass not just the activity of 
the artist, but also the endeavours of the superior individual who strives to ‘create’ himself as 
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 ‘[i]t is one and the same strength that one expends in art-conception and in the sexual act: there is just one 
type of strength. To be defeated here, to waste oneself here, is treacherous’. 
29
 ‘oldest jubilations of man’. 
30
 ‘the sex drive, intoxication, and cruelty’.  
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a work of art. Evoking the ancient Greeks and their Dionysian mysteries, Nietzsche offers a 
strategy for this creativity; this is a form of regression, but one that draws the subject back to 
an earlier form of civilisation (for Nietzsche, the civilisation par excellence), rather than to a 
state of barbarity or animalism. In ‘die Mysterien der Geschlechtlichkeit’31 (GD-Alten-4) 
Nietzsche finds a key to the affirmative attitude of the ancient Greeks, which can fuel our 
own self-creation, and exalts their treatment of procreation – and thus the sex drive which 
enables it – as a paradigm of creativity, in all senses of the word.  
 For Nietzsche, then, the Dionysian is a drive which can provoke a regression to a 
more ‘primitive’ state in the individual, where instinct and intuition dominate and a sense of 
primal union is perceived. It also offers a means of stimulating a cultural revival through the 
rediscovery of ‘primitive’ and primordial energies, and allowing contemporary Germany to 
emulate, and perhaps surpass, the hitherto unparalleled artistic achievements of the ancient 
Greeks. The regression that the Dionysian triggers, however, must be tempered by a 
complementary drive, the Apollonian, which prevents the subject from regressing too far – to 
a state of barbarism for example. In his later writings Nietzsche exalts the value of the 
Dionysian for the creation of the self as a work of art, but, as has been argued, the regressive 
nature of the Dionysian also stimulates this creativity. 
 Nietzsche’s Dionysian exaltation of instinct, intuition, and spontaneity – balanced by 
the Apollonian in 1872, and by Dionysus’ appropriation of aspects of the Apollonian in later 
writings – provided an attractive alternative to the stagnation and sterility that was perceived 
to afflict modernity as the turn of the century approached. As was discussed in Chapter Two, 
Nietzsche’s rise to fame after 1890 was largely due to the dramatic technological, social, 
political and economic changes that had taken place in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, which suddenly rendered his thought appealing. Some readers, such as Expressionist 
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 ‘the mysteries of sexuality’. 
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artists, were to find aspects of vitalism in his writings, for example, which they saw as a 
welcome antithesis to modern sterility,
32
 and an exaltation of the individual that countered the 
sense of anonymity resulting from urbanisation.
33
 Around the turn of the century many of the 
attitudes that made Nietzsche’s thought seem so appealing also caused artists and intellectuals 
to turn away from the modern, urban West and to observe allegedly ‘primitive’ cultures, free 
from the discontents of (Western) ‘civilisation’. Such primitivist attitudes will now be 
discussed.  
 
ii) Cultural Primitivism 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, Western 
cultural production can be seen dramatically to increase its occupation with non-Western and 
pre-modern themes and techniques. Most visibly in the visual arts, but also in music and 
literature, simpler and more ‘naïve’ techniques appear, as well as rural and exotic themes. 
This is the cultural attitude that has been termed ‘primitivism’, and which constitutes a 
problematic period in the history of Western cultural exchange; for it involved the artistic 
appropriation of themes and techniques believed to characterise civilisations considered 
‘primitive’ in comparison to the modern, urban West. This was driven partly by 
disillusionment with Western modernity in the aftermath of the sudden industrialisation and 
urbanisation of the second half of the nineteenth century. In his Tess of the D’Urbervilles 
(1891), Hardy talks of the ‘ache of modernism’ (1985, p. 180), for example. The dramatic 
social, political and economic changes that took place during this period were discussed in 
the second chapter of this thesis in the context of Europe’s (belated) reception of Nietzsche’s 
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 Donahue explains that ‘as all studies of Expressionism emphasise, the initially liberating shape of modernity 
had congealed: the self as epistemological centre, voicing both nourishing Nature and threatening City, had 
become totally sterile; “Ichdissoziation” (dissociation of self […]) is the primal moment of Expressionism’ 
(2005, p. 174). 
33
 Donahue also cites the expressionist poet Ernst Blass, who found that Nietzsche appealed because of his 
promotion of ‘Der Mut zum eigenen Selbst und eigenen Erlebnis’ (‘the courage to be oneself, and have one’s 
own experience’ [p. 5]).  
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thought. Some of the attitudes that rendered Nietzsche’s ideas appealing appear also to have 
resulted in what Perry refers to as ‘the going away’ (in Harrison, Frascina and Perry, 1993, p. 
8) from urban spaces and the withdrawal to unknown rural spaces. Hence painters like Paul 
Gauguin (1848-1903) retreated to areas like Pont-Aven (p. 8), in rural Brittany, and 
eventually to even more remote locations such as Tahiti (p. 28).  
 Trilling finds the cultural criticism inherent in primitivism to be a defining 
characteristic of modernism: ‘it seems to me that the characteristic element of modern 
literature, or at least of the most highly developed modern literature, is the bitter line of 
hostility to civilisation which runs through it’ (1980, p. 3). Yet a disillusioned criticism of the 
current period is not unique to the early twentieth century, and the sentiments and desires that 
underpin primitivism can be found throughout the history of the West. Cuddon (2013) locates 
elements of ‘primitivism’ as far back as Michel de Montaigne’s Des cannibales34 (Of 
Cannibals [1580]), Sir Philip Sidney’s Arcadia35 (1580), as well as Shakespeare’s The 
Winter’s Tale (c. 1610) and As You Like It (c. 1599), for example (p. 561). Cuddon also 
suggests that ‘Dante, Tasso, Spencer and Milton expressed similar [‘primitivist’] ideas, often 
in relation to a prelapsarian state’ (ibid.). Enlightenment philosopher and historian 
Giambattista Vico (1688-1744) is counted among the critical thinkers who display an element 
of primitivism, but who predate the cultural trend under discussion. Vico emphasised the 
irrationality and brutality of ‘primitive’ (earlier) peoples, and attributed to them a mode of 
creativity that appeared inaccessible to contemporary man. In his Scienza nuova (New 
Science [1725]) he states: 
poetic wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile world, must have begun with a metaphysics not 
rational and abstract like that of learned men now, but felt and imagined as that of these first 
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 Montaigne’s essay details the ritual practices of the Tupinambá people in Brazil. 
35
 Sidney’s Arcadia is a romance written in the style of Heliodorus, a Greek writer who is thought to have lived 
either during the third or fourth century AD. 
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men must have been, who, without power of rationcination, were all robust sense and 
vigorous imagination (Vico, cited in Pompa, 1990, p. 44).  
An echo of this sentiment appears in a statement from T. S. Eliot (in whose literature 
elements of primitivism are frequently located): ‘poetry begins, I dare say, with a savage 
beating a drum in a jungle’ (Eliot, cited by Ellis, 2009, p. 21).  
Rousseau is often seen as a precursor to the earliest strands of primitivism; largely 
because of his glorification of nature as an alternative to the corruption of civilisation and the 
city
36
. As already indicated, for Rousseau, ‘man’s best hope [was] to return to nature and to 
follow its example in the teaching of children’ (Outram, 2006, p. 98), as illustrated in his 
treatise Émile, ou De l’éducation. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) ‘followed Rousseau 
[…] in defending the superiority of primitive cultures to their modern counterparts’ 
(Chantler, 2004, p. 491), although he also believed ‘that every epoch must be evaluated on its 
own terms as a stage in the development of a culture’ (ibid.). In his 
Briefwechsel über Ossian und die Lieder alter Völker (Correspondence about Ossian and the 
Songs of Ancient Peoples [1773]), Herder claims that ‘primitive’ cultures are ‘the more 
barbarous, that is, the more alive, the more free, the closer to the senses’ (cited by Chantler, 
p. 491). As Habib notes, the Romantic poets (including Shelley, Byron and Wordsworth) 
were repulsed by the squalor and mechanisation they perceived in the modern city, and 
‘turned for spiritual relief to mysticism; to nature; to Rousseauistic dreams of a simple, 
primitive, and uncorrupted lifestyle’ (2004, p. 332).  
Moving towards the twentieth century, the (delayed) reception of Nietzsche is also 
posited as contributing to the trend of primitivism, by Trilling (1980, p. 16) and Pan (2001, p. 
17), for example. Trilling notes that while Kaufmann is correct in warning us against 
concluding that Nietzsche portrays the (more ‘primitive’) Dionysian more enthusiastically 
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 See, for example, Charles E. Ellison, ‘Rousseau and the Modern City: The Politics of Speech and Dress’, 
Political Theory, 13 (1985), pp. 497-533. 
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than the Apollonian in Die Geburt der Tragödie, ‘no one reading Nietzsche’s essay for the 
first time is likely to heed this warning’ (ibid.). Similarly, Pan finds that Nietzsche ‘first 
formulated the distinction between primitive and modern that is elaborated in expressionism 
[considered a primitivist branch of art] by differentiating a Dionysian from a Socratic impulse 
in ancient Greek culture’ (2001, p. 17) and by affirming ‘the validity of an intuitive, aesthetic 
mode of relating to the world’ (ibid.) in the Dionysian. Gordon also suggests that the work of 
expressionist artists ‘reflects that Dionysian or vitalist impulse that had earlier been 
advocated by Friedrich Nietzsche’ (Gordon, cited in Erwin, 2003, p. 285). Coinciding with 
the period during which Nietzsche’s thought rose to prominence, James Frazer’s The Golden 
Bough (1890) is also widely cited as influencing the primitivist trend (again, by Trilling 
[1980, p. 13], for example). In Frazer’s study of religion and mythology Trilling finds 
criticisms of irrational and wild practices, but also notes that ‘[i]f [Frazer] deplores the 
primitive imagination, he also does not fail to show it as wonderful and beautiful’ (p. 15). 
Both Nietzsche and Frazer, then, whose works were selling very well at the end of the 
nineteenth century, oppose a rational, or overly rational, modernity to a ‘primitive’ 
irrationality and intuition, and – whether deliberately or not – indicate positive aspects in the 
latter. 
Around the same time thinkers and theorists, such as Max Weber (1864-1920) and 
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), sought explanations for the discontents of modernity. As 
Barkan and Bush note, ‘their ideal types approximated the polarised ideals of the primitive 
and the civilised’ (1995, p. 2). The antithesis of ‘civilised’ (equated with the modern Western 
world) and ‘primitive’ (equated with geographically or temporally remote, and allegedly less 
advanced, peoples) was to underpin the values and desires of primitivism. Like the 
Romantics several decades before them, many artists around the turn of the century began to 
look beyond the Western, urban space for creative inspiration, and pursued a more ‘organic’ 
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and ‘intuitive’ form of art. This can probably be seen most strikingly in the visual arts, such 
as painting and sculpture. From the 1880s artists like Gauguin, van Gogh and Stanhope 
Forbes turned to rural communities for artistic inspiration, resulting in a proliferation of 
paintings featuring peasants, farmers and rustic rituals. As Perry notes, ‘[t]hroughout Europe 
as a whole, including Russia, Scandinavia and Britain, and in Germany in particular, the 
vogue for forming artists’ communities and colonies away from urban centres had been 
established in the mid-nineteenth century’ (in Harrison, Frascina and Perry, 1993, p. 9). Perry 
gives Stanhope Forbes’ A Street in Brittany (1881) and Gauguin’s Vision après le sermon 
(Vision After the Sermon, 1888) as examples of the resulting works of art. While the 
‘primitivism’ of the first is limited largely to the painting’s content – it shows peasant women 
in traditional dress and engaged in traditional crafts – the latter displays both ‘primitive’ style 
and content. Gauguin’s painting displays exaggerated and unexpected colours, distorts scale 
and dimension, and does not hide the painter’s brush-strokes. Such formal features were 
regarded – sometimes stereotypically – as characteristics of the artefacts of ‘primitive’ 
peoples. In his Primitive Art (1927), for example, anthropologist Franz Boas describes 
African masks which treat the form of the face ‘decoratively with the greatest freedom’ 
(2010, p. 70), showing eyes which are ‘slits with geometrical ornaments’ (ibid.); he also 
describes silhouetted representations of the human body by Bushmen, which feature 
‘exaggeration of the length of the limbs’ (p. 166).   
In his examination of primitivism in fine art, Perry (in Harrison, Frascina and Perry, 
1993) also discusses the Fauves and the German Expressionists, whose works display 
common features. The Fauves, a loose group of predominantly French artists working during 
the first decade of the twentieth century, who included Henri Matisse (1869-1954), painted 
with bright, unnatural colours and eschewed realism. Their very name, which translates 
literally as ‘wild beasts’, clearly indicates the ‘primitive’, even animal, impulses that these 
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artists sought to capture and express. In 1905 Marcel Nicolle reviewed the Fauves with 
disdain, likening their works to ‘the barbaric and naïve sport of a child who plays with a box 
of colours he has just got as a Christmas present’ (cited by Perry, in Harrison, Frascina and 
Perry, 1993, p. 46). Fauvist works certainly suggest a – deliberate – regression towards more 
naïve and intuitive modes of creativity. The German Expressionists, such as Ernst Ludwig 
Kirchner, Fritz Bleyl, Erich Heckel, and Karl Schmidt-Rottluff, who formed the group known 
as Die Brücke
37
 (The Bridge) in 1905, adhered to a similar use of colour in order to convey 
emotions and portrayed more sexually explicit themes than the Fauves. They looked to 
‘primitive’ artefacts in the Dresden Ethnographical Collections, believing to find in these 
artefacts ‘“truthful” unsophisticated forms of art, uncorrupted by modern bourgeois culture’ 
(Perry, in Harrison, Frascina and Perry, 1993, p. 66). As Perry also notes, both the Fauves 
and the artists of Die Brücke are known to have engaged with Nietzsche’s works (p. 47 and p. 
63). 
 Bell (1972) locates primitivist elements in literature: for example, in the works of 
Herman Melville (p. 20), especially Moby Dick (1851); Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness 
(1899; p. 38); D. H. Lawrence
38
 (p. 12), including The Rainbow (1915); T. S. Eliot (p. 42), 
including The Waste Land (1922) and James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922; p. 45). These literary 
texts portray geographically remote peoples (Polynesians in Moby Dick and peoples of the 
Congo in Heart of Darkness); undermine the notion of an opposition between ‘civilised’ and 
‘primitive’ (Heart of Darkness); allude to myth and legend (Arthurian legend in The Waste 
Land and classical mythology in Ulysses); and, in The Rainbow, Lawrence ‘attempts to 
gather into a modern sensibility some of the richness and strength of the primitive sensibility 
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 The group’s name was almost certainly a reference to Nietzsche’s Also sprach Zarathustra, in which 
Zarathustra describes man as ‘eine Brücke und kein Zweck’ (‘a bridge and not an end-point’ [Za-I-Vorrede-4]), 
implying that man is to be a bridge to the Übermensch. 
38
 For a study of D. H. Lawrence’s ‘primitivism’ see Jascha Kessler, ‘D. H. Lawrence’s Primitivism’, Texas 
Studies in Literature and Language, 5 (1964), pp. 467-488, and Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage 
Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 159-174. 
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without surrendering the poise of the civilised self’ (p. 18). Much primitivist literature, as 
well as the discourse that underpinned it, also often had a more sinister function, which was 
to justify European colonial ventures. Mclaren (2006) cites d’Annunzio’s play Più che 
l’amore (More than Love [1906]) and Marinetti’s Mafarka le futuriste as two of the most 
influential works of Italian colonialist literature (p. 110 and p. 112). D’Annunzio’s play 
showcases Africa as ‘terra incognita39 […] and terra promessa40’ (p. 110), ripe for the arrival 
of the Italian superuomo; and Marinetti’s novel similarly portrays Africa as ‘a primitive or 
virgin territory separate from the decadence of the West in which the birth of the Futurist man 
was possible’ (p. 112). 
 Primitivism can arguably be found elsewhere in d’Annunzio’s literature. Many of his 
works are set in the rural region of the Abruzzo and depict its traditions and rituals. These 
include the collection of short stories Terra vergine (Virgin Land [1882]), Il trionfo della 
morte and Le novelle della Pescara (The Stories of Pescara [1902]). D’Annunzio was born in 
Pescara and grew up in the Abruzzo.
41
 A recent study of his literary use of the region by 
Härmänmaa (2013) considers the Abruzzo’s function both as a literary realm of primitivism 
and as a locus which satisfied d’Annunzio’s own longings for the ‘primitive’. It was a region 
to which he often returned to write, apparently finding this untamed natural space more 
conducive to creative production. As Härmänmaa indicates, ‘in the 1880s, the simple 
countryside formed a striking contrast to d’Annunzio’s lifestyle among the high society of 
Rome’ (p. 701). Mazzarotto (1949, p. 512) notes that he habitually stayed in a convent at 
Francavilla al Mare (one of Il piacere’s settings), where he wrote Il piacere, L’innocente (The 
Innocent One, most commonly translated as The Intruder, 1892) and Il trionfo della morte. 
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 ‘unknown land’. 
40
 ‘promised land’. 
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 While his juxtaposition of the natural landscapes and ‘primitive’ people of this region against the modern 
Italian city can therefore be considered primitivistic, the Abruzzo does not hold the same exotic and unknown 
value for d’Annunzio as, say, the jungle for Henri Rousseau, or the Congo for Conrad. Nonetheless, for (the 
majority of) d’Annunzio’s readers the region was one of mystery and superstition, which had remained in the 
past and where nature still dominated. 
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Härmänmaa also points out that the region had long been presented ‘as both an idyllic region 
of heroic people and a land of magical barbarism’ (2013, p. 702) in classical texts, in 
documents from the Kingdom of Italy, and in accounts of individuals’ travels. D’Annunzio’s 
portrayals of the Abruzzo retain this element of ambivalence, and while the region is one of 
fertile abundance and natural beauty in Il trionfo della morte, it is also the scene of shocking 
and grotesque rituals. As Härmänmaa explains, ‘[o]n the one hand, it symbolises vitality and 
natural human impulses, as is often the case in his early short stories; yet on the other hand, it 
points to something far more sinister, such as mindless violence, cruelty, or fanaticism’ 
(ibid.). This mindless and grotesque fanaticism is also seen in the paintings of Michetti, who 
was a friend of d’Annunzio. In particular, in Il voto (The Offering [1883]) Michetti depicts a 
scene of religious devotion which is strongly echoed in d’Annunzio’s portrayal of the Vigil at 
Casalbordino in Il trionfo della morte. In Michetti’s painting devotees prostrate themselves 
upon the floor of a basilica and crawl towards the altar with their tongues to the ground.
42
  
 While d’Annunzio’s primitivism is striking and obvious, in the case of Thomas Mann 
traces of primitivism are less immediately visible. He largely favours modern urban settings
43
 
and often writes through the eyes of the burgher. Nonetheless, Mann’s engagement with the 
‘primitive’ has been noted; for example, by Robertson (1990), who finds that Mann, in 
combining psychoanalytic ideas with those of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, was able to 
‘[articulate] his conviction that the primitive is present within civilisation, and within the 
individual psyche’ (p. 90). Mann wishes, Robertson claims, ‘to explore and understand [the 
‘primitive’] with the aid of his modern consciousness. Hence his irony, as a means of keeping 
the primitive at bay while acknowledging its authority and its appeal’ (p. 91). Erwin also 
locates elements of primitivism in Doktor Faustus, reminding us, for example, of 
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 Härmänmaa notes that d’Annunzio and Michetti visited the Abruzzo together in 1882 to witness a pilgrimage 
(2013, p. 704), and that d’Annunzio based the scenes at Casalbordino in Il trionfo della morte on this 
experience. 
43
 Texts such as the short story Die vertauschten Köpfe (The Transposed Heads, 1940) and the tetralogy Joseph 
und seine Brüder (Joseph and his Brothers [1930-1943]) are notable exceptions.  
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Leverkühn’s embrace of ‘the ideas of primitivism and barbarism’ (2003, p. 292) in his 
musical breakthrough. Erwin reminds us of Kretschmar’s revelation to Leverkühn of the 
regressive and primitive nature of music.
44
 Doktor Faustus also contains the declaration 
(made by the narrator Serenus Zeitblom), that ‘das […] Gegenteil der bürgerlichen Kultur 
sei nicht Barbarei, sondern die Gemeinschaft’45 (Mann, 2007, p. 541), supporting Robertson’s 
findings regarding Mann’s understanding of the ‘primitive’ and the ‘barbaric’. In his 
Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen Mann explicitly expresses the creative value he sees in 
the ‘primitive’, with which (he suggests) the artist must remain in contact: 
Um einen Künstler aber, dem das Primitive ein durchaus fremdes Element, der jedes 
“Rückfallsˮ ins Primitive durchaus unfähig geworden wäre, stünde es, glaube ich, nicht gut. 
Ein Künstler ist vielleicht nur eben so weit Künstler und Dichter, als er dem Primitiven nicht 
entfremdet ist [...]
46
 (1974, p. 151). 
In Doktor Faustus the ‘primitive’ is largely accessed through Dionysian music. I will argue 
that the Dionysian functions as a ‘primitivist’ foil to modernity elsewhere in Mann’s 
literature, particularly in the texts under discussion. 
 The problematic nature of primitivism was noted above. Later strands of primitivism 
moved away from the derogatory and negative representations of geographically remote 
peoples (‘based on nineteenth-century concepts of social evolution’ [Li, 2012, p. 983]), and 
instead romanticised peoples considered ‘primitive’, attributing to them a more ‘organic’ or 
‘truthful’ form of artistic creativity. Yet the same problematic binaries of ‘modern’ and 
‘primitive’ were promoted, and geographically remote peoples remained a fetishised ‘other’. 
Later in the twentieth century, as Li argues, ‘neoprimitivism’ (p. 987) attempted to resolve 
                                                          
44
 Kretschmar speaks of ‘die Neigung der Musik, ins Elementare zurückzutauchen’ (‘the tendency of music to 
plunge backwards into the elemental’ [Mann, 2007, p. 97]). 
45
 ‘the [...] antithesis of burgherly culture is not barbarism, but the collective’. 
46
 ‘But an artist to whom the primitive had become a thoroughly alien element, who was incapable of 
“relapsingˮ into the primitive, would face difficulties. An artist is possible only an artist and poet as long as he is 
not estranged from the primitive […]’. 
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the issues of primitivism. Li notes the strategies, such as inversion, parody and magical 
realism, used by writers in an attempt to create an acceptable form of primitivism, but also 
finds that, paradoxically, some of these strategies tend to propagate the problematic attitudes 
that they purport to reject (p. 1001). 
 This overview of ‘primitivist’ discourse and its impact upon artistic production – in 
the visual arts as well as literature – has revealed an enduring preoccupation with the 
‘primitive’ other, and a persistent longing for the allegedly ‘simpler’ and more ‘organic’ way 
of life of this other. Primitivism can be seen as a critique of modernity, which juxtaposes 
vitalistic longings with the perceived sterility and stagnancy of the modern West, especially 
during the final decades of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. These 
longings were inherently regressive in nature, betraying a desire for the perceived simplicity 
of peoples considered anterior to the modern West in terms of development. As Paul Klee 
noted, when commenting upon the artefacts on display in ethnographical museums, ‘So weit 
müssen wir zurück’47 (cited in Erwin, 2010, p. 285). Nietzsche has been seen to have 
provided some impetus for the primitivist attitude, and in Nietzsche’s Dionysian we find a 
symbol for many of the desires and hopes of those who turned towards the rural or the exotic 
as a foil to modernity. Before examining d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s portrayals of these 
‘regressive’ and ‘primitivist’ aspects of the Dionysian, brief consideration will be given to 
psychoanalytical discussions of the cultural trend of primitivism. Sigmund Freud and Carl 
Jung both reflected upon the draw of the ‘primitive’ to modern, ‘civilised’ man, and allow us 
to understand the cultural attitude from a psychological perspective. Their explanations for 
the phenomenon of primitivism, and of the relationship between the ‘primitive’ and the 
‘civilised’ will provide crucial clarification when examining the texts of d’Annunzio and 
Mann. 
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iii) Psychoanalysis and the Primitive 
The discontents of civilisation, which underpinned much of the art of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, occupied thinkers and theorists, who attempted to explain why the 
primitive was proving so attractive to the modern West. Prominent among these thinkers 
were Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, both of whom sought psychological explanations for 
these discontents. Their ideas, discussed here, will not provide a dominant framework within 
which to analyse d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s texts, but are ranged instead alongside the 
cultural primitivism discussed above, by way of complementary exploration. Freud’s and 
Jung’s ideas regarding the draw of the primitive do not offer unproblematic frameworks with 
which to analyse literature today, partly because their attempts to account for the draw of the 
primitive simultaneously support the period’s dichotomy of ‘civilised’ versus ‘cultural’; but 
they nonetheless allow an insight into the attitudes of the period. They are presented here as 
sources containing primitivism, rather than as theoretical tools with which to analyse the texts 
under discussion.  
 In his Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Civilisation and its Discontents, 1930), Freud 
explains the psychological conflicts that arise when individuals exist together in a large-scale 
society. These conflicts result from the repression (at least to a certain extent) of certain 
drives, which is demanded by civilisation, and are posited as the key to the attraction of the 
primitive. While the individual who exists free of civilisation and culture may obey all of his 
desires and instincts, free from the fear of punishment, members of a large-scale society may 
not. Just as the infant learns that satisfying certain urges will lead to punishment from 
parental authority, so the individual must renounce certain drives for the sake of civilisation, 
and to avoid punishment and ‘unpleasure’ (‘Unlust’) from external authorities. As Freud 
notes in Die Zukunft einer Illusion (The Future of an Illusion, 1927), ‘Es scheint [...], daß sich 
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jede Kultur auf Zwang und Triebverzicht aufbauen muß’48 (1955d, p. 327). A paradigmatic 
example is the sexual drive. Unbridled satisfaction of the sexual drive would work against the 
creative goals of civilisation and is therefore punished, by religion for example. Aggressive 
impulses must also be quelled for the sake of civilisation. As Freud explains, humans are not 
naturally well-disposed towards their neighbour, who constitutes ‘eine Versuchung, seine 
Aggression an ihm zu befriedigen, seine Arbeitskraft ohne Entschädigung auszunützen, ihn 
ohne seine Einwilligung sexuell zu gebrauchen, sich in den Besitz seiner Habe zu setzen, […] 
ihm Schmerzen zu bereiten, zu martern und zu töten’49 (p. 470). But if an individual is to gain 
long-term benefit from his neighbour, he must learn to co-operate, which requires a 
suppression of the instinct towards aggression and exploitation. When the instinct towards 
aggression is not satisfied externally, however, it turns inwards, as Freud explains, and is 
directed against the ego: ‘Die Aggression wird introjiziert, verinnerlicht’50 (p. 482). This 
leads to the formation of the super-ego (‘Über-Ich’), whose tension with the ego (‘Ich’) 
results in the feeling of guilt
51
 (p. 484).  
 As Freud notes, the discontents (such as frustrated aggression) that result from 
civilisation’s demands may lead to the contention that ‘wir wären viel glücklicher, wenn wir 
sie aufgeben und in primitive Verhältnisse zurückfinden würden’52 (p. 445). The effort 
required to meet civilisation’s demands can even lead to neurosis: ‘der Mensch [wird] 
neurotisch [...], weil er das Maß von Versagung nicht ertragen kann, das ihm die Gesellschaft 
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 ‘It seems […] that every civilisation must be built upon coercion and renunciation of instinct’. 
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 ‘a temptation to satisfy one’s aggression on him, a temptation to exploit his manpower without compensation, 
a temptation to use him sexually without consent, to seize his possessions, […] to harm him, torture him, and 
kill him’. 
50
 ‘The aggression is introjected, internalised’. 
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 Here Freud strongly echoes Nietzsche’s understanding of the formation of ‘bad conscience’ in Zur 
Genealogie der Moral (Towards a Genealogy of Morals, 1887); as the formation of ‘bad conscience’ can be 
considered a version of sublimation, it will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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im Dienste ihrer kulturellen Ideale auferlegt’53 (p. 446). Precisely this attitude lay at the roots 
of artistic primitivism, and earlier Romanticism. Freud observes that one of the reasons that 
this attitude has become so widespread is the increased ‘Berührung mit primitiven Völkern 
und Stämmen’54 (ibid.) that has been rendered possible by technological advancements – 
such as faster and more convenient modes of transport, photography, and so on. These 
‘primitive’ peoples appear to lead happier lives, Freud writes; he explains, however, that this 
is largely a misguided conclusion based on flawed and insufficient observations.   
 The repressions required by civilisation create an apparent gulf between the man of 
the modern West and peoples considered more primitive. But Freud warns that occasionally 
the mental structures which effect the repression that civilisation demands will fail, revealing 
modern man to be a ‘wilde Bestie’55 (p. 471). Repressed instincts are merely held at bay, not 
abolished, and remain in the unconscious. The instincts that apparently characterise the 
‘primitive’ man as against the civilised man, then, are to be found persisting within the 
members of civilisation, partially undermining any notions of inherent differences between 
modern, Western man and the exotic, ‘primitive’ other. This idea had already occurred to 
d’Annunzio, who, in a speech of 1920 (a decade before Freud’s Das Unbehagen in der 
Cultur), declared: ‘Dopo tante confessioni e dopo tanti martirii, la radice della barbarie 
primitiva non è ancor divelta dall’anima civica. Anzi sembra inespugnabile’56 (1926, p. 366). 
Robertson notes that with Freud’s location of ‘primitive’ characteristics within the ‘civilised’ 
mind, ‘psychoanalysis [became] a method of studying primitive survivals’ (1990, p. 83). The 
longings of the civilised for the perceived simplicities and harmony of the ‘primitive’ is 
revealed by Freud as a symptom of the process of civilisation itself, and one which seems 
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 ‘a person [becomes] neurotic because he cannot bear the extent of the renunciation that society demands in 
service of its cultural ideals’. 
54
 ‘contact with primitive peoples and races’ 
55
 ‘wild beast’. 
56
 ‘After so many confessions and after so many martyrdoms, the root of primitive barbarism has still not been 
eradicated from the civic soul. Indeed, it seems unassailable’, 
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inevitable. The draw of the ‘primitive’ betrays a yearning for those parts of the psyche, and 
for the satisfaction of those instincts, of which civilisation demands renunciation. Artists who 
looked to geographically remote and apparently ‘uncivilised’ peoples appear to have been 
driven by a search both for the ‘other’ and for the (lost) ‘self’.  
 In exposing the ‘primitive’ depths of modern, Western man, Freud arguably goes 
some way towards collapsing the pernicious binary of ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ that had 
been used to justify colonial ventures and peddled again by more well-meaning primitivist 
artists. However, as Brickman notes, in his ‘recourse to the categories and methods of 
Victorian anthropology as well as to mechanisms such as Lamarckian inheritance and 
biogenetic recapitulation, [Freud] reinstated primitivity as an evolutionarily prior and 
therefore […] a racially indexed category’ (2003, p. 52). Freud subscribed, for example, to 
(now discredited) theories positing ‘primitive’ cultures as an earlier stage of evolution now 
surpassed by Western civilisation. This was an idea propagated by early anthropologists such 
as Edward Tylor.
57
 Indeed, when Freud posited neurosis as a possible consequence of the 
repression that civilisation demands (in Totem und Tabu
58
 [Totem and Taboo, 1913]), 
neurosis was understood as a regressive reversion to an earlier state of psychosexual 
development. As Brickman notes, Freud conceives of ‘neurosis [as] a primitive state of mind’ 
(2003, p. 67), leading to the establishment of the highly problematic view that ‘neurotics = 
children = primitives’ (ibid.). It is also to neurotics that Freud refers when he states: ‘es leben 
Menschen, von denen wir glauben, daß sie den Primitiven noch sehr nahe stehen, viel näher 
als wir, in denen wir daher die direkten Abkömmlinge und Vertreter der früheren Menschen 
erblicken’59 (1961, p. 5). 
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 Tylor (1832-1917), as well as the anthropologist Lewis Morgan (1818-1881) used the categories ‘savagery, 
barbarism, and civilisation’ (Andreatta and Ferraro, 2014, p. 75) to classify cultures. 
58
 This text carries the subtitle ‘Einige Übereinstimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker’ 
(‘Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics’). 
59
 ‘there are people living whom we believe still stand very close to primitive man, much closer than we do, and 
in whom we glimpse the direct descendants and representatives of early man’. 
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Freud’s discussions of the lure of the primitive, and civilisation’s discontents, reveal 
man’s subconscious and regressive wish to return to a state of instinctual and intuitive 
existence, free of civilisation’s inhibitions. A regressive longing is also evident in another 
phenomenon discussed by Freud in the first chapter of Das Unbehagen in der Kultur; 
namely, the feeling that is referred to as ‘das ozeanische Gefühl’60 (1955d, p. 422). The term 
was coined by Romain Rolland, who, after reading Freud’s Die Zukunft einer Illusion, which 
investigates the origins of religion, used it in a letter to Freud to describe a feeling for which 
no explanation seemed to exist. As Freud reports at the beginning of Das Unbehagen in der 
Kultur, Rolland (who is unnamed and referred to only as a friend) described the sensation 
thus: ‘Ein Gefühl, das er die Empfindung der “Ewigkeit” nennen möchte, ein Gefühl wie von 
etwas Unbegrenztem, Schrankenlosem, gleichsam “Ozeanischem”’61 (p. 421). Freud 
concludes that the feeling can be traced back to ‘eine frühe Phase des Ichgefühls’62 (p. 430). 
It harks back, he claims, to that early stage of psychological development when the infant has 
not yet recognised its individuality or grasped the difference between the interior and exterior 
world. At this stage the infant believes all things to be part of a single entity. Freud explains:  
Ursprünglich enthält das Ich alles, später scheidet es eine Außenwelt von sich ab. Unser 
heutiges Ichgefühl is also nur ein eingeschrumpfter Rest eines weitumfassenderen, ja – eines 
allumfassendes Gefühls, welches einer innigeren Verbundenheit des Ichs mit der Umwelt 
entsprach.
63
 (p. 435)  
Freud finds that the ‘oceanic’ feeling, which Rolland suggested could be the fons et origo of 
religion, is a residue of this early stage of perceived unity with one’s environment.  
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 ‘the oceanic feeling’. 
61
 ‘A feeling, that he would like to call the sensation of “eternity”, a feeling as of something boundless, limitless, 
as it were “oceanic”’.  
62
 ‘an early phase of ego-feeling’. 
63
 ‘Originally the ego encompasses everything; later it divides an exterior world from itself. Our present ego-
feeling is therefore merely a shrunken residue of a more widely encompassing – indeed, an all-encompassing – 
feeling, which corresponded to an inner bond between the ego and its environment’. 
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 The ‘oceanic’ feeling has been discussed more recently by Torgovnick, in her 
investigation of the West’s relationship to the ‘primitive’. She finds that ‘[p]rimitive beliefs 
and social relationships [are sometimes] seen as equivalent to the “oceanic”: to a dissolution 
of boundaries between subject and object and between all conceived and conceivable 
polarities’64 (1991, p. 18). Torgovnick finds that Freud associates the ‘oceanic’ with the 
female – for its connection to the body of the mother, with which the infant initially believes 
to be connected, and which must therefore be rejected – as well as with the primitive or 
infantile, and takes issue with Freud’s belief that the ‘oceanic’ must be renounced in the name 
of normal psychological development and for the sake of civilisation. She notes that Freud 
neglects to observe the harmful effects of a rejection of the ‘oceanic’, which include ‘an 
alienation from one’s past and from one’s environment, the establishment and perpetuation of 
relations of mastery rather than reciprocity, the repudiation of the “feminine” as a source of 
“primary narcissism” and loss of self’ (p. 207). Again, these afflictions resemble those 
bewailed by certain artists and writers around the turn of the century. Loss of the ‘oceanic’ is 
a prerequisite for civilisation, but also ensures the individual’s alienation from certain, 
pleasurable, psychological experiences. A longing for the primitive seems also to involve a 
longing for the ‘oceanic’, and in the striking frequency with which the primitive female other 
was portrayed by certain artists (such as Gauguin) we arguably see an attempt to recapture 
the (maternal) female that was rejected with the ‘oceanic’.  
 Freud’s location of ‘primitive’ elements within ‘civilised’ man is echoed by Jung, 
whose friendship with Freud broke down around 1913 after many years of mutual support for 
each other’s work. In a lecture given in 1928 entitled ‘Das Seelenproblem des modernen 
Menschen’ (‘The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man’) Jung references Freud’s portrayal of 
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 She locates this feeling, for example, in D. H. Lawrence’s The Plumed Serpent (1926) and in the writer’s 
longing for ‘an idealised primitive state in which man, nature, and eternity are one’ (p. 170). 
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the unconscious as ‘Schmutz und […] Dunkelheit und […] Übel’65 (1981, p. 102) and as 
‘Unrat und Schlacke’66 (ibid.); he also references Freud’s attempts to discourage interest in 
the unconscious and notes that his warnings against the darkness of the ‘seelischen 
Hintergrund’67 (p. 97) went unheeded. Instead, Jung claims, modern man’s interest in the 
unconscious has grown considerably. He notes ‘jene ganz allgemeine Überhandnahme des 
Interesses für seelische Erscheinungen, Spiritismus, Astrologie, Theosophie, Parapsychologie 
usw.’68 (p. 100), and throughout the lecture offers explanations for this. He asks whether it is 
mere coincidence that interest in the unconscious has increased in the aftermath of historic 
scientific discoveries and innovations, such as Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (p. 106). 
Modern man’s fascination with the unconscious may be situated within the antipositivism of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and as Bell notes, ‘modern primitivism […] 
is part of a general concern in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the 
subconscious mind and anti-rational modes of understanding’ (1972, p. 71). 
 For Jung, man’s progression towards modernity has constituted a gradual departure 
from the unconscious, with which man now seeks reacquaintance. By contrast, allegedly 
‘primitive’ cultures, Jung finds, have remained in touch with their unconscious, and can offer 
us ways of re-establishing communication with this lost aspect of ourselves. This, Walker 
claims, is the attitude of ‘idealising’ primitivism, as opposed to ‘sentimental’ primitivism 
(2002, p. 137), both of which he locates within Jung’s writings. While ‘sentimental’ 
primitivism displays veiled contempt for the ‘primitive’ other, Walker explains, and may be 
used to justify colonialist activities, ‘idealising’ primitivism ‘sees that Other as Us, or rather, 
in Us’ (p. 136), and regards the (‘primitive’) other as a means of restoring modern man’s 
identity. As Walker notes, this primitivist attitude holds ‘the primitive in us [as] more 
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 ‘dirt and darkness and evil’. 
66
 ‘refuse and slag’. 
67
 ‘psychic background’. 
68
 ‘that general and excessive interest for psychic phenomena, spiritualism, astrology, theosophy, 
parapsychology etc.’  
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authentic, more in contact with the wellsprings of life’ (ibid.). Jung claims that ‘it is not only 
primitive man whose psychic processes are archaic. […] [E]very civilised human being, 
whatever his conscious development, is still an archaic man at the deeper levels of his 
psyche’ (p. 129). Here he echoes Freud’s understanding of modern man as a ‘savage beast’ 
tamed only by repression; but Jung finds greater value in this ‘savage beast’ and does not call 
for its suppression.  
 The ‘primitive’ within ‘civilised’ man is, ‘in Jungian terms, more in contact with the 
archetypes of the collective unconscious’ (Walker, 2002, p. 136). Jung’s idea of the 
‘collective unconscious’ (‘das kollektive Unbewusste’) proposed that a second unconscious 
exists alongside the personal, individual unconscious discovered by Freud. It is defined by 
Jung as ‘[…] inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only 
become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents’69 
(1991, p. 43). Walker defines it as belonging to ‘a category of ideas that posit a universal 
human nature – one that, if not eternal, is at least very slow in changing’ (2002, p. 9). It links 
‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ man, somewhat undermining any ideas about innate differences. A 
collective unconscious allows a culture to retain its ‘rootedness’, which Jung considered 
crucial to the mental health of a civilisation. While Jung adhered to the same conflation as 
Freud (of ‘primitive’, child, and neurotic), Kunin notes that for Jung ‘this equation is not 
negative’ (2003, p. 57). Kunin explains that for Jung ‘“primitive” is positive precisely 
because it is more fully related to the collective unconscious, hence the conscious articulation 
of archetypes in myth. Modernity is partially negative due to its attempts to ignore the 
collective unconscious’ (ibid.).  
 An important term to note when considering Jung’s relevance to primitivism is the 
concept of ‘participation mystique’, a term he borrowed and adapted from anthropologist 
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 This statement was made in a lecture given by Jung in English on October 19th 1936. 
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Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939). The term was used by Lévy-Bruhl for the first time in his 
Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (How Natives Think, 1910) to ‘identify 
what it is about the mentality of so-called primitives that makes them understand things 
differently from Westerners’ (Haule, 2010, p. 668). Lévy-Bruhl claimed that ‘Primitive man 
[…] lives and acts in an environment of beings and objects, all of which, in addition to the 
properties that we recognise them to possess, are endued with mystical attributes’ (Lévy-
Bruhl, 1985, p. 65). Jung adopted and expanded the meaning of Lévy-Bruhl’s term, and 
utilised it throughout his works, beginning with Psychologische Typen (Psychological Types, 
1921). Winborn summarises the areas Jung wishes to address with his use of this term: ‘he 
highlights the blurring of subject-object boundaries resulting in an experience of a priori 
oneness, that participation mystique is regularly observed in people from cultures which Jung 
labels as “primitive”, and that it occurs in the mental states of early infancy’ (2014, p. 4). For 
Jung, the term can be applied to early psychological stages of development, as well as to 
‘primitive’ man. It can also be experienced by adults of ‘civilised’ societies on occasions 
where individuation is challenged – for example, when one goes to the theatre and becomes 
part of a collective audience. A similar effect can be achieved through sensual interaction, as 
Jung notes in Psychologische Typen:  
Das sinnliche Fühlen, oder besser gesagt, das im Zustande der Sinnlichkeit befindliche Fühlen 
ist collektiv, d.h. es schafft ein Bezogen- oder Affiziertsein, welches den Menschen immer 
zugleich auch in den Zustand der “participation mystiqueˮ versetzt, also in den Zustand einer 
partiellen Identität mt dem empfundenen Objekt
70
 (1921, p. 133).  
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 ‘Sensual feeling, or rather the feeling that is found in the state of sensuality, is collective. It produces a 
relatedness or proneness to affect which always puts the individual in a state of participation mystique; that is, in 
a state of partial identification with the perceived object’. 
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Winborn notes that ‘projection and identification’71 (2014, p. 4) are the two main phenomena 
that can trigger participation mystique, leading to its sense of profound unity. 
The sensation of participation mystique is experienced via a regressive process. Gray 
informs us that one of Jung’s explanations for modern man’s return to a collective is that 
‘groups re-establish to a certain extent the neonatal omnipotence and the sense of security 
originally provided by the symbiotic union with the mother’ (1996, p. 133). Jung himself 
stated that participation mystique ‘is really a return to the primitive condition’ (Bishop, 1995, 
p. 25; original in English). Profound participation in a collective distracts the subject from his 
individuation and allows for an experience of oneness recalling that of the infant and of the 
‘primitive’. This notion strongly recalls Freud’s idea of the ‘oceanic’, for both terms describe 
a state of infantile union with one’s environment (including one’s mother), which is shattered 
by the infant’s realisation of his status as a separate, bordered, entity, and his mother as a 
separate individual.  
Van den Berk notes that Jung conceives of both a ‘healthy and an unhealthy’ (2013, p. 
39) version of participation mystique:  
It is healthy for a person to realise that he is an intrinsic part of reality. […] But something 
detrimental takes place when, at an adult age, this participation mystique slows down a 
healthy process of individuation and a person misses out on important aspects of his 
individual independence’ (ibid.).  
Gray notes that participation in a collective can offer ‘strength and direction for those unable 
to sustain the work of individuation’ (p. 137), highlighting the therapeutic potential of a 
return to participation mystique, especially for modern man.  
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 Von Franz defines Jungian projection as ‘an unconscious, that is, unperceived and unintentional, transfer of 
subjective psychic elements onto an outer object’ (1995, p. 3). The term has now entered common discourse and 
is no longer utilised only in strictly psychoanalytical contexts. 
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A further aspect of participation mystique that is relevant here, and which is explored 
by Bishop (1995), is Jung’s use of the term ‘as a synonym for the state of Dionysian 
reconciliation, defining both in terms of loss of individuality and individuation’ (p. 257). 
Bishop notes the striking similarities between Jung’s description of participation mystique 
and Nietzsche’s description of the Dionysian state in Die Geburt der Tragödie (ibid.), Jung’s 
knowledge of which is widely accepted.
72
 He cites a statement made by Jung in one of his 
Visions Seminars, which were given in English between 1930 and 1934: ‘The Dionysians 
were seeking that effect – namely, to be like everything else, to feel themselves in 
everything’ (Jung, cited in Bishop, 1995, p. 257). Bishop also notes that, in Jung’s 
Psychologische Typen, ‘the barbaric aspect of man had been identified with the Dionysian’ 
(p. 174), and that ‘the return to the primordial experience in the process of artistic creativity 
[…] [represents] a return to Dionysos’ (ibid.). He cites Jung’s description of a return to 
Dionysus as ‘[ein] Wiedereintauchen’73 (p. 175). As Bishop demonstrates, Jung appears to 
conceive of participation mystique as a Dionysian experience that is undergone via a 
regressive process, and which can be creatively beneficial. This gives Jung’s idea of 
participation mystique particular relevance for this thesis, for something resembling this 
participation mystique is sought or experienced by certain characters in the texts under 
discussion, as part of their regressive Dionysian engagement that – it is hoped – will fuel 
artistic creation. 
In terms of primitivism, Jung appears to find that regression to a ‘primitive’ state can 
trigger creativity and relieve modern man of the burdens of civilisation, such as wearying 
individuation or an over-reliance on rationality, echoing the beliefs of those artists who, 
dissatisfied with modernity, sought solace in exotic and allegedly less developed cultures. 
Like the primitivist discourse discussed above, Jung’s statements regarding ‘primitive’ man 
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 See Paul Bishop, The Dionysian Self: C. G. Jung’s Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche (Berlin and New York: 
de Gruyter, 1995). 
73
 ‘a re-immersion’ (translated by Bishop). 
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are problematic; but, as Winborn notes, Jung propagates the contrast between ‘civilised’ and 
‘primitive’ ‘to draw attention to particular characteristics of the modern psychological state 
which he considered problematic’ (2014, p. 5). While this does not render Jung’s use of the 
‘primitive-civilised’ dichotomy entirely harmless, it does differentiate him from those 
primitivists who employed such dichotomies to justify colonialist activities, for example.  
In the texts under discussion, a longing for something resembling participation 
mystique is evident.
74
 Given that Jung discussed participation mystique after the publication 
of the texts under consideration, no suggestion of influence will be posited, however.
75
 It will 
simply be noted that Jung’s treatment of the subject is relevant to these texts, and that his 
theories regarding participation mystique are applicable to, and illuminate, (some of) the 
experiences d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s characters.  
Linked to the value he placed on participation mystique, Jung also found particular 
importance in myth, which he found to be a prominent feature of the native peoples he 
observed in the non-Western world. By comparison, he perceived the ‘rootlessness of modern 
Western culture, psychologically impoverished since the Renaissance by its break with the 
mythic world and suffering from a dangerous split between the conscious world of modern 
rationalism and the shadow world of the unconscious’ (Walker, 2002, p. 138). In primitivist 
art (such as the paintings of Gauguin, Matisse and others, described earlier) Jung found 
therapeutic value: ‘[i]t is as if […] we bring to expression that part of the psyche which 
reaches back into the primitive past and reconcile it with present-day consciousness, thus 
mitigating its disturbing effects upon the latter’ (1933, p. 73). He refers to the discontents of 
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 The sensations of oneness that constitute the participation mystique also recall the feeling of Dionysian 
communion that was examined in the previous chapter, as an experience that offers a creatively stimulating foil 
to the artist’s isolation. As a return to participation mystique is a regressive process, however (associated by 
Jung with both ‘primitive’ man and the infant), it will be discussed in this chapter, in the context of the 
regression that is triggered by the Dionysian. 
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 For a discussion of the relationship between Jung and Mann in the context of Mann’s later works, see Paul 
Bishop, ‘“Literarische Beziehungen haben nie bestanden”? Thomas Mann and C. G. Jung’, Oxford German 
Studies, 1 (1994), pp. 124-172.  
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the modern, civilised man as ‘the dubious gifts of civilisation’ (p. 98), and notes that even if 
civilised man does turn back to nature, inspired by Rousseau, ‘we “cultivate” nature’ (ibid.).  
In ‘Das Seelenproblem des modernen Menschen’ Jung declares: ‘Der Untergrund der 
Seele ist Natur, und Natur ist schöpferisches Leben’76 (1981, p. 108). He does concede that 
the unconscious has ‘[ein] abschreckendes Aussehen’77 (ibid.) but also states: ‘das 
Unbewußte [ausübt] eine mächtige Anziehungskraft, und zwar nicht etwa nur auf krankhafte 
Naturen, sondern auch auf gesunde, positive Geister’78 (ibid.). As Torgovnick notes, Jung 
‘actively worked towards reclaiming those unfulfilled parts of the self’ (1996, p. 33) whose 
repression (as Freud claimed) had been demanded by civilisation. Modern man’s fascination 
with the unconscious should not, Jung believed, be taken as a sign of degeneration or 
decadence, but as a step towards a more complete and healthy grasp of one’s identity, and for 
the benefit of mental health.  
For Freud and Jung, then, the lure of the primitive reflected the outcome of the 
psychological repression demanded by civilisation or socialisation. Both accepted that a 
‘savage beast’ lay hidden in the unconscious of ‘civilised’ man, but Jung found greater value 
in these hidden depths than Freud, and sought to establish channels of communication with 
these, through religion for example.  
 We will now turn our attention to d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s portrayals of the 
‘primitive’ as a lure to ‘civilised’ man (here, the artist). In the texts discussed, however, the 
‘primitive’ is not symbolised by geographically remote cultures but by the Dionysian, which 
promotes precisely those impulses and sensations that primitivist artists sought. This drive 
will be seen to trigger ‘internal regression’, which will be discussed first, whereby the 
individual adopts (at least temporarily) a more instinctual, intuitive and spontaneous mode of 
existence. Sensations regarding Freud’s ‘oceanic’ feeling and Jung’s participation mystique 
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 ‘The depths of the soul are nature, and nature is creative life’.  
77
 ‘an alarming appearance’. 
78
 ‘the unconscious exerts a powerful attraction, and not just over the sick, but also over healthy, positive souls’. 
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are also arguably sought by some of the fictional artists under discussion. Additionally, the 
Dionysian will be seen to offer a channel for ‘atavistic regression’ (which will be discussed 
second), whereby the artist seeks, sometimes subconsciously, to recuperate creative energies 
from earlier cultures – usually the pre-Socratic Greeks, who, as Nietzsche tells us, were 
cognisant of the power of the Dionysian.  
 
iv) The Artist and Internal Regression  
In the texts under discussion, some form of internal regression, both attempted and 
actually achieved, is an experience undergone by Gustav von Aschenbach, Gabriele 
Klöterjahn, Tonio Kröger, Giorgio Aurispa, Stelio Effrena and Foscarina. For these 
characters, engagement with the Dionysian triggers a regressive process that reverses the 
repression Freud describes as a requirement of civilisation. At such times the artist acts 
according to instinct and intuition, which often translates into unbridled sexual desire. In the 
cases of Aschenbach and Kröger, paternally imposed repression has resulted in an extreme 
repression of the ‘primitive’ and of the more creative and bohemian influence of their 
southern mothers. Gabriele Klöterjahn left behind a musical childhood when she married a 
bourgeois merchant and was obliged to focus solely on the creation of offspring; and Aurispa 
is cripplingly afflicted by a disillusionment with modernity and the isolation and sterility that 
it causes. Il fuoco’s Effrena does not appear to suffer because of civilisation’s demands and 
has not practised repression in the manner of Aschenbach and Kröger. He is, nonetheless, like 
all of the characters under discussion, a member of the modern West, and is therefore 
estranged from the ‘primitive’ and the ‘primordial’ – the coveted objects of turn of the 
century primitivism. All of these characters undergo, or attempt to undergo, regression, 
whether consciously or not, as a means of stimulating creativity, be it creativity that results in 
the composition of conventional works of art, or in the shaping of the self as the work of art. 
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Creativity is often reached by recuperating a lost aspect of the artist’s identity and by 
retrieving something resembling the ‘oceanic’ sensation discussed by Freud and Torgovnick, 
and participation mystique discussed by Jung. This is especially true of d’Annunzio’s texts, 
where the male hopes to find creative inspiration in his female companion. In most cases, the 
artist enjoys an initial stimulation of creativity alongside his regressive experience of the 
Dionysian; but in several cases the internal regression undergone by the artist goes too far to 
promote art, and any initial creativity is lost.  
The most repressed character under discussion is without doubt Mann’s Aschenbach. 
We read of his monastic lifestyle in Munich and of his extreme efforts to eliminate from his 
work any impulse or characteristic that could be considered ‘primitive’. He has, for example, 
eradicated ‘jedes gemeine Wort’79 (Mann, 2004, p. 515) from his style of writing. Obsessive 
discipline characterises his daily routine, which includes a cold shower after rising early, 
followed by two or three ‘inbrünstig gewissenhaften Morgenstunden’80 (p. 510) which are 
devoted to productivity. The rigidity of this routine recalls the neurotic symptoms that Freud 
warns can emerge as a side-effect of the repression demanded by civilisation.
81
 In 
Aschenbach’s case (as well as Tonio Kröger’s), repression of certain instincts has been 
demanded both by civilisation in general (as Freud described) and by northern, burgherly 
society. The fathers of both Aschenbach and Kröger are members of the north-German 
middle-class and impose an influence over their sons which opposes the more artistic and 
passionate influence of their southern mothers. Aschenbach has unquestioningly adopted the 
values of his paternal ancestors, applying them to his own form of ‘war’,82 and therefore 
encounters the Dionysian after a lifetime of asceticism. Yet Freud warns that repression 
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 ‘every rough word’ 
80
 ‘vehemently conscientious morning hours’. 
81
 Freud states: ‘der Mensch [wird] neurotisch [...], weil er das Maß von Versagung nicht ertragen kann, das ihm 
die Gesellschaft im Dienste ihrer kulturellen Ideale auferlegt’ (‘a person [becomes] neurotic because he cannot 
bear the extent of the renunciation that society demands in service of its cultural ideals’ [1955d, p. 446]). 
82
 When he thinks of his ancestors, who were officers, judges, and administrators, Aschenbach attempts to cast 
his own occupation in a more respectable light, and attempts to cast it as s form of service: ‘die Kunst war ein 
Krieg, ein aufreibender Kampf’ (‘art was a war, a gruelling battle’ [Mann, 2004, p. 568]). 
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requires constant effort (‘einen anhaltenden Kraftaufwand’83 [1949, p. 253]), and that a lapse 
in these efforts can lead to a ‘Wiederkehr des Verdrängten’84 (p. 257). In the exhausted 
Aschenbach, whose repression begin to erode, we witness the return of ‘uralte, seiner Jugend 
überlieferte und bis dahin niemals von eigenem Feuer belebte Gedanken’85 (Mann, 2004, p. 
553). This confirms the regressive nature of his experience. Not since his youth have these 
resurgent thoughts been allowed to manifest themselves in his psyche. These feelings are 
described as ‘so neu oder doch so längst entwöhnt und verlernt’86 (p. 504), indicating that it is 
the discipline and self-control he has practised since his youth that has caused his 
estrangement from them. As Aschenbach’s Apollonian austerity crumbles (through fatigue) 
he is reunited with more basic instincts, which – rendered dangerous and uncontrollable by 
unfamiliarity – are expressed in a form of desire considered deviant, that of a middle-aged 
man for an adolescent boy.
87
  
As Aschenbach subconsciously allows the Dionysian to influence him, relaxing his 
repression, his creativity is initially sparked. On the beach, in view of Tadzio, he is able to 
compose a brief but brilliant treatise,
88
 whose ‘Lauterkeit, Adel und schwingende 
Gefühlsspannung binnen kurzem die Bewunderung vieler erregen sollte’89 (ibid.). This is the 
first act of creation we witness him completing. The creative block
90
 that troubled 
Aschenbach at the beginning of Mann’s novella seems reversed. Yet this act of writing has 
been fuelled by impulses which have (hitherto) been banished from Aschenbach’s work. We 
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 ‘a constant expenditure of force’. 
84
 ‘return of the repressed’. 
85
 ‘primal thoughts, which had been passed down from his youth and until now had never been set alight by his 
own fire’.  
86
 ‘a feeling, so vivid, so new or at least so long discouraged and forgotten’. 
87
 It is perhaps for this reason that Mann choses Tadzio as the object of Aschenbach’s desire: both homosexual 
and paedophilic connotations render it the most transgressive form of lust imaginable, emphasising 
Aschenbach’s inexperience at handling the unfamiliar instincts that now afflict him.  
88
 This work is described as an ‘Abhandlung’ (p. 556) of ‘[erlesene] Prosa’ (‘choice prose’ [ibid.]). 
89
 ‘purity, nobility and oscillating tension of feeling would soon excite the admiration of many’. 
90
 We read, for example, of the ‘[zunehmende] Abnutzbarkeit seiner Kräfte’ (‘increasing wearing-away of his 
energies’ [p. 501]). 
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read that Eros has guided Aschenbach in this creative act
91
 and that sexual desire is at its 
heart. As he writes he engages in a process of ‘Verkehr’ (‘intercourse’ or ‘communion’ [p. 
556]) with Tadzio’s body, emphasising the sexual nature of this episode of creativity. The 
description of this act as ‘intercourse’, implying interaction, suggests that this is how 
Aschenbach views it. Yet Tadzio is not an active participant, and any suggestion of 
interaction seems to be a delusion, or projection, on Aschenbach’s part. As noted earlier, 
projection was one of the ways in which Jung believed participation mystique was activated, 
and here Aschenbach might be said to imagine a profound, almost mystical, relationship 
between himself and the youth, the product of which is Aschenbach’s brief treatise. Either 
way, had Aschenbach not engaged first with the Dionysian, leaving him more receptive to 
impulses of which civilisation demands the repression, this treatise would never have come 
about. He may still have completed a creative act, but it certainly would not have resembled 
the composition inspired by Tadzio’s beauty. Under the sway of the Dionysian, Aschenbach 
has undergone a regressive experience which has re-ignited his creativity. His regressive 
embrace of instinct does not end here, however, and it is destined to reach a dangerous 
extreme where creative focus is impossible to maintain.  
While Aschenbach initially insists – to himself – that his fascination with Tadzio is 
based upon innocent aesthetic appreciation, he must eventually acknowledge that more 
carnal, and sinister instincts underpin his interest in the adolescent. At first Aschenbach casts 
himself as a cultured admirer of an exemplary piece of Western art, likening Tadzio to the 
statue of the Spinario (or Boy with Thorn), for example (Mann, 2004, p. 530); but the reader 
soon realises that Aschenbach’s fascination is with a living body, of flesh and blood, and that 
aesthetic appreciation merely cloaks erotic desire. It is the sexual instinct which has been 
unleashed by the Dionysian, and which responds to Tadzio’s body; and Aschenbach’s interest 
                                                          
91
 ‘Nie hatte er die Lust des Wortes süßer empfunden, nie so gewußt, daß Eros im Worte sei’ (‘[n]ever before 
had he felt such sweet delight in the word, never had he been so aware that Eros is in the word’ [p. 556]). 
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arises from the ‘primitive’, rather than the ‘civilised’ side of his character. Although he is 
initially able to write in Tadzio’s presence, as time goes by Aschenbach moves ever closer to 
the ‘primitive’ and further from the ‘civilised’, leading to a loss of creative focus. After 
composing the brief treatise on the beach, Aschenbach writes nothing else. He eventually 
becomes a slave to a most transgressive form of desire, surrendering to his instincts, 
culminating in scenes of barbaric atavistic regression that will be discussed shortly.  
Under the influence of the Dionysian, Aschenbach behaves in a way that directly 
opposes the upbringing imposed upon him by his father and by his own self-discipline, and 
obeys impulses antithetical to the dignified and respectable world of the burgher; Tonio 
Kröger’s encounter with the Dionysian leads to a similar situation. Like Aschenbach, 
Kröger’s upbringing has been characterised by burgherly and paternally imposed repression. 
As an adolescent, for example, Kröger was scolded by his father and teachers when his 
poetry was discovered. Kröger, however, feels their disapproval was justified, revealing 
discomfort with his creative tendencies: ‘Wenigstens gehört es sich, daß man mich ernstlich 
schilt und straft dafür, und nicht mit Küssen und Musik darüber hinweggeht’92 (p. 246). 
Kröger’s experience of the Dionysian occurs when he departs from the north, leaving 
behind his ‘Vaterstadt’ (‘paternal town’ [p. 263]) and its influence, for the south. It is to the 
land of his (musical) mother’s origin that he wanders (‘vielleicht war es das Blut seiner 
Mutter, welches ihn dorthin zog’93 [p. 264]), in an apparent migration from northern, paternal 
austerity to southern, maternal bohemianism. Here, Kröger temporarily abandons the 
paternally inherited disapproval which he has always harboured for bohemians and 
hedonists,
94
 and instead lives as one of them, indulging in carnality and ‘Wollust’ 
(‘sensuality’ [ibid.]). Kröger has not subscribed to the same excessive Apollonianism as 
                                                          
92
 ‘It is only right that I am at least properly scolded and punished for it, and that it is not brushed over with 
kisses and music’. 
93
 ‘maybe it was the blood of his mother that drew him there’. 
94
 ‘Wir sind doch keine Zigeuner im grünen Wagen, sondern anständige Leute, [...] die Familie der Kröger’ 
(‘We are no gypsies in green caravans, but respectable people, [...] the Kröger family’ [p. 247]). 
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Aschenbach, however, and is not as vulnerable to the primitive instincts that he rediscovers in 
the south, under the influence of the Dionysian. Aschenbach has utterly shunned the 
‘primitive’ side of his nature, and practised a thoroughly northern and burgherly form of 
artistic creation; but Kröger has always existed ‘zwischen krassen Extremen’95 (p. 265), and 
has remained aware of both the northern and southern, paternal and maternal, ‘primitive’ and 
‘civilised’ sides of his character. Unlike Aschenbach, Kröger is able to recognise the 
Dionysian as it approaches. He is comparatively far more capable of ‘sublimating’ the potent 
impulses and instincts that accompany the Dionysian, as will be seen in the next chapter.  
Kröger’s regressive experience is one which proves creatively fruitful. Unlike the 
creative spurt of Aschenbach’s engagement with the Dionysian, however, Kröger attains 
lasting creativity. This creativity is shown to rely upon a regressive experience as it follows 
his hedonistic, carnal adventures in the south, and his (temporary) departure from burgherly 
values and principles. After these experiences, his art becomes ‘wählerisch, erlesen, kostbar, 
fein, reizbar gegen das Banale und aufs Höchste empfindlich in Fragen des Taktes und 
Geschmacks’96 (p. 265). If he had not attempted to embrace a bohemian lifestyle, indulging 
in base, sensual pleasures, Kröger would not have experienced the artistic enhancement that 
resulted. For the conflict between hedonistic sensuality and bourgeois decorum, although 
exhausting, produces a fruitful tension
97
 in Kröger, which in turn stimulates creativity.
98
  
A visceral reaction (‘Ekel’ [‘disgust’, p. 265]) against uncivilised sensual abandon 
draws Kröger back to the north (to Munich) and to a bourgeois way of life. Paglia finds the 
presence of the Apollonian in such reactions: ‘Disgust is an Apollonian response, an aesthetic 
judgement’ (2001, p. 93). If Apollo causes us to feel distaste, here it is the Dionysian that 
                                                          
95
 ‘between stark extremes’. 
96
 ‘fastidious, delicate, rich, subtle, irritable at banality and highly sensitive in matters of rhythm and taste’.  
97
 ‘in dem Maße, wie seine Gesundheit geschwächt ward, verschärfte sich seine Künstlerschaft’ (‘as his health 
was weakened, his artistry was sharpened’ [p. 265]). 
98
 It is noteworthy, however, that when Kröger engages with the Dionysian, he has not, like Aschenbach, led a 
life of extreme (outward) asceticism, and has not (yet) attempted to stamp out every element of hedonism; it is 
only after his taste of Dionysian abandon and excess that Kröger decides to adopt the modus operandi of a 
bourgeois, although he remains plagued with guilt at his artistry and troubled at his isolation.  
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offends. Outwardly Kröger appears to eschew the ‘primitive’ and ‘base’ impulses which he 
had satisfied in the south, as well as the bohemian art that embraces them. His friend 
Lisaweta even mocks his ‘Patriziergewänder’ (‘aristocratic clothing’ [Mann, 2004, p. 269]), 
which Kröger defends by claiming that an artist is outlandish enough in his interior, without 
the need for dilettantish attire. In an effort to relieve the guilt caused by his regression to a 
state of primal sensuality in the south, Kröger takes pains to behave as a decent burgher when 
he returns to the north, apparently seeking the corrective influence of his northern father and 
upbringing. Tellingly, during his time of southern hedonism, Kröger had longed for a deeper 
kind of happiness, which he could not find in carnal pursuits: ‘eine schwache, sehnsüchtige 
Erinnerung […] an eine Lust der Seele, die einstmals sein eigen gewesen war, und die er in 
allen Lüsten nicht wiederfand’99 (p. 264). This appears to be a longing for ‘den hellen 
Lebendigen, den Glücklichen, Liebenswürdigen und Gewöhnlichen’100 (p. 318), from which 
Kröger cannot fully sever himself, preventing him from living as those artists who venture 
into demonic beauty but despise humanity.
101
 As well as declaring to detest those hedonists 
who obey a ‘trunkene Philosophie’102 (p. 278) – possibly an allusion to the Dionysian and 
those who embrace it utterly – Kröger also retains a love for the banality of life. This 
combination proves an effective prophylactic in his encounter with the Dionysian and his 
experience of regression, and at the end of Mann’s novella Kröger declares that he is on the 
verge of unparalleled creativity, which will lead to unprecedented works of art.
103
  
                                                          
99
 ‘a weak, longing memory [...] of a desire of the soul, which once had been his, and which he could not find in 
all other forms of desire’.  
100
 ‘the light-hearted ones, the happy, worthy of love, and ordinary’.  
101
 ‘die Stolzen und Kalten, die auf den Pfaden der großen, der dämonischen Schönheit abenteuern und den 
“Menschenˮ verachten’ (‘the proud and cold, who venture onto the path of great and demonic beauty, and who 
“despise mankindˮ’ [p. 318]). 
102
 ‘drunken philosophy’. 
103
 ‘Was ich getan habe, ist nichts, nicht viel, so gut wie nichts. Ich werde Besseres machen, Lisaweta, – dies ist 
ein Versprechen. [...] Ich schaue in eine ungeborene und schemenhafte Welt hinein, die geordnet und gebildet 
sein will’ (‘What I have achieved so far, that is nothing, not much, as good as nothing. I will produce better, 




In Tristan, as with Aschenbach and Tonio Kröger, the Dionysian triggers a regressive 
experience that results in uncharacteristic behaviour. We learn that Gabriele Klöterjahn left 
behind a musical upbringing when she married and that she has been forbidden to play the 
piano since the birth of her excessively healthy son, Anton – which left her in a state of ill-
health. Her husband and the bourgeois world he represents seem antithetical to the world of 
(Dionysian) music, and for Gabriele burgherly civilisation appears to have demanded the 
sacrifice of artistic impulses. While Euchner arguably overlooks Gabriele’s seemingly 
genuine claims to have married Herr Klöterjahn willingly, and suggests that Gabriele’s 
marriage constitutes a situation of ‘prolonged misery’ (2005, p. 206) – for which there is no 
real evidence, other than Spinell’s fanciful interpretations – her situation could nonetheless be 
termed one of ‘repression’, for a former source of pleasure has been cut off. Yet once 
encouraged by Spinell – ‘[w]ir sind frei…Sie sind frei, gnädige Frau!’104 (Mann, 2004, p. 
347) – Gabriele plays the piano again in the Einfried sanatorium. She plays several of 
Chopin’s nocturnes105 before Spinell discovers the music sheets for Tristan und Isolde, which 
she begins to play unprompted. In playing the piano again Gabriele abandons caution for the 
sake of pleasure, and indulges in musical excess. She plays what is arguably the most 
Dionysian of all music, which Nietzsche singled out as the best example of the dangers of the 
Dionysian (GT-21). While Freud would probably consider her musical performance a 
‘civilised’ act, for art is one of the defining achievements of civilisation, Mann’s choice of 
music adds a sinister undercurrent to the episode and colours the artistic act as one which 
engages with darker and more dangerous instincts, rather than as a mark of civilisation. Here 
Gabriele departs from her normal state and rediscovers artistic impulses that had previously 
been confined to the past; as Euchner notes, at the piano, Gabriele can ‘start working through 
the thicket that denies her access to herself’ (2005, p. 196) in a process of rediscovery.  
                                                          
104
 ‘We are free…You are free, dear woman!’ 
105
 As Schnitman notes (1971, p. 405), possibly a hint at the apparent attack of tuberculosis that she will suffer 
soon afterwards, for Chopin also died of tuberculosis. 
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In Tristan, regression to the ‘primitive’ is largely symbolised by the unleashing of 
instincts triggered by the Dionysian music of Tristan und Isolde. As in Der Tod in Venedig 
and Tonio Kröger, these are mainly sexual instincts, which can be, Freud tells us, hostile to 
civilisation if unrestrained. This music is, as Hutcheon states, of an ‘orgasmic nature’ (1990, 
p. 285), and, as Bassett explains, portrays ‘a sexual love so intense that even the physical 
bodies of the lovers are a barrier to its fulfilment’ (2006, p. 6). In Mann’s description of the 
music that Gabriele plays, sexuality is (implicitly) unleashed and exalted as we read of ‘ein 
Versinken in sublimer Begierde’106 (Mann, 2004, p. 354), and ‘[d]er Überschwang einer 
ungeheuren Lösung und Erfüllung’107 (ibid.). However, a protruding blue vein108 betrays 
Gabriele’s inner turmoil and emotional involvement as she plays Wagner’s climactic music, 
and she participates in the music to a greater degree than Spinell (who cannot play the piano). 
Whether or not Euchner’s interpretation of this scene (discussed on page 115) is correct, and 
the wild sexual impulses evident in Wagner’s music are also, to some extent, Gabriele’s 
experience, her Dionysian regression certainly involves some form of heightened sexuality 
and erotic abandon; this may be limited to her experience of musical reproduction, or the 
effect of some ecstatic reunion.  
Gabriele’s regressive experience is entirely personal; she (subconsciously) seeks to 
return to an earlier state (that of her musical adolescence), and arguably retrieves a lost aspect 
of her identity. An episode of creative ecstasy occurs along the way, but as with Aschenbach, 
it is only brief and isolated. Her regression involves abandon (in her disregard of medical 
instruction) and excess (in her reproduction of a piece of music that Mann considered ‘ein 
überaus unzüchtiges Werk’109 [1961, p. 182]), from which recovery seems unlikely. Several 
hints lead us to believe that she (like Aschenbach) will perish: the pale blue vein that is 
                                                          
106
 ‘a descent into sublime lust’. 
107
 ‘the exuberance of a tremendous release and fulfilment’. 
108
 This is described as ‘ein kleines, seltsames Äderchen [,] [...] blaßblau und kränklich’ (‘a small, peculiar vein 
[,] [...] pale blue and sickly’ [p. 323]). 
109
 ‘a thoroughly indecent work of art’. 
170 
 
visible on her forehead (and becomes more prominent when she plays the piano) has 
constantly emphasised her fragility; and she has been rendered angelic by both her bourgeois 
husband
110
 and the degenerate Spinell.
111
 Schnitman also finds an allusion to Gabriele’s death 
in the fact that as Spinell wanders into the garden after her downturn, the snow has melted, 
which ‘[implies] the demise of Gabriele, who has been consistently associated with the snow’ 
(Schnitman, 1971, p. 413). When she arrives at Einfried, for example, thick snow covers the 
garden. Gabriele’s death seems imminent when her attack of tuberculosis is announced by 
Gabriele’s companion in the sanatorium, Rätin Spatz, who interrupts a confrontation between 
Herr Klöterjahn and Spinell.  
In Il trionfo della morte, Tristan und Isolde also signals the release of uncontrollable 
sexual instincts, and a return to a more primal state. While Giorgio Aurispa has not practised 
repression equal to Aschenbach and Kröger (and possibly Gabriele), he does offer a 
paradigmatic example of disillusionment with modernity and of the suffering that results 
from the sacrifices that civilisation demands. He laments modern man’s alienation and 
estrangement from nature, and feels similarly alienated from his fellow man, as was seen in 
the previous chapter. Aurispa longs to follow the teachings of Nietzsche-Zarathustra, and 
become the superuomo. He realises, though, that his own impotence and sterility (as 
afflictions of modernity) will always impede him, reflecting sadly that ‘Una discordia 
incessante agita e sterilisce tutti i miei pensieri’112 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 717).  
Aurispa’s hopes for recovery and redemption lead him to withdraw to the hermitage 
by the sea in San Vito with Ippolita. Aurispa’s flight to the countryside arguably resembles, 
to a certain degree, the wandering of Tonio Kröger, for, like Kröger, Aurispa returns to a land 
                                                          
110
 Herr Klöterjahn cautions, ‘take care, mein Engel’ (‘take care, my angel’ [Mann, 2004, p. 321]).  
111
 Spinell whispers to her ‘wie als höbe er sie in scheuer Andacht sanft und hoch empor und bettete sie auf 
Wolkenpfühle, woselbst kein schriller Laut und keine irdische Berührung sie erreichen solle’ (‘as if he were 
elevating her gently upwards in shy devotion, to lay her upon cloud cushions, where no shrill sound or earthly 
contact should reach her’ [p. 342]) 
112
 ‘A constant discord stirs and sterilises all my thoughts’.  
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that has maternal connotations. Kröger migrates to the land of his mother’s origin, while 
Aurispa seeks the comfort of the womb, ‘una solitudine raccolta e beninga come un 
grembo’113 (p. 777). The likening of this area to the womb emphasises the regressive nature 
of this withdrawal and hints at the possibility of, or hope for, rebirth. Like the gendered 
strand of primitivist discourse that longed for the female other, these two characters 
experience a regressive longing for a retrieval of the ‘primitive’ and the maternal – and 
arguably, the comforting and unifying sensations of (Freud’s) ‘oceanic’ and (Jung’s) 
participation mystique. Aurispa’s flight from the city resembles d’Annunzio’s own frequent 
stays in the Abruzzo, noted earlier. Perhaps in Aurispa we find a more extreme version of 
d’Annunzio’s own longings, although there is no evidence that the author shared his 
protagonist’s debilitating sense of impotence. Similarly, Aurispa’s struggle to resist his 
seductive and overtly sexualised lover may recall d’Annunzio’s own difficulties in balancing 
artistic productivity with sensual pursuits.
114
  
Aurispa withdraws to the hermitage in hope of recovery: he seeks a Rousseauian 
return to nature – which, he hopes, will welcome him benevolently and offer healing. He still 
possesses ‘una brama ardentissima di vivere’115 (p. 784) and has not yet reached the point of 
utter destitution. He pins his hopes partly on Ippolita, and the prospect of ‘La Vita Nuova’ 
(‘The New Life’ [p. 784]), for he still hopes to overcome the crippling lust that she incites in 
him – which is reminiscent of Effrena’s distracting erotic desire for Foscarina and 
Aschenbach’s for Tadzio – and render their love more transcendent.116 When Aurispa first 
arrives at the hermitage he finds himself in an atmosphere of harmony, fertility, and vitality. 
The rural location of the hermitage seems the very personification of abundance and life, and 
                                                          
113
 ‘a pleasant and benevolent solitude like that of the womb’. 
114
 Woodhouse notes that ‘[t]he power of sex and his attraction to women were, throughout his life, to be 
d’Annunzio’s main spur and inspiration for creative writing’ (2001, p. 24). He also notes that d’Annunzio ‘often 
expressed regret, […] that his devotion to sexual pleasures weakened or diminished his artistic prowess’ (p. 6). 
115
 ‘an ardent longing to live’. 
116
 ‘sperava di poter dare al suo amore un alto significato morale’ (‘he hoped to be able to give his love a high 
moral significance’ [d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 784]). 
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augurs well for his hoped-for recovery. Initially he feels like a convalescent
117
 and rejoices in 
an ‘ebrietà pànica’118 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 781). He reflects upon the healing that can be 
derived from such constant contemplation of nature, which will lead (he hopes) to ‘il palpito 
concorde di tutto ciò che è creato’119 (ibid.). The sensation Aurispa seeks strongly resembles 
Jung’s idea of participation mystique, whereby the individual returns to a state of harmony 
and communion with nature. 
Soon after his welcome into the arms of nature, however, Aurispa’s attempted 
regression into primitive innocence is interrupted by confirmation of his earlier articulated 
fear that contemporary man can no longer exist in harmony with nature.
120
 Aurispa’s 
misplaced belief in the benevolence of nature is suggested, for example, by the drowning of a 
child in the sea – the cruel indifference of which is emphasised by its calmness and 
gentleness following the death
121
 – and the near-drowning of Ippolita. Such events suggest 
that Aurispa has naively overlooked the cruelty and perilousness of nature (recalling 
Nietzsche’s criticism of Rousseau). An early note by Nietzsche regarding nature seems 
pertinent here: ‘Die Natur ist nichts so Harmloses, dem man sich ohne Schauder übergeben 
könnte’122 (NF-1870, 7 [155]). While it would be difficult to claim that d’Annunzio, in 
Aurispa, pits a Rousseauian return to nature against a Nietzschean version – largely because 
d’Annunzio only encountered Nietzsche after beginning his novel – the ideas of the two 
                                                          
117
 In Il piacere, literal, rather than figurative, convalescence is linked to a successful rediscovery of the 
‘primitive’. When Andrea Sperelli, wounded after a duel, leaves Rome and withdraws to a rural location 
(Francavilla al Mare, again in the Abruzzo) he is able to ‘riprender coscienza di sé stesso, a ritrovare il 
sentimento della sua persona, a rientrare nella sua corporeità primitiva’ (‘regain consciousness of himself, to 
rediscover awareness of his person, to re-enter into a state of primitive corporeality’ [p. 134]). The portrayal of 
the Abruzzo in Il piacere is not as ambivalent as in Il trionfo della morte, and is the region where Sperelli 
successfully recovers from his wound and rediscovers art. 
118
 ‘panic drunkenness’. 
119
 ‘the harmonious pulse of all that is created’. 
120
 ‘La terra non gli svelerà mai il suo segreto’ (‘The earth will never reveal its secret to him’ [d’Annunzio, 
1988, p. 718]) 
121
 ‘Il mare in calma respirava presso il capo del morticino, dolcemente’ (‘The calm sea breathed around the 
head of the dead boy, sweetly’ [p. 957]). 
122
 ‘Nature is not so harmless that one could be consigned to it without shuddering’. 
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philosophers regarding a return to instinct and nature can nonetheless be used to illuminate 
Aurispa’s experience, and may also help us understand the reasons for his failure.  
Fleeing the city and the restraints of civilisation allows Aurispa and Ippolita to lead a 
leisurely existence of unbridled pleasures; in the hermitage they are utterly unburdened by the 
demands of urban life, work and society, and they can simply live according to their desires. 
Again, it is sexual desire that comes to dominate their existence and consume their energies. 
Their days are characterised by a ‘pesantissimo ozio’123 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 935), and 
withdrawal into nature has brought out Aurispa’s animalism, leaving him as enslaved to 
sexual desire as a beast: ‘Il nuovo modo di vivere, all'aria aperta, in quella campagna, su quel 
mare, favoriva lo sviluppo della sua animalità, eccitava nella sua natura inferma una forza 
fittizia e il bisogno di esercitarla sino all'eccesso’124 (p. 949). Imagining his future with 
Ippolita, Aurispa sees himself ‘legato a quella carne come il servo al suo ferro, privo di 
volontà e pensiero, istupidito e vacuo’125 (p. 916). This vision of his future self could not be 
further from his ideal of the superuomo. Additionally, Aurispa reflects upon Ippolita’s 
sterility, which he believes renders their sexual relationship meaningless and base: ‘Mancava 
al suo amore la ragion prima: l'affermazione e lo sviluppo della vita di là dai limiti 
dell'esistenza individua. Mancava alla donna amata il più alto mistero del sesso: “la 
sofferenza di colei che partorisce”’126 (p. 916). The lack of procreative possibility ensures 
that the sexual act between Aurispa and Ippolita is purely an act of pleasure and implies that 
no creative benefit is to be derived from this relationship. The arrival of a piano at the 
hermitage is welcomed by Aurispa as a possible means of interrupting ‘l'ozio delle lunghe ore 
                                                          
123
 ‘extremely heavy lethargy’. 
124
 ‘The new way of life, in the open air, in that countryside and on the coast, favoured the development of his 
animality, exciting a fictitious force within his sick nature and the need to exercise it excessively’.  
125
 ‘tied to that flesh like a slave to his irons, void of will and thought, becoming stupid and vacuous’. 
126
 ‘His love lacked its primary reason: the affirmation and the development of life beyond the limits of 
individual existence. And the beloved woman lacked the highest mystery of sex: “the sufferings of she who 
gives birth”’. Here d’Annunzio appears to reference a declaration made by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: ‘Dass der 
Schaffende selber das Kind sei, das neu geboren werde, dazu muss er auch die Gebärerin sein wollen und der 
Schmerz der Gebärerin’ (‘For the creator to become the child that is newly born, he must also wish to be the 
mother who gives birth and desire the pains of childbirth’ [Za-II-Inseln]). 
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diurne e di evitare le tentazioni...’127 (p. 948). It merely becomes a means of unleashing 
further impulses towards sexual abandon, however, and allows a deathly seduction to take 
place.   
Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde is once again used to demonstrate the release of sexual 
drives that occurs as part of Aurispa’s internal regression. It is not the only erotic music 
played by Aurispa and Ippolita in the hermitage (they also play Grieg’s Erotik for example), 
but it is by far the most significant, and d’Annunzio dedicates roughly fifteen pages to 
describing it. As in Tristan, the music is played by the woman, and Ippolita performs while 
Aurispa listens, becoming lost in the music.
128
 D’Annunzio’s ekphrasis of Tristan und Isolde 
focuses on the erotic nature of the music, which Aurispa vividly recalls witnessing on a 
pilgrimage to Bayreuth. At the centre of this work of art is, we are told, ‘il desiderio 
insaziable’129 (p. 974), and aspiration towards ‘[la] suprema voluttà’130 (p. 987). Desire is 
inflamed to a frenetic fury
131
 and the ecstasy of the final climax is hindered by the limits of 
the lovers’ bodies: ‘le anime avide di confondersi incontravano l’ostacolo impenetrabile dei 
corpi’132 (p. 979).  
The ecstatic union of Tristan and Isolde recounted here reflects Aurispa’s longing for 
absolute possession of his lover.
133
 After playing Wagner’s music, renunciation of the sexual 
drive seems impossible, and death appears to offer the only alternative to a life of 
enslavement to animal carnality. It is for this reason that Aurispa finally decides attempt a re-
                                                          
127
 ‘the lethargy of the long daytime hours and of avoiding temptations…’  
128
 Curiously, both Mann and d’Annunzio also note the lamentable quality of the instrument upon which their 
characters play Wagner’s music, and note that despite this both Gabriele and Ippolita succeed in conveying the 
effect of the orchestra with their great talent and sensitivity. It may even be the case that Mann had read 
d’Annunzio’s novel and that the many parallels between the two scenes are the result of parodic intention on 
Mann’s part; although it is difficult to find sufficient evidence to support this interpretation, aside from textual 
coincidences, and we cannot say for sure whether Mann actually read (or knew of) Il trionfo della morte. 
129
 ‘insatiable desire’. 
130
 ‘supreme sensual pleasure’. 
131
 ‘[c]on una divorante furia, [...] il desiderio si dilatava, s’agitava, fiammeggiava sempre più alto’ (‘with an all-
consuming fury, [...] desire was inflated, excited, and blazed ever higher’ [p. 975]). 
132
 ‘their souls, longing to mingle, encountered the impenetrable obstacle of their bodies’. 
133
 ‘C’è su la terra una sola ebrezza durevole: la sicurtà nel possesso di un’altra creatura, la sicurtà assoluta, 
incrollabile. Io cerco questa ebrezza’ (‘Upon earth there is only one lasting intoxication: the surety of possession 
of another creature, absolute and unshakable security. I seek this intoxication’ [p. 776]).  
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enactment of the death of Tristan and Isolde, but his own attempted re-enactment of the 
Liebestod is characterised by bathos rather than rapture. One night, after plying Ippolita with 
alcohol in order to intoxicate her (and render her more pliable), he encourages her to take a 
walk in the countryside surrounding the hermitage. Originally, Aurispa had intended to throw 
himself and his lover into the path of an oncoming train, but by the time they step out into the 
dark the train is already thundering past. Instead, Aurispa leads Ippolita to a nearby cliff, 
coaxing her to its precipitous edge. Once she realises that he intends to leap from the 
precipice, and take her with him, she fights viciously (‘si difese con le unghie, con i morsi, 
come una fiera’134 [p. 1018]) and screams for help. Her cries of ‘assassino’ (‘murderer’ 
[ibid.]) emphasise her total lack of compliance, and destroy any possibility of a Liebestod. 
The scene becomes one of murder and undignified scrapping, little resembling the lofty 
demise of Wagner’s lovers. Eventually Aurispa succeeds in throwing them both of the cliff, 
and they hurtle towards death wrapped in each other’s arms (‘avvinti’ [‘bound together’, 
ibid.]) – but there is no sublime love in their embrace. 
Ironically, the place to which Aurispa withdraws in an attempt to effect a personal 
rebirth, establish contact with his ancestors, stimulate his creativity, and heal his crippling 
melancholy, becomes the site where his impotence is confirmed. His internal regression 
leaves him more destitute and desperate than ever. The tension that Freud describes between 
civilisation and certain instincts, necessitating repression, is strikingly evident in Il trionfo 
della morte, and once the lovers surrender to their instincts they become dominated by 
characteristics hostile to civilisation, which Aurispa (like Aschenbach and Gabriele 
Klöterjahn) is eventually unable to restrain, leading to his suicide. Aurispa’s search for the 
‘primitive’ (which is encountered most strongly – and fatally – in the Dionysian music of 
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 ‘she defended herself with her nails, with bites, like a wild beast’. 
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Tristan und Isolde), then, leads him only to barbarism and animalism, enslavement to 
antisocial instincts and death.  
In Il fuoco, the superuomo-artist does not display the same dissatisfaction with 
modernity displayed by Aurispa and has not practised extreme (and neurosis-inducing) 
repression that leaves him in a state of psychological exhaustion. Nonetheless, Effrena is still 
a member of modern Western civilisation and can still benefit from a retrieval of the 
Dionysian and its more ‘primitive’ impulses, which will aid him in his artistic goal of 
inaugurating a tragic tradition for the modern age. As will be discussed shortly, in his oration 
to the crowds in Venice he revives the Dionysian and incites his listeners into a bacchic 
frenzy, where they resemble the ancient deity’s wild worshippers. In his episodes of 
creativity with Foscarina, who allows him access to the Dionysian, regressive aspects are also 
clear. Foscarina allows Effrena to retrieve ancient creative energies, which are accessible ‘via 
sexual intercourse’ (Otey, 2010, p. 174); their episodes of erotic intoxication are described as 
wild, even animalistic at times, and appear to show unbridled sexuality (of the kind Freud 
warns is antithetical to civilisation). When creatively focused, these episodes show the benefit 
of the ‘primitive’ influence of the Dionysian, and reveal how it can be incorporated into 
modern times for the benefit of civilisation (here: art); but occasionally these episodes of 
carnality threaten art and creativity, distracting the artist and leaving him unable to resist 
carnal pleasures for the good of creative productivity.  
Effrena’s desire for Foscarina frequently escalates into barely containable, wild erotic 
lust. This appears to occur in particular when Dionysus is near, for example after Effrena’s 
speech, when both he and his listeners are reunited with creative Dionysian impulses. 
Following his oration, and after he has dined with several fellow artists, he meets with 
Foscarina so that they can fulfil their promise of consummation. An atmosphere of unbridled 





 Between Effrena and Foscarina sexual desire becomes irresistible. He is afflicted by 
‘una volontà mostruosa’136 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 304) and ‘[un] instinto crudo’137 (ibid.), 
while she longs to submit to her lover (‘Tutto il suo corpo allora si contorse e vibrò intorno a 
un nucleo di fuoco, chiedendo di soggiacere’138 [p. 311]). Periodically, the two lovers’ lust 
becomes ‘insano e smisurato’139 (p. 304) and borders on madness. After Effrena’s oration, for 
example, he is possessed by ‘un ardore selvaggio’140 (p. 303) for Foscarina’s body, and later 
on we read of Foscarina biting Effrena ‘come una fiera’141 (p. 330), leaving a territorial mark. 
In such incidents excessive sexual desire reduces the artist and his muse to feral beasts 
(indeed, their lustful gazes are ‘ferino’ [‘feral, p. 311]), and to a level of primitivism where 
art and culture are unthinkable. Effrena’s desire is explicitly primitive, and of a regressive 
nature: ‘di lontano gli veniva quel torbido ardore, dalle più remote origini, dalla primitiva 
bestialità delle mescolanze subitanee, dall’antico mistero delle libidini sacre’142 (p. 304). This 
form of lust recalls man’s animal origins and brushes with instincts so bestial that creative 
focus seems irrevocably lost. For d’Annunzio’s superuomo, however, gaining mastery over 
such instincts is not as impossible as it is for, say, Mann’s Aschenbach.  
Sexuality can, however, also fertilise Effrena’s mind and establish communication 
between the ancient Dionysian energies rediscovered by Foscarina, and the artist who can 
shape them into art. Effrena is the only artist under discussion who engages in collaborative 
creation. While both Effrena and Aschenbach are inspired to sudden creativity by the 
presence of the objects of their desire (Foscarina and Tadzio respectively), only in Il fuoco 
does this object of desire play an active role in creation. Aschenbach’s act of writing may be 
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 ‘Pareva [...] che una sovrabbondanza di vita sensuale gonfiasse le arterie degli uomini’ (‘It seemed that an 
overabundance of sensual life was swelling the arteries of men’ [d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 304]). 
136
 ‘a monstrous will’. 
137
 ‘a crude instinct’. 
138
 ‘Her whole body contorted itself and trembled around a nucleus of fire, longing to submit’. 
139
 ‘insane and excessive’. 
140
 ‘a wild desire’. 
141
 ‘like a wild animal’. 
142
 ‘That torpid desire came to him from afar, from the most remote origins, from the primitive bestiality of 
sudden couplings, from the ancient mystery of sacred lusts’. 
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described as a process of ‘Verkehr’ between Tadzio’s body and Aschenbach’s mind, but this 
intercourse is one-sided. In Il fuoco, however, Foscarina’s body willingly fertilises Effrena’s 
mind, and he is astonished that ‘le linee d’un volto, le movenze d’un corpo umano potessero 
toccare e fecondare così fortemente l’intelletto’143 (p. 470). In their collaborative creativity, 
the influence of the Dionysian and its ‘primitive’ impulses is evident. Yet rather than 
stimulating pure carnality, here the Dionysian stimulates embodied creativity. Just as Jung 
saw sensuality as a means of achieving participation mystique and establishing profound 
identification, so the sexual relationship of Effrena and Foscarina allows them to feel 
primally united – which in turn unleashes hitherto neglected creative impulses. 
Collaborative creativity between Effrena and Foscarina is highly sexualised. Effrena 
exploits the Dionysian energies rediscovered by Foscarina through interaction that ‘becomes 
a process of rape’ (Otey, 2010, p. 174), and she furnishes him with creative Dionysian 
impulses in a process that resembles (subverted) fertilisation. Reflecting upon Foscarina as a 
means of accessing primitive myth, Effrena expresses violent sexual desire: ‘io ti possederò 
come in un’orgia vasta; io ti scrollerò come un fascio di tirsi’144 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 284). 
It is in her role as an actor that Foscarina appears most receptive. She is ready to be filled 
with words supplied by Effrena, and becomes ‘concavo come un calice per ricevere 
quell’onda’145 (p. 211). In Il fuoco the creative process seems to offer d’Annunzio a means of 
reaffirming patriarchal structures and of retrieving the virility and potency lacking in earlier 
protagonists such as Giorgio Aurispa. For even when Foscarina ‘fertilises’ Effrena in a 
reversal of traditional gender roles, the latter is not emasculated. He appropriates the (female) 
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 ‘the lines of a face, the movements of a human body should so strongly touch and fertilise the intellect’. 
Effrena’s reaction to Foscarina’s body here strongly recalls that of Aschenbach opposite Tadzio, when he is 
suddenly inspired to write. 
144
 ‘I will possess you as if in a vast orgy, I will wield you as a bundle of thyrsi’. A thyrsus is a wand carried by 
Dionysian worshippers, often wound with ivy and topped by a pine-cone. 
145
 ‘concave like a chalice, ready to be filled by that wave’.  
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experiences of impregnation, gestation
146
 and birth in a way that actually reinforces his 
masculinity. Foscarina’s ‘fertilisation’ is not an act forced upon Effrena, but rather by him.147  
When d’Annunzio’s artist is able to channel the primitive Dionysian, and the 
unbridled sexual desire that it triggers, into artistic activity, he is able to tap unparalleled 
sources of inspiration. This is seen in the climactic episode of collaborative creativity that 
occurs towards the end of Il fuoco. As Foscarina enters a room, Effrena is suddenly struck by 
a vision of her as a figure of profound and ancient wisdom, which she renders attainable to 
Effrena. She appears ‘sicura come se venisse dalle profondità della Saggezza, di là dove tutte 
le agitazioni umane sembrano un gioco di vènti nella polvere d’un cammino senza termine’148 
(d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 309). Effrena envisages Foscarina in a scene from his coming drama 
and instructs her as she becomes the character who discovers the tomb of Agamemnon and 
Cassandra,
149
 guiding her through the scene that appears and vanishes alternately in his mind. 
As noted earlier, Foscarina here becomes Effrena’s artistic raw material and acts according to 
his instruction, allowing his partial visions to be completed. There is a Dionysian intoxication 
in this process of creation and they experience ecstasy and profound communion: ‘[e]ntrambi 
erano intenti alle scintille che si generavano dalle loro forze commiste. Una medesima 
vibrazione elettrica correva per i loro nervi meravigliosi’150 (p. 473).  
Foscarina stimulates sensations and unleashes creative forces that have lain dormant – 
both in Effrena and in Italy’s contemporary cultural landscape. Her affinity with the 
Dionysian, as well as her ability to place this potent drive at Effrena’s artistic disposal, means 
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 We read, for example: ‘l’opera ch’egli nutriva entro di sè, ancora informe, ebbe un fiero sussulto di vita’ 
(‘the work that he was nourishing within himself, still shapeless, gave a proud jolt of life’ [p. 244]). 
147
 The forceful nature of Effrena’s exploitation of Foscarina’s rediscoveries is evident when, for example, he 
rushes towards her ‘con impeto come se volesse percuoterla per trarne scintille’ (‘with force, as if he wanted to 
strike sparks from her’ [p. 472]). 
148
 ‘sure, as if she came from the depths of Knowledge, from beyond where human troubles seem like a game of 
the winds in the dust of an endless path’. 
149
 The theatrical work that is beginning to take shape in Effrena’s mind is actually d’Annunzio’s La città morta, 
which premiered in 1898.  
150
 ‘Both were intent upon the sparks that were being generated by their mingled forces. The same electric 
vibration ran through the miraculous nerves of both’. 
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that she is a crucial component of Effrena’s desired cultural renaissance. Similarly, as an 
actor and woman, Foscarina apparently relies upon the more masterful hand of the male artist 
to refine and shape these Dionysian energies and impulses into artistic output. Yet Foscarina 
struggles, at times, to subjugate her desires and demands as a lover to the creative needs of 
Effrena, and as was seen in the previous chapter, occasionally threatens his identity as an 
artist. Her stifling embrace can render him ‘inerte’ (‘inert’ [p. 332]), for example. Her 
decision to leave Venice at the end of Il fuoco and travel abroad is a sacrifice designed to 
liberate Effrena and leave him free to devote himself to his art. She will continue to work for 
their artistic endeavour and will earn money to fund his plans. She promises to return once 
his drama has been composed, and take her place upon the stage as one of his characters.
151
 
Where the aspiring superuomo of Il trionfo della morte fails in his ambitions, Effrena 
succeeds, becoming d’Annunzio’s first fully-fledged superuomo. A crucial point of contrast 
between the two protagonists is their lovers, who, as companions to Effrena and Aurispa, 
should act as midwives for the arrival of the superuomo. Both Foscarina and Ippolita are 
unable to bear children – the former because of age, the latter because of a past illness – but 
while Ippolita’s sterility renders her seductive and sexualised nature hostile to Aurispa’s 
creative goals (her womb is likened to ‘una fornace ardente’152 [d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 916], in 
which his seed perishes), Foscarina is able to aid Effrena in his artistic endeavour, and play a 
vital role in the birth of his coming work of art. This is because Foscarina is the ‘donna 
dionisiaca’153 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 282), who performs a crucial role in the process of 
regression that fuels Effrena’s Dionysian creativity. Additionally, she offers a fertility higher 
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 ‘È necessario che ciascuno si trovi pronto al suo posto, e con tutte le forze, venuta l’ora, io non mancherò’ 
(‘It is necessary that each of us is ready in their place, and with all their energies, when the hour comes’ [p. 
512]). Effrena’s need for distance from the woman who inspires him echoes a statement made by Nietzsche in 
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft: ‘Der Zauber und die mächtigste Wirkung der Frauen ist, um die Sprache der 
Philosophen zu reden, eine Wirkung in die Ferne, eine actio in distans: dazu gehört aber, zuerst und vor Allem 
— Distanz!’ (‘The magic and most powerful effect of woman is, to speak the language of philosophers, an 
effect of distance, an actio in distans: that requires above all, however, – distance!’ [FW-60]).  
152
 ‘an ardent furnace’. 
153
 ‘Dionysian woman’. 
181 
 
than that which fuels the conception of offspring, and assists in the procreation of art. By 
contrast, Ippolita is referred to (with increasingly frequency) as ‘la Nemica’154 (d’Annunzio, 
1988, p. 850) in Il trionfo della morte, and she appears to hinder Aurispa rather than aiding 
him. While Foscarina is referred to as a ‘[strumento] dell’arte’155 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 478) 
Ippolita is described as a ‘strumento di piacere e di lascivia, strumento di ruina e di morte’156 
(d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 820) and ‘strumento di bassa lascivia’157 (p. 990). D’Annunzio’s 
portrayal of Ippolita arguably does not succeed in convincing modern audiences of her 
malevolence. Whereas Aurispa reads her sexual drive as a means of enticement and 
entrapment, for example, we find Aurispa’s inability to resist sexual temptation to be his own 
responsibility. Although we are told that Ippolita becomes intoxicated by her ability to seduce 
Aurispa (‘la inebriava’158 [p. 951]), we cannot support Aurispa’s vilification of her for failing 
to desire suicide after listening to Tristan und Isolde, and for not sharing his irrational and 
desperate desires.
159
 In both texts woman threatens her lover’s goals, but the success of the 
superuomo of Il fuoco suggests that, ultimately, responsibility lies with Effrena and Aurispa. 
If they are strong and determined enough, woman will not thwart them.  
 For the artists under discussion, then, an encounter with the Dionysian can provoke 
creativity partly through its tendency to unleash the ‘primitive’ side of the artist’s character. 
The Dionysian has been seen to provoke a regressive embrace of those impulses and instincts 
that Freud noted must be repressed if civilisation is to survive. In the texts considered, 
internal regression (both attempted and achieved, both conscious and subconscious) arguably 
involves a search for identity. Just as artistic primitivist discourse at the turn of the century 
can be seen to reflect the modern West’s search for a lost – or repressed – aspect of itself, the 
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 ‘the Enemy’. 
155
 ‘instrument of art’. 
156
 ‘instrument of pleasure and lasciviousness, [an] instrument of ruin and death’. 
157
 ‘instrument of base lasciviousness’. 
158
 ‘it intoxicated her’. 
159
 After she plays Wagner’s music, Aurispa is disappointed that she does not aspire to a similar Liebestod, and 
is dismayed to hear her declare, ‘su la terra non si muore così’ (‘in real life one does not die like that’ [p. 988]). 
182 
 
regressive experiences of d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artistic characters can be seen as an 
attempted recuperation of aspects of their identity, which have been suppressed or 
abandoned. This is seen when Gabriele Klöterjahn rediscovers musical ecstasy under the 
influence of the Dionysian, in a regressive recuperation of lost artistic impulses, for example. 
For some of the characters discussed, the Dionysian unleashes ‘primitive’ impulses and 
instincts cannot be harnessed; this may be due to an excessive practice of repression 
beforehand, which renders the ‘primitive’ lethal (as with Aschenbach), or due to the 
inherently weak will of the subject compared to overwhelming ‘primitive’ instincts (as with 
Aurispa). Lasting creativity appears to require that the process of internal regression is 
restrained, and that the subject has not been estranged from the ‘primitive’ for too long. 
 Parallels exist between the process of internal regression discussed here, and the more 
atavistic regressions that will now be considered. In both cases, creative success and the 
artist’s survival seem to depend upon a moderate regressive experience, under the influence 
of the Dionysian. This will be seen to allow the creativity of past cultures to be recuperated, 
and placed in the service of the present.  
 
v) The Artist and Atavistic Regression 
 In the texts under discussion, the atavistic regression provoked by the Dionysian 
proves as precarious as the experience of internal regression explored above. Atavistic 
regression aims to re-establish contact with an ancestral people. Here, reunion may be sought 
with one’s ancestors (as with Giorgio Aurispa, who returns to the land of his recent ancestors, 
the Abruzzo) or with an earlier civilisation (as with Stelio Effrena, who looks to the dramatic 
traditions of the ancient Greeks). The individual who seeks contact with his ancestors, and his 
ancestral soil, arguably longs for something resembling Jung’s idea of the participation 
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mystique, whereby modern rootlessness is replaced by sensations of timeless, and even 
mystical, unity.  
The atavistic regression examined here is often tied to artistic concerns. Creative 
sterility in the present causes the artist to look to the creativity of ancestral peoples. This is 
not a phenomenon that can be found in all of the texts under consideration, however. It 
appears only in Il trionfo della morte, Il fuoco, and Der Tod in Venedig. In Tristan and Tonio 
Kröger, where the Dionysian is portrayed more subtly, Mann does not include this form of 
regression as part of the Dionysian experience. 
Having come under the influence of the ‘primitive’ Dionysian, which has resurfaced 
from the depths of Aschenbach’s unconscious after a lifetime of repression, Aschenbach has 
been seen to act more instinctually and intuitively in Venice. His behaviour has become 
dominated by long-repressed sexual instincts which now cause havoc in their resurgence. 
Apart from the brief act of writing completed on the beach (Aschenbach’s final creation), 
productivity is involuntarily exchanged for voyeurism and Aschenbach disregards the future 
for the pleasure of the present. Immediate pleasure has come to dominate his Venetian 
existence, and his neurotic symptoms (recounted in the first two chapters of Mann’s novella) 
have arguably diminished with the relaxation of repression. Shortly after learning of the 
cholera epidemic, his knowledge of which Aschenbach keeps secret from Tadzio’s family, 
Aschenbach has a dream which reveals the fatality of his psychological shift, and 
demonstrates an atavistic regression that proves highly harmful, both to creativity and to the 
artist. 
The horrors of Aschenbach’s Dionysian dream in chapter five, in which he witnesses 
sparagmos, have already been glimpsed. These shocking scenes, conjured up by 
Aschenbach’s unconscious, offer a horrifying reflection of Aschenbach’s psyche and suggest 
that the instincts and impulses he has passively allowed to overpower him cannot now be 
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tamed or reversed. Compared with the austere environment in which we first encountered 
Aschenbach in Munich, this dream presents an assault on the senses. The dreamer smells ‘der 
beizende Ruch der Böcke’160 (Mann, 2004, p. 583), hears cries ‘wie kein jemals erhörter’161 
(ibid.) and is intoxicated by fumes (‘Dünste bedrängten den Sinn’162 [ibid.]). However, the 
once respectable Aschenbach is not horrified and repelled by his dream, and indeed longs to 
join these barbaric Dionysian worshippers in their wild and brutal practices (p. 584).  
In Nietzschean terms, Aschenbach appears to have regressed psychologically to the 
state of those Dionysian barbarians so contemptuously described in Die Geburt der Tragödie, 
whose savage rituals were too wild to offer any kind of creative inspiration. Throughout Der 
Tod in Venedig we have seen Aschenbach attempting a conscious identification with certain 
figures of antiquity, in an attempt to defend and validate his attraction to Tadzio. He has 
looked to Plato’s Phaedrus, for example, to offer a noble and respected precedent for his 
fascination with the adolescent. Ultimately, however, Aschenbach’s most vivid identification 
is not with those ancient Greeks who produced great works of philosophy and literature, but 
with the primitive ‘barbarians’ who embraced the Dionysian with no concern for civilisation 
or culture, and worshipped the deity through brutal practices. Again, Jung’s understanding of 
identification as one of the phenomena that can provoke participation mystique must be noted 
here, for Aschenbach’s identification with these Dionysian barbarians triggers a sensation of 
union that we have thus far not seen in Mann’s isolated protagonist.163 Aschenbach’s 
experience is a wholly negative one, however. He feels irresistibly drawn into the scenes of 
dismemberment and insane intoxication that he witnesses in his dream, and awakes 
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 ‘the biting stench of rams’. 
161
 ‘like none ever heard before’. 
162
 ‘fumes beset the mind’. 
163
 Van den Berk notes that Jung would have preferred to refer to participation mystique as ‘unconscious 
participation’ or ‘irrational participation’ (2013, p. 38): the fact that Aschenbach’s identification occurs within a 
dream brings Mann’s portrayal of his experience close to Jung’s understanding of participation mystique. 
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hopelessly enthralled to ‘Der fremde Gott’164 (p. 582): ‘Aus diesem Traum erwachte der 
Heimgesuchte entnervt, zerrüttet und kraftlos dem Dämon verfallen’165 (p. 584). 
Aschenbach’s lack of control over his experience of internal regression (given impetus by the 
Dionysian) leads him to an atavistic regression that proves highly damaging, despite his 
efforts to identify with the most ‘civilised’ and creative ancient Greeks. His Dionysian dream 
signals the end of both Aschenbach’s creativity and his life. He dies just days later. 
The barbaric crowd of Aschenbach’s dream echoes the scenes of the Vigil in Il trionfo 
della morte, which signal a similarly troubled regression. Just as Aschenbach has sought to 
follow the ancient Greeks – thus apparently justifying his forbidden desire – but identifies 
most strongly with Dionysian barbarians, so Aurispa seeks the creativity of the pre-Socratic 
Greeks and the healing primitivism of the Abruzzo, but finds in his ancestral people only 
madness, sickness and superstition. Aurispa’s inability to control his regression was 
considered earlier, and it was seen to trigger a return to instinctual existence that resulted in 
enslavement to the sexual drive. Hoping to establish a harmonious relationship with nature, 
Aurispa’s departure from the modern urban space provoked only lethargy, lassitude and 
carnality. The Abruzzo attracts Aurispa not only as an untamed natural space, but also as the 
land of his ancestors, with whom he hopes to connect. Here, a primitive way of life still 
exists:  
Riti di religioni morte e obliate vi sopravvivevano; simboli incomprensibili di potenze da 
tempo decadute vi rimanevano intatti, usi di popoli primitivi per sempre scomparsi vi 
persistevano trasmessi di generazione in generazione senza mutamento
166
 (d’Annunzio, 1988, 
p. 845).  
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 ‘the foreign god’. 
165
 ‘From this dream the afflicted one awoke unnerved, shattered, and powerlessly enslaved to the demon’.   
166
 ‘Rites of dead and forgotten religions survived here; incomprehensible symbols of powers long gone 
remained intact here, customs of primitive peoples who had disappeared forever persisted, transmitted from 
generation to generation without change’. 
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It is in the hope of establishing contact with the traditions and values of his ancestors, and 
sensing unity with them, recalling Jung’s idea of participation mystique, that Aurispa agrees 
to attend the Vigil at Casalbordino with Ippolita, for it provides an opportunity to enact this 
reconnection: 
Era necessario, nel suo pensiero, ch'egli seguisse quella profonda corrente, ch'egli facesse 
parte di quella selvaggia agglomerazione umana, ch'egli esperimentasse l'aderenza materiale 
con lo stato infimo della sua razza, con quello strato denso e permanente in cui le impronte 
primitive duravano forse intatte.
167
 (p. 864) 
During the religious Vigil participants prostrate themselves before the altar and offer 
riches in the hope of receiving a cure for whatever disease, illness or affliction troubles them. 
A Dionysian atmosphere is evoked by the multitude: individuation is lost, and the enraptured 
worshippers seem ‘invasi da una frenesia feroce’168 (p. 880). They approach the altar 
‘agitandosi come in convulsioni demoniache’169 (p. 883), and frenzy drives some to ‘[i] 
sacrifici sanguinosi, agli strazii della carne’170 (p. 880). While the bacchantes in 
Aschenbach’s dream draw blood from the bodies of living animals as they dismember them, 
the worshippers at the Vigil do violence to their own bodies, in a sign of irrational religious 
devotion. Some worshippers even drag their tongues across the ground as they crawl towards 
the altar, recalling Michetti’s painting, Il voto.  
The individuals become a mass, a single entity, whirling in procession around the 
church. One woman appears ‘quasi circonfusa d'un mistero dionisiaco, spirante quasi un’aura 
di antichissima vita su quella moltitudine barbarica’171 (p. 888). The participants resemble 
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 ‘It was necessary, in his mind, that he should follow that profound current, that he should be part of that wild 
human throng, that he should attempt physical adherence with the lowest level of his race, with that dense and 
permanent level in which primitive imprints may still be intact.’ 
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 ‘invaded by a ferocious frenzy’. 
169
 ‘writhing as if in demonic convulsions’. 
170
 ‘bloody sacrifices, to torments of the flesh’. 
171




‘strani animali gibbosi’172 (p. 872) in their wretched and abject behaviour. Like the Dionysian 
horde of Aschenbach’s dream – among whom were ‘Männer, Hörner über den Stirnen’173 
(Mann, 2004, p. 583) – the initiates in this ritual are no longer fully human; they have become 
alarming hybrids. Härmänmaa notes that in the scene of Casalbordino, ‘the image of Abruzzo 
as a cradle of sinister primitivism is most fully developed’ (2013, p. 703). While the Vigil is 
ostensibly a Catholic event, elements of paganism, and the pre-Christian demonic, are clear. 
It appears to be a grotesque amalgam of Christian traditions and ancient superstition, and the 
brutality of barbaric Dionysian worship does not seem far off. As Härmänmaa notes, in this 
isolated part of Italy ‘the Christian religion has descended into a madness’ (p. 704). Sickness 
reigns over this Dionysian mass, and barely a healthy body is to be discerned among those 
gathered here, seeking healing. The crowds gathered here do not offer a glimpse into 
Aurispa’s ancestors, with whom he seeks contact: he finds only ‘una razza disfatta’174 
(d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 902), and ‘corpi accomunati alla bestia immonda e alla materia 
escrementale’175 (ibid.). For a moment it looks as though Aurispa, too, who is pathologically 
hypnotised rather than inspired to identification, will become infected by the contagion of the 
primitive mass,
176
 but ultimately both he and Ippolita are repulsed by the bestial horde, and 
leave when Ippolita becomes faint with horror, partly after glimpsing an epileptic suffering a 
seizure, which reminds her of her own illness. Having sought the innocence and simplicity of 
his rural ancestors, Aurispa has found only deformity, decay and insanity, which provoke 
only revulsion and increase his sense of isolation.  
The scene of the Vigil presents a bleak verdict on Aurispa’s attempted atavistic 
regression. Whereas his internal regression has gone too far and left him enslaved to the 
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 ‘strange gibbous animals’. 
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 ‘Men, horns above their brows’. 
174
 ‘a deformed race’. 
175
 ‘bodies surrounded by bestial filth and excrement’.  
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 ‘Era l’effetto del contagio. Sentiva Giorgio omai di non esser più padrone di sè. I nervi lo dominavano, gli 
imponevano il disordine e l’eccesso delle loro sensazioni’ (‘It was the effect of the contagion. Giorgio no longer 
felt in control of himself. His nerves dominated him, they commanded him with their disorder and excessive 
sensation’ [p. 882]) 
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‘primitive’, the barbarism of the Vigil has repelled Aurispa and prevented him from 
connecting to his ancestors. The Vigil merely cements Aurispa’s isolation and his alienation 
from his roots, although identification and unification with the grotesque hordes of the Vigil 
would arguably have been no healthier. After recovering from the trauma of the Vigil, the 
region’s primitive ritualism is witnessed again, but in a far healthier manifestation. While the 
Vigil had showcased superstition, bodily decay, bestial insanity, base promiscuity, and 
clerical corruption, Aurispa’s next encounter with Abruzzan tradition celebrates vitality, 
fertility and growth in the gathering of the harvest.  
The rituals surrounding the harvest recall ancient mysteries and ‘Dionisie rurali’177 (p. 
928). Aurispa asks himself whether he should not rather have attempted reunion with the 
roots of his race in these kind of rituals, rather than in the savagery of Casalbordino, but this 
realisation has come too late and Aurispa’s demise is already unavoidable. Like Aschenbach, 
he compares himself to his ancestors and is left feeling inadequate and defective. They lived 
as Zarathustra teaches us to live, Aurispa imagines,
178
 but he has failed to adopt such a 
strategy, and must accept the futility of his ‘aspirazioni […] verso l’ideale “dionisiaco”’179 
(d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 929). Even when he assists with the harvest – in precisely the kind of 
traditional activity that was idealised by idealising primitivist discourse at the turn of the 
century – and perceives something resembling the kind of regressive union which he pursued, 
there is a catch. He experiences ‘una rinnovellata aspirazione verso le fonti della vita, verso le 
Origini’180 (p. 921), but interprets this sensation as the last gasp of his youth and vitality, soon 
to be extinguished: ‘Era forse l’ultimo sussulto della sua giovinezza ferita nell’intimo della 
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 ‘rural Dionysia’. 
178
 He recalls the following words of Zarathustra: ‘Quando il cuor vostro palpita nella sua maggior pienezza e 
sta per traboccare [...], ivi è la fonte della vostra virtù’ (‘When your heart throbs with its greatest fullness and is 
about to overflow […], this is the source of your virtue’ [p. 929]). The same words can be found in Also sprach 
Zarathustra: ‘Wenn euer Herz breit und voll wallt, [...] da ist der Ursprung eurer Tugend’ (‘When your heart 
surges, broad and full, […] that is the origin of your virtue’ [Nietzsche, Za-I-Tugend-I]).  
179
 ‘aspirations towards the “Dionysian” ideal’. 
180
 ‘a renewed aspiration towards the sources of life, towards its Origins’. 
189 
 
potenza sostanziale’181 (ibid.). This healthy experience of contact with his ancestors appears 
to have come too late; but perhaps, given his constant psychological turmoil, Aurispa’s case 
has been a hopeless one from the start, which would never have been redeemed by atavistic 
regression. In the end, it is Aurispa’s defective will that ensures his failures, for which the 
imagery of Casalbordino serves as a graphic illustration. 
As well as seeking communion with his ancestors, Aurispa also aspires to identify 
with the ancient Greeks, and adopt their approach to existence. His reflections on the ways of 
the ancient Greeks strongly recall Nietzsche’s claims regarding their affirmative embrace of 
existence, and indeed both Nietzsche and Zarathustra are mentioned (and cited) several times 
in the latter parts of the book. The earlier parts may have already been written by the time 
d’Annunzio first encountered Nietzsche. Aurispa contemplates the ancient Greeks’ joy of 
life: 
il culto profondo della Natura madre eternamente creatrice ed eternamente lieta della 
sovrabbondanza di sue forze; la venerazione e l’entusiasmo per tutte le energie fecondanti, 
generative e distruttive; l’affermazione violenta e tenace dell’istinto agonistico, dell’istinto di 
lotta, di predominio, di sovranità, di potenza egemonica: non erano questi i cardini incrollabili 
su cui si reggeva l’antico mondo ellenico nel suo periodo ascensionale?182 (p. 924) 
Just as the ancient Greek celebrated the ‘perpetuità della vita’183 (p. 925) in their Dionysian 
mysteries, so Aurispa wishes to do the same in his ‘aspirazione ad essere egli medesimo 
l’eterna voluttà del Divenire’184 (ibid.). The strategies of the ancient Greeks, and the influence 
of their Dionysian energies, can offer a remedy to the dilemma of modern man, who has lost 
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 ‘Maybe it was the last gasp of his youth, wounded in the depths of its essential power’. 
182
 ‘the profound cult of Nature, the eternally creative mother, eternally content with the overabundance of her 
forces; veneration and enthusiasm for all fertilising, generative, and destructive energies; the violent and 
determined affirmation of the agonistic element, of the instinct towards struggle, towards domination, towards 
sovereignty, towards hegemonic power: were not these the unshakable principles which held up the ancient 
Hellenic world during its ascendant period?’ 
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 ‘perpetuity of life’. 
184
 ‘aspiration to be himself the eternal joy in Becoming’. 
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contact with nature and no longer knows how to immerse himself in the essence of things.
185
 
Aurispa longs, therefore, to ‘regress’ to the ancient Greeks’ way of existence and adopt their 
affirmative attitude, which would allow him to enter into a harmonious immersion with 
nature, render his own suffering active instead of passive
186
 and overcome his crippling 
isolation. Aurispa is simply unable to reach the heights to which he strives, however, and he 
fails to embrace a way of existence that follows the example of the ancient Greeks. He 
reflects sadly that ‘ogni giorno […] io perisco segretamente’187 (p. 716) and that ‘La morte, 
infatti, m’attira’188 (p. 717). Instead of receiving the creative impetus he craves in order to 
become the superuomo he commits suicide and murders his lover in a way that utterly 
contradicts the Greeks’ affirmation of life.   
In Il fuoco, Stelio Effrena similarly takes the ancient Greeks as a model for his own 
creativity, for he aspires to inaugurate a tragic tradition for modernity that makes use of their 
Dionysian energies. He aims to reinvigorate both his own art, and the Italian people, with the 
Dionysian, and provoke regressive and restorative processes. Atavistic regression must be 
undergone by the masses if the artistic glory of Italy’s past is to be recaptured, and if a 
cultural renaissance is to take place. Significantly, however, Effrena’s aim is not purely 
regressive. He does not wish merely to revert to ancient models of creativity, and aims rather 
to restore aspects of ancient creativity for the sake of the present.
189
 His regression is 
therefore carried out in the name of progress, and is forward-looking. It may be the 
progressive nature of his regression that renders it artistically beneficial. 
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 The ancient Greek, by contrast, was able to ‘immedesimarsi nella natura della cose’ (‘identify with the nature 
of things’ [p. 925]) 
186
 Aurispa knows that if he wishes to follow the teaching of Zarathustra, he must ‘cercare il mezzo di rendere 
attivo il mio dolore’ (‘search for a means of rendering my pain active’ [p. 931]). 
187
 ‘every day I die secretly’. 
188
 ‘I am drawn to death’. 
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 As Effrena explains: ‘Io non voglio risuscitare una forma antica; voglio inventare una forma nuova, 
obbedendo soltanto al mio istinto e al genio della mia stirpe, così come fecero i Greci quando crearono quel 
meraviglioso edifizio di bellezza, non imitabile, che è il loro drama’ (‘I do not wish to revive an ancient form; I 
want to invent a new form, obeying only my instinct and the genius of my descent, as the ancient Greeks did 




A communal Dionysian regression is precisely what is triggered by Effrena’s 
climactic speech at the beginning of d’Annunzio’s novel, resulting in a creative intoxication 
that spreads through the Venetian crowds. During his oration, Effrena evokes unparalleled 
masters of Italy’s (and especially Venice’s) artistic past, such as Giorgione, Leonardo da 
Vinci and Paolo Veronese, with the aim of reuniting modern crowds with the artistic legacy 
of their ancestors. He wishes to reinvigorate a tired cultural landscape and return Venice to 
her rightful status as ‘Città d’arte’190 (p. 233) as well as ‘Città di Vita’191 (p. 254). The 
Bacchic chorus that arises when he concludes his oration suggests that his words are having 
the desired effect, and Dionysus is indeed welcomed back to Venice: ‘Dioniso liberatore 
riappariva [my emphasis] d’improvviso in conspetto degli uomini su le ali del canto’192 (p. 
262). D’Annunzio is explicit in heralding Dionysus’ triumphant return to the decaying city, 
and he couches his descriptions of Effrena’s enraptured crowds in terms strongly reminiscent 
of bacchic worship. Just as Foscarina recovers primitive impulses and ancient Dionysian 
energies for Effrena’s exploitation, so he performs a similar service for his crowds, allowing 
them to be reunited with a neglected creative drive that was allegedly employed by their 
artistically renowned ancestors.  
The effect of Effrena’s speech seems to mirror exactly Nietzsche’s apparent intention 
in Die Geburt der Tragödie, where the restorative power of the Dionysian is posited as 
contemporary Germany’s best hope for artistic rejuvenation. Just as Nietzsche claims that 
Wagner’s music will allow modern Germans to rediscover their artistic heritage and 
Dionysian affinities, so Effrena’s intoxicating words trigger a Dionysian frenzy that appears 
to dissolve the distance between his modern audience and their past cultural glories. The 
ecstatic Dionysian atmosphere engendered by his speech, erases the ‘errore del tempo’193 (p. 
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 ‘City of art’. 
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 ‘City of Life’. 
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 ‘Dionysus the liberator reappeared suddenly in the presence of men, on the wings of song’. 
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 ‘error of time’. 
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346), allowing a profound connection between modern listeners and ancient Dionysian 
worshippers to be established: ‘era parso che in quel punto il delirio dionisiaco, memore delle 
antiche selve arse nelle notti sacre avesse dato il segnale dell’incendio in cui doveva 
risplendere ultimamente la bellezza di Venezia’194 (p. 267). As the gulf of centuries is erased, 
the crowd vividly perceives the return of their artistic legacy:  
Ora, nella magica tregua che le davano le virtù della poesia e del sogno, ella [the crowd] 
sembrava ritrovare in sè stessa i segni indistruttibili delle primitive generazioni, quasi una 
vaga effigie dell’ascendenza remota, e riconoscere il suo diritto a un antico retaggio di cui 
fosse stata dispogliata: a quel retaggio che il messaggero le annunciava essere ancora intatto e 
recuperabile.
195
 (p. 256)  
Again, d’Annunzio’s use of words such as ‘ritrovare’ (‘rediscover’) and ‘riconoscere’ 
(‘rediscover’) emphasises the regressive nature of this Dionysian intoxication. It is also a 
communal experience that promises a revitalised future for Venice’s cultural landscape.  
In Il fuoco – in stark contrast to Der Tod in Venedig – bacchic crowds are a positive 
phenomenon, auguring revived creativity and a rediscovery of Venice’s artistic heritage. The 
exuberance of Effrena’s crowds after his oration causes them to ‘become’ maenads engaged 
in wild rituals: ‘[l]e Menadi parevano gridar quivi, col capo riverso in dietro, con le chiome 
effuse, con le vesti discinte, [...] agitando i crotali: – Evoè!’196 (p. 262). This Dionysian crowd 
is suffused with health and joy, unlike the morbid hordes of the Vigil described in Il trionfo 
della morte, or those of Aschenbach’s dream. The ‘maenads’ observed here are distinctly 
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 ‘in that moment it seemed that the Dionysian delirium, reminiscent of ancient forests burning in the sacred 
night, had given the signal of fire in which the beauty of Venice should shine forth again’.  
195
 ‘Now, in the magic truce given by the power of poetry and dream, she [the crowd] seemed to rediscover 
within herself the enduring traces of primitive generations, almost a vague effigy of remote ascendance, and to 
recognise her [the crowd’s] right to an ancient legacy of which she [the crowd] had been divested: the right to 
that legacy which the messenger announced was still intact and could be recovered.’ Here d’Annunzio refers to 
the crowd using the feminine pronoun ‘ella’ (‘she’). 
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 ‘The Maenads seemed to shout yonder, with their heads thrown backwards, their hair billowing, their clothes 
dishevelled, […] shaking snakes: – Evoe!’ 
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more ‘civilised’, and are not seen participating in the brutal rituals that Nietzsche abhorred in 
Die Geburt der Tragödie. The creative benefits of the regressive Dionysian intoxication that 
Effrena provokes in his crowds are clear: ‘[e]ra il sommo beneficio della Bellezza rivelata; 
era la vittoria dell’Arte liberatrice su le miserie e su le inquietudini e sui tedii dei giorni 
comuni’197 (p. 243). Through a restoration of ‘primitive’ Dionysian energies, retrieved from 
the past, Effrena aestheticises his listeners; as Effrena’s companion, the poet Daniele Glauro 
comments, ‘[a]lmeno per qualche ora dunque, a Venezia, il ritmo dell’arte e il polso della vita 
han riavuto un medesimo battito’198 (p. 281).  
As noted earlier, internal and atavistic regressions sometimes merge, and this is seen 
particularly in Il fuoco. While Effrena incites his crowds to grasp their artistic heritage, 
Foscarina, the Dionysian woman, recovers the impulses and energies that render this 
possible:  
[...] ella sembrava ritrovare in sè stessa i segni indistruttibili delle primitive generazioni, quasi 
una vaga effigie dell’ascendenza remota, e riconoscere il suo diritto a un antico retaggio di cui 
fosse stata dispogliata: a quel retaggio che il messaggero le annunciava essere ancora intatto e 
recuperabile.
199
 (p. 256) 
It is the internal regression undergone by Effrena and Foscarina that allows this process – and 
the atavistic regression it triggers – to take place: Foscarina must first embrace instinct and 
primitivism if she is to recuperate the Dionysian energies which Effrena wishes to present to 
his audience. Through Foscarina internal and atavistic regressions are inherently interwoven; 
she captures the primitive, primordial side of human nature as well as the ancient Greeks’ 
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 ‘the victory of Art the liberator over the mysteries and over the anxieties and over the tediousness of 
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 ‘At least for an hour, then, in Venice, the rhythm of art and the pulse of life have shared the same heartbeat’. 
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ability to channel such drives into supreme art. She has ‘una potenza risvegliatrice’200 (p. 
342) and recuperates ‘il senso dionisiaco della natura naturante, l’antico fervore delle energie 
istintive e creatrici, l’entusiasmo del dio multiforme emerso dal fermento di tutti i succhi’201 
(p. 388). She channels these energies into classical tragic figures when she interprets them on 
the stage. She can thus convey ‘La fedeltà eroica di Antigone, il furore fatidico di Cassandra, 
la divorante febbre di Fedra, la ferocia di Medea, il sacrifizio d’Ifigenia’202 (p. 282). She 
unites the ‘primitive’ and primordial, the classical and the modern in her acting, and this 
proves crucial for Effrena’s artistic goals. He hopes to abolish the ‘error of time’ which 
separates the modern stage from its ‘primitive’, Dionysian origins and from its zenith (Attic 
tragedy). He appears to pursue a sensation recalling Jung’s participation mystique, for 
Effrena aims to eradicate the temporal distance that divides ancient and modern man, leading 
to artistic and creative unity. Towards the end of Il fuoco, after an episode of ecstatic 
collaborative creativity between Foscarina and Effrena, we read: ‘Il Passato è in atto. 
L’illusione del Tempo è caduta. La Vita è una’203 (p. 467).  
In Il fuoco, Effrena and Foscarina demonstrate a highly successful way of uniting the 
‘primitive’ and the ‘civilised’. Through art, in the manner of the ancient Greeks (as described 
by Nietzsche), they harness primordial (Dionysian) impulses, allowing these to be 
communicated to modern audiences in Venice. The process of artistic creation is even likened 
to archaeology. This is seen in particular when Effrena converses with his friend, the poet 
Daniele Glauro: 
Hai tu mai pensato a quel grosso Schliemann nell’atto di scoprire il più fulgido tesoro che la 
Morte abbia adunato nell’oscurità della terra da secoli, da millennii? Hai tu mai pensato che 
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 ‘a power of reawakening’. 
201
 ‘the Dionysian sense of natura naturans, the ancient fervour of instinctive and creative energies, the 
enthusiasm of the multiform god who emerged from the ferment of all juices’.  
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 ‘The heroic faith of Antigone, the fateful fury of Cassandra, the devouring fever of Phaedra, the ferocity of 
Medea, the sacrifice of Iphigenia’. 
203
 ‘The Past is in action. The Illusion of Time has fallen. Life is whole’. 
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quello spettacolo sovrumano e terribile avrebbe potuto apparire a un altro: a uno spirito 
giovanile e fervente, a un poeta, a un animatore, a te, a me forse? Allora la febbre, la frenesia, 
la demenza....Imagina!
204
 (p. 362)  
But archaeology here is not a sober discovery of cold, dead objects. It is instead a vivid, even 
magical process whereby figures from the (ancient) past are reawakened and breathe the air 
of the present. Thus Effrena instructs Foscarina to ‘evocare Cassandra dal suo sonno’205 (p. 
472) when she inhabits a character from Effrena’s next drama. The drama gestating in 
Effrena during Il fuoco is entitled La Vittoria dell’Uomo (The Victory of Man), and strongly 
recalls d’Annunzio’s play of 1898, La città morta (The Dead City). In this play, d’Annunzio 
portrays the archaeological excavation of Mycenae (which d’Annunzio visited in 1895 
[Nikopoulos, 2010, p. 155]), through which ‘the original Dionysian spirit of tragedy’ (p. 167) 
will also be rediscovered.
206
 Foscarina plays the role of a modern character who bridges the 
temporal distance between ancient Mycenae and the modern theatre, entering the excavated 
tombs of Agamemnon and Cassandra to awaken them, thus eradicating the ‘error of time’. 
Foscarina must not only awaken, but also become Cassandra (‘Cassandra è in te e tu sei in 
lei’207 [d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 472]) in the ultimate process of regressive recuperation, which 
requires the suspension of her modern identity.  
Atavistic regression is not an experience undergone by all of the fictional artists 
discussed. Nor is it an experience that proves creatively beneficial for all of the artists who 
undergo it. Indeed, only Il fuoco’s Stelio Effrena and Foscarina manage to carry out a 
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 ‘Have you ever thought of the great Schliemann in the act of discovering the most glorious treasure that 
death has ever gathered in the obscurity of the earth for centuries, for millennia? Have you ever thought that that 
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 ‘Cassandra is within you and you are within her’. 
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successful psychological regression to recuperate the artistic impulses and instincts of the 
ancient Greeks. For Aschenbach, atavistic regression – seen in his Dionysian dream – proves 
harmful, but arguably because he has already reverted to such a state of instinctual abandon 
that further creativity is precluded. Perhaps if Aschenbach had been better equipped to 
moderate the extent of his return to instinct, he might have been able to effect an 
identification with (to use Nietzsche’s terms) Dionysian Greeks, rather than the Dionysian 
barbarians who overrun his psyche in his dream. It should also be noted that Aschenbach’s 
earlier interest in Tadzio causes him to become more mythically aware, and to read the events 
of each day as episodes from Greek mythology.
208
 His act of writing follows his (arguably 
regressive) embrace of mythology, but as his interest for Tadzio becomes obsession, allusions 
to classical mythology cease, as does creativity. In Il trionfo della morte, Aurispa consciously 
attempts atavistic regression but is dismayed to find his isolation reaffirmed by the 
impossibility of fostering a meaningful connection to his ancestral roots. The hordes at the 
Vigil, who are also reminiscent of Nietzsche’s Dionysian barbarians, repel him, but the extent 
of his despair and isolation is such that he is unable to immerse himself even in the 
wholesome side of the primitive Abruzzo – its harvest festivals. The superuomo Effrena, on 
the other hand, whose internal regression retains artistic focus, successfully recuperates the 
attitude of the ancient Greeks, and their creative harnessing of the Dionysian.  
 While this chapter has attempted to situate d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s – and to some 
extent, Nietzsche’s – portrayals of the Dionysian within the primitivist discourse of the turn 
of the century, an important difference must be noted. Although some of d’Annunzio’s other 
works display the derogatory and problematic side of primitivist discourse, which was used, 
for example, to justify colonial and imperial activities, in none of the texts here can this brand 
of primitivism be located. D’Annunzio and Mann do not here look to exotic peoples to find a 
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 Sunrise, for example, becomes the journey of ‘der Gott mit den hitzigen Wangen’ (‘the god with the fiery 
cheeks’) who moves with his ‘Viergespann durch die Räume des Himmels’ (‘carriage through the spaces of the 
heavens’ [Mann, 2004, p. 549]). 
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stereotypically ‘primitive’ foil to modern, Western, man; instead they show the ‘primitive’ 
side of human nature that has been repressed by civilisation (as described by Freud), and with 
which re-established communication can be beneficial (as Jung believed). It is therefore an 
internal ‘primitive’ that is sought, and there is no talk of ‘savages’, for example. The 
‘primitive’ is admittedly located in an external source, the ancient Greeks: but the Dionysian 
(in its ideal and most creative form) is located only in this temporally remote people, rather 
than posited as a characteristic of all pre-modern peoples. D’Annunzio and Mann do not 
seem to locate the ‘primitive’ impulses required for Dionysian creativity in an earlier stage of 
mankind’s evolutionary development, but only in the unrivalled art of the ancient Greeks. 
Their fictional artists aim to discover their own, internal ‘primitivism’ when they engage with 
the Dionysian, in the manner of these Greeks. Additionally, both d’Annunzio and Mann bear 
the impact of an engagement with Nietzsche in their understandings of the ancient Greeks, 
and arguably romanticise the creativity of ‘Nietzschean’ Greeks, rather than ‘historical’ 
Greeks.  
 Throughout this chapter engagement with the Dionysian and its regressive tendencies 
has been seen to constitute a hazardous process. If regression goes too far, creative focus is 
lost and the life of the artist is endangered. The impulses and instincts that are associated with 
the Dionysian are highly powerful and must be tamed if they are to be harnessed creatively. 
In the next chapter this harnessing will be explored, and the psychological phenomenon of 
sublimation will be posited as a means of gaining control over the Dionysian. Sigmund Freud 
has been mentioned in this chapter because of his findings regarding primitivism; the next 
chapter will explore a different aspect of Freud’s thought, which will provide an illuminating 
lens through which to regard the experiences of d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artists in their 




Chapter Five: Dionysian Creativity and Sublimation 
 
Throughout this thesis the Dionysian has been seen to offer a precarious form of creativity to 
the fictional artists (and artistic figures) of Mann and d’Annunzio, just as it does for 
Nietzsche. The previous chapters have demonstrated that the Dionysian can offer creativity 
and vitality, but also destruction and death. Explanations for the creative success of some 
artists, such as Stelio Effrena and Tonio Kröger, who engage with the Dionysian, and for the 
failure of others, such as Gustav von Aschenbach and Giorgio Aurispa, have been hinted at 
already, and will be more fully illuminated here. These successes and failures will be 
explored using the tools of Freudian psychoanalysis, and in particular, the unconscious 
phenomenon of sublimation, which, when successfully achieved by Mann’s and 
d’Annunzio’s characters, seems to offer a strategy for dealing with the turbulent impulses of 
the Dionysian most creatively, and most safely.  
 This penultimate chapter will argue that both Mann and d’Annunzio portray 
sublimation as a necessary part of the (Dionysian) creative process, and that their depictions 
of sublimation can be clarified through the ideas of Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud regarding 
this psychological phenomenon. In the psychological sense in which it is now understood, the 
term ‘sublimation’ was first used by Nietzsche. It was with the psychoanalytical theories of 
Sigmund Freud, however, that the term gained currency and entered common discourse. 
While it is arguably inaccurate to refer to Nietzsche’s notion of sublimation as a ‘theory’ (as 
Assoun [2006, p. 98] does) – Nietzsche is a famously unsystematic thinker – Nietzsche does 
provide a collection of thoughts regarding the phenomenon’s function, effect, and uses. The 
process of sublimation was subsequently explored and expanded upon more systematically 
by Freud. It is because of the prominent position of both Nietzsche and Freud in this context 
that the ideas of both regarding sublimation will be used to clarify the portrayals of creative 
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sublimation offered by Mann and d’Annunzio. The close ties between Nietzsche, Mann and 
d’Annunzio make Freud’s ideas regarding sublimation doubly relevant. 
This chapter will begin by exploring Freud’s and Nietzsche’s ideas of sublimation, 
which are compared and contrasted by Gemes (2009). Consideration will be given to the 
object of sublimation (what is being sublimated), the process itself (how sublimation occurs), 
as well as to the possible outcomes of this process (what happens when sublimation is 
successful, and what happens if it fails). Attention will then turn to the texts of Mann and 
d’Annunzio, where strong affinities regarding sublimation and Dionysian creativity will be 
uncovered, and where striking echoes of both Nietzsche’s and Freud’s ideas of sublimation 
will be highlighted.  
While it may be possible to claim that Nietzsche’s ideas influenced d’Annunzio’s and 
Mann’s understandings of sublimation, and their portrayal of the psychological phenomenon 
in the texts under discussion, the issue is slightly more complicated in the case of Freud. Of 
the texts under investigation, Il trionfo della morte, Il fuoco, Tonio Kröger and Tristan had all 
already been published by the time of Freud’s Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (Three 
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 1905), in which he speaks of sublimation properly for the 
first time (after a few passing mentions in earlier texts). It would be impossible, therefore, to 
claim that Freud’s ideas regarding sublimation influenced d’Annunzio during the 
composition of Il fuoco, for example; although it should be noted that other Freudian theories 
(such as that regarding the unconscious, introduced in Die Traumdeutung [The Interpretation 
of Dreams, 1900]) were in the intellectual air from around the start of the twentieth century. 
This chapter will therefore argue the case for affinities rather than influence, in the cases of 
both Nietzsche and Freud. Freud’s and Nietzsche’s understandings of psychology will be 
used to illuminate the experiences of the fictional artists of d’Annunzio and Mann, and to 
explain why some of these artists meet with creative success while others do not. Failure to 
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create ends in death for these characters, and Freud’s and Nietzsche’s conceptions of 
sublimation will be used to understand why this occurs. Clarifying the portrayal of 
sublimation by Mann and d’Annunzio in this way allows us to come close to finding a 
formula for ideal creativity, and a strategy for engaging in the Dionysian in the most creative 
and successful way; thus we can reach a conclusion regarding Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s 
views on the creative potential of the Dionysian, after much ambiguous treatment in their 
writings. 
 
i) ‘Sublimation’ before Freud 
Freud may have been the first to offer a comparatively coherent and systematic theory of 
sublimation of the sexual drive, but he certainly was not the first to discover or invent the 
phenomenon itself. The term ‘sublimation’ has its origins in chemistry, and the Oxford 
English Dictionary dates its first use to 1393. Its meaning at this stage is defined thus: ‘The 
action or process of converting a solid substance by heating directly into vapour without 
liquefaction or decomposition, the vapour resolidifying on cooling.’ By the time we find the 
term used by Freud at the beginning of the twentieth century, it has come to be applied to 
psychological processes. A brief overview of the history of the idea of sublimation – not 
always referred to as such – will now be traced, before we examine Freud’s own use of the 
term more closely.  
There is a long tradition of viewing achievements of the mind (creativity, 
philosophical enlightenment and spiritual attainment, for example) as dependent upon 
abstinence from bodily pleasures, including sexual gratification. This can be seen, for 
example, in the promotion of celibacy and abstinence (and the accompanying condemnation 
of sexuality) by many religions, particularly among religious leaders. Celibacy and 
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abstinence are commonly seen as practices which lead to purification and holiness
1
. In 
Christianity, for example, as Olson explains, ‘the narrative of the virgin birth suggests a 
mentality that closely linked virginity to the gift of prophecy’ (2008, p. 11). Support for 
abstinence can also be found in contemporary Christianity: Abbott notes that the ‘True Love 
Waits’ group (founded in 1993 by the Southern Baptists) uses dance as a means of 
sublimating sexual desire (2001, p. 151), for example. In religious texts of classical 
Hinduism, celibacy is affirmed as a means of ‘[attaining] immortality and [acquiring] 
superhuman powers on earth’ (p. 14), although later Hinduism found greater value in sexual 
practices. Celibacy is also of great important to Jain ascetics, who hold the belief that 
‘celibacy protects the soul from the harm associated with passion connected to sexual 
activity’ (p. 15). Within eastern European Orthodox Judaism, as Tweed notes, ‘the yeshiva 
movement and Hasidism shared an emphasis on the sublimation of sexual energies in the 
service of God’ (1997, p. 51). While by no means all religious thinking has promoted the 
practice of celibacy and abstinence – some religions, such as Chinese Buddhism, actually 
finding it to be ‘antireligious and antisocial’ (Olson, 2008, p. 16) – a striking number of 
religions have called for the denial of bodily pleasures and sexual gratification, in a belief that 
such practices enrich the mind and lead to greater spiritual achievements. In such beliefs, an 
opposition between body and mind is affirmed: the fulfilment of one is the impoverishment 
of the other, and bodily pleasure erodes one’s ability for spirituality. This opposition arguably 
bases itself upon the mind-body problem (addressed, but not invented by, René Descartes 
[1596-1650]), which posits the mind and body as separate substances, whose purposes may 
therefore be different. 
                                                          
1
 Goebel cites a passage from Romans which illustrates this: ‘For to be carnally minded is death; but to be 
spiritually minded is life and peace. Because the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the 
law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God’ (Romans, 8:6-8, cited by 
Goebel, 2012, p. 81).  
202 
 
The notion that creative and philosophical achievement can be reached through 
abstinence from sexual activity arguably begins with Plato, who believed ‘that desire can be 
withdrawn from the physical appetites […], and focused upwards’ (Klosko, 2006, p. 99). As 
will be seen, Freud describes a redirection of the sexual urge which echoes Plato’s belief in 
the withdrawal and reapplication of physical urges. For Plato, corporeal beauty is not to be 
shunned as a source of polluting sensuality, but is rather the first step on a path towards 
philosophical enlightenment. In his Symposium (c. 380 BC), Plato has Socrates speak of a 
ladder upon which one can ascend towards the highest contemplation: ‘a person properly 
initiated into the mystery of love rises on a ladder or a stairway [...]’ (Shookman, 2004, p. 79) 
and may eventually glimpse Beauty in its ‘original’, Platonic Form, through a series of 
abstractions. ‘The love of beauty can thus lead to a love of wisdom and truth – in other 
words, to philosophy’ (ibid.) – but only if one is able to move beyond physical gratification 
and progress beyond the lowest rungs of the ladder. Goebel notes that for Marcuse and 
Adorno, Platonic sublimation, in which ‘the path to understanding the idea of the good leads 
directly through sensual love’ (2012, p. 83), is seen as ‘an alternative to the Christian model 
of the condemnation of the flesh’ (ibid.).  
This idea can be found again in the revival of Platonism which took place in Italy 
during the Renaissance. Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), for example, founded an academy in 
Florence which took inspiration from Plato’s theories, and which has since been referred to as 
the ‘Accademia Platonica’ (‘Platonic Academy’). As Quiviger explains, ‘in Ficino’s universe, 
visible beauty is a reflection of the divine shining through the human body and the first step 
on the Platonic ladder of love leading to the contemplation of the divine’ (2010, p. 100). 
Here, as in Plato’s original idea, the process by which one approaches ‘philosophy’ or the 
‘contemplation of the divine’ seems a form of sublimation: while the subject could remain 
upon the lowest rung of Plato’s ladder, and remain enslaved to sensual beauty, there is also a 
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possibility of redirecting one’s desires and attentions to more spiritual matters. Robb claims 
that ‘the diffusion of Neoplatonism in the sixteenth century was so enormous that it is not 
possible to estimate its direct influence on the artists of the age with anything approaching 
certainty’ (1935, p. 212). Quiviger, on the other hand, suggests that Neo-Platonism was a 
‘marginal rather than mainstream Renaissance philosophical current’ (2010, p. 100). Quiviger 
notes, however, that Ficino’s De Amore (On Love, 1484) exerted a great influence on 
sixteenth-century Italian literature and that ‘the belief that the sight of beauty, usually 
feminine beauty, can trigger the ascension of the soul features in classics such as Pietro 
Bembo’s Asolani2 (1505) and Baldassare Castiglione’s Cortigiano3 (1528)’ (ibid.). While 
scholars disagree on the prominence of Neoplatonism during the Renaissance, then, elements 
of Neoplatonism which recall sublimation are nonetheless to be found and are evident in 
highly influential texts from the period.  
Several centuries before the Renaissance, sublimation can also arguably be found in 
the tradition of courtly love, as Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), among others, argues. This 
medieval European tradition (Markale names the eleventh to the thirteenth century as the era 
of courtly love [2000, p. 2]) centred around ‘a doctrine of paradoxes, a love at once illicit and 
morally elevating, passionate and disciplined, humiliating and exalting, human and 
transcendent’ (Newman, 1973, p. vii). Boase (1977), surveying theories on the origin of 
courtly love, finds elements of Neoplatonism in sources named as possible contributors to the 
formation of the tradition. Among Hispano-Arabic sources, he names Avicenna’s (980-1037) 
Risāla fi’-l-‘Ishq4 (Treatise on Love), for example, a text ‘deeply influenced by Neoplatonic 
doctrines’ (p. 65), in which the following passage can be found: ‘If a man loves a beautiful 
form with an animal desire, he deserves reproof, even condemnation […]. But whenever he 
                                                          
2
 Quiviger here refers to Bembo’s Gli Asolani (The People of Asolo). 
3
 Quiviger here refers to Castiglione’s Il libro del cortigiano (The Book of the Courtier). 
4
 A precise year of publication for this text is unknown; Avicenna is believed to have lived between 980 and 
1037 AD (Boase, 1977, p. 65). 
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loves a pleasing form with an intellectual consideration, […] then this is to be considered an 
approximation to nobility and an increase in goodness’ (Avicenna, cited by Boase, p. 65). 
Once again, an opposition between body and mind is asserted, and something resembling a 
redirection of the sexual urge is posited as a means of attaining spirituality. Recalling Plato, 
love of a beautiful object is encouraged as long as it conveys the subject to spiritual, rather 
than physical activity, a notion which will be echoed in Freud’s ideas regarding sublimation. 
Within the tradition of courtly love we can place Dante’s Vita nuova (New Life, 
1295), for example, ‘with its story of an entirely sublimated “heavenly” love’ (Barolini, 1993, 
p. 29) and Petrarch’s (1304-1374) sonnets. In his Vita nuova, Dante speaks of ‘his passing 
from “amor sensitivo” [“sensual love”] aroused by the sight of Beatrice, to “amor 
intellettivo” [“intellectual love”], and hence to the universalised and depersonalised emotion 
of “Oltre la sfera [sic] che piu largo [sic] gira”’5 (Robb, 1935, p. 18). Similarly, Petrarchism, 
as Scaglione notes, ‘deflects the erotic instinct toward the realm of pure poetic imagination’ 
(1997, p. 568). For both Dante and Petrarch, ‘sublimation’ of the desire provoked by the 
(female) object of desire (Beatrice and Laura respectively) can lead to a transcendent realm of 
creativity and philosophy. As Bayliss explains, Dante’s Beatrice ‘is an intermediary, a means 
to an end rather than an end unto herself. Desire is sublimated to a purely spiritual plane’ 
(2008, p. 114).  
For Lacan, who produced his own theories on sublimation several decades after 
Freud, sublimation in courtly love is not limited to ‘the redirection of instinctual impulses and 
desires on the part of a creator of courtly verses […]’ (Frelick, 2003, p. 109), but also 
involves ‘a desire to evoke through artistic creation something that lies beyond the realm of 
representation, something that Lacan terms the Thing’ (ibid.). For Lacan, sublimation (which 
he treats in his seventh seminar, ‘L'Éthique de la psychanalyse’ [‘The Ethics of 
                                                          
5
 ‘Beyond the sphere that turns most widely’. 
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Psychoanalysis’, 1959-1960]) is thus a process which affects the object as much as the 
subject: Rabaté gives Duchamp’s transformation of a urinal into a work of art as an example 
of raising an object so that it can no longer be reduced to its formal properties (2014, p. 83). 
While parallels exist between Freud’s and Lacan’s understandings of sublimation (Lacan 
‘follows Freud in linking sublimation with creativity and [art]’ [Evans, 1996, p. 201]), many 
divergences are also evident. Moyaert notes, for example, that while Freudian sublimation 
‘does something to the aim of the instinct’, whereby the aim is ‘transformed into a new, non-
sexual aim’ (2004, p. 45), in Lacanian sublimation something also happens to the object of 
the instinct (ibid.). While it is important to note the relationship between Freud’s and Lacan’s 
theories regarding sublimation, an in-depth study of Lacan’s understanding of sublimation 
lies outside the scope of this thesis. 
Goebel (2012), locating his study within German philology and beginning with 
Goethe, offers a partial history of the idea of sublimation. He finds Freudian sublimation to 
be significantly anticipated in Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, and looks beyond Freud 
to those who subsequently engaged with his idea, highlighting Mann, Adorno and Lacan. 
Goebel finds evidence of sublimation in Goethe’s autobiography,6 before interrogating the 
possibility of sublimation in Schopenhauer’s thought. He finds that for Schopenhauer ‘music 
[takes] the place of a sublimation that has become impossible’ (p. 52); it is Schopenhauer’s 
division of the world between will and representation that makes this impossible, and 
Schopenhauer can offer only mortification and resignation, not sublimation. Goebel does 
note, however, that Schopenhauer’s ‘sublime conception of a wholly objective and thus 
occasionally beatific worldview liberated from the urging of the will is nearly identical to 
certain of Freud’s descriptions of successful sublimation’ (p. 59), and also highlights Freud’s 
                                                          
6
 Goebel cites, for example, Goethe’s description of his ability to ‘transform whatever gladdened or tormented 
me, or otherwise occupied my mind, into an image, a poem, and to come to terms with myself by doing this, to 
that I could both refine my conceptions of external things and calm myself inwardly in regard to them’ (Goethe, 
cited by Goebel, p. 5). 
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admission that Schopenhauer should be ‘counted among the discoverers of the unconscious’ 
(p. 50).  
Turning to post-Freudian treatments of sublimation, Goebel considers in particular 
Adorno (especially his posthumous Ästhetische Theorie [Aesthetic Theory, 1970]) and Lacan 
(discussed above). Goebel summarises Adorno’s theory of sublimation thus: ‘Artistic beauty 
is realised as the spiritualisation of the process of civilisation, which is already conceived of 
as an emancipation, a continued sublimation; nature thereby recurs in the beauty of art’ (p. 
207). Like Lacan, Adorno concurs with certain elements of Freudian sublimation (such as its 
value for art [Paddison, 1997, p. 129]) while rejecting others, such as Freud’s belief in the 
possibility of ‘[interpreting] art works through a psychoanalysis of the artists’ personal lives’ 
(p. 128), as can be seen in Freud’s essay on Leonardo da Vinci, which will be discussed 
below. Adorno also emphasised the precariousness of sublimation, arguing against the notion 
that sublimation safely neutralises potentially disruptive drives (p. 134). This can be seen in a 
statement from his Minima Moralia (1951) cited by Paddison: ‘Every work of art is an 
uncommitted crime’ (ibid.). 
Sublimation, then, certainly did not begin with Freud, and his theories regarding the 
uses and function of sublimation constitute a more scientific articulation of existing ideas 
rather than a discovery or invention. These ideas and theories were to be treated again by 
later psychoanalysts and thinkers, such as Lacan and Adorno. Some later psychoanalysts 
were to take issues with certain elements of Freud’s thought, including his understanding of 
sublimation, while others have defended and supported his ideas. Feminist critics, for 
example, such as writer and activist Betty Friedan
7
 and psychoanalyst Clara Thompson,
8
 
accused Freud of misogyny, while Laplanche attempted to ‘safeguard’ (Roustang, 2012, p. 
                                                          
7
 See, for example, her chapter ‘The Sexual Solipsism of Sigmund Freud’ in Betty Friedan, The Feminine 
Mystique (London: Penguin Classics, 2010), pp. 79-98. 
8
 See, for example, Thompson’s article ‘Some Effects of the Derogatory Attitude Towards Female Sexuality’, 
Psychiatry, 1 (1950), pp. 349-354. 
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31) Freud’s theories in his lectures. In the past twenty years, interest in Freud has been 
somewhat renewed thanks to what Burnham refers to as ‘[the] movement [of] “the New 
Freud Studies”’ (2012, p. 8), which has brought ‘a fresh perspective to the history of 
psychoanalytic ideas and the psychoanalytic movement’ (ibid.). 
In this chapter, the theories of Freud are employed for several reasons. As Billig 
notes, Freud is the ‘dominating presence in the history of psychoanalysis’ (1999, p.5) and 
subsequent writings ‘are either an argument with him or a self-conscious tidying up of loose 
ends’ (ibid.). He was the first to offer an extended treatment of sublimation, and can take 
much of the credit for the entrance of the term ‘sublimation’ into popular discourse. W. H. 
Auden, in his poem entitled ‘In Memory of Sigmund Freud’ (1976), suggests that while 
certain of Freud’s theories may have been disproved, the immense cultural significance of the 
figure and his ideas gives him a continued relevance: ‘if often he was wrong and, at times, 
absurd, / to us he is no more a person / now but a whole climate of opinion / under which we 
conduct our lives’ (1976, p. 215). The striking affinities that will be demonstrated between 
Freud’s understanding of sublimation, and the portrayal of the phenomenon by d’Annunzio 
and Mann render Freud’s articulation of sublimation a useful tool for this thesis, and the ease 
with which Freudian and Nietzschean sublimation can be placed in dialogue (as undertaken 
by Gemes [2009]) results in a fruitful lens through which to view the literature under 
discussion, and through which to understand the creative potential of the Dionysian. 
 
ii) Freud and Sublimation 
While Freud’s treatment of sublimation occurred several decades after Nietzsche’s use of the 
term, it is pertinent to take his (relatively) more systematic theory of sublimation as a starting 
point. While Freud does not by any means provide a complete theory of sublimation – 
Laplanche and Pontalis find that Freud left the theory ‘in a primitive state’ (1983, p. 433) – 
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he does offer an extensive collection of thoughts on the matter, supported by his own 
observations of subjects and patients. As Gemes notes (2009), it is ‘more advisable to use 
Nietzsche to clarify Freud on sublimation’ (p. 54) than vice versa, necessitating an 
exploration of Freud’s ideas before moving onto to those of Nietzsche. 
 As Stafford-Clark notes, sublimation is ‘Freud’s hope for the creative future of 
humanity’ (1965, p. 199). His most extensive thoughts regarding the phenomenon are to be 
found in his Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie. Tyson notes that one of Freud’s ‘most 
radical insights’ (1999, p. 12) was the notion that humans are ‘motivated, even driven, by 
desires, fears, needs, and conflicts of which they are unaware – that is, unconscious’ (ibid.). 
Sublimation takes place within this unconscious and acts upon these drives and motivations. 
As Freud describes it, sublimation is an unconscious process which allows for creative 
possibilities, both for the individual as well as for civilisation. Unlike Nietzsche (as will 
shortly be seen), Freud understood sublimation to occur almost exclusively with the sexual 
drive,
9
 and to involve its redirection into non-sexual activity. 
 Sublimation differs from repression, however. As was seen in the previous chapter, 
when repression occurs, the outward expression of a drive, and not exclusively the sexual 
drive, is inhibited and the inner idea behind the drive suppressed. Sublimation, on the other 
hand, is the process by which ‘den überstarken Erregungen aus einzelnen Sexualitätsquellen 
Abfluß und Verwendung auf andere Gebiete eröffnet wird’10 (Freud, 1949, p. 140). While 
repression involves a denial of the ‘ideational portion’ (‘Vorstellungsanteil’ [Freud, 1949, p. 
256]) of a drive as well as the energetic component (ibid.) (‘Affektbetrag’ [p. 255]), 
sublimation denies only the ideational component of the sexual drive, allowing expression to 
the energetic component – but, crucially, expression in a non-sexual activity. A further 
                                                          
9
 Although as Laplanche and Pontalis briefly point out, Freud ‘did also mention the possibility of a sublimation 
of the aggressive instincts’ (1983, p. 433). 
10




difference between repression and sublimation is suggested by Smith’s claim that sublimation 
cannot be considered a defence mechanism (while repression can), for ‘it is the very 
relaxation of defences that makes sublimation possible’ (2005, p. 89). Whereas repression, in 
defence of the subject, suppresses (but cannot abolish) a drive that could cause anxiety in the 
subject, thus rendering its expression impossible, sublimation requires that the drive’s 
energetic component is expressed. As Freud states, adding weight to the idea that sublimation 
cannot be considered a defence mechanism, ‘Eine frühzeitig vorgefallene Verdrängung 
schließt die Sublimierung des verdrängten Triebes aus; nach Aufhebung der Verdrängung ist 
der Weg zur Sublimierung wieder frei’11 (1955b, p. 58). 
As noted earlier, sublimation is regarded both as a stage in the development of 
civilisation, as well as a stage of the individual’s psychosexual development.12 Freud 
considers sublimation to be a natural and normal part of one’s development, and claims that 
‘Die bleibenden Charakterzüge sind entweder unveränderte Fortsetzungen der ursprünglichen 
Triebe, Sublimierungen derselben oder Reaktionsbildungen gegen dieselben’13 (1955a, p. 
209). A ‘sub-species’ (‘Unterart’ [Freud, 1949, p. 140]) of sublimation, Freud tells us in Drei 
Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, can be seen in ‘die Unterdrückung durch 
Reaktionsbildung’14 (ibid.), such as the development of ‘Scham, Ekel und Moral’15 (1949, p. 
64), in the infant. These reaction-formations develop between the age of around five years 
and puberty, and are formed ‘auf Kosten dieser von erogenen Zonen gelieferten 
                                                          
11
 ‘A prematurely occurring repression excludes the possibility of sublimation of the repressed drive; after the 
suspension of repression the route to sublimation is again open’. 
12
 ‘Die Kultur ist doch überhaupt auf Triebverzicht aufgebaut, und jedes einzelne Individuum soll auf seinem 
Wege von der Kindheit zur Reife an seiner Person diese Entwicklung der Menschheit zur verständigen 
Resignation wiederholen.’ (‘After all, culture is built entirely upon the renunciation of instinct, and on his 
journey from childhood to maturity every single individual must repeat, in his own person, this development of 
humanity to reasonable resignation.’ [Freud, 1955c, p. 424]).  
13
 ‘The permanent characteristics are either unchanged continuations of the original drives, sublimations of those 
drives, or reaction-formations against them’. 
14
 ‘suppression through reaction-formation’. 
15
 ‘shame, disgust and morality’. 
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Erregungen’16 (p. 205), as Freud notes in his essay ‘Charakter und Analerotik’ (‘Character 
and Anal Eroticism’, 1908). 
An example of a non-sexual activity that might result from sublimation’s re-direction 
of a sexual drive is the creation of art. While Freud did not claim that creativity is only and 
always born of sublimation, he did find ‘that the highest excursions of the human spirit, in the 
worlds of creative art and science, gained their impetus at the human level from the reserves 
of libidinal energy converted to their use’ (Stafford-Clark, 1965, p. 200). Echoing Nietzsche, 
Freud comments as follows in his essay ‘Die “kulturelle” Sexualmoral und die moderne 
Nervosität’ (‘“Civilised” Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness’, 1908): ‘Ein 
abstinenter Künstler ist kaum recht möglich’17 (1955a, p. 160). Freud notes that artistic 
achievements may actually be ‘mächtig angeregt’18 (p. 16) by sexual experience.19 It is not in 
the artist’s interests, therefore, to repress the sexual drive, and instead this impulse should be 
harnessed, through sublimation, for creativity. It is the demands of civilisation that render full 
satisfaction of the sexual drive (in its most basic form) impossible; but this in turn creates the 
possibility of sublimation. As Freud comments, ‘welches Motiv hätten die Menschen, 
sexuelle Triebkräfte anderen Verwendungen zuzuführen, wenn sich aus denselben bei 
irgendeiner Verteilung volle Lustbefriedigung ergeben hätte?’20 (1955b, p. 91). If humans, 
unimpeded by civilisation’s restrictions, were free to satisfy their sexual drive in sexual 
activity, their cultural achievements (including art) would be impoverished, Freud finds. 
Sublimation is therefore a crucial device to the artist, but one that, as will be seen, also 
involves a degree of precariousness. 
                                                          
16
 ‘at the cost of the excitements supplied from erotogenic zones’. 
17
 ‘an abstinent artist is hardly to be conceived’. 
18
 ‘powerfully stimulated’. 
19
 In his notes Nietzsche writes: ‘ohne eine gewisse Überheizung des geschlechtlichen Systems ist kein Raffael 
zu denken…’ (‘without a certain overheating of the sexual system, a Raphael would be unthinkable’ [NF-1888, 
14 (117)]). His statement that Rausch, and ‘vor Allem der Rausch der Geschlechtserregung’ (‘above all the 
Rausch of sexual excitement’ [GD-Streifzüge-8]) is required for creativity has already been noted.  
20
 ‘what motive would men have for putting sexual impetus to other uses if full satisfaction of sexual desire 
could be achieved through any distribution of these desires?’ 
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Freud also notes, for example, that a character of artistic disposition who undergoes 
sublimation may display a mixture of ‘Leistungsfähigkeit, Perversion und Neurose’21 (1949, 
p. 140). This seems to be due to the proximity of sublimation and neurosis, for neurosis, like 
sublimation, denies the ideational component of a drive while allowing expression to the 
energetic component; indeed, the difficulty in distinguishing between sublimation and 
neurotic symptoms has long troubled readers of Freud, and it is partly in an attempt to clarify 
this confusion that Gemes turns to Nietzsche’s version of sublimation (as will shortly be 
seen). Freud himself seemed to suggest that the outcome of sublimation, as opposed to 
neurosis, would be socially valued. Sublimation, he explains, in an essay entitled 
‘Libidotheorie’ (‘The Libido Theory’, 1923), leads to a ‘sozial oder ethisch höher gewerteten 
Leistung’22 (Freud, 1955c, p. 231). As Gemes cautions, however, the tendency of social 
values to change and shift renders this method of differentiation problematic (2009, p. 41). 
For now it can be noted that the neurotic symptoms which are (technically) the result of a 
form of sublimation are pathological symptoms, such as obsessive-compulsive thoughts and 
behaviour. 
The extent to which an individual can – or must – engage in sublimation varies, and is 
further affected by ‘den Einflüssen des Lebens und der intellektuellen Beeinflussung des 
seelischen Apparates’23 (Freud, 1955b, p. 151). In Freud’s essay of 1910, ‘Eine 
Kinderheitserrinerung des Leonardo da Vinci’ (‘A Childhood Memory of Leonardo da 
Vinci’), Leonardo da Vinci is named as an example of an individual with a high capacity for 
sublimation:  
Einer anderen Person wäre es wahrscheinlich nicht geglückt, den Hauptanteil der Libido der 
Verdrängung durch die Sublimierung zur Wißbegierde zu entziehen; unter den gleichen 
                                                          
21
 ‘productivity, perversion and neurosis’. 
22
 ‘achievement of higher social or ethical value’ 
23
 ‘the influences of life and the intellectual impact of the mental apparatus’. 
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Einwirkungen wie Leonardo hätte sie eine dauernde Beeinträchtigung der Denkarbeit oder 
eine nicht zu bewältigende Disposition zur Zwangsneurose davongetragen
24
 (1955b, p. 209).  
As Gemes explains, Leonardo da Vinci was able to redirect his homosexual drive towards 
‘possession of idealised representations of the male body, as opposed to actual sexual 
possession of male bodies’ (2009, p. 48). In the danger Freud highlights in da Vinci’s 
considerable sublimations (if attempted by a lesser man), as well as in the proximity between 
sublimation and neurotic symptoms, we see something of the precariousness of sublimation. 
Indeed, Freud notes, in several places, that failed or exaggerated sublimation can have 
pernicious effects on the subject. The first danger to consider lies in the inability to sublimate; 
most individuals who are unable to sublimate their sexual drive, Freud notes, ‘werden 
neurotisch oder kommen sonst zu Schaden’25 (1955a, p. 156). As noted earlier, if the sexual 
drive is neither repressed nor sublimated and its energetic component is allowed expression, 
neurotic symptoms will result. An example of an individual who may be unable to achieve 
sublimation is one of ‘ungünstiger Sexualkonstitution’26 (1955a, p. 424) or one who has 
sustained ‘gestörter Entwicklung an ihrer Sexualität’27 (ibid.). Such individuals will have 
recourse to ‘Hemmungen und Ersatzbildungen’28 (ibid.), rather than achieving complete 
sublimation.  
Even some individuals who do achieve sublimation court danger, because sublimation 
which goes too far, and attempts to go beyond the particular capacity of the individual, can 
result in harm. As Freud puts it: 
                                                          
24
 ‘A different person would probably not have succeeded in withdrawing the majority of the libido from 
repression by sublimating it into a desire for knowledge; under the same influences as Leonardo he would have 
suffered lasting damage to his intellectual activity or developed an overwhelming disposition towards 
obsessional neurosis’  
25
 ‘become neurotic or come to some kind of harm’.  
26
 ‘adverse sexual constitution’. 
27
 ‘disrupted sexual development’. 
28
 ‘inhibitions or substitutes’. 
213 
 
Aber so wenig wir darauf rechnen, bei unseren Maschinen mehr als einen gewissen Bruchteil 
der aufgewendeten Wärme in nutzbare mechanische Arbeit zu verwandeln, so wenig sollten 
wir es anstreben, den Sexualtrieb in seinem ganzen Energieausmaß seinen eigentlichen 
Zwecken zu entfremden. Es kann nicht gelingen, und wenn die Einschränkung der Sexualität 
zu weit getrieben werden soll, muß es alle Schädigungen eines Raubbaues mit sich bringen
29
 
(1955b, p. 59). 
Here Freud offers an opposite warning to the one given by Nietzsche, who cautioned the 
artist against squandering all of his energies in the sexual act, leaving none for artistic 
creation (cited on page 136). If the opposite is attempted, Freud explains, and the individual 
(including the artist) attempts to divert all of his sexual energy into non-sexual activity, he 
may become exhausted. Illness and fatigue will often be the reward of the individual who 
attempts immoderate sublimation, and who overstretches himself in this way. It seems that 
the process, for Freud, requires equilibrium in order to optimise it. The phenomenon of 
sublimation, then, is one which requires careful, but unconscious, negotiation, and failed or 
ineffective sublimation can prove harmful both to creative goals and to the individual who 
aspires to them. Some of these dangers will be seen in Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s portrayals 
of sublimation later on in this chapter, which also appear to posit equilibrium as a crucial part 
of this delicate process. 
So far, references to the subject of Freudian sublimation have all suggested a male 
participant, and not without reason. Freud’s scepticism regarding the possibility of 
sublimation in women is made explicit in several places. In Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, for 
example, he notes that women are ‘little capable’30 (1955d, p. 463) of sublimation, 
                                                          
29
 ‘But just as we do not expect our machines to transform more than a certain fraction of the heat consumed 
into useful mechanical work, so we should not seek to alienate the whole of the sexual drive from its actual 
aims. It cannot succeed, and if the constraints upon sexuality should be too extreme, it would lead to all of the 
damages of exhaustive cultivation’  
30
 ‘wenig gewachsen’. 
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civilisation having become ‘immer mehr Sache der Männer’31 (ibid.). Here Freud claims that 
men, able to achieve sublimation and participate in cultural matters, must hold back a certain 
amount of energy from sexual (and family) pursuits, which are evidently the realm of women. 
The resulting distance that develops between man and family creates hostility in women, 
whom civilisation has forced ‘in den Hintergrund’32 (ibid.). Levine traces the alleged 
incapacity for sublimation in women to Freud’s notion of castration anxiety in male infants, 
and the lack thereof in female infants:
33
 because there is ‘no threat of castration’ (2002, p. 
266) for girls, they ‘fail to internalise the authority of their father, and consequently fail to 
fully develop a super-ego and a capacity for sublimation’ (ibid.). In addition, Levine notes, 
‘shame at their “inferior” genitals causes repression rather than sublimation of woman’s 
sexuality’34 (ibid.). While these ideas and claims have been challenged and discredited (ibid.), 
they arguably draw on notions and prejudices prevalent at the time, and may be relevant to 
Mann’s and (especially) d’Annunzio’s contemporary depictions of sublimation.  
 As will shortly be seen, while there may not be a complete correspondence between 
Freud’s version of sublimation, and the portrayals of this phenomenon in the texts of Mann 
and d’Annunzio, there are striking affinities nevertheless. Freud’s location of the origins of 
psychological particularities in childhood occurrences is arguably not as strongly reflected by 
d’Annunzio and Mann, for example, but there is still a strong case for interpreting the 
experiences of Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s artistic characters in terms of Freudian sublimation. 
                                                          
31
 ‘increasingly the concern of men’. 
32
 ‘into the background’. 
33
 Freud gives a definition of castration complex and penis envy in the second of his Drei Abhandlungen zur 
Sexualtheorie, which is entitled ‘Die infantile Sexualität’ (‘Infantile Sexuality’). He discusses his idea of penis 
envy more at length in ‘Einige psychische Folgen des anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschiedes’ (‘Some 
Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Differences Between the Sexes’, 1925). 
34
 In ‘Einige psychische Folgen des anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschiedes’, Freud claims that female infants 
go through a ‘phallic’ period, ‘bald nach den Anzeichen des Penisneides’ (‘soon after the manifestation of penis-
envy’ [1955d, p. 27]), which is followed by ‘eine intensive Gegenströmung gegen die Onanie’ (‘an intense 
countercurrent against masturbation’ [ibid]). He attributes this occurrence to ‘jenes Verdrängungsschubes, der 
zur Zeit der Pubertät ein großes Stück der männlichen Sexualität beseitigen wird, um Raum für die Entwicklung 
der Weiblichkeit zu schaffen’ (‘that phase of repression which, at the time of puberty, eradicates a large part of 
the girl’s masculine sexuality in order to make room for the development of her femininity’ [ibid]).  
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The close connection between Freud’s ideas regarding sublimation and literary texts is 
illustrated by Richard Sterba’s report (1985, p. 118; Sterba was a colleague of Freud’s) that 
Freud claimed to have arrived at the idea after reading Heinrich Heine’s Die Harzreise (The 
Harz Journey, 1826). After establishing Nietzsche’s understanding of this psychological 
phenomenon, an exploration of Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s texts will reveal these substantial 
affinities. 
 
iii) Nietzsche and Sublimation 
While sublimation is arguably less extensively and comprehensively treated by Nietzsche 
than by Freud, Nietzsche’s understanding of this psychological process foreshadows Freud’s 
conception to a considerable degree, and is highly relevant to an understanding of Mann’s 
and d’Annunzio’s portrayals of Dionysian creativity. While it is possible, even likely in the 
case of Mann, that the two writers came across the idea of sublimation in Nietzsche’s 
writings, the fragmentary and often implicit nature of Nietzsche’s treatment of the 
psychological phenomenon means that it will not be argued here that Nietzsche was a direct 
influence on Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s understandings of sublimation. Instead, while it is 
acknowledged that this may have been the case, Nietzsche’s idea of sublimation will be used 
instead as a tool to illuminate and analyse the sublimation we see portrayed in the literary 
texts under discussion. Striking affinities will be uncovered, rendering Nietzsche’s 
understanding of sublimation a useful explanatory device that complements the clarification 
offered by Freud. Modern usage of the term ‘sublimation’ owes much to Nietzsche: 
Kaufmann notes that the term ‘sublimation’ had already been used ‘in modern times [by] 
Goethe, Novalis, and Schopenhauer’ (1974, p. 219), but that ‘the specific connotation it has 
today’ (ibid.) is due to Nietzsche. While Nietzsche refers to sublimation (‘Sublimirung’) 
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explicitly only 37 times in his writings, passages describing a process strongly resembling 
sublimation have been noted by several commentators.  
 It is important to note, firstly, that Nietzsche, like Freud, saw humans as ‘collections 
of drives’35 (Gemes, 2009, p. 46). This can be seen in Jenseits von Gut und Böse, for 
example, where Nietzsche talks of interactions between ‘die Grundtriebe des Menschen’36 
(JGB-6). Some of these drives, according to Nietzsche, work towards similar ends, while 
others are completely opposite in their aims. Although Nietzsche appears not to have used the 
term ‘repression’ (‘Verdrängung’) in the context of these drives, the term ‘sublimated’ 
(‘sublimirt’) is used in connection with them. When these passages are examined, striking 
parallels between Freud’s and Nietzsche’s ideas of sublimation emerge. As Schacht, who 
finds that Nietzsche’s interest in sublimation increased around the time of Die fröhliche 
Wissenschaft, notes, Nietzsche found that ‘different sorts of social and cultural conditions’ 
(2006, p. 119) have the ability to modify our affects and thoughts, echoing the role played by 
civilisation in the development of Freudian sublimation. Elsewhere he argues convincingly 
that Nietzsche employs the term ‘spiritualisation’ (given in English, which Gemes translates 
as ‘Vergeistigung’ [2009, p. 56]) in the sense of ‘sublimation’ (Schacht, 1992, p. 323). 
Assoun notes that sublimation, for Nietzsche, is ‘a way of perfecting the instinct and 
rendering it useful’ (2006, p. 98), which is consonant with Freud’s view of sublimation as a 
creative and productive process. Some of these affinities will now be explained in greater 
detail.   
 In Götzen-Dämmerung, Nietzsche describes how ‘Alle Passionen haben eine Zeit, wo 
sie bloss verhängnissvoll sind, wo sie mit der Schwere der Dummheit ihr Opfer 
hinunterziehen — und eine spätere, sehr viel spätere, wo sie sich mit dem Geist verheirathen, 
                                                          
35
 For an investigation of Nietzsche’s use of the term ‘drive’, see Paul Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical 
Psychology’, in The Oxford Handbook to Nietzsche, ed. by Ken Gemes and John Richardson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 727-756.  
36
 ‘the basic drives of humans’. 
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sich “vergeistigenˮ’37 (GD-Moral-1). Here he suggests that human beings are capable 
(eventually) of ‘spiritualising’ passions, which Schach equates with ‘sublimation’. Nietzsche 
implies that the earlier expression of these passions had disastrous and harmful results and 
that spiritualisation therefore renders them more valuable. Crucially, Nietzsche appears to 
believe that in such processes the original passion, impulse, instinct or drive will not be 
abolished. These passions can be said to have been redirected into a more ‘spiritual’ form of 
expression, which anticipates Freud’s notion of sublimation. 
 Further affinities can be seen in section 16 of the second essay of Zur Genealogie der 
Moral (On the Genealogy of Morality, 1887), where Nietzsche explains the formation of ‘bad 
conscience’. Schacht (2006, p. 127) argues that this phenomenon can be seen as a case of 
sublimation, and Goebel finds Nietzsche to understand it as ‘the most subtle instrument of 
false sublimation’38 (2012, p. 82). The development of ‘bad conscience’, Nietzsche tells us, 
coincided with the emergence of societies, and with the recategorising of instincts which had 
previously been advantageous for survival (such as cruelty) as undesirable and hostile to 
society. The advent of society, Nietzsche claims, constituted a change no less tumultuous 
than the evolution of sea animals into land animals (GM-II-16). A frustration of the old 
instincts (now deemed undesirable) was effected through ‘Jene furchtbaren Bollwerke, mit 
denen sich die staatliche Organisation gegen die alten Instinkte der Freiheit schützte — die 
Strafen gehören vor Allem zu diesen Bollwerken’39 (GM-II-16). These frustrated instincts 
then turned inwards: ‘Die Feindschaft, die Grausamkeit, die Lust an der Verfolgung, am 
Überfall, am Wechsel, an der Zerstörung — Alles das gegen die Inhaber solcher Instinkte 
                                                          
37
 ‘All passions have a time when they are merely disastrous, where they suck their victim down with the weight 
of their stupidity – and a later, much later, time, where they become wedded to the spirit, where they are 
“spiritualised”’.   
38
 For Nietzsche, a ‘false sublimation’, Goebel explains, is one that involves ‘the weakening of the drives’ (p. 
xi). 
39
 ‘Those terrible bullwarks, with which state organisations protected freedom from the old instincts – above all, 
punishments belong to these bullwarks’. 
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sich wendend: das ist der Ursprung des “schlechten Gewissensˮ’40 (GM-II-16). As Schacht 
argues, in his account of the origin of ‘bad conscience’ Nietzsche ‘introduced a theory of 
drive or instinct inhibition, internalisation, and sublimation that is one of the hallmarks and 
central features of his philosophical psychology and anthropology’ (2006, p. 127). Here 
Nietzsche demonstrates the ability of sublimation to alter the psychology of civilisation as a 
whole, as well as that of the individuals who make up this social group, reflecting Freud’s 
own concerns. While Nietzsche may not consider ‘bad conscience’ to be a positive outcome 
of sublimation, the process by which this takes place reveals much about Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the psychological phenomenon.  
That the process of redirection can be, for Nietzsche, negative is echoed again in a 
note from 1881 which speaks of the possible consequences of a refinement (‘[Verfeinerung]’) 
of the sexual drive. Nietzsche lists ‘Menschenliebe, Anbetung von Maria und Heiligen, 
künstlerische Schwärmerei’41 (NF-1881, 11 [24]) as potential outcomes of this sublimation. 
On several occasions Nietzsche criticises Christianity for bringing about a sublimation of the 
sexual drive and causing the original drive to be viewed as unclean and undesirable. 
Nietzsche finds Schopenhauer to have advocated a similar kind of ‘false sublimation’ 
(Goebel, 2012, p. 82), leading Nietzsche to label him ‘der Erbe der christlichen 
Interpretation’42 (GD-Streifzuege-21). As noted earlier, and as Goebel argued (2012, p. 5), 
Schopenhauer saw no possibility for a life-affirming form of sublimation, and instead argued 
for mortification of the flesh and withdrawal from the world. 
 Elsewhere Nietzsche appears to find sublimation a useful process to be endorsed. In a 
note from 1885, for example, he declares, ‘Ich wünsche mir selber und allen denen, welche 
ohne die Ängste eines Puritaner-Gewissens leben — leben dürfen —, eine immer größere 
                                                          
40
 ‘Animosity, cruelty, pleasure in pursuing, in attacking, in changing and in destroying – all this turned against 
he who had such instincts: that is the origin of “bad conscience”’. 
41
 ‘human love, worship of Mary and the saints, artistic ecstasy’. 
42
 ‘the heir of the Christian interpretation’. 
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Vergeistigung und Vervielfältigung der Sinne’43 (NF-1885, 37 [12]). Sublimation (or 
‘spiritualisation’) must not necessarily work against the senses, as it does in the practices of 
the Church. It can be a way of embracing and maximising the senses. Following this 
declaration, Nietzsche states that we must value the senses for their ‘Feinheit, Fülle und 
Kraft’44 (ibid.) and honour them with our spirituality (‘Geist’). Sublimation for Nietzsche is 
not limited to the ‘spiritualisation’ of sexual and sensual impulses and it can act upon drives 
like aggression and revenge. In two separate notes from 1883 he claims that ‘Alle Tugenden 
sind eigentlich verfeinerte Leidenschaften und erhöhte Zustände’45 (NF-1883, 24 [1]) and 
posits ‘Gerechtigkeit als Entwicklung des Rachetriebes’46 (NF-1883, 23 [31]). Whether 
Nietzsche intends ‘Tugenden’ (‘virtues’) in a positive or negative sense is unclear, but this 
brief note nevertheless illustrates Nietzsche’s understanding of the process by which certain 
drives and instincts can be refined and redirected.  
 Anticipating Freud’s claims that sublimation can fuel creativity (of various kinds), 
Nietzsche speaks of the artistic value of sublimation (or ‘spiritualisation’). Just as Freud 
would posit sublimation (and repression) as key factors in the creation of civilisation, 
Nietzsche claims that ‘Fast Alles, was wir “höhere Cultur” nennen, beruht auf der 
Vergeistigung und Vertiefung der Grausamkeit’47 (JGB-229). Again he emphasises that the 
original drive or impulse will not be destroyed by such processes, but merely harnessed: the 
‘“wildes Thier”’48 (ibid.) which he posits as the source of cruelty behind higher culture, and 
which recalls the ‘wilde Bestie’49 (1955d, p. 471) that Freud found at the depths of modern 
man, hidden by layers of repression, is not slain but merely rendered spiritual and deified 
(‘vergöttlicht’). In a later note Nietzsche also highlights the sexual undercurrents of art, 
                                                          
43
 ‘I wish for myself and for all those, who live – who may live – without the fear of a puritanical conscience-, 
an ever greater spiritualisation and duplication of the senses’. 
44
 ‘subtlety, abundance and power’. 
45
 ‘All virtues are actually refined passions and heightened states’. 
46
 ‘Justice as a development of the drive for revenge’.  
47
 ‘Almost everything that we call “high cultureˮ rests upon the spiritualisation and absorption of cruelty’. 
48
 ‘“wild animal”’. 
49
 ‘wild beast’.  
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which comes about through sublimation. He finds art to constitute a ‘disguised’ version of 
sensuality, ‘Die Sinnlichkeit in ihren Verkleidungen’50 (NF-1887, 8 [1]). Another note from 
the same year reaffirms the interrelatedness of sexuality and creativity: ‘Das Verlangen nach 
Kunst und Schönheit ist ein indirektes Verlangen nach den Entzückungen 
des Geschlechtstriebes’51 (NF-1887, 8 [1]). The word ‘indirekt’ here even suggests a drive 
which has undergone redirection, and the statement recalls Freud’s own findings that the 
artist benefits from sexual arousal, and should not forgo it completely. 
Sublimation in a different creative context can be seen in a passage from Ecce homo, 
which is highlighted by Gemes (2009, p. 47). In this passage, Nietzsche explains how one 
achieves the self-creative and affirmative goal of becoming what one is (‘[wie] man wird, 
was man ist’52 [EH-Klug-9]): 
Inzwischen wächst und wächst die organisirende, die zur Herrschaft berufne “Ideeˮ in der 
Tiefe, — sie beginnt zu befehlen, sie leitet langsam aus Nebenwegen und Abwegen zurück, 
sie bereitet einzelne Qualitäten und Tüchtigkeiten vor, die einmal als Mittel zum Ganzen sich 
unentbehrlich erweisen werden, — sie bildet der Reihe nach alle dienenden Vermögen aus, 




Here, one drive – the dominating drive – redirects subservient drives and trains them towards 
its (the dominant drive’s) own ends. In this way, weaker and stronger drives are united in 
their goals, allowing the individual to become what he is. The importance to Nietzsche of 
                                                          
50
 ‘The senses in their disguises’. This motto is the subtitle of Ecce homo. 
51
 ‘The desire for art and beauty is an indirect desire for the delights of the sexual drive’.  
52
 ‘[how] one becomes what one is’. 
53
 ‘In the meantime the organising “idea”, which is appointed as the dominating “idea”, grows deep down, – it 
begins to command, it slowly leads us back out of byroads and detours, it prepares single qualities and 
capabilities that will, one day, will prove themselves essential as a medium towards the whole, – it trains, in 
sequence, all serving faculties, before it allows anything of the dominating task, of the “aim”, “purpose”, 
“meaning”, to be sounded.’ 
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united drives is highlighted by Gemes, who cites another passage by way of illustration, this 
time from Nietzsche’s Nachlaß: 
Die Vielheit und Disgregation der Antriebe, der Mangel an System unter ihnen resultirt als 
“schwacher Willeˮ; die Koordination derselben unter der Vorherrschaft eines einzelnen 
resultirt als “starker Willeˮ; – im erstern Falle ist es das Oscilliren und der Mangel an 
Schwergewicht; im letztern die Präcision und Klarheit der Richtung.
54
 (NF-1888, 14 [219]) 
For Nietzsche, then, unification of drives leads to a ‘strong will’, while disparate and 
fragmented drives result in a ‘weak will’. Gemes summarises Nietzsche’s understanding of 
sublimation thus: ‘sublimations involve integration or unification, while pathological 
symptoms involve splitting off or disintegration’ (2009, p. 48). The subject must not attempt 
to abolish a drive completely, if he is to put it to creative use, for this would lead to 
Ressentiment (as seen in Christianity, which sublimated the hostility of individuals towards 
one another and turned it into love [JGB-189]); it must instead be trained and redirected.  
It is in this stipulation that Gemes finds a way of resolving the potential problem, 
alluded to earlier, that may arise from Freud’s understanding of sublimation, namely, that it 
can be difficult to distinguish between sublimation and neurosis. In Freud’s version of events, 
neurotic symptoms can result if the ideational component of the sexual drive is suppressed 
while its energetic component is allowed to manifest itself, but in an activity that civilisation 
judges negatively (such as compulsive behaviour). In Nietzschean terms, these neurotic 
symptoms represent a non-unified collection of drives, for the drive which brings about the 
neurotic symptoms has not been trained to act towards the goal of the dominant drive. In the 
converse case, Freud’s subject sublimates his sexual drive through a socially valued activity, 
such as the creation of art, which, in Nietzsche’s terms, occurs in accordance with the 
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 ‘The multiplicity and disgregation of urges, and the lack of system amongst them, results in a “weak will; the 
coordination of the same [urges] under the dominance of one [urge] results in a “strong will”; – in the first case 
there is oscillation and a lack of gravity; in the second case a precision and clarity of direction’ 
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subject’s dominant drive, thus avoiding fragmentation and neurotic symptoms. What 
Nietzsche refers to as a lack of gravity and unity, resulting in a weak will, would thus 
constitute an equivalent to Freud’s notion of neurosis, while what Nietzsche refers to as the 
cooperation of drives, resulting in a strong will, demonstrates successful sublimation.  
 Schacht explores how Nietzschean sublimation (or ‘spiritualisation’) takes place, and 
claims that, for Nietzsche, ‘all […] spiritualisations of the affects have as their general 
precondition the learning of restraint’ (1992, p. 325). This can be seen especially in a passage 
Schacht highlights from Götzen-Dämmerung, in which Nietzsche explains this first 
precondition for reaching spirituality: ‘auf einen Reiz nicht sofort reagiren, sondern die 
hemmenden, die abschliessenden Instinkte in die Hand bekommen’55 (GD-Deutschen-6). A 
failure to achieve this, and a tendency to react instantly to all stimulants, leads (Nietzsche 
claims) to ‘Krankhaftigkeit, Niedergang, Symptom der Erschöpfung’56 (ibid.). Here 
Nietzsche explains that spirituality, or sublimation, requires one to take control over one’s 
various instincts, echoing the idea that sublimation involves the unification of disparate 
drives. A note from 1886 offers a similar warning to this passage from Götzen-Dämmerung, 
by explaining the implications of failing to unify and sublimate various and opposing drives, 
and of attempting to satisfy them all (in the sense of reacting to all stimulants): ‘wo sie alle 
Befriedigung wollen, [ist] ein Mensch von tiefer Mittelmäßigkeit zu denken’57 (NF-1886, 7 
[3]). Sublimation, then, appears to be a means of escaping mediocrity, and of achieving 
greatness, maybe even creative greatness.  
 For both Freud and Nietzsche, sublimation is a psychological phenomenon which 
involves the redirection of certain drives, which can be harnessed for creative activity. Both 
seem to find an element of danger or precariousness in the process. Freud cautions against 
attempting over-extreme sublimation beyond the capacity of the subject, as well as explaining 
                                                          
55
 ‘not to react immediately to a stimulus, but to take control of the debilitating, isolating instincts’.  
56
 ‘morbidity, decline, symptom of exhaustion’. 
57
 ‘where they all demand satisfaction, a being of profound mediocrity will result’.  
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the harmful implications of failed sublimation. Nietzsche, too, gives a warning regarding 
failed sublimation – which results in fragmentation and disparate drives. A warning may also 
lie in Nietzsche’s claims that sublimation does not actually destroy the ‘“wildes Thier”’58 that 
lurks beneath culture and civilisation. While neither speaks of the Dionysian in the context of 
sublimation, it is a drive to which the theories of both could be applied. For Nietzsche, 
sublimation is not a phenomenon that acts exclusively upon the sexual drive, and aspects of 
the Dionysian (such as its impetus towards reckless abandon, which may result in cruelty) 
arguably resemble those drives which Nietzsche describes as undergoing a process of 
sublimation into ‘bad conscience’, opening up the possibility of applying his understanding 
of sublimation to the Dionysian, too. While Freud more or less insists that sublimation only 
affects the sexual drive, the strong affinities that will be seen between Mann’s and 
d’Annunzio’s portrayals of Dionysian sublimation, and Freud’s notion of sublimation, invite 
application of this psychological idea to the literary texts under discussion. It is to these 
portrayals that we will now turn our attention, after presenting a brief overview of the writers’ 
relationships with Freud. 
 
iv) The Artist and Sublimation of the Dionysian 
While this thesis will not attempt to establish the extent to which Freud’s ideas regarding 
sublimation – or, indeed, Nietzsche’s – may have ‘influenced’ Mann or d’Annunzio, this 
overview will help to illustrate the relevance of Freud’s psychoanalytical theories to Mann 
and d’Annunzio. Brief consideration will therefore be given to any knowledge Mann and 
d’Annunzio may have had of Freud and to the critical history linking the two writers with 
Freud. 
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 ‘“wild animal”’. 
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While it is difficult to establish whether Mann and d’Annunzio were familiar with 
Nietzsche’s idea of sublimation, it has been established, both in this thesis and elsewhere, that 
both Mann and d’Annunzio read (at least some of) Nietzsche’s works and were familiar with 
many of his ideas, through both first- and second-hand discoveries. Mann at least, whose 
acquaintance with Nietzsche’s writings was intimate, is likely to have encountered 
references, including implicit ones, to sublimation in Nietzsche’s writings before Freud’s 
more famous use of the term. Nietzsche’s views regarding sublimation may well have helped 
to shape Mann’s own reflections upon the psychological process, although this chapter will 
argue the case for affinities rather than influence. In the case of d’Annunzio, citations from 
Jenseits von Gut und Böse – the first of Nietzsche’s texts to be translated into Italian, in 1899 
– at the beginning of Il trionfo della morte suggest that d’Annunzio had read at least part of 
Nietzsche’s text, in which references to, for example, man’s drives and to the sublimations in 
the form of Christianity can be found, although it is impossible to establish this with absolute 
certainty.  
While d’Annunzio, Mann and Freud were near contemporaries, most of d’Annunzio’s 
novels were written before or during the earliest stages of Freud’s writing career. It is only in 
the case of Mann’s fictional texts, therefore, that it would be possible to speak of a reception 
of Freud, or of Freud’s ideas having an impact. Indeed, as Spackman points out, referring to 
d’Annunzio’s novel of 1892, L’innocente, it could even be argued that d’Annunzio to some 
extent anticipated some of Freud’s ideas. Spackman notes the affinities between 
d’Annunzio’s novel, in which a man murders the baby of his wife by another man, and 
Freud’s famous Oedipus complex. She comments: ‘The mythical subtexts are too many, the 
variations on the family romance too obsessive, the rhetorical mechanisms too similar not to 
suspect that d’Annunzio here is discovering Freud’s terrain before Freud has even set foot on 
it’ (1989, p. 150). The words ‘sublimation’ (‘sublimazione’) and ‘sublimate’ (‘sublimare’) 
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can be found several times in various configurations in d’Annunzio’s writings, and 
commentators have found incidences of sublimation in d’Annunzio’s novels. Caburlotto, for 
example, talks about the sublimation of Venice that takes place in Il fuoco: ‘Venezia, 
l’emblema dell’arte, immersa nella melodia, si evolve fino a giungere alla sublimazione in 
musica’59 (2014, p. 85). Borelli (2012) refers to sublimation as the achievement of the 
protagonist in Forse che sì forse che no (Maybe Yes Maybe No, 1910) to describe aviator 
Paolo Tarsis’ escape from his debilitating sexual attraction for Isabella, whose base, fleshy 
body is juxtaposed with the lightness and freedom of flight. While sublimation of the sexual 
drive has been noted in Il fuoco,
60
 no detailed study of this phenomenon in d’Annunzio’s 
novels seems to exist, and links between the Dionysian and sublimation remain unexplored.    
Bonadeo notes that ‘without any knowledge of psychology, d’Annunzio understood 
the meaning of sublimation’ (1995, p. 93) and he points to one of d’Annunzio’s later short 
stories, La leda senza cigna (Leda Without Swan, 1916), where sublimation is defined thus: 
‘Sublimare è d’una cosa bassa e corrotta farla alta, e grande, cioè pura’61 (d’Annunzio, 1989, 
p. 1062). This definition posits the object of sublimation as a something negative, which must 
be improved; this chapter will argue, however, that d’Annunzio does not always see 
sublimation in this way, and that in Il fuoco he portrays the successful sublimation of drives 
(the Dionysian, and its impulse to sexual abandon) which are not inherently negative. While 
the sexual drive, for example, can certainly be base and impure for d’Annunzio, especially in 
Il trionfo della morte, it can also be creatively inspiring and transcendent, most notably in Il 
fuoco.  
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 ‘Venice, the emblem of art, immersed in melody, evolves until it is sublimated in music’. 
60
 Boccali, for example, talks of the sublimation effected by the fire of Effrena’s words during his oration: ‘Il 
fuoco alchemico prodotto dalle parole dell’oratore, dalla sua arte divine, avvampa in tutta la città, consuma tutti 
gli elementi funerei e putridi er far nascere altre parole e altre immagini attraverso un’azione di sublimazione e 
di decontaminazione’ (‘The alchemic flame produced by the words of the orator and by his divine art, burns 
throughout the city, consumes all of its funereal and putrid elements and provokes the birth of other words and 
other images, through an action of sublimation and of decontamination’ [2011, p. 109]). 
61
 ‘Sublimation is where a base and corrupt thing is elevated, and made great, that is, pure’. 
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 In the case of Thomas Mann, a reception of Freud’s ideas is more visible, thanks, in 
part, to Mann’s two essays concerning Freud: ‘Die Stellung Freuds in der modernen 
Geistesgeschichte’ (‘Freud’s Place in the History of Modern Thought’, 1929) and ‘Freud und 
die Zukunft’ (‘Freud and the Future’, 1936). While Mann praises Freud in both essays, he 
also betrays an element of (personal) ambiguity regarding psychoanalysis itself. In an 
interview with La Stampa in 1928 Mann calls psychoanalysis ‘una specie di attaco generale 
contro il subcosciente’62 (Sorani, 1925, p. 3) and likens Freud’s analysis of the artist to an X-
ray image that could even harm creativity.
63
 The possibility of a Freudian influence on 
Mann’s literature has received much critical attention. Michael (1950), for example, 
investigates Mann’s claims about when he actually read Freud, mindful of the apparent 
affinities with Freud in Der Zauberberg (The Magic Mountain, 1924), concluding that in 
1924 Mann knew only ‘das Allgemeinste von dem Werk Freuds’64 (p. 169). As Mann himself 
noted in 1944, in a quotation cited by Michael, ‘One could be influenced in this sphere 
without any direct contact with his work, because for a long time the air had been filled with 
the thoughts and results of the psychoanalytic school’ (ibid. [original text in English]). Mann 
himself claimed not to have read Freud before writing Der Zauberberg, leaving a window of 
five years in which he must have become more directly acquainted with Freud’s ideas before 
his 1929 essay. With this in mind, Mann’s statement, made in the 1928 La Stampa interview, 
that Der Tod in Venedig – the latest publication of the texts under consideration in this thesis 
– came about under the influence of Freud,65 must refer to a second-hand reception of Freud’s 
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 ‘a kind of general offensive against the subconscious’.  
63
 To Sorani Mann states: ‘come artista, io devo convenire di non essere del tutto soddisfatto e consolato 
dall’idea freudiana, e dalla sua fortuna. Infatti, come artista, io mi sento turbato e diminuito da Freud, perché 
dall’idea di Freud l’artista resta penetrato come da un fascio di raggi Roentgen, troppo penetrato, penetrato sino 
alla violenza del mistero dell’azione’ (‘as an artist I must agree that I am not wholly satisfied and comforted by 
the idea of Freud, and by its reception. In fact, as an artist, I feel agitated and diminished by Freud, because his 
idea penetrates the artist like an X-ray – it penetrates too deep and violates the mystery of artistic activity’ [p. 
3]). 
64
 ‘the most general aspects of Freud’s works’. 
65
 ‘Quanto a me, è certo che almeno un mio romanzo, La morte a Venezia, ha risentito dell’influsso freudiano. 
Senza aver conosciuto Freud, io non sarei stato portato a trattare questo soggetto erotico, un soggetto erotico 
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ideas, which, as Mann noted, had entered into the common intellectual consciousness of the 
time.  
 With regards to the idea of sublimation, Goebel finds that ‘One could with relative 
ease develop the hypothesis that Thomas Mann’s work delivers a far-reaching 
phenomenology of sublimation and inhibition’ (2012, p. 156). Goebel also suggests that 
Mann’s literature which portrayed sublimation, was, itself produced as an act of sublimation, 
allowing Mann to manage ‘frustrated instinctual desires’ (p. 158). Many commentators have 
found that sublimation plays a significant role in Mann’s fiction, including Doktor Faustus 
(Bridges, 1999) and, more commonly, Der Tod in Venedig. Kohut, for example, 
psychoanalyses Aschenbach, as part of his psychoanalysis of Mann, and finds that ‘the 
waxing and waning of artistic productivity in Aschenbach seems to run parallel with the 
predominance of either sublimated or unsublimated homosexual strivings’ (2011, p. 127). For 
Kohut – as for most commentators – it is exclusively the homosexual drive which 
Aschenbach must sublimate, contrary to the argument advanced in this thesis. Similarly, 
while Wieler suggests that Tonio Kröger’s ‘Arbeitswut’ (‘work-mania’ [1996, p. 386]) serves 
‘der Sublimation eines unbefriedigten Daseins’66 (ibid.), sublimation is only mentioned in 
passing and there is no mention of the Dionysian.  
While sublimation has been noted in the literature of Mann and d’Annunzio, 
therefore, very few comprehensive studies of their portrayal of sublimation exist, and 
sublimation of the Dionysian into artistic activity has not yet been critically explored. 
Attention will now turn to Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s fictional artists, and their experiences of 
sublimation – both successful and unsuccessful. Those artists who achieve sublimation, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
così particolare e morboso, o almeno non avrei concepito così il racconto della [...] fine del mio eroe’ (‘As far as 
I am concered, it is certain that at least one of my novels, Death in Vence, was affected by the influence of 
Freud. Had I not know Freud, I would not have been moved to treat this erotic subject, an erotic subject so 
peculiar and morbid, or at least I would not have conceived of the end of my hero in the same way’ [Sorani, 
1925, p. 3]). 
66
 ‘the sublimation of an unsatisfied existence’. 
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leading to creativity, will be examined first, before moving on to consider those artists who 
fail to achieve, or even to attempt, sublimation. Consideration will also be given throughout 
to the nature of the sublimation processes presented, and whether, when Mann and 
d’Annunzio depict their failure, they do so as criticism of the processes themselves or of the 
object of the (attempted) sublimation. 
 Tonio Kröger and Stelio Effrena have, throughout this thesis, been posited as the most 
successful and ‘healthy’ of the artists under consideration. Both artists experience an 
intensification of the sexual drive when they engage with the Dionysian (Kröger in his carnal 
adventures in the south, Effrena in his relationship with Foscarina, the ‘Dionysian’ woman), 
along with impulses of abandon and wildness. In the case of Kröger, especially, this wildness 
and hedonism constitutes a stark contrast to the principles of discipline and self-control that 
have been instilled in him throughout childhood and adolescence. Kröger’s experience of the 
Dionysian is far milder than Effrena’s, perhaps because, for Mann, this is the only way in 
which the Dionysian can be safely negotiated.   
 No sooner has Kröger indulged in Dionysian excesses in the south, than his 
conscience protests and voices its disapproval of such wild behaviour. This conscience is the 
source of Kröger’s ‘Ekel und Haß gegen die Sinne’67 (Mann, 2004, p. 265), and could be 
termed a ‘reaction formation’, recalling Freud’s explanation of the development of disgust 
and shame in infants in his Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie. Just as the infant (in 
Freud’s theory) makes use of these sensations to avoid anxiety, which occurs when the infant 
receives disapproval for following drives and instincts considered inappropriate by parental 
figures and society in general, Kröger’s sensations of distaste draw him away from the 
promiscuities of the south, relieving him of guilt (‘heiße Schuld’68 [p. 264]). As noted earlier, 
Freud considers such ‘reaction formations’ to constitute a ‘sub-species’ of sublimation, and 
                                                          
67
 ‘disgust and hatred of the senses’. 
68
 ‘hot guilt’. 
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Kröger’s reaction of shame could be regarded as a sublimation of guilt. This seems to be a 
‘paternally inherited’ reaction, and opposes the maternal influence of the south,69 preventing 
it from becoming Kröger’s dominant side. The result is equilibrium between these various 
psychological influences.  
Here, the object of sublimation is without doubt the Dionysian. It is the impulses of 
the south that most threaten Kröger, and for Mann the south is commonly associated with 
Dionysus (as a realm of ‘Sammetblauer Himmel, heißer Wein und süße Sinnlichkeit’70 [p. 
282], as Tonio Kröger describes Italy); Mann also likens the atmosphere of the south to an 
eternal spring (‘eines beständigen Frühlings’71 [p. 265]) – spring is season of Dionysus.72 The 
kind of impulses that Kröger obeys in the south, at least initially, before his burgherly 
conscience protests, strongly resemble those of the Dionysian, as described by Nietzsche and 
as portrayed by Mann elsewhere: abandon, recklessness, suspension of identity and 
licentiousness all characterise Kröger’s southern adventures. Additionally, Kröger’s 
adventures in the south recall to some extent those of Aschenbach, where the Dionysian is all 
but named. As has already been noted, however, affinities between Aschenbach and Kröger 
do not extend to the outcome of their engagement with the Dionysian.  
 To use Nietzsche’s language of sublimation, Kröger arguably achieves unity of his 
various drives. Crucially, however, this happens in such a way that the two sides of Kröger’s 
character triumph together. There is no repression of the Dionysian, and both sides of 
Kröger’s nature cooperate, resulting in the non-sexual activity of artistic creation. A balance 
between these two sides appears to offer the most fruitful formula for creativity. Kröger 
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 Mann writes, ‘vielleicht war es das Blut seiner Mutter, welches ihn dorthin zog’ (‘maybe it was the blood of 
his mother that drew him there’ [p. 264).  
70
 ‘velvet blue sky, hot wine and sweet sensuality’.  
71
 ‘a constant spring’. 
72
 In Die Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche writes: ‘bei dem gewaltigen, die ganze Natur lustvoll durchdringenden 
Nahen des Frühlings erwachen jene dionysischen Regungen, in deren Steigerung das Subjective zu völliger 
Selbstvergessenheit hinschwindet’ (‘with the violent approach of spring, which lustfully penetrates the whole of 




successfully brings his (Dionysian) impulse towards licentiousness and hedonism in line with 
his drive towards artistic productivity, largely through his reaction of shame and disgust. His 
desire, or compulsion, to create art harnesses both his more sensual, bohemian side, as well as 
his burgherly, productive side. At this point in Mann’s novella, however, Kröger still appears 
uncertain of his inner conflicts and remains ‘haltlos zwischen krassen Extremen, zwischen 
eisiger Geistigkeit und verzehrender Sinnenglut hin und her geworfen’73 (Mann, 2004, p. 
265).  
Yet in this cooperation between northern, paternal drives and southern, maternal 
drives, we arguably find an anticipation of the state of self-security and unity that Kröger 
achieves by the end of Mann’s novella, when he affirms the two sides of his character, and 
profits from their fruitful tension. Here he declares that it is precisely his burgherly love of 
mankind, in all its banality, that makes him a Dichter, rather than a Literat (p. 318),
74
 
affirming the unity of his position. Art now appears to bridge the two sides of Kröger’s 
character and has become his dominant drive, subjugating both his (Dionysian) impetus 
towards intoxication and hedonism, and his burgherly impetus towards productivity and 
respectability. He writes to Lisaweta, ‘Ich schaue in eine ungeborene und schemenhafte Welt 
hinein, die geordnet und gebildet sein will’75 (p. 318), suggesting an impetus towards inner 
harmony and organisation that echoes Nietzsche’s idea of sublimation, in which organised 
and unified drives result in ‘die Präcision und Klarheit’.76 Indeed, Kröger’s final letter to 
Lisaweta, with which Mann’s novella closes, exudes clarity and control, and he confidently 
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 ‘adrift between stark extremes, thrown back and forth between icy intellect and consuming sensual ardour’. 
74
 In an abandoned essay entitled ‘Geist und Kunst’ (‘Intellect and Art’) Mann explains the difference between 
the Dichter (commonly translated as ‘poet’) and the Schriftsteller (synonymous with the Literat, and usually 
translated as ‘writer’), as cited by Reed: ‘Der Dichter geht von der Idee aus und setzt sie in Plastik, Gestaltung 
und Leben um. Der reine (absolute) Schriftsteller geht vom Leben, Erlebnis, dem Sinnlichen aus und setzt es in 
Ideen, in Geist urn, “verwandelt alles in Licht und Flammenˮ, wie Nietzsche sagt’ (‘The Dichter departs from 
the idea and translates it into sculpture, form and life. The pure (absolute) Schriftsteller departs from life, 
experience, the sensual, and translates it into ideas, into intellect, “transforms everything into light and flame”, 
as Nietzsche says’ [1996, p. 76]). 
75
 ‘I gaze into an unborn and hazy world that wishes to be ordered and refined’. 
76
 ‘precision and clarity’. 
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announces his imminent creativity, which will allow him to surpass anything he has yet 
produced. The extent of Kröger’s hard-fought achievement is rendered even clearer by the 
experiences of Aschenbach, whose failed sublimation will be considered shortly. 
 Tonio Kröger’s sublimation of the Dionysian, which allows him to channel the 
various impulses of the potent drive into artistic creation, rather than hedonism, appears to be 
a relatively smooth process. At no point does Mann suggest that Kröger, or his creativity, are 
endangered, and the subtlety of Kröger’s Dionysian experience gives the impression that he is 
likely to harness this creative – but dangerous – drive. The fact that his conscience reacts so 
swiftly with disgust and shame when he experiences the wild (and more dangerous) side of 
the Dionysian seems crucial. An artist who shares Kröger’s success in sublimating the 
Dionysian, but who arguably encounters greater obstacles in the process, is Il fuoco’s Stelio 
Effrena.  
 In Il fuoco, the Dionysian unleashes a sexual urge which appears more turbulent and 
rebellious than the one explored in Tonio Kröger. The most prominent aspect of the 
Dionysian in Il fuoco is probably its promotion of sexual arousal. The Dionysian overtones of 
the sexual arousal depicted in this novel have been seen in previous chapters. Sexuality is 
seen here as an aid to, even as a precondition of, creativity, but it can also threaten the artist’s 
task (in both cases echoing Nietzsche and Freud). While Effrena is no burgher and is not 
possessed of a Leistungsethik that reproaches him for his excesses (as happens to Kröger and 
Aschenbach), the sexual drive in Il fuoco is shown to constitute a considerable distraction to 
creative productivity. Nietzsche’s warning that the artist must not squander all of his energies 
in sexual gratification, for fear of leaving none for artistic creation, seems pertinent to 
d’Annunzio’s novel. As in Tonio Kröger, however, the impulses of the Dionysian must not 
be repressed or suppressed, but instead be embraced by the artist and channelled into 
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creativity. Alone among the texts under consideration, Il fuoco depicts sublimation as the 
goal of the primary artist (Effrena), as well as his lover, muse, and artistic tool (Foscarina). 
 Sexual possession of the Dionysian woman is a crucial stage of Effrena’s creativity. 
As has been seen, she allows him to exploit ancient creative energies that she has 
rediscovered and employ them in his art. The sexual foundation of their creativity is made 
clear. During an ecstatic episode of collaborative creativity, for example, Effrena, creatively 
and sexually charged, seems about to rape Foscarina: ‘L’animatore andò verso di lei con 
impeto come se volesse percuoterla per trarne scintille’77 (d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 472). When 
Effrena instructs Foscarina as an artist directing an actor (notably a female actor), her 
submissiveness seems sexual as well as creative: her body becomes ‘concavo’ (‘concave’ [p. 
211] and receptive. Such episodes demonstrate the inseparable relationship between 
creativity and sexuality. Sexuality is crucial to the kind of (Dionysian) creativity for which 
Effrena strives. But elsewhere in Il fuoco, we see sexuality undermining creativity and 
presenting an obstacle to the artist’s goal. It is in these instances that the necessity of 
sublimation is seen.  
 At times in Il fuoco, the effects of the Dionysian remain anchored in the body and its 
gratifications, and they are not allowed to reach and enrich the mind of the artist. At these 
times Dionysian abandon is expressed in purely carnal excesses, and energy that could fuel 
creativity is instead dissipated throughout the aroused body. Here Effrena appears to lack the 
discipline that Nietzsche urges when he recommends that the individual should not act 
immediately upon his desires and impulses. Instead Effrena responds instantly to the 
stimulation offered by his lover. This was seen in the previous chapter, where unrestrained 
Dionysian regression was shown to threaten civilisation with its promotion of near-bestial 
wildness. On the evening chosen by Effrena and Foscarina to consummate their relationship, 
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 ‘the creator moved towards her with force, as if he wanted to strike sparks from her’. 
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Effrena’s sexual desire for Foscarina becomes extreme, verging on madness: ‘Il suo desiderio 
fu insano e smisurato’78 (p. 304). While the Dionysian is present in this scene (Foscarina is, 
after all, the ‘donna dionisiaca’79 [p. 282], and is likened in this scene to a maenad), it is 
expressed here primarily as erotic, rather than artistic intoxication.  
 When sublimation succeeds in Il fuoco, it shifts the focus of the artist (and his muse) 
from the body to the mind. When this takes place, Foscarina’s body is no longer the tool of 
the lover, employed for physical pleasure, but the tool of the artist, put to creative use. It is in 
such moments that Foscarina’s body becomes a stimulant to the mind rather than the body of 
the artist.
80
 When creative intoxication reaches its zenith, and Foscarina is transfigured before 
Effrena’s eyes into the characters of his imminent drama, we read: ‘La Tragica palpitava 
come se di nuovo il soffio del dio l’invadesse. Ella era divenuta una materia ardente e duttile, 
soggetta a tutte le animazioni del poeta’81 (p. 472). Here, Foscarina, inspired by the breath of 
Dionysus, is now subject to the direction of the poet, where once she was subject to the 
instruction of her lover. The Dionysian, which is strongly associated (traditionally and also 
by d’Annunzio) with the body, bypasses the sexual organs and stimulates the creative mind 
instead, resulting in non-sexual activity. This is also seen towards the end of Il fuoco, when 
Foscarina expresses her ardent desire to serve Effrena as an artist, which is contrasted with 
the night following Effrena’s oration, when she had served him as a lover: ‘Come nella 
lontana ora del delirio notturno, la donna ripeteva: “Servire, servire!”’82 (p. 499) In 
Foscarina’s progression from carnal lover to artistic muse we see a reflection of Effrena’s 
own sublimation, for he eventually reaches a situation in which he sees neither Foscarina nor 
the singer Donatella Arvale (who had also exerted a sexual attraction over him) as sexual 
                                                          
78
 ‘His desire become insane and excessive’. 
79
 ‘Dionysian woman’. 
80
 ‘Si stupì che le linee d’un volto, le movenze d’un corpo umano potessero toccare e fecondare così fortemente 
l’intelletto’ (‘He was shocked that the lines of a face, the movements of a human body, could touch and fertilise 
the intellect so strongly’ [p. 470]). 
81
 ‘The Tragic one palpitated as if the breath of the god had once again invaded her. She had become an ardent 
and pliant material, subject to the animations of the poet’. 
82
 ‘As in the far off hour of nocturnal delirium, the woman repeated: “Let me serve, let me serve!” 
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objects, but solely as artistic tools.
83
 As Effrena reaches this successful resolution, he recalls 
the earlier precariousness of his position, caught between the drives of the libidinous lover 
and those of the aspiring artist. During the Dionysian ecstasy that followed his oration, he 
recalls, he had issued a call to Foscarina, ‘non per l’amore soltanto ma per la gloria, non per 
una sete sola ma per due seti; e non sapevo quale fosse la più ardente’84 (p. 494). The ‘two 
thirsts’ of which Effrena speaks are clearly that of the lover’s body and that of the artist’s 
mind, and at the end of Il fuoco the ‘most ardent’ is doubtless that of the artist. 
In this shift from sexual to creative desire, however, the erotic origins of the impulses 
in play are clear. The likening of Foscarina and Donatella to bows ready to be drawn, for 
example, indicates a clear sexual undercurrent, placing the malleable bodies of the women in 
the hands of a powerful male. Similarly, when Foscarina becomes ‘una materia ardente e 
duttile’85 (p. 472), she seems simultaneously creatively and sexually submissive, especially 
given the virility of the artistic-superuomo. The crucial difference between this episode and 
earlier episodes is the outcome, which is a creativity ready to produce great works. The trace 
of sexuality often seen in creative sublimation in Il fuoco arguably tallies with Freud’s notion 
of sublimation, for the sexual drive has not been stifled, merely channelled into culturally 
valued activity. While hints at the sexual origins of Effrena’s creativity may, in Freudian 
terms, betray the ideational component of the sexual drive, d’Annunzio’s is an artistic 
depiction of the process, one in which the reader arguably gains a deeper, and more revealing, 
insight into the protagonist than the psychoanalyst with a patient.  
 Again, Nietzsche’s explanation of sublimation can be applied. While Effrena once felt 
himself to be fragmented and torn, at times a lover and at times an artist, now his drives are 
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 ‘Sentì che in quell’ora egli non amava nessuno: non lei, non Donatella: ma che le considerava entrambe come 
puri strumenti dell’arte, come forze da adoprare, ‟archi da tendere”’ (‘She felt that in that hour he loved nobody 
– not her, not Donatella – but that he considered both as pure instruments of art, as forces to be employed, 
“bows to draw”’ [p. 478]). 
84
 ‘not just for love but also for glory, not for one thirst only but for two thirsts; and I did not know which was 
the most ardent’. 
85
 ‘an ardent and pliant material’.  
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unified, and aspire towards the same goal – that of artistic production. This is also mirrored in 
his relationship with Foscarina, for the novel ends with both prioritising art and subjugating 
their own carnal desires to work towards (Effrena’s) artistic goals. Just as Effrena unites his 
own drives and places them in the service of art, the (at times) conflictual drives of Foscarina 
and Effrena eventually cooperate towards a shared goal. Effrena could certainly be said to 
possess the ‘[starke] Wille’86 (Nietzsche, NF-1888, 14 [219]) that characterises the individual 
in whom disparate drives are united and sublimated, and, like Kröger’s, Effrena’s story 
finishes with ‘die Präcision und Klarheit der Richtung’87 (ibid.). It is notable, however, that 
the union of Effrena’s and Foscarina’s drives involves submission on her part. She frequently 
expresses her desire to serve his art (‘Servire, servire!’88 [d’Annunzio, 1989, p. 499]) and 
declares that all should be subjugated to Effrena’s art (‘Che tutto, sempre, sia propizio al tuo 
lavoro!’89 [p. 512]) While Foscarina also appears to unify her individual drives, therefore, it 
would arguably be inaccurate to speak of her attaining the ‘[starke] Wille’ that Effrena 
achieves, for her will (however unified) is always subject to his.  
Additionally, Effrena can be said to have developed the ability to resist responding 
immediately to a stimulant, posited by Nietzsche as a means towards spiritualisation, and to 
defer pleasure. He is now able to channel physical arousal, stimulated by Foscarina’s 
sensuality, into artistic output. Nietzsche describes how the individual must resist immediate 
action and learn how to ‘see’: ‘Man hat sehen zu lernen, man hat denken zu lernen, man 
hat sprechen und schreiben zu lernen’90 (GD-Deutsche-6). Interestingly, when Effrena begins 
to experience optimal creativity, he uses the stimulation provided by Foscarina in order to 
‘see’ his future work of art (eschewing sexual pleasure) and the characters he will create, 
after which he will be able to ‘write’ the drama that is gestating within him. This is seen in 
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 ‘strong will’. 
87
 ‘precision and clarity of direction’. 
88
 ‘Let me serve, let me serve!’ 
89
 ‘May everything, always, be favourable to your work!’ 
90
 ‘One must learn to see, one must learn to think, one must learn to speak and write’.  
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particular during the climactic episode of collaborative creativity between Foscarina and 
Effrena, when vivid visions of Effrena’s imminent work of art are described (d’Annunzio, 
1989, p. 473). 
A description of Dürer’s Melencolia I symbolises the productivity that will result 
from Effrena’s sublimation, as well as highlighting the alchemical origin of the term 
‘sublimation’; for the angel, on the verge of productivity, sits before a crucible, ‘ove dalla 
materia sublimata doveva generarsi qualche virtù nuova per vincere un male o per conoscere 
una legge’91 (p. 514). As noted earlier, Effrena’s sublimation is unique in that it appears to 
require that Foscarina similarly sublimate the Dionysian drives towards promiscuity, 
carnality, and abandon that are acting upon her. While Effrena can overcome his erotic desire 
for Foscarina, he can only make use of her as a creative tool if she can place art above 
carnality and love (including the burdensome jealousies and insecurities which result from 
this love) which she eventually succeeds in doing. Foscarina’s willingness to subjugate 
herself to Effrena’s art contrasts sharply with Ippolita’s apparently ceaseless will to keep 
Aurispa enslaved to her in Il trionfo della morte; but Aurispa is no superuomo, and his failure 
to become one is secured, as we shall see, largely by his own weak will and fragmented 
drives. 
Foscarina has also achieved sublimation of the tragic impulses that render her such a 
talented actor – and such a useful artistic medium for Effrena’s words. She has, we are told, 
suffered agonies and anguishes, which have drawn her into abysses of melancholy and 
despair. But Foscarina has escaped from the desolation of her sufferings by sublimating them: 
‘Da quali abissi di melanconia aveva ella tratto le sublimazioni della sua virtù tragica?’92 (p. 
284) Thus Foscarina has overcome her sufferings while affirming them, and drawing artistic 
inspiration from them. That Foscarina has achieved sublimation, admittedly of a non-sexual 
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 ‘where a new virtue was to be generated from the sublimated material, to defeat evil or to produce a law’. 
92
 ‘From what abysses of melancholy had she drawn the sublimations of her tragic virtue?’ 
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drive, clashes with Freud’s declaration that women are less able to sublimate; but when 
Foscarina completes her most significant and challenging (and, arguably, her most Freudian) 
sublimation, that of harnessing erotic desire and love for art, she becomes notably more 
masculine. We read of her desire to become ‘un buono e fedele istrumento al servigio di una 
potenza geniale, una compagna virile e volenterosa.’93 (p. 512) Here it is her ability to resist 
her sexual (and romantic) urge that marks her as ‘virile’. For d’Annunzio, too, it seems, the 
ability to sublimate is one which requires masculinity, and only a female who takes on 
masculine qualities is capable of taking charge of her own drives in this way; thus bringing 
d’Annunzio’s understanding and portrayal of sublimation in line with Freud’s contentious 
theory. 
 Der Tod in Venedig’s Aschenbach presents a more complicated case than Tonio 
Kröger or Stelio Effrena, for he appears to achieve sublimation when he writes a short treatise 
on the beach, in view of and evidently inspired by Tadzio. As will be seen, however, Mann 
gives us reason to believe that this is not an act of sublimation, and is rather a form of 
substitution, which does not lead to prolonged successful creativity. Accordingly, the case of 
Aschenbach will be considered alongside Tristan’s Gabriele Klöterjahn and Il trionfo della 
morte’s Giorgio Aurispa, for these are the characters who fail to achieve sublimation, unlike 
the successful artists seen above.  
 
v) The Artist and Failed Sublimation of the Dionysian 
The hazards of sublimation in both Freud’s and Nietzsche’s understandings were noted 
earlier. In the texts of Mann and d’Annunzio precisely these perils can be seen in portrayals 
of artists who fail to achieve sublimation of the Dionysian. Indeed, these literary depictions of 
sublimation arguably present the psychological phenomenon as something even more 
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perilous than it appears in the writings of Freud and Nietzsche, and failed sublimation (for 
Mann and d’Annunzio) ends in death. This may be because the object of sublimation here is 
the Dionysian, which is in itself a potentially lethal drive. As has been demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, while both Mann and d’Annunzio see creative potential in the 
Dionysian, they also acknowledge its darker side. This was conceded by Nietzsche, who 
employed Tristan und Isolde by way of illustration
94
 (GT-21). Cases of failed sublimation in 
Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s texts will now be discussed. Reasons for these failures will be 
identified, and consideration given to any possible criticisms made of the process of 
sublimation itself, or of the Dionysian (upon which it acts).   
 Giorgio Aurispa attempts sublimation as part of his ambition to become (or father) the 
superuomo. The objects of his hoped-for sublimation are both the sexual drive, inflamed by 
erotic desire for Ippolita and incited by her seductions, and the Dionysian, which are, of 
course, linked. As Aurispa notes when reflecting on the philosophy of Nietzsche and the 
teachings of his Zarathustra, it was under the aegis of the Dionysian that the ancient Greeks 
embraced the mysteries of sexuality.
95
 Aurispa aspires to this life-affirming sexuality, but 
instead finds his vitality and creativity drained.  
 That Aurispa must achieve sublimation seems clear. D’Annunzio’s narrator, for 
example, commenting upon the protagonist’s disparate drives, asks, ‘Ma perché dunque, 
volendo conservare la vita, non diverrebbe egli, a forza di metodo, così valido e così agile da 
abituarsi a rimanere in equilibrio pur tra quelle diverse impulsioni e a danzare pur su l’orlo 
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 See page 63. 
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 ‘Come nelle Dionisie egli celebrava la perpetuità della vita, il ritorno perpetuo delle forze trasformate, e 
venerava con sentimento religioso dinanzi al simbolo del Sesso il gran misero genitale – così nella Tragedia, che 
è appunto di origine dionisiaca e collegata a quelle feste, non aspirava se non ad essere egli medesimo l’eterna 
voluttà del Divenire...’ (‘Just as he [the ancient Greek] celebrated the perpetuity of life and the perpetual return 
of transformed forces in the Dionisia, and just as he venerated the great genital mystery, with a religious feeling, 
before the symbol of Sexuality – thus he aspired, in the Tragedy, which is of Dionysian origin and linked to 
these festivals, to be himself the eternal joy of Becoming…’ [d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 925]). 
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del precipizio liberamente e arditamente?’96 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 892) The image used here 
to symbolise Aurispa’s goal, that of dancing on the edge of a precipice, recalls Nietzsche’s 
Also sprach Zarathustra, where dance is a sign of the affirmative attitude of the 
Übermensch.
97
 Aurispa also reflects upon other individuals who appear to have achieved 
sublimation: he considers, for example, the ancient Indian king Vishvamitra, ‘il quale nelle 
volontarie torture durate per mille anni acquistò una tal sicurtà nel suo potere, una sì gran 
fidanza in sé medesimo, che imprese a construire un nuovo cielo’98 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 
931). Vishvamitra is also named in Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral (GM-III-10) and 
Morgenröthe (Dawn, 1881 [M-113]), and d’Annunzio’s description of the king is a direct 
translation of Nietzsche’s epithet. Legend has it that King Vishvamitra practised extreme 
sexual abstinence and self-control, which gave him the strength to construct the new heaven 
described by Nietzsche (and d’Annunzio). Vishvamitra’s achievements (as recounted by 
Nietzsche and d’Annunzio) could be seen as a form of sublimation, for his strength is 
described as a product of his (willingly accepted) sufferings. Vishvamitra’s sexual 
abstinence, which is possibly a form of conscious repression, is not alluded to by Nietzsche 
or d’Annunzio, and it is rather his ability to channel resilience into creative strength which is 
praised. This resembles Freud’s description of the redirection of drives, and it exhibits even 
stronger affinities with Nietzsche’s calls for united drives, which lead to a strong will.  
Aurispa, by contrast, struggles to unite ‘quelle diverse impulsioni’99 (d’Annunzio, 
1988, p. 892) and suffers from their conflict. His aspiration towards the superuomo should 
become his dominant drive – in Nietzsche’s terms, ‘[die] organisirende, die zur Herrschaft 
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 ‘But why, then, wishing to preserve life, could he not become, by force of method, strong and agile enough to 
accustom himself to remaining in equilibrium even amongst those diverse impulses, and dance upon the edge of 
the precipice, freely and ardently?’  
97
 For an extended treatment of both Nietzsche’s treatment of dance, and of his impact upon the world of dance, 
see Kimerer L. LaMothe, Nietzsche’s Dancers: Isadora Duncan, Martha Graham, and the Revaluation of 
Christian Values (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
98
 ‘who, in the course of a thousand years of voluntarily-suffered tortures, achieved such surety in his power, 
such a faith in himself, that he embarked upon the construction of a new heaven’.  
99
 ‘those diverse impulses’. 
240 
 
berufne “Idee”’100 EH-Klug-9) – but Aurispa’s sexual drive threatens, and often manages, to 
usurp this impulse. In Il trionfo della morte, the sexual drive is posited as a form of activity 
that drains the subject’s energy, and may distract him from other activities. This is seen, for 
example, towards the end of the novel, when Aurispa finally feels he has the energy to 
complete the suicide (and murder) to which he has long aspired. As Ippolita begins to act 
seductively, Aurispa notes the necessity of not wasting his energies in the sexual act: ‘sentiva 
bene l’assoluta necessità di non disperdere nell’amplesso quella sua momentanea energia 
nervosa su cui doveva fare assegnamento per la prossima azione’101 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 
1011). Aurispa’s desire to resist sexual arousal here echoes Nietzsche’s statement that 
spiritualisation requires the ability not to react immediately to stimulants (GD-Deutsche-6). 
The power of Aurispa’s sexual drive and its ability to wreak destruction, is seen when 
Aurispa visits his father, who has abandoned his family for the sake of a concubine. Aurispa 
is dismayed to note parallels between the sordid relationship of his father with his concubine 
and his own relationship with Ippolita. Aurispa feels that he has inherited an overwhelming 
impulse towards sexual gratification from his father, which he notes with regret: ‘Lo sviluppo 
ereditario del centro preposto a ricevere gli stimoli che ricerca l’appetito sessuale, appunto, 
teneva tutto l’organismo sotto il predominio d’una tendenza particolare’102 (d’Annunzio, 
1988, p. 789). The mechanism that should redirect Aurispa’s carnal desires into non-sexual 
activity is apparently defective, leaving him defencelessly enslaved to a dominating sexual 
drive – one that is far more tyrannical than that which was affirmed by the ancient Greeks in 
their experience and understanding of Dionysian. 
In Il trionfo della morte, the only successful sublimation is arguably one which is not 
Aurispa’s achievement. Shortly before the Vigil at Casalbordino, as Aurispa reflects upon the 
                                                          
100
 ‘the organising “idea”, which is appointed as the dominating “idea”’. 
101
 ‘he knew well the absolute necessity of not allowing that momentary nervous energy, upon which the 
completion of his next action depended, to be wasted in the sexual act’.  
102
 ‘The hereditary development of the centre responsible for receiving those stimulations which controls the 
sexual appetite, held the whole organism under the predominance of a particular tendency’. 
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possibility of recovery, he notes the three aspects of Ippolita which are her most attractive 
features. Her brow, eyes, and mouth are described as divinely attractive (d’Annunzio, 1988, 
p. 653). During this brief moment of optimism, Aurispa finds that Ippolita has become an 
ideal of beauty, as opposed to a fleshy incarnation of sexual attraction: ‘Pareva che la notte 
serena favorisse quella sublimazione della forma sprigionando da lei la vera essenza ideale e 
permettendo all’amante di percepirla intieramente con l’acuità non della pupilla ma del 
pensiero.’103 (p. 849) Here, Ippolita no longer appears as a trigger for base eroticism, but 
rather as a symbol of ideal and lofty beauty, a stimulant to the mind rather than the (aroused) 
eye; in short, a sublimation has taken place which, for a time at least, neutralises the danger 
that Ippolita often presents. It is notable, however, that this sublimation is not described as an 
action completed by Aurispa. This sublimation has been ‘favoured by the serene night’, and 
seems an anomalous occurrence – not to be repeated. Aurispa’s morbid pessimism soon 
returns, and he reflects, sadly, that even here a ‘mortale odio’104 (p. 850) lurks beneath 
Ippolita’s pleasing exterior. Despite this sublimation, Ippolita remains the ‘Nemica’ (‘Enemy’ 
[p. 850]). Aurispa will not succeed in viewing her as an ideal again, and she will remain ‘uno 
strumento di bassa lascivia’105 (p. 990).  
 It is for this reason that Aurispa proves so unable to resist the seductive appeal of 
Ippolita. When he imagines the intimacy that will follow her arrival at the hermitage, his 
desire is referred to as ‘quel terribile fenomeno fisico delle cui tirannie egli era vittima senza 
difesa’106 (p. 795). At such times, the sexual drive becomes overwhelming and depletes 
Aurispa’s energies. His (fragile) drive towards creativity suffers as a result, and he finds 
himself unable to realise his creative dream of becoming (or generating) the superuomo. But 
Aurispa oscillates between accepting responsibility for his own untameable sexual drive and 
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 ‘The serene night seemed to favour that sublimation, liberating her true ideal essence, and allowing her lover 
to perceive her entirely – not with the sharpness of his eye but with the sharpness of his thought.’  
104
 ‘mortal hatred’. 
105
 ‘an instrument of base lasciviousness’. 
106
 ‘that terrible physical phenomenon under whose tyranny he was a victim without defence’. 
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weak will, and projecting his failures onto Ippolita, who becomes a scapegoat. While Ippolita 
is certainly a highly sexualised and seductive figure and does impede Aurispa on several 
occasions,
107
 Aurispa’s own inability to resist sexual temptation seems more prominent. He 
reflects: ‘io anche non potrò mai sottrarmi al desiderio ch’ella ha acceso in me. Non potrò 
mai estirparla dalla mia carne’108 (p. 990). Here Aurispa’s desire becomes Ippolita’s sin. 
Comparison with Il fuoco highlights Aurispa’s own failure, however, for Foscarina, too, can 
be a burdensome and distracting lover (both because of her insecurities and her erotic appeal) 
– but Effrena, as the superuomo, is able to liberate himself from purely carnal desire, and she, 
too, acknowledges Effrena’s need for distance. Where Effrena and Foscarina triumph, 
Aurispa and Ippolita fail.  
 The psychological situation which arises in Aurispa as a result of his inability to 
sublimate his sexual desire strongly recalls Nietzsche’s description of the individual who fails 
to unite his disparate drives, and the ‘Krankhaftigkeit, Niedergang, [und] Erschöpfung’109 
(GD-Deutschen-6) that will result if one must always react immediately to stimulation. Just 
as Nietzsche notes that this individual experiences ‘das Oscilliren und der Mangel an 
Schwergewicht’110 (NF-1888, 14 [219]), Aurispa laments that he is not in possession of 
himself: ‘Il senso ch’io ho del mio essere è simile a quello che può avere un uomo il quale, 
condannato a restare su un piano di continuo ondeggiante e pericolante, senta di continuo 
mancargli l'appoggio, dovunque egli posi il piede’111 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 716). Similarly, 
just as Nietzsche describes ‘Die Vielheit und Disgregation der Antriebe, der Mangel an 
System’112 (NF-1888, 14 [219]) regarding this individual’s drives, Aurispa experiences a 
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 She tries to prevent him from crossing a perilous bridge that she herself is too afraid to attempt, for example, 
and almost causes him to drown when swimming across a channel, for he is forced to turn back to rescue her. 
108
 ‘I will never be able to free myself from the desire that she has ignited in me. I will never be able to eradicate 
her from my flesh’. 
109
 ‘morbidity, decline and exhaustion’. 
110
 ‘oscillation and a lack of gravity’. 
111
 ‘The sense that I have of my own being is similar to that of a man who, condemned to remain upon a 
dangerous and continually undulating foundation, feels an eternal lack of support, wherever he places his foot’.  
112
 ‘The multiplicity and disgregation of urges, and the lack of system amongst them’. 
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‘contrasto bizzarro fra la lucidità del pensiero e la cecità del sentimento, tra la debolezza della 
volontà e la forza degli istinti, tra la realtà e il sogno’113 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 792). And 
finally, the ‘schwacher Wille’114 that Nietzsche diagnoses in the individual who fails to 
sublimate is echoed when Aurispa laments, ‘il dubbio corrode la mia volontà’115 (p. 931) and 
finds himself plagued by ‘quell’abolizione assoluta della volontà attiva’116 (p. 941). Aurispa’s 
conflicting drives, aspirations and instincts result in a psychological discord that exhausts his 
willpower, and leaves him increasingly vulnerable to melancholy, apathy and inertia. On the 
other hand, Aurispa’s hopes also recall the ideal of sublimation that Nietzsche describes, 
whereby the individual unifies his disparate, conflicting drives. In Il trionfo della morte, we 
read that ‘Il segreto dell’equilibrio per l’uomo d'intelletto sta nel saper trasportare gli istinti, i 
bisogni, le tendenze, i sentimenti fondamentali della propria razza in un ordine superiore’117 
(p. 848). For both d’Annunzio and Nietzsche, then, the individual should aim at placing his 
various drives and instincts into an ordered harmony, thus avoiding fragmentation and inner 
conflict. 
 Another side effect of Aurispa’s disparate drives and his inability to sublimate is 
arguably an array of neurotic symptoms, such as those diagnosed by Freud as typical of failed 
sublimation. Aurispa suffers from ‘congestioni, di varia durata, nei plessi cerebrali’118 (p. 
790), and is described as a ‘soggetto estremamente nervoso’119 (ibid.), for example. Like 
many other contemporary writers, d’Annunzio follows the fin-de-siècle trend for pseudo-
science,
120
 seen also when he describes a loss of ‘contrattilità’ (‘contractibility’ [ibid.]) in 
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 ‘bizarre contrast between lucidity of thought and blindness of feeling, between weakness of will and strength 
of instinct, between reality and dream’.  
114
 ‘weak will’. 
115
 ‘doubt corrodes my will’. 
116
 ‘that absolute abolition of every active will’.  
117
 ‘The secret of equilibrium for the man of intellect lies in knowing how to transport the instincts, needs, 
tendencies, and fundamental sentiments of his own race into a superior order’.  
118
 ‘congestions, of varying duration, of the cerebral plexuses’. 
119
 ‘eternally nervous subject’. 
120
 Max Nordau’s best-selling Entartung (itself informed by Bénédict Augustin Morel’s Traité des 
dégénérescences physiques, intellectuelles et morales de l'espèce humaine et des causes qui produisent ces 
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Aurispa’s ‘vasi sanguigni encefalici’121 (ibid.). Aurispa’s obsessive nature is seen in his 
frequent fixations,
122
 especially with death.
123
 In this, Aurispa resembles one of Freud’s case 
studies, Dr Daniel Paul Schreber (referred to by Gemes as a paradigmatic case of 
pathological repression, as opposed to sublimation [2009, p. 42]), who is plagued by 
‘krankhaft bedingten Vorstellungen’124 (1955b, p. 246). At times, a single thought comes to 
dominate Aurispa’s mind, ‘contro ogni virtù della volontà’125 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 790), 
creating a state of ‘follia temporanea parziale’126 (ibid.). The turmoil of Aurispa’s mind is 
even likened to the effects of opium and hashish, which trigger a state of hallucination (ibid.). 
The pathological symptoms of Aurispa’s failed sublimation arguably go beyond those 
suggested by Freud, however, for Aurispa finds himself propelled unavoidably towards death.  
This can be seen, for example, in Aurispa’s letters, written to Ippolita during a period 
of separation, which can possibly be seen as an attempt at sublimation. The letters, written 
before the period contained in Il trionfo della morte, and which Aurispa and Ippolita 
nostalgically read together during the novel, contain declarations of love, but also reveal the 
debilitating lethargy and inertia that overwhelms Aurispa when he is parted from Ippolita. He 
writes, for example, ‘Passo le ore nell’inerzia, pensando’127 (p. 688) and describes imagining 
himself dead: ‘Talvolta io mi vedo disteso in una bara; io mi contemplo nella immobilità della 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
variétés maladives [Treatise on the Physical, Intellectual and Moral Degeneracy of the Human Race 1857]) is 
one of the most significant examples of this trend. Nordau employs pseudo-scientific terms such as ‘der 
Entartete’ (‘the degenerate’) to diagnose the cultural sickness he perceived at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Cesare Lombroso also contributed to the pseudo-scientific trend; for example, with his (long since discredited) 
claims regarding innate criminality in L’uomo delinquente (The Criminal Man, 1876) or his tenuous attempt to 
link genius and ‘degeneration’ in Genio e degenerazione (Genius and Degeneration, 1897).  
121
 ‘encephalitic blood vessels’. 
122
 ‘[...] avveniva che un pensiero e un'imagine occupassero la conscienza per un tempo indefinito, ad onta di 
tutti gli sforzi fatti per cacciarli’ (‘[...] a thought and an image would occupy his consciousness for an indefinite 
time, to the shame of all of his efforts to banish them’ [p. 790]). 
123
 ‘Talvolta, un pensiero l'occupava, unico, assiduo: il pensiero della morte’ (‘At times, a thought occupied him, 
singularly, assiduously: the thought of death’ [p. 784]). 
124
 ‘morbidly conditioned ideas’. 
125
 ‘against every virtue of will’. 
126
 ‘temporary partial madness’. 
127
 ‘I pass the hours in a state of inertia, thinking’. 
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morte, con una lucidezza imperturabile’128 (ibid.). Aurispa is dismayed to find that his letters 
are characterised principally by a sense of morbidity and depression, and he notes that they 
resemble ‘epitaffi in un cimitero’129 (p. 690). That the writing of these letters is intended to 
replace sexual gratification is suggested when Aurispa notes that the act of writing can 
actually resemble orgasm: ‘Egli conosceva bene lo staordinario orgasmo che invade l’amante 
nell’atto di scrivere una lettere d’amore’130 (p. 690). Writing a letter to the object of desire, 
then, appears to offer a substitute for sexual intercourse, but when attempted by Aurispa it 
results only in depression and neurotic symptoms, not successful sublimation. Aurispa 
appears unable to find strength in separation from the object of his desire (as Effrena 
eventually does), possibly because he is tethered too closely to this object of desire. 
Attempting to extricate himself does not endow him with vitality and strength, only with 
melancholy and weakness. Aurispa’s letters even reveal an intensification of desire, rather 
than its dissipation: ‘Di pagina in pagina l’ardore cresceva’131 (p. 694). If these letters can be 
considered as an attempt at sublimation, they certainly constitute a failed one, which leaves 
the subject even more enslaved to sexual desire. Parallels between Aurispa’s experience here 
and Aschenbach’s in Der Tod in Venedig are clear.  
 Aurispa’s obsession with death reaches its zenith – or nadir – following the recital of 
Tristan und Isolde, which takes place at the hermitage. As Ippolita plays the music upon a 
slightly inadequate piano (as Gabriele Klöterjahn does in Tristan), Aurispa remembers seeing 
the drama performed in Bayreuth. The memory of the music seduces Aurispa and he becomes 
intoxicated with the idea of death, in particular with the idea of re-enacting the Liebestod of 
Wagner’s drama. It is at this point that Aurispa’s drive towards death becomes his master 
drive, which now dominates all his other impulses and instincts. Henceforth, Aurispa is no 
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 ‘Sometimes I see myself laid out in a coffin; I contemplate myself in the stillness of death with a disturbing 
clarity’.  
129
 ‘epitaphs in a cemetery’. 
130
 ‘He knew well the extraordinary orgasm that invades the author in the act of writing a letter of love’.  
131
 ‘From page to page the ardour grew’. 
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longer able to pursue an alternative aspiration. In Nietzschean terms, Aurispa possibly 
achieves unity of his drives here (recalling Nietzsche’s ‘Koordination’ [‘coordination’, NF-
1888, 14 (219)]), but the overwhelming drive is significantly that which drives him towards 
death rather than life. It is with good reason that Aurispa refers to the day upon which 
Ippolita plays Wagner’s deathly music as ‘l’Epifania della Morte’132 (d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 
991), and the deaths of Aurispa and Ippolita follow a few days later.  
 After the performance of Tristan und Isolde, sublimation looks decidedly unlikely. 
Aurispa is now ‘interamente posseduto dall’idea fissa’133 (ibid.): the idea which possesses 
him is, of course, that of dying with Ippolita, in imitation of Wagner’s doomed lovers. In his 
state of pathological fixation with death, Aurispa appears to find a ‘momentanea energia 
nervosa’134 (p. 1011) which finally allows him to actively pursue his aim, whereas previous 
thoughts of suicide have been thwarted by a paralysing inertia. He knows that he must guard 
against this reserve of energy being dissipated in sexual activity, which fills him with a 
revulsion for Ippolita’s attempts to seduce him as he tries to put his suicidal plan into action. 
Again, there is no sublimation here, for Aurispa must fight to suppress his sexual urge, in 
order to follow his impulse towards death. His experience of the Dionysian, given a final 
potency by the music of Tristan und Isolde, has not shown him how to sublimate potentially 
destructive impulses (such as those towards death, abandon, and sexual arousal), and has left 
him instead in a state of devastating psychological conflict. Yet in the final pages of Il trionfo 
della morte Aurispa displays ‘una straordinaria chiarezza’135 (p. 1007), and feels ‘più forte e 
più lucido’136 (p. 1010). This clarity arguably resembles that which Nietzsche describes as a 
result of unified drives, for in the very final pages of d’Annunzio’s novel Aurispa’s drives are 
unified, by an overarching, overpowering desire for death. The death drive becomes 
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 ‘The Epiphany of Death’. 
133
 ‘wholly possessed by the fixed idea’. 
134
 ‘momentary nervous energy’. 
135
 ‘an extraordinary clarity’. 
136
 ‘stronger and more lucid’. 
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Aurispa’s master drive, seen in his fixation, on the night designated for his suicide, with an 
image of his dead uncle, Demetrio (who committed suicide): ‘un’imagine, fissa, dominava su 
tutte le altre; a poco a poco oscurava e fugava tutte le altre, rioccupando il centro 
dell’anima’137 (p. 1009). Even this apparent state of psychological harmony is fragile, 
however, for Aurispa knows that if he allows his sexual urges free reign, they will erode his 
impetus towards death. For once, however, Aurispa achieves this, and experiences no erotic 
pleasure in Ippolita’s touch; indeed, physical contact with her in their final moments actually 
disgusts him, and he is dismayed to think that he will have to touch her body in order to drag 
her from the clifftop as he leaps to his death. He nevertheless overcomes this revulsion and 
succeeds in killing both himself and his lover.  
 Failed sublimation in Der Tod in Venedig proves just as harmful as in Il trionfo della 
morte. Almost in the manner of a psychoanalytical report – or obituary – Mann gives a 
detailed biography of his protagonist at the beginning of the novella, which offers many clues 
as to Aschenbach’s psychology. This biography hints strongly at repression, as seen in the 
previous chapter, and at obsessive neurotic symptoms, seen particularly in Aschenbach’s 
compulsive adherence to a rigid routine. Every day is characterised by the same (ascetic) 
activities in the same sequence, until we meet Aschenbach and he is forced to abandon this 
routine due to overstimulation from his morning’s work, which hints at a resurgence of his 
Dionysian impulses. The exhaustion that Mann describes as the result of Aschenbach’s 
compulsive routine recalls the ‘exhaustive cultivation’ (‘[Raubbau]’ [1955b, p. 59]) to which 
Freud likens the outcome of excessive sexual abstinence (here a symptom of repression of the 
Dionysian) and suggests that Aschenbach’s current state of mind is highly precarious. 
Aschenbach’s fatigue is, we read, a condition that has developed fairly recently, but which 
seems to be intensifying. Sublimation would allow Aschenbach to find a way out of his 
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 ‘one image, fixed, dominated over all others; gradually it obscured and eradicated the others, reoccupying the 
centre of his soul’. 
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current psychological crisis, providing a means of dealing with his repressed drives and 
impulses (and those which are returning from the depths of repression to influence him) more 
creatively, and more safely. 
 While sublimation has commonly been noted by commentators in Der Tod in 
Venedig, the object of this unconscious process is almost exclusively identified as a 
homosexual drive, which commentators claim constitutes a shared trait between Aschenbach 
and his author, and occasionally as paedophilic desire. Kohut, for example, posits that 
‘unsublimated homosexual desire in the ageing writer’ (2011, p. 125) is the ‘decisive threat to 
Aschenbach’s defensive system’ (ibid.), and does not mention the Dionysian in his 
psychoanalysis of Aschenbach. Similarly, Gullette (1984) argues that Aschenbach’s 
experiences in Venice centre on his paedophilic desire for Tadzio, which she likens to 
Humbert Humbert’s desire for an under-age girl in Nabokov’s Lolita (1955). In this thesis it 
is argued, however, that Aschenbach’s homosexual and paedophilic desires are merely a 
symptom of a darker and more dangerous drive – the Dionysian – and that homoeroticism 
and pederasty symbolise the deviant behaviour of the Dionysian initiate, and especially one 
rendered so vulnerable through repression and exhaustion. Mann’s frequent hints at the 
presence of Dionysus in his novella (for example: his reference to ‘der fremde Gott’138 
[Mann, 2004, p. 582]) indicate that this is the drive that is reawakening in his protagonist’s 
psyche. Transgressive (homosexual and paedophilic) desire is arguably a manifestation of the 
Dionysian, for this is a drive which gives impetus to promiscuity, licentiousness, abandon and 
aberration. In focusing upon the homosexual nature of Aschenbach’s desire, commentators 
neglect its paedophilic nature, which is perhaps its most prominent aspect. For what reason 
should we view Aschenbach’s repression as acting solely upon homosexual desire if it is 
expressed in paedophilic desire once it returns? While there is not room here to carry out a 
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 ‘the foreign god’. 
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full investigation into Aschenbach’s alleged (repressed) homosexuality,139 it will be argued 
that the Dionysian is the ultimate object of Aschenbach’s repression, as it is for the other 
artistic characters under consideration in this thesis. 
Some commentators have found that Mann’s novella does contain an episode of 
sublimation, but one which is an anomalous occurrence and not destined to be repeated by 
Aschenbach. This is the act of writing upon the beach, when Aschenbach composes a short 
treatise in the presence of Tadzio. Widmaier-Haag (1999, p. 188), for example, has suggested 
that this act of creativity constitutes a sublimation of the sexual drive that afflicts Aschenbach 
as a symptom of his resurgent Dionysian side, for Mann’s protagonist resists any carnal 
desires and instead produces a work of art. The most astute examinations of this episode, 
however, challenge the notion of this creativity as sublimation, and note the clear signs of 
eroticism in the act of writing. Goebel, for example, posits this creative act as a ‘surrogate’ 
(2012, p. 159) activity, rather than a sublimation. As was noted earlier, Freud found that 
‘Hemmungen und Ersatzbildungen’140 (1955a, p. 424) indicate failed sublimation in 
individuals whose psychosexual development has been disturbed. Given the events which 
follow Aschenbach’s act of writing, this seems very much an example of substitution. It is 
only a few hours later, for example, that Aschenbach attempts to touch Tadzio, indicating the 
intensification, rather than the dissipation, of his desire for contact with that body; and just a 
couple of pages later Aschenbach utters ‘Ich liebe dich!’141 (Mann, 2004, p. 563) 
Additionally, during the composition of the treatise, Aschenbach perceives, more sharply 
than ever, the presence of Eros.
142
 While the act of writing may initially appear to be a non-
sexual activity, indicating successful sublimation, closer inspection reveals that this creativity 
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 See Heinz Kohut, ‘Death in Venice by Thomas Mann: A Story about the Disintegration of Artistic 
Sublimation’ in Search for the Self, Vol. I (London: Karmac, 2011), pp. 107-130.  
140
 ‘inhibitions or substitutes’. 
141
 ‘I love you!’ 
142
 ‘Nie hatte er die Lust des Wortes süßer empfunden, nie so gewußt, daß Eros im Worte sei’ (‘Never before 
had he felt such sweet delight in the word, never had he been so aware that Eros is in the word’ [p. 556]).  
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is not only fuelled by erotic desire, but that this desire is also not redirected into the act of 
creation and instead inflames the underlying desire to a new intensity. 
It is the heightening of sexual desire following Aschenbach’s act of creativity that 
differentiates it from the creativity of Il fuoco, for example, where the creative act also 
displays carnal undercurrents. In d’Annunzio’s novel, successful sublimation results in 
unmatched creativity that still betrays an aspect of sexuality. The collaborative creativity of 
Effrena and Foscarina still recalls sexual intercourse and reveals the erotic undercurrents of 
their artistic actions – which are not dissimilar to those underlying Aschenbach’s act of 
writing. In Il fuoco, however, erotic creativity is not followed by an inflammation of the 
sexual drive as it in in Der Tod in Venedig, and artistic creation itself, for d’Annunzio’s 
lovers, satisfies the sexual urge. It is Aschenbach’s ever-increasing sexual drive that renders 
his creativity a failed sublimation, for it leaves him ever more enslaved to Dionysian erotic 
desire. When he awakes from his Dionysian dream, Mann’s narrator describes Aschenbach as 
‘entnervt, zerrüttet und kraftlos dem Dämon verfallen’143 (p. 584). For Aschenbach, writing 
does not appear to satisfy any erotic impulses, but instead attempts to replace them, and to 
divert the artist’s attention from unpalatable desires. This recalls Aurispa’s failed attempts to 
sublimate his sexual drive through the writing of letters in Il trionfo della morte. Aurispa 
similarly found that his impetus towards intercourse was heightened instead of calmed, and 
his activity would seem to be another case of ‘substitution’. For both Aschenbach and 
Aurispa, the act of writing (for the former, literature, for the latter, love letters) fails to quell 
carnal desire, indicating a failed attempt to redirect the sexual drive. While art can satisfy this 
sexual drive, for the protagonists of Der Tod in Venedig and Il trionfo della morte, it does 
not.  
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 ‘unnerved, shattered, and powerlessly enslaved to the demon’. 
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Another sign of Aschenbach’s failed sublimation is the increase in guilt that he 
experiences in the final stages of Mann’s novella, following the act of writing. Recalling his 
respectable ancestors, for example, Aschenbach reflects – with ‘Bestürzung’ (‘dismay’ [p. 
568]) – ‘Auf welchen Wegen!’144 (ibid.). According to the theory of creativity of Hanns 
Sachs (a friend and colleague of Freud’s), guilt is a side-effect of the asocial activity of 
daydreaming, which is a precursor to creativity (Sachs, 1942, p. 12). While daydreams 
themselves are isolating and formless, when the artist translates these daydreams into art – a 
public and socially valued activity – his guilt is lifted: ‘This getting rid of the isolation [of the 
daydream] means a great alleviation of their guilt-feeling’ (p. 36). Aschenbach’s increased 
guilt suggests that he is no longer channelling sensations and impulses into sociable activity 
and is becoming increasingly asocial. Anticipation of this is seen in his first hallucination, or 
day-dream, in which he sees a primordial wilderness, devoid of civilisation. Here, primitive 
instincts are not captured in form, and remain ‘asocial’. The guilt that Aschenbach feels 
directly after his act of writing upon the beach
145
 suggests that this is not an incident of 
healthy – and socially acceptable146 – creativity (and sublimation).  
In the very last days of Aschenbach’s life, however, following his Dionysian dream, 
his guilt begins to fade.
147
 At this point, Aschenbach’s conscience, or superego, has been 
stifled by his id, which has become more powerful. This id, whose purpose is to ensure the 
satisfaction of the most basic (and base) instincts and urges, becomes all-powerful. The 
reduction of Aschenbach’s guilt is due to the abolition of the mechanism of guilt itself, rather 
than the avoidance of that which causes guilt. Aschenbach’s dream is also surely another sign 
that the (renascent) Dionysian is the ultimate cause of his psychological turmoil. There is 
                                                          
144
 ‘What a path I have taken!’ 
145
 ‘ihm war, als ob sein Gewissen wie nach einer Ausschweifung Klage führe’ (‘it felt to him as if his 
conscience were reproaching him after a debauchery’ [Mann, 2004, p. 556]). 
146
 That this act of creation would receive society’s disapproval is implied when Mann’s narrator comments, ‘Es 
ist sicher gut, daß die Welt nur das schöne Werk, nicht auch seine Ursprünge, nicht seine 
Entstehungsbedingungen kennt’ (‘it is surely a good thing that the world knows only the beautiful work of art, 
and not its origins, or the conditions under which it came into being’ [Mann, 2004, p. 556]). 
147
 Moral law now seems ‘hinfällig’ (‘invalid’ [p. 584]). 
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little doubt that the scenes of this dream, conjured up by Aschenbach’s own psyche, depict 
bacchic revellers, and that Aschenbach’s identification with these bacchantes demonstrates 
his psychological seduction by the Dionysian.  
Mann’s portrayal of (failed) sublimation in Der Tod in Venedig has been interpreted 
by some commentators as a criticism of the notion of sublimation itself, and as proof that 
Mann believes there is little possibility of successful sublimation. Goebel, for example, 
claims that ‘Freud’s sublimation is both staged and critically reflected upon’ (2012, p. 159) in 
Der Tod in Venedig. Here it is argued, however, that it is specifically Aschenbach, and not 
the process of sublimation itself, that is the target of Mann’s criticism and that Mann does 
indeed see a possibility for sublimation. 
If it were the case that Mann looks to undermine the idea of sublimation in Der Tod in 
Venedig, then Aschenbach’s demise should be seen as inevitable, and we should conclude 
that, for Mann, there can be no way of engaging creatively with the Dionysian. Many 
commentators find evidence for this reading in the final chapter of Mann’s novella, where 
Aschenbach, who has collapsed in an exhausted fever at the foot of a well, reflects upon the 
inherently transgressive – and erotic148 – nature of art and upon the falsity of the artist’s aloof 
position. Reed, for example, highlights the striking likeness between this passage and a 
passage from Lukács’ essay ‘Sehnsucht und Form’149 (‘On Longing and Form’, 1911). In this 
passage, Lukács notes ‘how precarious and rare was Socrates’ achievement when he shaped 
men’s longings into philosophy’ (cited in Reed, 1974, p. 165) and claims that in general, 
‘efforts at sublimation are almost bound to fail, because of the earthliness of the objects 
which first stimulate them’ (ibid.).  
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 As Aschenbach notes, imaging himself as Socrates in dialogue with Phaedrus (Tadzio), ‘wir Dichter 
[können] den Weg der Schönheit nicht gehen [...], ohne daß Eros sich zugesellt und sich zum Führer aufwirft’ 
(‘we poets [cannot] walk on the path of beauty, unless Eros accompanies us and becomes our guide’ [Mann, 
2004, p. 588]). 
149
 This was published in Die Seele und die Formen (The Soul and Forms, 1911). 
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Yet how is Mann’s alleged pessimism regarding the possibility of sublimation in Der 
Tod in Venedig to be reconciled with Tonio Kröger’s apparently successful sublimation? In 
fact, here it is suggested that Mann does not portray Aschenbach’s demise as an inevitable 
event and that there are particularities in Aschenbach’s case that render him particularly 
vulnerable to the destructive side of the Dionysian. In the first two chapters of Der Tod in 
Venedig, Mann gives several hints at the downfall of his protagonist: he notes, for example, 
that Aschenbach’s extreme discipline has led to ‘eine Verwöhntheit, Überfeinerung, 
Müdigkeit und Neugier der Nerven, wie ein Leben voll ausschweifendster Leidenschaften 
und Genüsse sie kaum hervorzubringen vermag’150 (Mann, 2004, p. 516). Here Mann implies 
that it is Aschenbach’s over-extreme repression (of the Dionysian) that is the ultimate cause 
of his demise, and that if Aschenbach had not practised such rigid and inflexible repression, 
he might not later have found himself so inept at dealing with the Dionysian when it re-
emerged (the return of the repressed). Rather than the Dionysian itself being a drive that 
always results in death and destruction, Mann gives us reason to believe that Aschenbach’s 
method of dealing with this drive is the crux of his demise. It is unfamiliarity which renders 
the Dionysian so dangerous, and which leaves Aschenbach unable to sublimate it 
successfully – unlike Tonio Kröger, who has practised a less extreme form of repression, 
allowing the various aspects of his character to develop healthily. On this reading, 
Aschenbach’s downfall should not be considered inevitable, and nor should we claim that 
Mann sees no possibility for successful sublimation.  
Aschenbach’s failed sublimation results in behaviour that recalls the neurotic 
symptoms described by Freud as a consequence of failed sublimation. The most striking of 
Aschenbach’s symptoms is his increasing obsession with Tadzio, whom he follows 
                                                          
150
 ‘an overfastidiousness, over-refinement, tiredness and curiosity of the nerves, which can hardly result from a 
life full of excessive passions and enjoyment’.  
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compulsively. He experiences anxiety when he cannot be sure of Tadzio’s whereabouts151 
and keeps a constant eye on Tadzio on the beach. His pursuit of the adolescent becomes ever 
more extreme – until Aschenbach collapses in a deserted piazza, ostensibly because of a fever 
(a symptom of the cholera he has contracted), but largely because of his psychological 
turmoil. The intensification of Aschenbach’s obsession for Tadzio accompanies the abolition 
of the writer’s creativity, for after writing that brief treatise on the beach, which has been 
posited as a substitution for, rather than a sublimation of, Dionysian erotic desire, 
Aschenbach produces nothing else. His obsessive-compulsive behaviour could therefore be 
considered a side-effect of the domination of those impulses associated with the Dionysian, 
which Aschenbach fails to sublimate. His compulsive behaviour at the start of Mann’s 
novella betrayed over-extreme repression, but his increasingly obsessive fixation with Tadzio 
in Venice shows the failure of his attempted sublimation. Like Giorgio Aurispa, Aschenbach 
fails to attain a state of inner harmony and cannot organise his drives in the way that 
Nietzsche recommends. Impetus towards creative production should become the dominant 
drive to which all other impulses are subjugated, but it is instead stifled by resurgent 
Dionysian drives – towards abandon, recklessness, lethargy and licentiousness. Oscillation 
(recalling Nietzsche’s ‘das Oscilliren’ [‘oscillation’, NF-1888, 14 (219)]) certainly 
characterises Aschenbach’s time in Venice as he fluctuates between Dionysian abandon and 
burgherly concern for decorum, before finally being overwhelmed by the former, which seals 
his demise.  
Mann also depicts failed sublimation in Tristan, in which the result of Gabriele 
Klöterjahn’s encounter with the Dionysian resembles Aschenbach’s to some extent. Gabriele 
encounters the Dionysian when she performs Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde on the piano, an 
act whose regressive aspects were examined in the previous chapter. This is the first time 
                                                          
151
 ‘Die polnischen Geschwister hatten nebst ihrer Gouvernante bei der Hauptmahlzeit im großen Saale 
gefehlt,—mit Besorgnis hatte Aschenbach es wahrgenommen’ (‘The Polish siblings, along with their governess, 
had been missing during the evening meal in the great hall’ [p. 561]).  
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Gabriele has played the piano since becoming ill, and it is probably her first artistic 
experience since marrying the bourgeois Herr Klöterjahn, the antithesis to the dilettante 
Spinell.  
Recalling the experiences of Aschenbach and Aurispa, substitution (as opposed to 
sublimation) of the drives of the Dionysian is arguably also evident in Tristan. While 
Gabriele had enjoyed artistic pursuits as an adolescent and played music with her father, the 
only ‘creative’ activity in which she has participated since her marriage is the procreation of a 
child, who is ‘von einer exzessiven Gesundheit’152 (p. 356). While this could be interpreted as 
sublimation, as one drive (the creative drive) is re-directed into an alternative (and socially 
valued) activity, the return of Gabriele’s artistic drive – the return of the repressed – in the 
Einfried sanatorium indicates its persistence. Had Gabriele sublimated her artistic drive, it 
would have been satisfied by the birth of her son, but she clearly still retains a desire to 
perform music, which is only finally – and fatally – satisfied in her performance of Tristan 
und Isolde. This is arguably the first incidence of failed sublimation in Tristan, and it may 
render the Dionysian return of Gabriele’s artistic drive more harmful, for she has forgotten 
the hazardous side of this drive. 
The second incidence occurs when Gabriele plays Tristan und Isolde. This incident 
both illustrates Gabriele’s original failure to sublimate her artistic drive (through procreation), 
and unleashes Dionysian impulses which she – again – fails to sublimate. During Gabriele’s 
playing of Wagner’s music, Mann’s text is filled with impulses towards death, final union 
and abandon:  
Der Überschwang einer ungeheuren Lösung und Erfüllung brach herein, wiederholte sich, ein 
betäubendes Brausen maßloser Befriedigung, unersättlich wieder und wieder, formte sich 
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 ‘excessively healthy’. 
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zurückflutend um, schien verhauchen zu wollen, wob noch einmal das Sehnsuchtsmotiv in 
seine Harmonie, atmete aus, erstarb, verklang, entschwebte’153 (p. 354).  
Of course, this description is not without its irony, and gently mocks Wagner’s music. As has 
already been noted, only the music of Tristan und Isolde – the Dionysian aspect of the drama 
– is performed here, and it is not tempered or balanced by its Apollonian aspects (such as the 
actors on stage) and any spectator runs the risk of being overwhelmed by the music’s 
tumultuous impulses. It may be, therefore, that the lack of sublimation in this scene is 
inevitable, and that the Dionysian aspects of this dangerous work of art, if encountered in 
isolation, are simply not to be sublimated.  
While Mann arguably shows the possibility of sublimation in Tonio Kröger and Der 
Tod in Venedig, in Tristan the chances of sublimation seem slim. The vehicle for those 
Dionysian impulses which (as elsewhere in Mann’s texts) must be sublimated in order to be 
survived is Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde, which Mann views with suspicion. As noted earlier, 
he names it an ‘unzüchtiges Werk’154 (Mann, 1961, p. 182), and in Tristan demonstrates 
(again, slightly ironically) how the music can impact upon one’s health, through the figure of 
Rätin Spatz: ‘diese Art von Musik [wirkte] auf ihre Magennerven’155 (Mann, 2004, p. 351). 
According to Mann, Tristan und Isolde is a questionable work that worships death and erupts 
into orgasmic climaxes, threatening to overpower all who hear it. Mann exposes this danger 
by borrowing (and slightly adapting) a line from Wagner’s libretto,156 which in turn recalls a 
                                                          
153
 ‘The exuberance of a tremendous release and fulfilment descended, was repeated; a deafening roar of 
boundless pleasure, insatiable, was heard again and again, reshaped itself flooding back, seemed to desire 
extinguishment, wove the Sehnsucht-motif once more into its harmony, exhaled, died down, subsided, 
dissipated’. 
154
 ‘indecent work’. 
155
 ‘this kind of music affected her stomach nerves’. 
156
 Wagner’s verses are: ‘Wer des Todes Nacht liebend erschau’t, / wem sie ihr tief / Geheimnß vertraut: / des 
Tages Lügen, / Ruhm und Ehr‘, / Macht und Gewinn / so schimmernd hehr, / wie eitler Staub der Sonnen / sind 
sie vor dem zersponnen! / In des Tages eitlem Wähnen / bleibt ihm ein einzig Sehnen, / das Sehnen hin / zur 
heil’gen Nacht, / wo ur-ewig, / einzig wahr / Liebes-Wohhe ihm lacht.’ (‘The lies, fame, honour, power and 
rewards of day are as but paltry dust shining in a sunbeam to him who has glanced lovingly into the night of 
death and puts his trust in its deep secrets. Amidst day’s empty fancies, one single longing remains for him: the 
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line from Platen’s poem Tristan:157 Mann warns, ‘Wer liebend des Todes Nacht und ihr süßes 
Geheimnis erschaute, dem blieb im Wahn des Lichtes ein einzig Sehnen, die Sehnsucht hin 
zur heiligen Nacht, der ewigen, wahren, der einsmachenden …’158 (Mann, 2004, p. 352). The 
ambiguity of Mann’s scene means that we cannot tell whether this is a warning intended 
solely for Wagner’s lovers, or whether it also bears relevance for those who glimpse death as 
they play this music; that Mann changes the wording of the line suggests the latter.  
Copious references to ‘eternity’ and ‘forever’ in Mann’s description of the music 
expose its fatality, and caution that it can cause permanent, irreversible damage: we read of 
the ‘Ewige Liebesnacht!’159 (p. 353) for example, and an ‘überschwenglicher und 
unersättlicher Jubel der Vereinigung im ewigen Jenseits der Dinge!’160 (p. 352). Again, 
Mann’s ambiguity invites us to read the experiences of Tristan and Isolde in those of 
Gabriele, and we suspect that she, too, glimpses the ‘ewigen Jenseits der Dinge’.161 If so, then 
there really is little hope for Gabriele, for such sensations cannot be kept in check. Wagner’s 
potent music inflames a drive in Gabriele which strives towards a world beyond this one. 
This drive is not satiated by the music and it outlasts Gabriele’s performance. Her experience 
of the Dionysian here goes far beyond that of Tonio Kröger, for example, – who is never 
remotely seduced by death – and has more in common with that of Aschenbach. Indeed, 
Tristan und Isolde – much of which was composed in Venice, where Wagner also died in 
1883 – provides a link between the two texts. Whereas Aschenbach, who has practised 
extreme repression resulting in neurotic symptoms, seems unlikely to achieve sublimation (as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
longing for holy night where, everlasting, uniquely true, the bliss of love smiles upon him’ [Wagner, cited and 
translated by Bassett, 2006, p. 109]). 
157
 Platen’s lines are: ‘Wer die Schönheit angeschaut mit Augen, / Ist dem Tode schon anheimgegeben, Wird für 
keinen Dienst auf Erden taugen, / Und doch wird er vor dem Tode beben, Wer die Schönheit angeschaut mit 
Augen!’ (‘The man who has looked upon beauty with his eyes / Is already handed over to death; / He will be no 
good for any earthly duties, / And yet he will tremble in the face of death, / The man who has looked upon 
beauty with his eyes!’ [Platen, cited and translated by Appelbaum, 1995, p. 124]). 
158
 ‘To he who has seen the love night and glimpsed her sweet secret, a single longing remains in the mania of 
the light, the longing towards holy night, towards the eternal, the true, the unifying’. 
159
 ‘Eternal Love-night!’ 
160
 ‘exuberant and insatiable joy of union in the eternal beyond of things!’ 
161
 ‘eternal beyond of things’. 
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explored above) from the first pages of Mann’s novella, Gabriele is not depicted in such a 
precarious psychological position until she plays Wagner’s music. She may have abstained 
from artistic pleasure, but she shows no neurotic symptoms. This implies that Wagner’s 
music is inherently dangerous and triggers Dionysian impulses so strong that they defy 
sublimation. Of course, Gabriele’s unfamiliarity with such impulses, forgotten since her 
musical adolescence, may also be a factor in her demise, but it is notably when she plays 
Wagner’s music (as opposed to the nocturnes of Chopin, which she initially plays) that the 
Dionysian descends in full-force, and that obvious signs of her illness begin to manifest 
themselves. 
Any unification of drives seen in Tristan’s musical episode can hardly be considered 
as a sign of Nietzsche’s ‘[starke] Wille’162 (NF-1888, 14 [219]). The drive which comes to 
dominate, in both Wagner’s music and Mann’s scene, is the death drive, which commands 
and subjugates all other impulses. In Wagner’s lovers all disparate drives strive together, but 
towards a decadent union-in-death, rather than a healthy outcome. Gabriele appears to be 
overwhelmed by the same drive, as demonstrated by the fact that she experiences sudden 
tubercular symptoms while humming (a sign that the music has lured her towards death). 
Gabriele’s abandonment of an opposing drive – towards procreation – is possibly hinted at in 
the brief appearance of Pastorin Höhlenrauch during Gabriele’s performance (p. 354). 
Pastorin Höhlenrauch has given birth to nineteen children and been left mentally 
incapacitated. She could therefore act as a warning to Gabriele, who may be similarly 
debilitated if she sides with a life of burgherly procreation. Pastorin Höhlenrauch may also 
suggest Gabriele’s departure from this burgherly world, for the Pastorin disappears moments 
after her arrival, allowing the music to continue. 
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 ‘strong will’. 
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The outcome of Gabriele’s failed sublimation is her death, just days after she plays 
Tristan und Isolde. Like Aschenbach and Aurispa, she is seduced by the deathly side of the 
Dionysian, and fails to achieve psychological or creative equilibrium. In the texts under 
consideration, sublimation of the Dionysian is posited as a crucial part of the artist’s 
engagement with this dangerous drive. An unsublimated experience of the Dionysian results 
in obliterated creativity, even death, for this is a precarious drive that must be correctly 
harnessed. While the Dionysian can promote creativity through its abolition of inhibition and 
individuation, and its stimulation of intoxication abandon, it can (as has been seen throughout 
this thesis) also lead to oblivion, annihilation and barbarity. If the Dionysian is not 
sublimated, these pernicious latter effects appear to dominate, because the individual 
experiences this drive without moderation or restraint. As seen in the previous chapter, while 
the Dionysian can trigger a creatively inspiring brand of regression, it can also trigger a form 
of regression that renders a return to civilisation impossible. Sublimation appears to offer a 
way of taking part in such experiences safely. 
For Mann and d’Annunzio, sublimation seems to offer the artist a strategy for 
engaging with the Dionysian in a creative, healthy manner. It allows the artist to make use of 
impulses and instincts that may otherwise be harmful: the sexual urge, for example, which is 
a symptom of the Dionysian, can be sublimated and harnessed in the service of artistic 
creativity, disarming it of its destructive and distracting potential. The artist who sublimates 
such sexual desires is not forced to attempt extreme repression, which, as seen, can lead to 
exhaustion and degeneration, and merely deflects (a certain portion of) his sexual desires into 
artistic activity. Nietzsche’s and Freud’s understandings of sublimation have been seen to 
offer complementary illumination of the fictional portrayals of the psychological process seen 
here: Freud’s notion of the redirection of the sexual urge (which remains, and is not 
abolished) has been deployed to clarify the actions of the fictional artists who, having once 
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been distracted by carnal pleasures, appear to eschew them in favour of artistic pursuits. 
Freud’s understanding of sublimation can also explain why certain artists fail to create, for 
they attempt either to repress or to satisfy the sexual urge in its original form. Nietzsche’s 
understanding of sublimation has provided supplementary clarification regarding the 
experiences of Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s protagonists: ‘spiritualisation’ of instincts 
(including the Dionysian sexual instinct) has been seen, and Nietzsche’s notion of 
fragmentary versus unified drives has been successfully applied to the fictional artists 
discussed. Those who achieve unification of their drives, sublimating potentially discordant 
drives towards the singular goal of creativity (both of art and of the self), meet with great 
artistic success; those who fail to unify their drives remain impeded in their creative 
endeavours by a sense of fragmentation and weakness. Both Freud and Nietzsche also 
provide useful aids to understanding the precariousness of Dionysian creativity. For if the 
Dionysian – itself a highly hazardous drive – is not successfully sublimated according to their 
descriptions, the artist’s life as well as his creativity is endangered. 
Used in conjunction, Freud’s and Nietzsche’s ideas regarding sublimation have 
allowed for a more profound insight into the artistic characters in Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s 
texts, and into their understanding of ideal creativity. This ideal of creativity will now be 




Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has established a previously overlooked affinity between Gabriele d’Annunzio 
and Thomas Mann, two contemporary writers who are seldom considered together. The 
affinity investigated concerns the portrayal of creativity in selected works by the two writers. 
As has been demonstrated, the thread which ties together their views regarding creativity, and 
indeed each chapter of this thesis, is the use of the psychological and artistic drive known as 
the Dionysian, creatively and critically appropriated from Nietzsche. The Dionysian appears 
in the works of d’Annunzio and Mann as a drive that can promote but also hinder creativity, 
and offers a highly precarious form of artistic inspiration. This conclusion will draw together 
the various yet connected arguments made in support of this claim, briefly summarising the 
findings of each chapter. After an overview of these findings, the numerous aspects of 
creativity examined throughout this thesis will be synthethised, in order to determine an ideal 
of Dionysian creativity as suggested by d’Annunzio and Mann.  
 The first chapter of this thesis established that d’Annunzio and Mann each gained an 
early knowledge of Nietzsche and his ideas, whether through their own readings or through 
secondary sources. Mann claims to have begun reading Nietzsche himself from around 1894; 
while no precise dates can be offered for d’Annunzio’s first-hand acquaintance with 
Nietzsche, annotated volumes of the philosopher’s works in d’Annunzio’s library confirm 
that he did acquire first-hand knowledge of (at least some of) Nietzsche’s texts at some point. 
D’Annunzio was writing about Nietzsche as early as 1892, and articles written by Mann for a 
school newspaper during the 1890s display possible traces of his encounter with Nietzsche. 
 Both d’Annunzio and Mann were profoundly interested in the role of art and the 
artist, and frequently reflect upon creativity, artistic production and aesthetic values in their 
literature. Both often portray artists (in Mann’s case, sometimes under the guise of other 
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occupations) in their fiction, or characters who are deeply moved by art and whose existences 
revolve around artistic concerns. Mann also offers an insight into his artistic values and 
principles in texts such as his Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, revealing what he 
considers to be an appropriate role for the artist – although his views on this role alter over 
the course of his life. D’Annunzio’s ideas regarding the artist’s role must be gleaned largely 
from his fiction and from his own actions.  
 The first aspect of the creative process to be examined was the liminality of the 
artist’s experience, common to both d’Annunzio and Mann’s texts. For both, it was argued, 
the artist is seen as an isolated figure, who struggles to integrate himself fully into society. 
The alienation of these fictional artists was illuminated using Turner’s theory of liminality. 
The fictional artists considered were seen to display a striking resemblance to Turner’s 
‘liminal personae’ (Turner, 1991, p. 95), who inhabit a space ‘betwixt and between’ (ibid.) 
the structures of society. These ‘threshold people’ (ibid.), of whom Turner gives hippies as an 
example, are permanent occupiers of the liminal space, as opposed to individuals who 
temporarily undergo a liminal experience (for example, in a rite of passage) before returning 
to society’s structures. The artists under discussion display a similar liminality: Tonio Kröger 
feels caught ‘zwischen krassen Extremen’1 (Mann, 2004, p. 265), for example, and Stelio 
Effrena stands alone opposite his crowds and in his artistic mission.  
D’Annunzio and Mann invariably depict their artists as isolated: Aschenbach is a 
solitary resident in the Venetian hotel and passes his days alone (watching Tadzio); and 
Tonio Kröger travels by himself, his solitariness broken only by his friendship with the 
painter Lisaweta. While d’Annunzio’s artists may have lovers, for both Effrena and Aurispa 
the companionship of the woman is illusory. In Il trionfo della morte especially, where the 
lover becomes the ‘Nemica’ (‘Enemy’), Aurispa’s isolation is not effectively combated by 
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Ippolita, and he pursues his own secret plans to kill her and himself, thereby widening the 
‘distacco’ (‘distance’ [d’Annunzio, 1988, p. 651]) that segregates him. In Il fuoco Foscarina’s 
artistic talents admittedly render her a useful creative partner; but the distracting nature of her 
love means that she must become a distant companion, and leave Effrena unfettered and free 
to achieve his artistic goals. The artist seems condemned to his alienation, although Spinell, 
the dilettante in Mann’s Tristan, appears rather to position himself self-consciously and 
deliberately apart from the crowd in an attempt to act out the role of the aesthete. 
Turner’s theories were also deployed to show how the artist can combat the isolation 
and alienation of liminality, and experience a profound sense of communion that is – or can 
be, under the right conditions – creatively inspiring. It was argued that Turner’s idea of 
‘communitas’ (Turner, 1991, p. 97), whereby individuals experience profound communion, 
can be seen exemplified in the effects of the Dionysian as described by Nietzsche, and in the 
respective interpretations of these effects by d’Annunzio and Mann. For Nietzsche, the 
experience of primal unity that the Dionysian brings when it abolishes the (Apollonian) 
illusion of individuation provides a useful and creatively inspiring contrast to the restrictions 
and limits of individuation, just as communitas does for Turner. When they engage with the 
Dionysian, Mann’s and d’Annunzio’s artist-figures enter such a state of communitas, where 
they often find their creativity stimulated. Crucially, however, the suspension of identity that 
the Dionysian triggers must remain temporary, and not utterly annihilate the individual’s 
existence so that return to civilisation and society’s structures is impossible. Furthermore, it is 
the tension between liminality and communitas that proves the most creative: the artist who 
experiences only isolation or integration will know nothing of the Dionysian creativity that 
results from passage between the two. The Dionysian only provides creativity when 
communitas acts as a foil to isolating liminality. This is one of the reasons why Giorgio 
Aurispa is unable to create: while he longs for the kind of transcendent and primordial union 
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that he sees in Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde (which constitutes an excessive and pathological 
form of union), he is unable to achieve it himself.  
It has also been seen (in Chapter Four) that the Dionysian creative experience 
involves regression, aligning it with Nietzsche’s own version of the Dionysian, which 
promotes a more primal mode of existence.
2
 In some cases the regression portrayed by 
d’Annunzio and Mann is an internal one (of which Aschenbach’s return to a pre-repressive 
state is an example); in other cases it is atavistic, involving a return to an earlier form of 
civilisation. Some artists experience both forms of regression: as well as a regressive reversal 
of his personal repression Aschenbach also returns to a more primitive form of civilisation in 
his Dionysian dream, for example. Regression (of both varieties) was seen to promote 
creativity: regression leads to a more instinctual and impulsive state, acting as a foil to the 
restrictions and constraints of modern civilisation, allowing neglected energies to be 
retrieved. Reverting to a pre-repressive state of erotic awareness, for example, Aschenbach is 
able to compose an elegant treatise while observing Tadzio, and in Il fuoco Effrena taps 
primal creative energies when he enters a more impulsive and instinctual form of existence 
with Foscarina. Additionally, his creative process is likened to excavation, whereby he must 
awaken ancient figures from their sleep. But when regression goes too far, and leaves the 
individual unable to return to civilisation’s structures and inhibitions, creativity is 
extinguished: hence Aschenbach’s demise when he regresses mentally to the state of the 
Dionysian barbarians described by Nietzsche, and Aurispa’s inability to find creativity in the 
animal carnality that he experiences in the land of his ancient ancestors. 
A final aspect of creativity, discussed in the penultimate chapter of this thesis, is the 
need for sublimation. It was argued that d’Annunzio and Mann portray the Dionysian as a 
drive with immense creative potential, but one which must be harnessed into artistic 
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production if it is to be most fruitfully (and safely) engaged with; sublimation offers a way of 
achieving this. The sexual drive in particular, must be sublimated: sexual arousal and 
abandon have been seen as a symptom of the Dionysian (for d’Annunzio and Mann, as well 
as, to a certain extent and especially later in his career, Nietzsche) and a feature of the ancient 
worship of Dionysus, and can threaten creative focus for d’Annunzio’s and Mann’s artists. 
Freud’s and Nietzsche’s ideas regarding sublimation were used to explain how the Dionysian 
can be most effectively negotiated. Put simply, those who successfully sublimate the 
destructive power of the Dionysian, redirecting the sexual drive in the manner Freud 
describes, and unifying their various drives as Nietzsche recommends (so that the creative 
drive becomes the ‘master’ drive), will survive their encounter with the Dionysian and reap 
artistic rewards. Those who fail to achieve sublimation, on the other hand, are overwhelmed 
by the potent drive, and will likely perish.  
Several reasons for failed sublimation were seen: in the case of Aschenbach, extreme 
repression of the Dionysian and its associated impulses had rendered the drive unfamiliar and 
dangerous. As Freud himself notes, sublimation of a drive can only take place if the drive is 
not being repressed; while Aschenbach’s repression of the Dionysian has ceased by the time 
we first encounter him in Mann’s novella, theoretically opening up the possibility of its 
sublimation into creative productivity, Aschenbach’s lifelong avoidance of the drive has left 
him unable to handle or channel it, and he is soon overpowered. While Gabriele Klöterjahn 
does not have a history of extreme, paternally imposed repression like Aschenbach, she has 
nonetheless been alienated from the drive since her marriage, from which time she has been 
denied artistic (in her case, musical) activity; she is arguably as unprepared as Aschenbach, 




Cases of substitution, representing a failed attempt at sublimation were also seen. 
Here the artist engages in a creative activity merely as a means of replacing the sexual 
impulse, and sublimation fails. Aschenbach’s act of creation on the beach in Venice 
exemplifies this, for it is followed by an intensification of, rather than relief from, erotic 
desire. A true sublimation, whereby the sexual drive is channelled into creative activity, 
would have had the opposite effect. In Il trionfo della morte a similar situation of 
substitution, instead of sublimation, was seen in Aurispa’s attempts to channel his sexual 
desire for Ippolita into the writing of love-letters. As with Aschenbach, however, the act of 
writing only inflamed Aurispa’s desire, signalling the failure of sublimation. It was also 
suggested, in Chapter Five, that Gabriele Klöterjahn’s production of a child could be seen as 
an attempt at sublimation, whereby healthy and burgherly procreation seeks to satisfy the 
impetus towards artistic creation. When she plays the piano in the Einfried sanatorium, 
Gabriele reveals the failure of her original attempt at sublimation (which was actually a 
substitution), and unleashes a Dionysian drive that she again fails to sublimate, and which 
overpowers her.   
A further condition of successful creativity in the case of d’Annunzio might be that 
the artist is male: while he concedes that the male who strives towards creative goals will not 
always be successful, as demonstrated in Il trionfo della morte, he does not appear to 
acknowledge even the possibility of female creativity. In both Il fuoco and Il trionfo della 
morte the female companion is expected to aid the male artist in his creative goals; in the 
latter novel, this companion is also blamed for the artist’s creative failures. While Il fuoco’s 
Foscarina is admittedly a renowned and acclaimed artist, she readily subjugates herself to 
Effrena’s artistic mission, and her artistic talent is notably one which requires direction and 
instruction. As Duncan notes, the relationship between Foscarina (as female actor) and 
Effrena (as writer and playwright) is one of ‘ventriloquism’ (1997, p. 137). This can be seen, 
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for example, shortly before Effrena’s oration, when he speak to Foscarina and senses her 
spirit become ‘concavo come un calice per ricevere quell’onda’3 (1989, p. 211). The actor is 
not permitted true creativity or originality, and instead only repeats the words of the (more 
creative) male artist. The female’s reception of the male’s words also bears sexual overtones, 
resembling a process of artistic fertilisation – but one which will result in the male artist 
bearing the fruit of the conception. Elsewhere in d’Annunzio’s literature the maleness of the 
artist is echoed: the aesthete-poet of Il piacere is Andrea Sperelli, for example, and Claudio 
Cantelmo of Le vergini delle rocce pursues the creative goal of becoming the superuomo. 
For Mann the insistence upon the maleness of the artist does not appear to be as 
absolute. While the overwhelming majority of his artistic characters (both in the texts under 
discussion and in his literature generally) are male, notable exceptions include Tristan’s 
Lisaweta Iwanowna and Tonio Kröger’s Gabriele Klöterjahn. Although Gabriele Klöterjahn 
does not survive her encounter with the Dionysian, and although she does not technically 
experience ‘creativity’ (reproducing Chopin’s and Wagner’s works rather than composing her 
own), it was argued in Chapter Four that her ultimately fatal encounter with the Dionysian 
was nonetheless a ‘creative’ one. In Tristan Mann deliberately juxtaposes Gabriele and 
Detlev Spinell, resulting in a comparison that exposes the hollow dilettantism of the latter and 
highlights the more genuine artistic experience of the other; only Gabriele can play the music 
that Spinell professes to love. While Gabriele would probably have been no more than a muse 
or secondary artist in d’Annunzio’s world, in Mann’s novella she displays artistic talent 
which far surpasses that of the male imposter, and which emphasises his absurdity. As noted, 
she is not a typical artist – she claims that she cannot understand the meaning of Wagner’s 
music, for example – but she is the only character in Mann’s novella to undergo a profound 
and transformative experience of art, albeit one that overpowers and destroys her. 
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In Tonio Kröger the female artist is a more conventional one: the Russian Lisaweta 
Iwanowna is a painter (by trade, it seems), ‘an intelligent, emancipated, and independent 
woman in her early forties […], who appears to be an abstract, modern painter living a single, 
bohemian lifestyle’ (Mundt, 2004, p. 63). Although Lisaweta alone constitutes too small a 
sample size to reach any firm conclusions about Mann’s understanding of professional female 
artists, it may be significant that she is unmarried and that she is a painter, not a writer (as 
Mann’s artists more commonly are). Lisaweta appears stable and comfortable in her position 
as an artist, and does not suffer the same psychological turmoil as Kröger; but there is no 
suggestion that lack of intelligence or thoughtfulness bar her from such crises. Indeed, 
Whitinger finds Lisaweta to function ‘as an inspiring catalyst’ (2010, p. 32) for Kröger, and 
to aid to his intellectual and artistic development. Locating striking affinities between Mann’s 
novella and two texts by the Russian-born psychologist and writer Lou Andreas-Salomé
4
 
(Fenitschka and Eine Ausschweifung [A Debauchery], both 1898) which both treat the 
development of artistic figures, Whitinger suggests that Mann casts Andrea-Salomé in Tonio 
Kröger as Lisaweta, and that ‘With Lisaweta’s effect on Tonio in the fourth chapter, the text 
signals the inspiration it has drawn from Andrea-Salomé’s own literary treatment of the 
outsider problem’ (ibid.). Just as Mann himself appears to have benefited from his encounter 
with Andreas-Salomé, Kröger profits from his relationship with Lisaweta, Whitinger’s 
reading claims. Far from a secondary artist whose principal purpose is to nurture the true 
(male) artist in his more important goals, in this interpretation Lisaweta appears as the 
intellectual leader and guide, offering Kröger wisdom and insight.  
 Lisaweta and Gabriele Klöterjahn may offer notable examples of female artists, but 
they are anomalous characters in Mann’s primarily male world. Although Schneck overlooks 
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 Lou Andreas-Salomé and her partner Paul Rée spent a summer with Nietzsche, traveling through Europe and 
planning to establish an academic commune where the three would live. In autumn, however, the relationship 
between Nietzsche and the couple broke down, largely because of Nietzsche’s romantic feelings for Andreas-
Salomé. In 1894 Andreas-Salomé published one of the earliest studies on Nietzsche, entitled Friedrich 
Nietzsche in seinen Werken (Friedrich Nietzsche in his Works). 
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Lisaweta’s independence, he is largely correct in noting that Mann’s female characters ‘are 
all dependent upon a man for support’ (1940, p. 148). While there is not scope here to 
undertake a full discussion of the gendered representation of creativity and the artist in the 
literature of d’Annunzio and Mann, it is interesting to note that gender does indeed appear to 
be a relevant concern, and some divergences have been noted. Of course, neither d’Annunzio 
nor Mann are alone in insisting upon the maleness of the artist, and largely reflect 
contemporary beliefs and trends.
5
 For d’Annunzio the greatest artist will be male, but will 
make use of the Dionysian creativity offered by woman (seen in Effrena’s artistic intercourse 
with Foscarina); Mann acknowledges female artists, but they are still heavily outnumbered by 
their male counterparts. It may also be significant that Gabriele, who does encounter the 
Dionysian in her rediscovery of music, fails to cope successfully with this volatile drive.  
The Dionysian, then, for d’Annunzio and Mann, offers creativity through its 
promotion of profound and primordial unity and its incitement of impulses towards (sexual) 
abandon and excess. It acts as a ‘primitive’ foil to the restrictions and inhibitions of 
civilisation and its structures and enables the subject to regress to a more primal and 
instinctual form of existence, which stimulates creativity. But the Dionysian has been seen to 
offer a precarious form of creativity, and to be a volatile and potentially fatal drive. 
Successful creative engagement with the Dionysian therefore requires that several conditions 
are met: firstly, that the artist (a necessarily liminal, and usually male figure) experiences a 
mixture of isolation and communion, and that his experience of deindividuation and 
community should constitute only a temporary suspension, and not a permanent loss, of 
identity; secondly, the regression triggered by the Dionysian must be restrained and not be 
allowed to reach an extreme point from which return is impossible; and thirdly the artist must 
successfully sublimate the Dionysian and its associated impulses, and channel them into 
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 For a discussion of the gendered use of the term ‘genius’ (including artistic ‘genius’), see Christine Battersby, 
Gender and Genius (London: The Woman’s Press, 1989). 
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creative productivity. On the evidence of the texts by d’Annunzio and Mann investigated in 
this thesis, if these conditions are met then the artist who engages with the Dionysian will 
find his creativity stimulated. If they are not met, any initial creativity triggered by the 
Dionysian will be temporary, and the artist may even perish.  
This thesis has uncovered previously overlooked affinities between Gabriele 
d’Annunzio and Thomas Mann, and posited Nietzsche’s Dionysian as a crucial aspect of the 
creative process portrayed by these contemporaries in their literature. It has argued that 
d’Annunzio and Mann find similar creative value, as well as danger, in the Dionysian, and 
that they offer similar statements regarding successful engagement with this powerful drive. 
As well as establishing significant common ground between these two writers, and 
challenging previous views that held them as entirely antithetical, this thesis has also worked 
towards a more refined understanding of their respective treatments and portrayals of artistic 
creativity and of the value of (Nietzsche’s) Dionysian. For both, the Dionysian has been seen 
to offer a precarious brand of creativity which places the artist on a path beside a precipice: 
successful navigation of this perilous path brings creative rewards, and the artist often finds 
himself reinvigorated with enthusiasm for life; but to stumble on this path, or to approach it 
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